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Deconstructive Constitutionalism explores the relationship between the thinking of Immanuel Kant and Jacques Derrida concerning modern constitutionalism. Kant is widely recognized as one of the philosophical forebears of modern constitutionalism; that is, the notion that state powers should be defined and limited through a constitution. Kant laid the foundation of constitutionalism through his exposition of freedom, practical reason, and moral law. However, constitutionalism is under severe strain due to the challenges posed by inter alia climate change, global health, global conflict, authoritarianism, authoritarian populism, religious fundamentalism, migration, and inequality. Deconstructive Constitutionalism investigates, by way of Derrida's engagements with Kant, how the foundations of constitutionalism can be conceived differently to address some of these twenty-first-century challenges. The book examines the possible implications of such a re-reading of Kant for democracy, the human-animal relation, criminal law and punishment, as well as for a global constitutional order.

El constitucionalismo rígido, al conferir carácter normativo a los derechos fundamentales, ha introducido todo un sistema de límites y vínculos para la legislación. A juicio de Ferrajoli, éste es el fundamento del modelo garantista, caracterizado por un cambio estructural de doble vertiente, en el derecho y en la democracia, que se deriva de la inserción en ambos de una nueva «dimensión sustancial». La presencia de ésta hace del Estado constitucional de derecho la culminación de un laborioso proceso de erosión del viejo concepto de soberanía en el ámbito interno de los Estados, que se traduce en el imperativo jurídico de sujeción de toda forma de poder al derecho, ya no sólo en el plano de los procedimientos sino también en el del contenido de las decisiones. Pero este proceso, lamentablemente, no ha tenido correspondencia en el orden de las relaciones interestatales, a pesar del nacimiento de la ONU y del auténtico «contrato social internacional» que es la Carta de 1945. En ese ámbito prevalecen aún de manera más escandalosa las relaciones de fuerza. Y, como consecuencia, la pretensión de universalidad de los derechos humanos resulta negada, y éstos degradados, todavía, a la condición de derechos de ciudadanía: del ciudadano según de qué Estado y en función de qué fronteras y no de la persona. Es tal situación la que a juicio de Ferrajoli rezuma injusticia y da plenitud de sentido a la demanda de un verdadero constitucionalismo mundial.

Why originalism is a flawed, incoherent, and dangerously ideological method of constitutional interpretation Originalism, the view that the meaning of a constitutional provision is fixed when it is adopted, was once the fringe theory of a few extremely conservative legal scholars but is now a well-accepted mode of constitutional interpretation. Three of the Supreme Court's nine justices explicitly embrace the originalist approach, as do increasing numbers of judges in the lower courts. Noted legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky gives a comprehensive analysis of the problems that make originalism unworkable as a method of constitutional interpretation. He argues that the framers themselves never intended constitutional interpretation to be an inflexible and shows how it is often impossible to know what the “original intent” of any particular provision was. Perhaps worst of all, though its supporters tout it as a politically neutral and objective method, originalist interpretation tends to disappear when its results fail to conform to modern conservative ideology.

Is the United States Constitution the embodiment of certain principles? The four authors of this book for a variety of reasons, and with somewhat different emphases, believe the answer is no. Those who authored the Constitution no doubt all believed in liberty, equality, and, with caveats, republican self-government values, or if you will, principles. But they had different conceptions of those principles and what those principles entailed for constituting a government. Although the Constitution they created reflected, in some sense, their principles, the Constitution itself was a specific list of do's and don'ts that its creators hoped would gain the allegiance of the newly independent and sovereign states. And, for somewhat different reasons, the authors of this book believe that was a good thing.

The subject of this book is the social and political meaning of constitutional texts to the detriment of their legal concretization. Focusing on the discrepancy between the hypertrophically symbolic function of constitutions and their insufficient legal concretization, it offers a critical counterpoint to constitutional theory that treats constitutional texts as a panacea to solving political, legal, and social problems. In contrast to the premises of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory regarding law and constitution in world's society, symbolic constitutionalization is approached here in both a comprehensive and far-reaching perspective. Chapter 1 sets out the debate about symbolic legislation. Chapter 2 explains the notion of symbolic constitutionalization as a problem embracing the whole legal system. Chapter 3 approaches the issue in terms of allopoiesis of law, characterizing it primarily as a problem in peripheral modernity and referring to the Brazilian experience. The final chapter discusses the tendency to a symbolic constitutionalization of world society in the scope of a paradoxical peripheralization of the centre.

Is the constitution ideally'legal'or'political'?'Written'or'unwritten'? How thick or thin are its principles and guarantees? Where does constitutional fidelity fit among liberal political virtues? What of'restraint'in the conduct of judicial constitutional review, or'originalism'in constitutional interpretation? These are questions raised by lawyers in constitutional-democratic societies throughout the world. In Constitutional Essentials: On the Constitutional Theory of Political Liberalism, Michelman not only raises these questions but explains why these debates persist in modern day constitutional democracies. Through the lens of John Rawls'seminal work Political Liberalism, Michelman responds to the problems governments of constitutional-democratic societies face from deep-lying disagreement among citizens. Rawls'suggested one solution: a'constitution,'one that included a bill of rights-that all, despite other disagreements, could accept. Michelman explains Rawls'proposal, placing it within a duality of functions -'regulatory'and'justificatory'- for which, he says, lawyers in constitutional-democratic societies typically look to their countries'bodies of constitutional law. A close examination of the constitution-centered proposition on political legitimacy, this book will be valuable reading to academics in the fields of politics, philosophy, and law.

Drawing upon original manuscripts and The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, this collection represents the latest scholarship on Bentham's late and mature thought on constitutional law. The contributions cover a diverse range of major topics, from official aptitude or competency to the interests of women, and explore Bentham's writings on courts, codification, and cosmopolitanism. Together, its chapters challenge the received notion, based on early jurisprudential writings, that Bentham's constitutional thought is authoritarian, and show that Bentham, as a constitutional theorist, offers a distinctive liberal perspective. Freeing Bentham's theories from their long sentences and unfamiliar terminology, these essays make accessible Bentham's subtle and important ideas on liberal democracy. By shining a light on Bentham's mature thought, this volume offers a refreshingly comprehensive, detailed, and authentic account of Bentham's theory of democracy.

In this incisive and thought-provoking book, Francois Venter illuminates the issues arising from the fact that the current language of constitutional law is strongly premised on a particular worldview rooted in the history of the states around the North Atlantic Ocean. Highlighting how this terminological hegemony is being challenged from various directions, Venter explores the problem that all constitutional comparatists face: that they all must use the same words to express different meanings.Offering a compact but comprehensive constitutional history, Venter investigates the ways in which the standard vocabulary does not fit comfortably in many contemporary constitutional orders, as well as examining how its cogency is increasingly being questioned. Chapters contextualize comparative constitutional methods to demonstrate how the language choices made by comparatists are shaped by their own perspectives, arguing that careful explanation of the meanings attached to constitutional terms is imperative in order to be persuasive or even understood.Tackling the foundational elements of the field, this book will be a critical read for constitutional scholars across the globe. It will also be of interest to high-level practitioners of constitutional law and political scientists for its investigation of terminology that is crucial to their work.

This title offers a unique approach to constitutionalism, focusing on the paradoxical relationship between principles and rules from the perspective of systems theory. It presents a critical counterpoint to Ronald Dworkin's principle-based theory, and in particular to Robert Alexy's idea of optimizing balancing. Instead of ceding to the compulsion of an optimizing balancing, it suggests the possibility of a comparative or at least'satisficing'balancing, considering the precariousness of legal rationality. The book also reverses Dworkin's metaphor, associating rules with Hercules and principles with the Hydra. It takes constitutional principles seriously, criticizing the abuse of principles by the legal and constitutional doctrine and practice, and pointing out their relationship of complementarity and tension with rules. Finally, it offers an alternative model to the recent legal and constitutional theory on the basis of certain assumptions of the systems theory. It deals especially with the paradox of the circular and reflexive relationship between constitutional principles and rules: the former refers primarily to the openness and adequacy of legal system to society and thus to substantive argumentation; the second refers primarily to the closure and consistency of legal system and thus to formal argumentation.

Die Publikation setzt sich für einen neuen Zugang zur Verfassungsgeschichte ein. Beeinflusst durch die englische Verfassungsentwicklung seit dem 17. Jahrhundert vollzieht sich 1776 mit erstmals geschriebenen modernen Verfassungen die Geburt des modernen Konstitutionalismus. Damit wird eine Reihe grundlegender Prinzipien, darunter Volkssouveränität, Menschenrechte und repräsentative Regierung zur Basis von Verfassungen, die sich in der Folge nicht allein in den Vereinigten Staaten ausbreiten, sondern ebenfalls in der Französischen Revolution wie in den nach Unabhängigkeit strebenden Staaten Lateinamerikas aufgegriffen werden. Das 19. und 20. Jahrhundert erlebt dann gegen zahllose Widerstände die schrittweise Durchsetzung dieses modernen Konstitutionalismus in Europa und Lateinamerika und darüber hinaus. Für diese Entwicklung ist Deutschland ein eindrucksvoller Beleg, dessen Verfassungsgeschichte sich unter der Perspektive des modernen Konstitutionalismus in völlig neuem Licht präsentiert, das auch die Europäische Union einbezieht.

Law's Ideal Dimension provides a comprehensive account in English of renowned legal theorist Robert Alexy's understanding of jurisprudence, as expanded upon from his publications A Theory of Legal Argumentation (OUP 1989), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 1985), and The Argument from Injustice (OUP 1992). The collection is divided into three parts. Part One concerns the nature of law: it explores its real and ideal dimensions and how the ideal dimension of law is sometimes employed but does not play a systematically important role. Part Two discusses constitutional rights, human rights, and proportionality. It defends the construction of constitutional rights as principles against objections raised by the rule construction and elaborates on the nature of constitutional rights as well as the mathematical balancing of those rights. Part Three concerns the relation between argumentation, correctness, and law. The author concludes this volume with a biographical reflection.

The Kantian project of achieving perpetual peace among states seems (at best) an unfulfilled hope. Modern states'authority claims and their exercise of power and sovereignty span a spectrum: from the most stringently and explicitly codified-the constitutional level-to the most fluid and turbulent-acts of war. The Public Uses of Coercion and Force investigates both these individual extremes and also their relationship. Using Arthur Ripstein's recent work Kant and the Law of War as a focal point, this book explores this connection through the lens of the (just) war theory and its relationship to the law. The Public Uses of Coercion and Force asks many key questions: what, if any, are the normatively salient differences between states'internal coercion and the external use of force? Is it possible to isolate the constitutional level from other aspects of the state's coercive reach? How could that be done while also guaranteeing a robust conception of human rights and adherence to the rule of law? With individual replies by Ripstein to chapters, this book will be of interest to students and academics of constitutional law, justice, philosophy of law, criminal law theory, and political science.

America is increasingly defined not only by routine disregard for its fundamental laws, but also by the decadent character of its political leaders and citizens—widespread consumerism and self-indulgent behavior, cultural hedonism and anarchy, the coarsening of moral and political discourse, and a reckless interventionism in international relations. In The Historical Mind, various scholars argue that America's problems are rooted in its people's refusal to heed the lessons of historical experience and to adopt'constitutional'checks or self-imposed restraints on their cultural, moral, and political lives. Drawing inspiration from the humanism of Irving Babbitt and Claes G. Ryn, the contributors offer a timely and provocative assessment of the American present and contend that only a humanistic order guided by the wisdom of historical consciousness has genuine promise for facilitating fresh thinking about the renewal of American culture, morality, and politics.

How should the state face the challenge of radical pluralism? How can constitutional orders be changed when they prove unable to regulate society? Santi Romano, Carl Schmitt, and Costantino Mortati, the leading figures of Continental legal institutionalism, provided three responses that deserve our full attention today. Mariano Croce and Marco Goldoni introduce and analyze these three towering figures for a modern audience. Romano thought pluralism to be an inherent feature of legality and envisaged a far-reaching reform of the state for it to be a platform of negotiation between autonomous normative regimes. Schmitt believed pluralism to be a dangerous deviation that should be curbed through the juridical exclusion of alternative institutional formations. Mortati held an idea of the constitution as the outcome of a basic agreement among hegemonic forces that should shape a shared form of life. The Legacy of Pluralism explores the convergences and divergences of these towering jurists to take stock of their ground-breaking analyses of the origin of the legal order and to show how they can help us cope with the current crisis of national constitutional systems.

In Sociocybernetics and Political Theory in a Complex World, Roberto Mancilla posits that because current political and constitutional theory was crafted since the XVII century, in the age of globalisation, Google and Big Data, other arrangements are needed. He proposes a recasting of the ideas of the State, Separation of Powers, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutionalism by means of cybernetics, a body of knowledge that gave way to the technology that we have today. This will be done by means of a general introduction to sociocybernetics and complexity and then through the critical dismantling of said concepts of political theory and then proposals imbued with newer ideas.

Few terms in political theory are as overused, and yet as under-theorized, as constitutional revolution. In this book, Gary Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai argue that the most widely accepted accounts of constitutional transformation, such as those found in the work of Hans Kelsen, Hannah Arendt, and Bruce Ackerman, fail adequately to explain radical change. For example, a “constitutional moment” may or may not accompany the onset of a constitutional revolution. The consolidation of revolutionary aspirations may take place over an extended period. The “moment” may have been under way for decades—or there may be no such moment at all. On the other hand, seemingly radical breaks in a constitutional regime actually may bring very little change in constitutional practice and identity. Constructing a clarifying lens for comprehending the many ways in which constitutional revolutions occur, the authors seek to capture the essence of what happens when constitutional paradigms change.

An examination of how two fundamental concepts of order influence our ideas about sovereignty, citizenship, law, and history Western accounts of natural and political order have deployed two basic ideas: project and system. In a project, order is produced by the intentional act of a subject; in a system, order is immanent in the world. In the former, order is made; in the latter, discovered. Paul W. Kahn shows how project and system have long been at work in our theological and philosophical tradition. Against this background, Kahn explains the development of the modern legal imagination in the nineteenth century as a movement from project to system. Americans began the century imagining the constitutional order as their common project: a deliberate construction of We the People. They ended the century imagining that order is continuous with the common law: an immanent development of the principles of civilization. This imaginative shift affected ideas of legal text, sovereignty, citizenship, interpretation, history, and science.

The metaphor of'dialogue'has been put to different descriptive and evaluative uses by constitutional and political theorists studying interactions between institutions concerning rights. It has also featured prominently in the opinions of courts and the rhetoric and deliberations of legislators. This volume brings together many of the world's leading constitutional and political theorists to debate the nature and merits of constitutional dialogues between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. Constitutional Dialogue explores dialogue's democratic significance, examines its relevance to the functioning and design of constitutional institutions, and covers constitutional dialogues from an international and transnational perspective.

En ce moment propice aux débats sur la Constitution, la souveraineté du peuple, la démocratie directe, cet essai veut donner un aperçu historique, politique et philosophique du problème, à partir d'une seule idée directrice repensée dans la perspective de la « théorie mimétique » de René Girard : l'opposition établie par Giovanni Lobrano entre le « modèle ancien ou romain », seul vrai modèle républicain, et le « modèle moderne ou germano-anglais », d'origine féodale.

Constitutionalism Justified analyzes leading Frankfurt School theorist Rainer Forst's theory of a basic right to justification, unique in combining insights from philosophy, constitutionalism, and legal theory. Drawing upon Kant's critical philosophy and Habermas's discourse theory, he has developed fresh perspectives on core topics like the concept of justice, the relation between modernity and emancipation, and human rights. The contributors to this volume explore Forst's work from three different perspectives: philosophy, legal philosophy, and constitutional theory. The first part of this volume addresses the philosophical argument of the basic right to justification, including the influence of Kantian thought on this right, the deontological versus teleological fundamentals, the tension between moral pluralism and universalism, and the relation of the right to justification with social and distributive justice. The second part covers how the right to justification is embedded in constitutional and legal frameworks. It explores the implications that Forst's right to justification has for conceptualizing constitutional democracy and its foundations, and how the moral right to justification may translate into particular practices of justification that are constrained by a legal framework. This includes discussion of the value of constitutionalism in general, of the relation between the formal structure of democracy and substantive justice, of the inclusion of outsiders to the constitutional setting, and of proportionality analysis and judicial review as forms of justification. The book concludes with Rainer Forst's reply to his interlocutors, making the book a valuable source for future research.

Bereits nach einem Jahr war die zweite, erweiterte Auflage der »Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozeß« von 1996 vergriffen. Damit wurde eine dritte (unveränderte) Auflage möglich und erforderlich. Der Verfasser ist den Lesern, dem Verlag und nicht zuletzt den Rezensenten für die freundliche Aufnahme des Werkes von 1996 dankbar (vgl. z. B. Hans Peter Ipsen, in: DÖV 1997, S. 260f.; D. Thürer, »Verfassungslehre in offenem Denkstil«, in: NZZ vom 12. November 1997, S. 37; R. Walkenhaus, in: Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie, Bd. 9 [1997], S. 131). Auch die ausländischen Wissenschaftlergemeinschaften, namentlich in Griechenland, Italien und Spanien, haben sich des Buches sogleich in weiterführenden Würdigungen bzw. Kritiken angenommen. Nicht wenige der älteren und neueren Abhandlungen aus dem Sammelband von 1978 bzw. 1996 wurden bzw. werden in fremde Sprachen übersetzt (etwa ins Japanische, Koreanische, Spanische, Portugiesische, Italienische, Polnische und Ukrainische), erscheinen teilweise sogar als eigene Bücher (z. B. »Hermenêutica Constitucional«, Porto Alegre, Brasilien, 1997, oder »Retos actuales del Estado Constitucional«, Bilbao 1996). Darüber ist der Verfasser besonders glücklich.

In this follow-up volume to the critically acclaimed The Constitutional State, N. W. Barber explores how the principles of constitutionalism structure and influence successful states. Constitutionalism is not exclusively a mechanism to limit state powers. An attractive and satisfying account of constitutionalism, and, by derivation, of the state, can only be reached if the principles of constitutionalism are seen as interlocking parts of a broader doctrine. This holistic study of the relationship between the constitutional state and its central principles - sovereignty; the separation of powers; the rule of law; subsidiarity; democracy; and civil society - casts light on long-standing debates over the meaning and implications of constitutionalism. The book provides a concise introduction to constitutionalism and a detailed account of the nature and implications of each of the principles in question. It concludes with an examination of the importance of constitutional principles to the work of judges, legislators, and others involved in the operation and creation of the constitution. The book is essential reading for those seeking a definitive account of constitutionalism and its benefits.

Kenya, like the rest of Africa, has gone through three sets of constitutional crises. The first related to the trauma of colonialism and struggle for independence. The second a period of constitutional dictatorship and the clamor for reform. The third, most recent crisis, being one of identity, legitimacy and the inability of the state to discharge its functions which has resulted in civil unrest, violent ethnic conflicts, poverty, social exclusion and inequality. The Making of the Constitution of Kenya examines the processes, issues and challenges of constitution making, governance and legitimacy in that country and the lessons that can be learned for others on the continent. Equipping the reader with a sound historical perspective on constitutional developments and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy in Kenya it gives an invaluable insight into the normative and political complexities involved in evolving a truly democratic and widely acceptable constitutional order in Africa.

This book presents a comprehensive investigation of the notion of obligation in Bentham's thought. For Bentham, obligation is a fictitious – namely linguistic – entity, whose import and truth lie in empirical perceptions of pain and pleasure, ‘real'entities.This work explores Bentham's fictionalism, and aims to identify the general features that ethical fictitious entities (including obligation) share with other kinds of fictitious entities. The book is divided into two parts: the first examines the ontological and epistemological foundations of Bentham's distinction between real and fictitious entities; the second part addresses the normative and motivational aspects of moral and legal notions.This book reveals the centrality of the following issues to Bentham's legal reform: logic, theory of language, physics, metaphysics, metaethics, axiology, moral psychology, the structure of practical reasoning and action with reference to the law.

The author and dean of constitutional law offers framework for understanding the US Constitution and the current threats facing democracy.Worried about what a super conservative majority on the Supreme Court means for the future of civil liberties? From gun control to reproductive health, a conservative court will reshape the lives of all Americans for decades to come. The time to develop and defend a progressive vision of the US Constitution that protects the rights of all people is now.University of California Berkeley Dean and respected legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky expertly exposes how conservatives are using the Constitution to advance their own agenda that favors business over consumers and employees, and government power over individual rights.But exposure is not enough. Progressives have spent too much of the last forty-five years trying to preserve the legacy of the Warren Court's most important rulings and reacting to the Republican-dominated Supreme Courts by criticizing their erosion of rights—but have not yet developed a progressive vision for the Constitution itself. Yet, if we just look to the promise of the Preamble—liberty and justice for all—and take seriously its vision, a progressive reading of the Constitution can lead us forward as we continue our fight ensuring democratic rule, effective government, justice, liberty, and equality.Includes the Complete Constitution and Amendments of the United States of AmericaPraise for We the PeoplePaste Magazine's 10 Best Books of November“This work will become the defining text on progressive constitutionalism—a parallel to Thomas Picketty's contribution but for all who care deeply about constitutional law. Beautifully written and powerfully argued, this is a masterpiece.” —Lawrence Lessig, Harvard Law School, and author of Free Culture“Thank heaven for Erwin Chemerinsky.... His latest book, We the People, really is his finest work.... Clear and concise.... This book could not have come at a better time. It is a life preserver for those who feel adrift in the uncharted waters of the Trump era.” —Laurie L. Levenson, Los Angeles Review of Books“Chemerinsky... pulls no punches.... [His] rock-solid arguments are rooted in history, in a profound progressive philosophy.” —Kirkus Reviews (starred review)

Despite Rousseau's legacy to political thought, his contribution as a constitutional theorist is underexplored. Drawing on his constitutional designs for Corsica and Poland, this book argues that Rousseau's constitutionalism is defined chiefly by its socially directive character. His constitutional projects are not aimed, primarily, at coordinating and containing state power in the familiar liberal-democratic sense. Instead, they are aimed at fostering the social conditions in which a fuller sense of freedom – understood broadly as non-domination – can be realised across all social domains. And in turn, since Rousseau views domination as being deeply embedded in complex social practices, his constitutionalism is aimed at fostering a radical austerity – social, economic and cultural – as its foil. In locating Rousseau's constitutional projects within his social and political theory of servitude and domination, this book will challenge the predominant focus and orientation of contemporary republican theory. Leading republican thinkers have drawn on the historical republican canon to articulate a model of constitutionalism which is, on the whole,'liberal'in focus and orientation. This book will argue that the more communitarian orientation of Rousseau's constitutionalism – that is, its socially-directive focus – stems from a sophisticated and compelling account of the sources of unfreedom in complex societies, sources which are ignored or downplayed by the neo-republican literature. Rousseau embraces a communitarian social politics as part of his constitutional project precisely because, pessimistically, he views domination as being deeply embedded in the social relations of the liberal order.

Rule of law and constitutionalist ideals are understood by many, if not most, as necessary to create a just political order. Defying the traditional division between normative and positive theoretical approaches, this book explores how political reality on the one hand, and constitutional ideals on the other, mutually inform and influence each other. Seventeen chapters from leading international scholars cover a diverse range of topics and case studies to test the hypothesis that the best normative theories, including those regarding the role of constitutions, constitutionalism and the rule of law, conceive of the ideal and the real as mutually regulating.

Are human rights really a building block of global constitutionalism? Does global constitutionalism have any future in the theory and practice of international law and global governance? This book critically examines these key questions by focusing on the mechanisms utilised by global constitutionalism whilst comparing the historical functioning of constitutional rights in national systems. Yahyaoui Krivenko provides new insights into the workings of human rights and associated notions, such as the state, the political, and the individual, by demonstrating that human rights are antithetical to global constitutionalism and encouraging new discussions on the meaning of global constitutionalism and human rights. Drawing on the interdisciplinary works of such thinkers as Agamben, Luhmann, Bourdieu, Deleuze and Guattari, this book also considers practical examples from historical experience of ancient Greek and early Islamic societies. It will appeal to scholars interested in human rights, international law and critical legal theory.

This book advances a new reading of the central works of Carl Schmitt and, in so doing, rethinks the primary concepts of constitutional theory. In this book, Jacques de Ville engages in a close analysis of a number of Schmitt's texts, including Dictatorship (1921), The Concept of the Political (1927), Constitutional Theory (1928), Land and Sea (1942), Ex Captivitate Salus (1950), The Nomos of the Earth (1950) and The Theory of the Partisan (1963). This engagement takes place from the perspective of constitutional theory and focuses specifically on concepts or themes such as sovereignty, the state, the political, constituent power, democracy, representation, the constitution and human rights. The book seeks to rethink the structure of these concepts in line with Derrida's analysis of Schmitt's texts on the concept of the political in Politics of Friendship (1993). This happens by way of an analysis of Derrida's engagement with Freud and other psychoanalysts. Although the main focus in the book is on Schmitt's texts, it further examines two texts of Derrida (Khōra (1993) and Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok (1976)), by reading these alongside Schmitt's own reflections on the positive concept of the constitution.

In Global Constitutionalism and the Path of International Law, Surendra Bhandari succinctly offers an account of the most important growth and features of international law from the perspectives of global constitutionalism. The author examines the concept from its constitutive features and the operative standards or modus operandi. These two aspects offer a new and innovative methodology in explicating the theory of ‘global constitutionalism'. By examining three cases: international trade (WTO), human rights, and the role of Security Council, the author demonstrates how the idea of global constitutionalism is shaping and deepening the path of international law in the 21st century and elucidates the development of international law as a body of positive rules.

The current system of international law is experiencing profound transformations. Indeed, the simultaneous processes of globalization combined with the disintegration of international systems of governance and law-making pose complex challenges for legal scholarship. The doctrinal response to these challenges has been theorized within two seemingly contradictory discourses in international law: fragmentation and constitutionalisation.This book takes an innovative approach to international law, viewing the processes of the fragmentation and constitutionalisation as being profoundly interconnected and reflective of each other. It brings together a select group of contributors, including both established and emerging scholars and practitioners, in order to explore the ways in which the problems of fragmentation and constitutionalisation are viscerally linked one to the other and thus mutually conditioning and stimulating. The book considers the theory and practice of international law looking at the two phenomena in relation to the various fields of international law such as international criminal law, cultural heritage law and international environmental law.

Constitutionalism and democracy have been interpreted as both intimately related and intrinsically opposed. On the one hand constitutions are said to set out the rules of the democratic game, on the other as constraining the power of the demos and their representatives to rule themselves - including by reforming the very processes of democracy itself. Meanwhile, constitutionalists themselves differ on how far any constitution derives its authority from, and should itself be subject to democratic endorsement and interpretation. They also dispute whether constitutions should refer solely to democratic processes, or also define and limit democratic goals. Each of these positions produces a different view of judicial review, the content and advisability of a Bill of Rights and the nature of constitutional politics. These differences are not simply academic positions, but are reflected in the different types of constitutional democracy found in the United States, continental Europe, Britain and many commonwealth countries. The selected essays explore these issues from the perspectives of law, philosophy and political science. A detailed and informative introduction sets them in the context of contemporary debates about constitutionalism.

Nella complessa realtà internazionale vi è il rischio di sbiadire il concetto stesso di costituzione, che deve rimanere invece profondamente legato a quello di costituzionalismo per non smarrire il senso della sua unità e della sua chiara finalità pratica: il riconoscimento dei diritti fondamentali e la loro protezione. A mettere in discussione gli assetti degli Stati democratici e la stessa scienza del diritto costituzionale non è soltanto il prevalere dell'economia sulla politica e il diritto, ma anche l'inarrestabile crescita dei flussi migratori. Ciò pone problemi vecchi e nuovi di coesione sociale che necessitano non di un abbandono dei princìpi costituzionali fondamentali - a cominciare da quelli di libertà, eguaglianza e solidarietà - ma semmai di una loro rilettura in chiave interculturale, per contrastare fenomeni di fanatismo ideologico e di estremismo religioso.Salvatore Bonfiglio, docente di Diritto costituzionale italiano e comparato, è direttore del Laboratorio Multimediale di Comparazione Giuridica nell'Università degli Studi'Roma Tre'. Dal 2011 è direttore del periodico scientifico Democrazia & Sicurezza-Democracy and Security Review. Tra le sue più recenti pubblicazioni, Il Senato in Italia. Riforma del bicameralismo e modelli di rappresentanza (Laterza, 20072) e I partiti e la democrazia. Per una rilettura dell'art. 49 della Costituzione (il Mulino, 2013).

Constitutional politics has become a major terrain of contemporary struggles. Contestation around designing, replacing, revising, and dramatically re-interpreting constitutions is proliferating worldwide. Starting with Southern Europe in post-Franco Spain, then in the ex-Communist countries in Central Europe, post-apartheid South Africa, and now in the Arab world, constitution making has become a project not only of radical political movements, but of liberals and conservatives as well. Wherever new states or new regimes will emerge in the future, whether through negotiations, revolutionary process, federation, secession, or partition, the making of new constitutions will be a key item on the political agenda. Combining historical comparison, constitutional theory, and political analysis, this volume links together theory and comparative analysis in order to orient actors engaged in constitution making processes all over the world. The book examines two core phenomena: the development of a new, democratic paradigm of constitution making, and the resulting change in the normative discussions of constitutions, their creation, and the source of their legitimacy. After setting out a theoretical framework for understanding these developments, Andrew Arato examines recent constitutional politics in South Africa, Hungary, Turkey, and Latin America and discusses the political stakes in constitution-making. The book concludes by offering a systematic critique of the alternative to the new paradigm, populism and populist constituent politics.

Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional'revolutions', challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics, and philosophy.

This volume critically discusses the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. It does so with a view to respond to objections raised by legal and political philosophers who are sceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial review is an undemocratic institution. The book builds on earlier literature on the moral justification of the authority of constitutional courts, and on the current attempts to develop a system on “weak judicial review”. Although different in their approach, the chapters all focus on devising institutions, procedures and, in a more abstract way, normative conceptions to democratize constitutional law. These democratizing strategies may vary from a radical objection to the institution of judicial review, to a more modest proposal to justify the authority of constitutional courts in their “deliberative performance” or to create constitutional juries that may be more aware of a community's constitutional morality than constitutional courts are. The book connects abstract theoretical discussions about the moral justification of constitutionalism with concrete problems, such as the relation between constitutional adjudication and deliberative democracy, the legitimacy of judicial review in international institutions, the need to create new institutions to democratize constitutionalism, the connections between philosophical conceptions and constitutional practices, the judicial review of constitutional amendments, and the criticism on strong judicial review.

All democratic constitutions feature'the people'as their author and ultimate source of legitimacy. They claim to embody the political form that citizens are in some sense supposed to have given themselves. But in what sense, exactly? When does a constitution really or genuinely speak for the people? Such questions are especially pertinent to our present condition, where the voice of'the people'turns out to be irrevocably fragmented, and people themselves want to speak and be heard in their own voices.Founding Acts explores the relationship between constitutional claims of popular sovereignty and the practice of constitution-making in our pluralistic age. Serdar Tekin argues that the process of making a constitution, or its pedigree, is as morally and politically significant as its content. Consequently, democratic constitution-making is not only about making a democratic constitution but also about making it, as much as possible, democratically.Tekin develops two overarching arguments in support of this claim. First, citizen participation in the process of constitution-making is essential to the democratic legitimacy of a new constitution. Second, collective action, that is, the political experience of constructing public life together, is what binds diverse people into a democratic peoplehood. Bringing into dialogue a wide range of canonical and contemporary thinkers, Tekin examines historical realities extending from revolutionary America and France to contemporary South Africa and Germany.

This work provides a rational framework for legislation. The unifying premise behind the essays is that, although legislation and regulation are the result of a political process, legislation and regulation can be the object of theoretical study. The volume focuses on problems that are common to most European legal systems and the approach involves applying to legislative problems the tools of legal theory - hence'legisprudence'. Whereas traditional legal theory deals predominantly with the application of law by the judge, legisprudence enlarges the field of study so as to include the creation of law by the legislator. The original essays published in this collection expose and develop a range of new insights into the relationship between legislative problems and legal theory in a way which will engage and interest legal scholars throughout the world.

Are Western and Islamic political and constitutional ideas truly predestined for civilizational clash? In order to understand this controversy The Concert of Civilizations begins by deriving and redefining a definition of constitutionalism that is suitable for comparative, cross-cultural analysis. The rule of law, reflection of national character, and the clear delineation and limitation of governmental power are used as lenses through which thinkers like Cicero, Montesquieu, and the authors of The Federalist Papers can be read alongside al-Farabi, ibn Khaldun, and the Ottoman Tanzimat decrees. Bridging the civilizational divide is a chapter comparing the Magna Carta with Muhammad'sConstitution of Medina, as both documents can be seen as foundational within their traditions. For the first time in political theory, this text also provides a sustained, detailed analysis of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi's book The Surest Path, which explains his fusion of Muslim and Western ideas in his writing of Tunisia's first modern constitution, which is also the first constitution for a majority-Muslim state. Finally, the book discusses the Arab Spring through a brief overview of the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, and offers some early thoughts about Tunisia's uniquely successful revolution.

This volume provides the first English translation of Hans Kelsen's and Carl Schmitt's influential Weimar-era debate on constitutional guardianship and the legitimacy of constitutional review. It includes Kelsen's seminal piece,'The Nature and Development of Constitutional Adjudication', as well as key extracts from the'Guardian of the Constitution'which present Schmitt's argument against constitutional review. Also included are Kelsen's review of Schmitt's'Guardian of the Constitution', as well as some further material by Kelsen and Schmitt on presidential dictatorship under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. These texts show Kelsen and Schmitt responding to one another, in the context of a debate focused on a concrete constitutional crisis, thus allowing the reader to assess the plausibility of Kelsen's and Schmitt's legal and constitutional theories.

El volumen que ahora comienza a explorar el lector se mueve en estos parámetros, el de una prospección del constitucionalismo considerado como horizonte. Una realidad tornadiza y proteica, ciertamente, cuyos rasgos, en permanente definición, no nos permiten entenderlo como una realidad acabada y unívoca, sino como una pluralidad de sentidos que convergen en un horizonte hacia el que tender, porque posee también una inequívoca dimensión utópica que es inherentemente dinámica. Ese es el espíritu que late en las páginas de esta obra colectiva. Desde esas premisas ha sido concebida, como una aproximación cabal a un fenómeno complejo estrechamente conectado a las transformaciones de nuestras sociedades en la era de la interdependencia, un fenómeno que guarda una relación íntima con las transformaciones que el derecho está experimentando en la actualidad, con la crisis del ordenamiento jurídico y del imperio de la ley, desplazado finalmente por la primacía de la Constitución. Una aproximación al constitucionalismo contemporáneo recaba también un posicionamiento sobre la conexión entre constitucionalismo y derechos humanos que no puede ser eludido, porque los derechos constituyen la médula de este reviviscente constitucionalismo que aúna en la carta magna la dimensión normativa y la dimensión garantista.

Originalism holds that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted according to its meaning at the time it was enacted. In their innovative defense of originalism, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport maintain that the text of the Constitution should be adhered to by the Supreme Court because it was enacted by supermajorities—both its original enactment under Article VII and subsequent Amendments under Article V. A text approved by supermajorities has special value in a democracy because it has unusually wide support and thus tends to maximize the welfare of the greatest number.The authors recognize and respond to many possible objections. Does originalism perpetuate the dead hand of the past? How can following the original meaning be justified, given that African Americans and women were excluded from the enactment of the Constitution in 1787 and many of its subsequent Amendments? What is originalism's place in interpretation of the Constitution, when after two hundred years there is so much non-originalist precedent?A fascinating counterfactual they pose is this: had the Supreme Court not interpreted the Constitution so freely, perhaps the nation would have resorted to the Article V amendment process more often and with greater effect. Their book will be an important contribution to the literature on originalism, which is now the most prominent theory of constitutional interpretation.