Search

The aim of the study was to investigate how general personality traits (Big Five) and maladaptive traits (Personality Inventory for DSM-5) predict specific conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19 and the Russian-Ukrainian war. 925 participants from Slovakia, recruited via an online panel of a research agency (50.6% women, mean age 50.9 years), were interviewed in October 2021 with the Big Five Inventory Short (BFI-S) and the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 Brief Form (PID-5-BF). Later (July-August 2022 and April-May 2023), they completed the original scales to measure COVID-19 and Russian-Ukrainian war conspiracies. The results showed that after controlling for demographic variables, belief in specific conspiracies was positively predicted by extraversion and negatively predicted by agreeableness. Of the maladaptive traits, only psychoticism was a positive predictor of specific conspiracies. Since the effects were consistent across all types of conspiracies, the results suggest that personality traits may play a role in how people come to believe in specific conspiracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious and conspiracy beliefs are based on the assumption that a potent force exists which is capable of affecting people's destinies. According to compensatory control theory, the belief in such a potent external agent may serve to alleviate feelings of uncertainty and help restore a sense of control. This is of particular relevance and importance to attitudes and behaviour of religious individuals towards vaccinations during the Covid-19 pandemic, where a belief in such a potent external force controlling events and destinies may have lowered the sense of threat posed by Covid-19 and in turn reduced vaccination uptake. To test this, we conducted a cross-sectional study of highly religious adults in Poland (N = 213) and found that the number of COVID-19 vaccine doses taken was negatively predicted by conspiracy beliefs, perceived closeness to God, and frequency of church attendance, and positively predicted by the perceived COVID-19 threat. Furthermore, mediation analysis revealed that both conspiracy beliefs and perceived closeness to God were related to a decreased perception of the COVID-19 threat, which in turn led to a decreased number of vaccine doses received. Our study offers important insights for public health professionals and identifies further research pathways on conspiracy and religious beliefs in relation to health-related behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories have been treated mostly as a homogeneous phenomenon in empirical research. However, to fully understand their causes and consequences, a multifaceted approach to conspiracy theories would be useful. Here, we propose an organizational framework with three facets (groups, ideology, and status) to conceptualize conspiracy theories. Based on a review of recent research, the current contribution highlights the psychological differences between (a) perceived conspiracies within or outside of one's valued community; (b) ideological versus nonideological conspiracy beliefs, based on whether conspiracy beliefs are directly relevant for people's core values; and (c) upward versus downward conspiracy beliefs, that is, whether the perceived conspiracy involves a relatively high- or low-status group. Finally, we discuss some distinct consequences of these facets in affecting societally consequential behaviors, such as collective action, protest, hostility, or polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the origin, dissemination, and support of conspiracy theories has skyrocketed. Studies reveal how individual antecedents such as people's personality traits, intrinsic motivations, and broad social-psychological processes explain this phenomenon. Fewer studies, however, explored the role of cable news exposure. This study casts a new light on how exposure to Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC relate to people's levels of general conspiracy mentality fueled by the belief in "secret-plotting orchestrated by powerful others." Results from K-mean cluster algorithms, ordinary least squares (OLS) causal-autoregressive regressions, and cross-lagged panel structural equation model tests show Fox News exposure fosters people's conspiracy mentality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy beliefs have spread during the Covid‐19 pandemic. It is important to understand them because of their potential to undermine trust in societal institutions and willingness to get vaccined. In the present research (N = 538), we assessed the links between conspiracy beliefs, trust in institutions (e.g., government, WHO), and attitudes towards the Covid‐19 vaccination across the USA, Brazil and the UK. A moderated mediation analysis revealed the crucial role of political leaders in linking conspiracy beliefs with vaccination attitudes. Trust in the president was positively associated with conspiracy beliefs in Brazil because of its conspiracist president at the time (Bolsonaro), which in turn was negatively associated with vaccination attitudes. In contrast, trust in political leaders at the time in the UK (Johnson) and the USA (Biden) was negatively associated with conspiracy beliefs. In conclusion, our findings contribute to understanding the underlying mechanisms that link conspiracy beliefs with trust and vaccination attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People who hold multiplicistic (multiplist) epistemic beliefs about science tend to believe that scientific knowledge is always subjective and that varying opinions on a scientific matter are equally valid. Research suggests that multiplist epistemic beliefs may be maladaptive and lead to a radically subjective view of science. Little is known about the association between such beliefs and mistrust in science/scientists and the tendency to believe in misinformation. The aims of this study were to examine: (a) the degree to which multiplist epistemic beliefs about science are associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and science-related conspiracy beliefs, (b) the degree to which trust in science mediates the association between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and conspiracy beliefs, and (c) the extent to which COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and science-related conspiracy beliefs are associated with compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines. Participants were 210 undergraduate students attending a Hispanic-serving institution located in a large city in the southern U.S. Path analysis results indicated that multiplist epistemic beliefs about science were positively associated with science-related conspiracy beliefs after accounting for fundamentalism and conservatism. Moreover, trust in science mediated the positive association between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. Finally, belief in COVID-19 conspiracies was negatively associated with COVID-19 prevention guideline compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cancer is an important issue and a model topic for misinformatfion researchers. The present research experimentally investigates the effect of cancer‐related conspiracy beliefs and misinformation on oncology treatment intentions in a cancer‐free population. In three pre‐registered studies (N total = 1020), participants were asked to put themselves in the shoes of a patient recommended for chemotherapy. Study 1 (N = 300) failed to experimentally manipulate cancer‐related conspiracy beliefs with exposure to a health scandal not related to cancer. In Study 2 (N = 258), exposure to a pro‐conspiracy (vs. anti‐conspiracy) content related to cancer treatment was associated with more conspiracy beliefs, less intention to use chemotherapy and more intentions to use unconventional medicines. Exploratory analyses revealed that these effects were conditioned by the credibility of the misinformation. Study 3 (N = 462) replicated these findings using a full experimental design. Exposure (vs. no exposure) to a warning and accuracy prompt, prior to exposure to the pro‐conspiracy content, was found to be effective in reducing its credibility and preventing its detrimental effects. These findings corroborate the existence of an effect of conspiracy beliefs on treatment intentions in oncology and also suggest several ways to mitigate them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thailand is one of the most popular outbound destinations for Chinese tourists. However, the conspiracy theory about trafficking Chinese in Thailand has negatively affected the resilience of the Chinese outbound market after the COVID-19 pandemic. The issue of how beliefs in the conspiracy theory affect Chinese tourists' intention to visit Thailand is investigated in this study. An online survey with a valid sample of 452 Chinese was conducted in July and August 2023. The measurement model and structural model were tested via WarpPLS 8.0. The results of this study indicate that beliefs in the conspiracy theory arouse Chinese tourists' distrust towards Thailand and signify that tourism boycott is a form of negative political consumption. Furthermore, the respondents react differently to the conspiracy theory based on their age and past visit experience. This study highlights conspiracy beliefs as a psychological factor affecting tourist behaviour. It also suggests that relevant conspiracy theories overshadow tourism resilience in destinations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Harm functions complexly in moral judgement but has been treated differently in the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) and the Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). Both the SIM and TDM see felt harm as an outcome of experienced negative moral emotions (e.g., disgust), but the SIM regards harm as a kind of epiphenomenon in the sense that it does not affect moral judgement or behaviour, whereas the TDM interprets harm as an essential mediator of the link between negative moral emotions and immorality. The TDM also develops an explanation for how harm functions to initiate reactions to triggering events marked by an intentional agent causing injury to a vulnerable social actor. Here norms serve a regulatory function modulating the effects of harm committed by the agent on negative moral emotions. We conduct two experiments on representative samples of adults (N1=180;N2=192$$ {N}_1=180;{N}_2=192 $$) and address two different moral contexts (companies doing badly and government doing badly with respect to a threatened health crisis), two different normative moderators (moral identity and belief in conspiracies) and two different moral action tendencies (intentions and word of mouth). Harm is found to have direct and contingent mediated effects on moral action tendencies, in accord with the TDM. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories accusing specific groups of secret malevolent actions can foster a perception of the world as a dangerous place. In our research, we contend that both adherence and exposure to conspiracy beliefs can serve as a potential cause of certain psychological problems in the form of paranoid thoughts. This hypothesis was tested in three studies conducted among Polish and British participants. In Study 1 (longitudinal, N = 603), we found that conspiracy beliefs exerted a positive overtime effect on paranoid thoughts. Experimental studies 2 (N = 384) and 3 (N = 445), showed that being exposed to conspiracy theories (vs. control stimuli) heightened paranoid thoughts. In Study 3, we proposed a potential mechanism explaining this effect, according to which exposure to conspiracies increased paranoid thoughts via only negative intense emotions. Our work adds to the discussion on the consequences of conspiracy beliefs and has implications for mental health research, underlining the importance of designing interventions limiting the adverse effects of conspiracy beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 has elicited polarized reactions to public health measures, fueling anti-vaccination movements worldwide which indicate that vaccine hesitancy represents a common expression of dissent. We investigate changes in cognitive (i.e., trust in government, conspiracy beliefs, vaccine attitudes, and other COVID-19-related factors) and socio-emotional factors (i.e., psychological distress and social support) over time, and examine if these factors are associated with COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. A sample of Canadian young adults (N = 2,695; 18 to 40 years old) responded to an online survey in May/June 2021 (after the first vaccination campaign) and then in November 2021 (after vaccine mandates were introduced). Based on survey answers, participants were categorized as "not hesitant", "hesitant", and "do not intend to get vaccinated" at each time point. Results from generalized estimating equation models indicate that vaccination hesitancy decreased over time. The importance attributed to specific COVID-19-related factors (e.g., research and science about COVID-19 vaccines, opinions of friends and family) decreased whereas psychological distress increased over time. Cognitive and socio-emotional factors were associated with vaccine hesitancy, with participants who did not intend to get vaccinated reporting the lowest psychological distress scores. We argue that dissent may be an empowering way for young people to restore a sense of personal agency via the opposition to a system perceived as illegitimate and/or unfair. These results raise important questions about potential collateral effects of top-down government and public health interventions in times of crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(1) Background: Populist radical right-wing parties and politicians have used conspiracy theories to perpetuate the antagonism between an evil elite conspiring against the good and unknowing people. Yet, less is known about whether and to what extent radical right-wing populism at the individual level is associated with different conspiracy beliefs. This analysis explores how the main components of radical right-wing populism—populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes—relate to both a general conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy theories prevalent in political discourse. (2) Methods: Using data from an original 2023 online survey conducted in Austria, a stronghold of the populist radical right, this study includes new questions on immigration, COVID-19, and climate change, as well as a conspiracy mentality scale. (3) Results: The analyses reveal that all the main components are positively associated with different conspiracy beliefs, albeit to varying degrees. Across models, the strongest predictor is populism, followed by nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism varies the most across different conspiracy beliefs and is particularly associated with the belief in conspiracy theories related to immigration and climate change. (4) Conclusions: The results highlight the prevalence of radical right-wing populist attitudes across various conspiracy beliefs, reflecting how populist radical right-wing actors leverage conspiracy theories in their political discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectification, being treated as a tool to achieve someone's instrumental goals, is a common phenomenon. A workplace supervisor may view employees solely in terms of their output; likewise, friends may be seen only for their potential for personal and social advancement. We conducted five studies (N = 1209) to test whether objectification increases conspiracy beliefs through thwarted trust and whether postobjectification increases in conspiracy beliefs carry behavioural implications. While conspiracy beliefs may have evolved as a strategy for survival, they may be considered maladaptive in the modern world. Therefore, understanding the antecedents, underlying mechanisms, and implications of conspiracy beliefs is essential. We measured (Study 1) and manipulated objectification (Studies 2–5), consistently finding that objectification decreased trust, thereby increasing conspiracy beliefs (Studies 1–5). This effect remained after considering negative emotions (Study 2). Increased conspiracy beliefs following objectification positively predicted unethical tendencies, and the effect of objectification on unethical tendencies was serially mediated by trust and conspiracy beliefs (Study 4). Restoring objectified people's trust weakened their conspiracy beliefs and unethical tendencies (Study 5). We discussed the implications of our findings, proposing directions for researchers, practitioners, managers, and policymakers for theoretical advancement, healthier coping, and promotion of well‐being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy beliefs entail a scapegoating function by attributing the consequences of crises, such as economic downturns, to the secret action of outgroups. While conspiracy beliefs have been described as reactions to economic threats, we argue that this factor alone is not sufficient. Rather, perceiving one's ingroup as unfairly deprived compared to other groups (i.e., group relative deprivation) might be key to explaining the situation in terms of secret, intentional wrongdoings. Furthermore, individuals high in national narcissism (i.e., a perceived lack of recognition of the ingroup's greatness), may be especially sensitive to this dynamic. Three pilot studies (N = 1237) attested the robustness of the link between group relative deprivation and conspiracy beliefs. Then, Study 1 (N = 812) revealed that the effect of group relative deprivation on conspiracy beliefs was moderated by national narcissism. In Study 2 (N = 728), we found effects of induced national narcissism and group relative deprivation on conspiracy beliefs in a fictitious setting. Study 3 (N = 846) replicated the moderation of national narcissism on the link between group relative deprivation and conspiracy beliefs at the cross‐sectional level. Overall, these studies provide evidence that conspiracy beliefs in reaction to group relative deprivation are especially likely among collective narcissists. We discuss the scapegoating function of conspiracy beliefs during crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on conspiracy theories has long turned a blind eye on the role of age in explaining conspiracy beliefs. Few studies include age and those that do have yet to consider how and why age matters when it comes to the spread of conspiracy theories. In this article, we investigate the relationship between age and conspiracy beliefs with two complementary studies. In Study 1, we conduct a meta‐analysis of a large sample of studies on conspiracy beliefs published between 2014 and 2024 (k = 191; N = 374,224). The results reveal a small but robust negative association between age and conspiracy endorsement. In Study 2, we use an original multinational survey to investigate three potential mechanisms that may explain the relationship between age and conspiracy beliefs (N = 6098). We explain youth's higher beliefs in conspiracy theories by their predisposition to unconventional styles of political participation, lower levels of self‐esteem, and general political disaffection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 mobility restrictions, including workplace closures, introduced by national governments led to disruption of social and economic life including job loss. With the job loss, the victims may encounter social and economic threats which can prompt them to show less support for the government that introduced the workplace closures which led to their job loss. Thus, this study investigates whether job loss resulting from COVID-19 prompts COVID-19 anti-cohesive attitudes (dissatisfaction with government's response to COVID-19, and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs) in Europe; and whether strictness of workplace closures moderates the first proposition. The focus is on Europe because the degree of job loss and workplace closures vary between countries. With some COVID-19 items from the round 10 data of the European Social Survey conducted between 2021 and 2023, and independent context indices, the propositions are tested using a mixed model having about 142 groups and 25000 observations. The model formula has COVID-19 anti-cohesive attitudes as the response variable, COVID-19 job loss as the predictor variable at individual level, while COVID-19 workplace closures is the context variable. The findings support the hypotheses: COVID-19 job losers (compared to COVID-19 job keepers) are about 20percent more likely to show anti-cohesive attitudes; also, COVID-19 anti-cohesive attitudes are more predominant among COVID-19 job losers where workplace closures are very strict compared to where workplace closures are low. These findings are useful for policy makers in future pandemic management. Also, scientists may find the results useful for research on socioeconomic threats, public policy and cohesive attitudes.

Conspiracy beliefs have been found to have negative real-world consequences that can impact interpersonal relationships; however, this remains an under-researched area. With the current popularity of conspiracy movements such as QAnon, more research into these phenomena is necessary. The present research therefore aimed to explore the impact of QAnon belief on interpersonal relationships. Fifteen participants aged 21–54 (M = 41) with a QAnon-affiliated loved one were interviewed about how QAnon has changed their relationship. Using thematic analysis, four main themes were identified: Malignant Q, Distance, Qonflict, and Attempts at Healing. Participants characterized QAnon as a malignant force in their relationships and communicated with their loved ones less as a result. Although QAnon was a source of conflict and tension for all participants, they were motivated to understand their loved ones. Most participants who still had relationships with their loved ones were motivated to heal or maintain their relationships, while those who no longer did had previously tried many different strategies to save their relationships. These findings provide greater insight into how QAnon can impact relationships, offering fruitful directions for future research examining how individuals can heal from QAnon-afflicted relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Homosexuality constitutes a topic of ongoing debates not only in lay, but also political and religious discourse. At the same time, conspiracy theories gain more and more popularity and narratives about the hidden gay agenda result in discriminatory behaviors against LGBTQI+ people. This study aims to test (a) the relationship between religiosity and social distance from LGBTQI+ people, and (b) the serial mediating effect of gender conspiracy beliefs and LGBTQI+ conspiracy beliefs in the aforementioned relationship. Methods: N = 703 participants were recruited online in the UK in August 2020. Ethical approval was secured and participants provided their written consent. We measured religious attitudes, gender and homosexuality conspiracy beliefs, and social distance from LGBTQI+ people. Results: People higher in religiosity were more distant from LGBTQI+ people, a relationship that was serially mediated by gender and LGBTQI+ conspiracy beliefs. Conclusion and Policy Implications: Results open up the discussion for policy-making implications reflected, for example, on the need to introduce critical thinking and skills to debunk conspiracy theories even more in workplaces, schools, universities, and institutions, which are supposed to foster diversity among their members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transhumanism is a movement that emphasizes the improvement of the human condition by developing technologies and making them widely available. Conspiracy theories regularly refer to the allegedly transhumanist agenda of elites. We hypothesized that belief in conspiracy theories would be related to more unfavorable attitudes toward the transhumanist movement. We examined this association through two pre‐registered studies (based on two French samples, total N after exclusion = 550). We found no evidence of a negative relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and attitudes toward transhumanism. This null result was further corroborated by Bayesian analysis, an equivalence test, and an internal mini meta‐analysis. This work plays a precursory role in understanding attitudes toward an international cultural and intellectual movement that continues to grow in popularity and influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Procedural fairness encourages numerous beneficial organizational behaviors across many institutional settings, including schools. However, little research has explored the consequences of fair treatment in the higher education context. To address this gap, we conducted three studies exploring whether students’ experience of procedural (un)fairness during university education predicts their trust in scientists in particular and trust in science, generally. The participants were university students from Poland (N = 240), the UK (N = 500), and the US (N = 501) recruited through online panels. In all three studies, we administered a questionnaire about students’ experiences of treatment during university studies. We used regression analysis (Studies 1 and 2) and Structural Equation Modelling (Study 3) for data analysis. We found that students’ experience of procedural justice was positively correlated with their trust in science, and negatively linked with their belief in conspiracy theories about COVID-19 vaccines. This effect was partially mediated by students’ trust in scientists in Study 2 and fully mediated in Study 3. In other words, interacting with fair academic teachers leads students to trust scientists initially and ultimately develop trust in science in general. The experience of fairness also reduces conspiracy beliefs, a finding especially salient in the light of the recent pandemic. Our research supports the understanding that trust is relational and interpersonal rather than an abstract and generalized attitude. We also contribute to the study of higher education by highlighting the significance of quality academic experience for shaping students’ broader attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic unleashed a torrent of conspiracy theories across different social media platforms. Parallel to this conspiracy wave was a heightened sense of nationalism, which manifested through both in-group solidarity and perceived out-group threats. In this study, we examine how individuals' use of government social media to gather political information correlated with nation-related conspiracy beliefs during the pandemic. Data were collected from 745 subjects in China and analyzed through path analyses, which allowed us to examine the direct association with political information consumption from government social media and the indirect association with nationalism on conspiracy beliefs. The results indicated that the use of government social media to gather political information was associated with greater beliefs in nation-variant COVID-19 conspiracies, both directly and through different mediations of nationalism. Our findings highlight the importance of examining government social media use and how nationalism can have differentiated mediation effects on beliefs in conspiracy theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper reports the results of registered conceptual replications of the indirect effect of institutional trust in the relationship between precarity and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (CB). The original study of Adam‐Troian et al. (2023; British Journal of Social Psychology, 62(S1), 136‐159) indicated that subjective appraisals of economic hardship are associated with lower trust in governments and institutions, which in turn is associated with stronger endorsement of CB. Our Studies 1 to 3 report a series of replications using Slovak panel data. Study 4 reports a replication of the mediation model using data from the European Social Survey Round 10 collected in 17 countries. To provide a quantitative synthesis of these and previous results, we conducted mini meta‐analysis (N = 50,340). Although the strength of the observed relationships differed across the studies to some degree, the original patterns of relations remained robust, supporting the original model. The study corroborates the view that to curb the spread of CB, it is necessary to address structural issues, such as growing financial insecurity, socioeconomic inequalities, and the deficit of institutional trust. Finally, we discuss the role of cultural and political settings in conditioning the mechanisms through which precarity enhances the endorsement of CB. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tijdschrift voor Criminologie is the property of Boom uitgevers Den Haag and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Comparative Politics is the property of Journal of Comparative Politics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Comparative Politics is the property of Journal of Comparative Politics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite increased risk of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infections and higher rates of COVID‐19‐related complications, racialized and Indigenous communities in Canada have lower immunization uptake compared to White individuals. However, there is woeful lack of data on predictors of COVID‐19 vaccine mistrust (VM) that accounts for diverse social and cultural contexts within specific racialized and Indigenous communities. Therefore, we sought to characterize COVID‐19 VM among Arab, Asian, Black, and Indigenous communities in Canada. An online survey was administered to a nationally representative, ethnically diverse panel of participants in October 2023. Arabic, Asian, Indigenous, and Black respondents were enriched in the sampling panel. Data were collected on demographics, COVID‐19 VM, experience of racial discrimination, health literacy, and conspiracy beliefs. We used descriptive and regression analyses to determine the extent and predictors of COVID‐19 VM among racialized and Indigenous individuals. All racialized respondents had higher VM score compared to White participants. Among 4220 respondents, we observed highest VM among Black individuals (12.18; ±4.24), followed by Arabic (12.12; ±4.60), Indigenous (11.84; ±5.18), Asian (10.61; ±4.28), and White (9.58; ±5.00) participants. In the hierarchical linear regression analyses, Black participants, women, everyday racial discrimination, and major experience of discrimination were positively associated with COVID‐19 VM. Effects of racial discrimination were mediated by addition of conspiracy beliefs to the model. Racialized and Indigenous communities experience varying levels of COVID‐19 VM and carry specific predictors and mediators to development of VM. This underscores the intricate interaction between race, gender, discrimination, and VM that need to be considered in future vaccination campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThe recent intense interest in conspiratorial thinking is fuelled by the perception that belief in conspiracies is highly irrational. However, there have been few studies that have examined the associations of conspiracy belief with a comprehensive battery of rational thinking tasks that tap both epistemic and instrumental rationality. The Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking (CART) provides an opportunity to do just that because one of the subtests on the CART assesses the tendency to believe false conspiracies. That subtest is in the part of the CART that measures the presence of contaminated mindware—stored declarative knowledge that embodies poorly justified beliefs. Converging analyses (N = 747) using the 18 subtests and four thinking dispositions measured on the CART indicated that three variables were key predictors of conspiratorial thinking: superstitious thinking, actively open-minded thinking, and probabilistic reasoning. Theoretical consideration of these best predictors, and of the variables that predict the endorsement of true conspiracies, led us to rethink the classification of conspiracy belief as contaminated mindware and move instead towards a conception of conspiratorial thinking as a cognitive style. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Conspiracy beliefs (CBs) can have substantial consequences on health behaviours by influencing both conventional and non‐conventional medicine uptake. They can target powerful groups (i.e. upward CBs) or powerless groups (i.e. downward CBs). Considering their repercussions in oncology, it appears useful to understand how CBs are related to the intentions to use conventional, complementary and alternative medicines (CAM). Design and Methods: This paper includes two pre‐registered online correlational studies on a general French population (Study 1 N = 248, recruited on social media Mage = 40.07, SDage = 14.78; 205 women, 41 men and 2 non‐binaries; Study 2 N = 313, recruited on social media and Prolific, Mage = 28.91, SDage = 9.60; 154 women, 149 men and 10 non‐binaries). We investigated the links between generic and chemotherapy‐related CBs and intentions to use conventional, complementary and alternative medicines. Study 2 consisted of a conceptual replication of Study 1, considering the orientation of CBs. Results: Generic CBs and chemotherapy‐related CBs appear strongly and positively correlated, negatively correlated with intentions to take conventional medicine and positively with intentions to take CAM. The link between generic CBs and medication intention is fully mediated by chemotherapy‐related CBs. When distinguished, upward CBs are a stronger predictor of chemotherapy‐related CBs than downward CBs. Conclusions: The findings suggest that intentions to use medicine are strongly associated with CBs. This has several important implications for further research and practice, notably on the presence and effects of CBs on medication behaviours in cancer patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a global health crisis, COVID-19 has led to a rise in overall stress levels. Concurrently, conspiracy beliefs regarding the origin and spread of the disease have become widespread. Engaging in such beliefs can be explained as a form of coping in order to deal with elevated levels of stress. The present study investigated the indirect effects of coping strategies in the association between perceived chronic stress and COVID-related conspiracy beliefs. We report data from an online survey (N = 1,354 individuals: 807 female; 508 male; 8 diverse; 6 not specified; mean age 39.14 years) in German-speaking countries collected between January and March 2021. Our results indicate that people who felt more stressed were more prone to conspiracy beliefs. Coping via acceptance and self-blame was associated with decreased tendencies towards COVID-related conspiracy beliefs, while people who used denial as a strategy were more prone to these beliefs. These findings emphasize the need for stress management interventions and effective coping strategies during times of crisis in order to reduce chronic perceived stress, promote adaptive coping, and ultimately reduce conspiracy beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study examined how conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines specifically relate to symptoms of fear of COVID-19 in a sample of four South American countries. A total of 1785 people from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru participated, responding to a sociodemographic survey, the Fear of COVID-19 scale (FCV-19 S) and the Vaccine Conspiracy Beliefs Scale-COVID-19 (VCBS-COVID-19). Network analysis identified the most important symptoms of fear and conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines (nodes) and the associations between them (edges). In addition, the robustness of the network of these indicators of centrality and the possible differences in the structure and connectivity of the networks between the four countries were evaluated. The results suggest that the nodes with the highest centrality were items 2 and 5 of the FCV-19 S and item 2 of the VCBS-COVID-19. Likewise, item 6 is the belief that most predicts conspiracy beliefs about vaccines against COVID-19; while item 6 was the symptom that most predicts fear of COVID-19. The findings strongly support cross-cultural similarities in the networks across the four countries rather than differences. Although it was expected that a higher presence of symptoms of fear of COVID-19 may lead people to compensate for their fear by believing in conspiratorial ideas about vaccines and, consequently, rejecting the COVID-19 vaccine, the results do not clearly show this relationship. This could lead other researchers to generate evidence to explain the differences between Latin American countries and countries in other contexts in terms of vaccination rates. This evidence could be useful to develop policies favoring vaccination against COVID-19 that are more contextualized to the Latin American region, characterized by social instability and economic recession during the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Controlling the spread of COVID-19 requires individuals to adopt preventive behaviours, but conspiracy beliefs about its origin are spreading. The aim of this paper is to better comprehend the strength of conspiracy beliefs versus objective COVID-19 information to predict people's adherence to protective behaviours (getting vaccinated, being tracked through APPs, and keeping social distance from infected people). Study 1 shows that COVID-19 implicit theories detected in the Pre-study were activated as independent factors that constitute people's interpretations of the virus origin. These beliefs were related to a lesser intention to engage in preventive behaviours and a higher level of mistrust in institutional information, although some beliefs generate positive expectations about COVID-19 consequences. In Study 2, conducted with a different sample, official COVID-19 information was included as an independent variable, but this new variable did not further explain results. Lastly, Study 3 consisting of both previous samples confirmed that conspiracy beliefs had a direct effect on a lesser willingness to engage in preventive actions, a higher mistrust, and positive expectations about COVID-19 consequences. We conclude that objective COVID-19 information did not buffer the effect of conspiracy beliefs; they interfere with actions to prevent it by taking institutions as scapegoats or complicit with secret powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to investigate vaccine promotion messages, examine the heterogeneous effects of these messages and provide experimental evidence to help evaluate the efficiency of COVID-19 vaccine promotion campaigns in Hungary. This study presents the results of three randomised survey experiments that were embedded in cross-sectional, representative, public opinion studies of Hungarian adults based on in-person interviews. Simple randomisation and blinding were applied to assign participants into the control group (no message) or treatment groups (vaccine promotion messages). The first experiment (March 2021) aimed to test vaccination promotion messages from politicians (N = 331) and medical experts (N = 342) by comparing experimental groups' trust in vaccines and conspiratorial beliefs with the control group (N = 327). The second experiment (September 2022) tested the impact of two communication strategies ([1] highlighting the safety and effectiveness of vaccines, N = 104; and [2] highlighting the wide variety of vaccines available, N = 110) on increasing vaccine uptake among those who were still unvaccinated (control group, N = 89). The third experiment (September 2022) tested one message aiming to increase COVID-19 booster uptake among those who received only the first round of vaccination (N = 172; control group, N = 169). The outcome variable in the second and third experiments was intent to get vaccinated. Robust regressions, logit models, Mann–Whitney U-tests and model-based recursive partitioning were run. The inference criteria (p < 0.05) was set in pre-registration of the experiments. All treatment effects were insignificant, but exploratory research found significant conditional treatment effects. Exposure to vaccine promotion by medical professionals was associated with a higher level of trust in Russian and Chinese COVID-19 vaccines in older age cohorts (weighted robust regressions, 50–59 years old, Russian vaccine: +0.769, interaction term [i.t.] p = 0.010; Chinese vaccine: +0.326, i.t. p = 0.044; and ≥60 years old, Russian vaccine +0.183, i.t. p = 0.040; Chinese vaccine +0.559, i.t. p = 0.010) and with a lower level of trust in these vaccines among younger adults (<30 years old, Russian vaccine: −1.236, i.t. p = 0.023; Chinese vaccine: −1.281, i.t. p = 0.022). Receiving a vaccine promotion message from politicians led to a higher level of trust in Chinese vaccines among the oldest respondents (≥60 years: +0.634, i.t. p = 0.035). Short-term persuasion attempts that aimed to convince respondents about COVID-19 vaccination were ineffective. Booster hesitancy, similar to primary vaccine hesitancy, was resistant to vaccine promotion messages. Significant conditional effects suggest that COVID-19 vaccine promotion by medical experts and politicians may have had adverse effects for some demographic groups in Hungary. [Display omitted] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories tend to be prevalent, particularly in societies with high economic inequality. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic inequality and belief in conspiracy theories. We propose that economic inequality leads people to believe conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups (i.e., upwards conspiracy theories) and that moral evaluations of those groups mediate this relationship. Study 1 (N = 300) found support for these ideas in a survey among Chinese residents. Study 2 (N = 160) manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in a virtual society. The manipulation shaped moral evaluations of economically advantaged groups, and conspiracy beliefs, in the predicted manner. In Study 3 (N = 191) and Study 4 (N = 210), we experimentally manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in real Chinese society and replicated the results of Study 2. In addition, in Study 4, we find that economic inequality predicts belief in conspiracy theories about economically disadvantaged groups (i.e., downward conspiracy theories), which was mediated by anomie. We conclude that perceived economic inequality predicts conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups and that moral evaluations account for this effect. Also, upward and downward conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with different psychological processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 mobility restrictions, including workplace closures, introduced by national governments led to disruption of social and economic life including job loss. With the job loss, the victims may encounter social and economic threats which can prompt them to show less support for the government that introduced the workplace closures which led to their job loss. Thus, this study investigates whether job loss resulting from COVID-19 prompts COVID-19 anti-cohesive attitudes (dissatisfaction with government's response to COVID-19, and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs) in Europe; and whether strictness of workplace closures moderates the first proposition. The focus is on Europe because the degree of job loss and workplace closures vary between countries. With some COVID-19 items from the round 10 data of the European Social Survey conducted between 2021 and 2023, and independent context indices, the propositions are tested using a mixed model having about 142 groups and 25000 observations. The model formula has COVID-19 anti-cohesive attitudes as the response variable, COVID-19 job loss as the predictor variable at individual level, while COVID-19 workplace closures is the context variable. The findings support the hypotheses: COVID-19 job losers (compared to COVID-19 job keepers) are about 20percent more likely to show anti-cohesive attitudes; also, COVID-19 anti-cohesive attitudes are more predominant among COVID-19 job losers where workplace closures are very strict compared to where workplace closures are low. These findings are useful for policy makers in future pandemic management. Also, scientists may find the results useful for research on socioeconomic threats, public policy and cohesive attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National narcissism and national identification, two distinct types of national commitment, differ in terms of their psychological concomitants. Therefore, in the current article, we hypothesized that they would also relate to different adult attachment styles. Namely, we proposed that national narcissism would be positively associated with higher attachment anxiety, while national identification would be associated with lower attachment anxiety and avoidance. These hypotheses were tested in three cross-sectional surveys (Study 1 N = 570; Study 3 N = 558; Study 4 N = 649) and one longitudinal survey (Study 2 N = 808). In all studies, we found a consistent positive relationship between attachment anxiety and national narcissism, and a negative relationship between attachment avoidance and national identification. Finally, we also demonstrated indirect effects of attachment anxiety (via national narcissism) on maladaptive group-related outcomes: conspiracy beliefs, non-normative collective action, and willingness to conspire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paranormal beliefs encompass a wide variety of phenomena, including the existence of supernatural entities such as ghosts and witches, as well as extraordinary human abilities such as telepathy and clairvoyance. In the current study, we used a nationally representative sample ([Formula: see text]) to investigate the presence and correlates of paranormal beliefs among the secular Dutch population. The results indicated that most single paranormal phenomena (e.g. belief in clairvoyance) are endorsed by 10–20% of Dutch respondents; however, 55.6% of respondents qualify as paranormal believers based on the preregistered criterion that they believe in at least one phenomenon with considerable certainty. In addition, we invited four analysis teams with different methodological expertise to assess the structure of paranormal beliefs using traditional factor analysis, network analysis, Bayesian network analysis and latent class analysis (LCA). The teams’ analyses indicated adequate fit of a four-factor structure reported in a 1985 study, but also emphasized different conclusions across techniques; network analyses showed evidence against strong connectedness within most clusters, and suggested a five-cluster structure. The application of various analytic techniques painted a nuanced picture of paranormal beliefs and believers in The Netherlands and suggests that despite increased secularization, subgroups of the general population still believe in paranormal phenomena.

Background: The governments of democracies worldwide are relying on the active cooperation of their populations to combat COVID-19. Simultaneously, beliefs in conspiracy theories surrounding the pandemic have flourished. The present article examines the effects of the big five personality traits and conspiracy beliefs on the intention to get vaccinated against COVID-19 in Germany. Methods: This correlational, cross-sectional mediation analysis was conducted using data from a nationwide German household panel (N = 1390). Results: Openness to experience (β = −.082, p = .004) and neuroticism (β = .112, p

ObjectiveLittle is known about parents' willingness to vaccinate their children against COVID-19. We assessed the prevalence of vaccine hesitancy among parents with a child or adolescent aged 12-15 years, examined predictors of parents' COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, their reasons for resisting a pediatric COVID-19 vaccine, and the correlation between parents' intentions to vaccinate their child and the acceptance of a vaccine for themselves.MethodsWe conducted a national online survey of 637 parents of a child or adolescent aged 12-15 years in March 2021, before COVID-19 vaccines had been approved for this age group. We assessed univariate predictors of vaccine hesitancy, and we used logistic regression analysis to assess independent effects of variables on vaccine hesitancy.ResultsNearly one-third (28.9%; 95% CI, 25.5%-32.5%) of respondents reported pediatric vaccine hesitancy. Vaccine-hesitant parents were less knowledgeable about vaccines, more accepting of vaccine conspiracies, and less worried about COVID-19 risks to their child's health than vaccine-accepting parents were. Vaccine hesitancy was higher among female (vs male), single (vs married/living as married), older (vs younger), low income (vs high income), non-college graduates (vs college graduates), and Republican (vs Democrat) parents. The primary concerns expressed by vaccine-hesitant parents pertained to vaccine safety rather than vaccine effectiveness. One-quarter of vaccine-hesitant parents preferred that their child obtain immunity through infection rather than vaccination. Non-vaccine-hesitant parents' reasons for vaccinating focused on protecting the health of their child and others. Childhood COVID-19 vaccine acceptance was strongly associated with parents' intentions to get the vaccine for themselves.ConclusionA messaging strategy for effective public health interventions that includes educating the public about vaccination, countering misinformation about vaccine development and safety, and stressing the safety of approved COVID-19 vaccines may boost vaccine acceptance among vaccine-hesitant parents.

(1) Background: Populist radical right-wing parties and politicians have used conspiracy theories to perpetuate the antagonism between an evil elite conspiring against the good and unknowing people. Yet, less is known about whether and to what extent radical right-wing populism at the individual level is associated with different conspiracy beliefs. This analysis explores how the main components of radical right-wing populism—populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes—relate to both a general conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy theories prevalent in political discourse. (2) Methods: Using data from an original 2023 online survey conducted in Austria, a stronghold of the populist radical right, this study includes new questions on immigration, COVID-19, and climate change, as well as a conspiracy mentality scale. (3) Results: The analyses reveal that all the main components are positively associated with different conspiracy beliefs, albeit to varying degrees. Across models, the strongest predictor is populism, followed by nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism varies the most across different conspiracy beliefs and is particularly associated with the belief in conspiracy theories related to immigration and climate change. (4) Conclusions: The results highlight the prevalence of radical right-wing populist attitudes across various conspiracy beliefs, reflecting how populist radical right-wing actors leverage conspiracy theories in their political discourse.

The aim of the experimental study was to verify the reduction of Covid‐19 unfounded beliefs through arguments in favor of vaccination. The sample includes 720 participants recruited by Qualtrics (50% women, age: M = 38.8, SD = 10.90). The participants were equally and randomly divided into three groups. The control group was given the task of reading a neutral text about Norway. The first experimental group was provided with a debunking text that corrected popular misinformation and unfounded beliefs about vaccination against polio and vaccination against Covid‐19. The second experimental group read the same text as the first, with two additional paragraphs addressing the motives and errors in the thinking of unfounded belief spreaders. The results confirmed that exposing the participants to arguments for vaccination reduces the endorsement of Covid‐19 unfounded beliefs and increases the willingness to be vaccinated against Covid‐19 disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research investigates the antecedents of immunisation intentions during the COVID‐19 pandemic, including information‐related factors (conspiracy beliefs, immunisation knowledge and health communication perception) and confidence‐related factors (trust in healthcare institutions and vaccine risk perception). Data were collected online from two samples of Italian (N = 324) and Serbian (N = 486) participants. Path analyses confirmed a mediation mechanism: trust in health institutions and vaccine risk perception mediate the relationship between information‐related factors and vaccination intentions, both towards COVID‐19 and other diseases, with a few exceptions and differences between the samples. Findings show a glimpse into the inner psychological mechanisms of vaccination intentions. During times of crisis, such as pandemics, compliance toward vaccination can be fostered through the quality of information and the promotion of citizens' trust towards health institutions and vaccines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although people who endorse conspiracy theories related to medicine often have negative attitudes toward particular health care measures and may even shun the healthcare system in general, conspiracy theories have received rather meager attention in bioethics literature. Consequently, and given that conspiracy theorizing appears rather prevalent, it has been maintained that there is significant need for bioethics debate over how to deal with conspiracy theories. While the proposals have typically focused on the effects that unwarranted conspiracy theories have in the public health context, Nathan Stout's recent argument concentrates on the impacts that such theories have at the individual level of clinical decision‐making. In this article, I maintain that duly acknowledging the impacts of conspiracy theories that raise Stout's concern does not require bioethics debate over the proper response to the influence of conspiracy theories in healthcare. Having evaluated two possible objections, I conclude by briefly clarifying the purported import of the response to Stout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2022, the Mpox viral outbreak signaled a global public health emergency. Infectious disease management and prevention are crucial tasks for healthcare workers. In their line of work, orthopedic surgeons could come across cases of the Mpox virus. The aim of the present study was to explore orthopedic surgeons' knowledge of the Mpox virus, their conspiracy beliefs regarding emerging viral infections, and their self-confidence in managing the Mpox virus. In this cross-sectional survey, 137 orthopedic surgeons completed an online questionnaire. The participants had low knowledge of the Mpox virus, providing on average 11.5 correct answers (SD = 2.68) of a possible 21. In addition, the participants tended to express moderate conspiracy beliefs and to have low self-confidence in managing the Mpox virus. Age 30 or older, a higher knowledge level, and lower conspiracy beliefs predicted greater self-confidence in managing the Mpox virus. In addition, a negative association was found between knowledge of the Mpox virus and conspiracy beliefs. Arab and younger orthopedic surgeons expressed stronger conspiracy beliefs. Interventions should include introduction of material regarding emerging tropical infections in medical curricula and in-service training programs. In addition, special attention should be paid to younger and Arab orthopedic surgeons, as these subgroups may endorse higher conspiracy beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work aims to evaluate the predictive effect of Social Dominance Orientation, Need for Closure, Attitudes toward Math, Paranormal Beliefs, Religiosity, and Education over General Conspiracy Beliefs (GCB) and Conspiracy Mentality (CM). Two studies were conducted with Brazilian samples. In Study 1, a higher Educational Level and being a female were negatively associated with GCB. In Study 2, Paranormal Beliefs had a positive predictive relationship with CM, while greater Religiosity was associated with lower CM. Future studies should explore the effects of mediators in the relationships found in this study and provide a better conceptualization and operationalization of conspiracy beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID‐19 pandemic has sparked an interest in conspiracy theories worldwide. Previous research has shown that reflective thinking can inhibit belief in conspiracy theories. However, this study delves further by investigating whether reflective thinking moderates the effects of other personal factors, such as anxiety and social class. We conducted an online survey and analyzed data from 937 crowd workers in Japan. The results show that the inhibitory effect of reflective thinking, measured through performance‐based and self‐report methods, remained robust among the participants. However, our analysis yielded near‐null results for the interaction, rejecting the idea that reflective thinking acts as a significant moderator in the relationship between reflective thinking and various personal factors. The implications of these findings suggest that reflective thinking does not amplify factors that strengthen belief in conspiracy theories. Instead, fostering reflective thinking appears to be an effective strategy for reducing conspiracy beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Stage 2 Registered Report concerns the relationship between rumination, a repetitive style of negative thinking, and conspiracy beliefs (Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/y82bs, date of in-principle-acceptance: 23/05/2023). Based on four pilot studies, we tested in a fifth, registered study whether brooding, a particularly dysfunctional form of rumination, contributes to conspiracy beliefs using a repeated-measures within-person experiment (N = 1,638). Mean difference scores (conspiracy beliefs at T2 minus conspiracy beliefs at T1) were significantly greater in the brooding condition than in the control condition. However, we could neither confirm that this effect was larger than the specified smallest effect size of interest of d = 0.20, nor conclude that it was too small to be of interest (i.e., smaller than d = 0.20). We explored how reflection, an analytic form of rumination, impacted conspiracy beliefs. We further discuss implications for theories about the formation of conspiracy beliefs, and efforts aimed at preventing or reducing unfounded conspiracy beliefs. Hopefully, this article sparks a discussion among conspiracy belief researchers about how smallest effect sizes of interest could be determined in a principled way based on real-world outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Comparative Politics is the property of Journal of Comparative Politics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)