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This paper investigates the explanatory power of social convention theory for explaining the persistence of female genital cutting (FGC) in a broad sample of African countries. While influential in policy circles, the idea that FGC is best described as a bad equilibrium in a social coordination game has recently been challenged by quantitative evidence from selected countries. These studies have pointed towards the importance of private preferences. We use novel approaches to test whether FGC is social interdependent when decisions also depend on private preferences. We test implications of the simple fact that according to social convention theory mothers will sometimes cut their daughters even if they do not support the practice. The substantial regional variation in FGC practices warrants investigation in a broad sample. Empirical results drawing on Demographic and Health Survey data from 34 surveys performed between 1992-2018 in 11 African countries suggest that cutting behavior is indeed often socially interdependent, and hence that it can be understood as a social convention. Our findings indicate that even if social convention theory does not provide the full picture, it should not be dismissed. Accordingly, interventions that acknowledge the social interdependence of cutting behavior are likely to be more successful than interventions that do not. JEL codes: D71; D91; I15; O55

We investigate the impact of son preferences in India on gender inequalities in education. We distinguish the impact of preferential treatment of boys from the impact of gender-biased fertility strategies (gender-specific fertility stopping rules and sex-selective abortions). Results show strong impacts of gender-biased fertility strategies on education differences between girls and boys. Preferential treatment of boys has a more limited impact on gender differences. Further, results suggest that gender-biased fertility strategies create gender inequalities in education both because girls and boys end up in systematically different families and because of gender-inequalities in pecuniary investment within families. The extra advantage of the eldest son within the family is small. D13, I20, J16, O15

Social scientists regularly criticize the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which has led to much focus being placed on investigating the possible biases related to its results. Recent research shows that CBA is not routinely done prior to environmental, energy, and climate policymaking in Sweden, and in countries where a CBA is made, the results have little influence on political decisions. This paper investigates obstacles to using CBA information with a focus on bureaucrats. We use empirical data from Sweden, where the ministries are small by international standards and hence government agencies have a sizeable influence on policymaking. We construct a theoretical model and then test the theoretical predictions with empirical data collected from five Swedish government agencies. The empirical results lend support both for the assertion that risk aversion concerning the environmental outcome, the bureaucrats’ environmental attitudes, and the cost of taking CBA information into account have a considerable impact on the probability of using information from a CBA. Hence risk averse and bureaucrats with strong environmental preferences are less likely and bureaucrats with low cost of doing a CBA more likely than other bureaucrats to use CBA information. Finally, a binding governmental budget constraint may positively influence a bureaucrat’s choice of undertaking a CBA. A tentative conclusion is therefore that it may be possible to increase the use of CBA by making the budgetary consequences of policies much clearer and demanding due consideration of costs.

We investigate within-family inequalities in human capital accumulation in India. We consider both indicators of the child's current stock of human capital and of investment into their continued human capital accumulation, distinguishing between time investments and pecuniary investment into school quality. We develop a theoretical framework that demonstrates how credit constraints and opportunity cost of child time matter differently for time investments and pecuniary investments into human capital. We employ a within family model using sibship fixed effects, and find mostly negative birth order effects, i.e. earlier born children are better off. This is more in line with previous results from developed countries rather than from developing countries. However, for time investments, which are influenced by the opportunity cost of child time, birth order effects are more in line with what has previously been found in developing countries. Hence, we demonstrate that patterns of birth order effects differ by measure of human capital. JEL:D13, I20, J16, O15 An earlier version of this report was published May 2017: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/52351

In this paper we investigate birth order and gender effects on the development of children’s human capital in India. We investigate both indicators of the child’s current stock of human capital and of investment into their continued human capital accumulation, distinguishing between time investments and pecuniary investment into school quality. Our results show that in India, birth order effects are mostly negative. More specifically, birth order effects are negative for indicators of children's accumulated human capital stock and for indicators of pecuniary investments into school quality. These results are more in line with previous results from developed countries than from developing countries. However, for time investments, which are influenced by the opportunity cost of child time, birth order effects are positive. Gender aspects are also important. Girls are disadvantaged within families, and oldest son preferences can explain much of the within-household inequalities which we observe. JEL:D13, I20, J16, O15 A later version of this report was published December 2018: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/58462

In recent years, a growing number of authors have turned their focus to the question of why children work. While much of the research focuses on household level factors, macroeconomic factors have gained increasing attention. This is particularly true in the case of globalization. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the role of globalization in child labor by examining a specific aspect of globalization: social globalization. The results of the empirical analysis indicate that social globalization does have a significant impact on the average incidence of child labor in the cross-country sample of developing countries. JEL classification: J20; O11

We revisit the model of child labor in a peasant household presented in Bhalotra and Heady (2003), and demonstrate that the effect of credit market imperfections on child labor differs between households that save and households that borrow. This in turn is important for the interpretation of empirical results.

In recent years, a growing number of authors have turned their atten- tion to the question of why children work. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the more recent theoretical and empirical research into the topic of child labor, and to illustrate the fact that no one factor on its own can account for the phenomenon of child labor. Therefore, policies aimed at eradicating child labor will need to address the broad range of underlying factors that contribute to the incidence of child labor, such as poverty, market imperfections and access to education.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of island status and country size on institutional quality, and to determine if these institutional effects can explain the relatively strong economic performance of islands and small countries. One of the main findings of this paper is that the relationship between island status and institutional quality is significantly positive, and that these results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Further, we find that country size is negatively related to institutional quality, which is in keeping with previous results. Finally, using an instrumental variable method we demonstrate that when Rule of Law is included in regressions on levels of per capita GDP, the positive effects of small country size and island status disappear. These results provide further support for our hypothesis that institutions account for these countries’ relatively better economic performance.

There are several factors that may contribute to the decision to send a child to work, such as poverty, market imperfections and parental preferences. The aim of this paper is to determine empirically the relative importance of these diverse factors on the incidence of child labor in rural India. In order to examine several potentially influential factors separately, we outline a theoretical model of child labor in a peasant household based on the model presented in Bhalotra and Heady (2003) with modifications to allow for the child to participate in different types of labor. We then use the theoretical model to specify and estimate an empirical model of rural child labor participation. Our results indicate that parental education and household income appear to play the most important role in determining whether a child works, attends school or is idle. Market imperfections, on the other hand, only play an important role in determining whether the child participates in family labor.

Paper 1: “Congo: The Prize of Predation” Abstract: The article analyzes the war against Mobutu (1996–97) and the more recent war (1998– ) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with particular attention to greed and grievance as motivating factors in these two wars. Whereas the authors’ usage of the term ‘greed’ simply reflects the desire to gain control of natural resource rents, they model ‘grievance’ as deliberate institutional differences, implemented by the ruler, between the formal and informal sectors. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative evidence, the authors outline a model of a predatory conflict between a kleptocratic ruler and a group of potential predators within a given region. The potential predators choose between peaceful production and predation on the ruling elite, who control the country’s natural resource rents. It is shown that institutional grievance between the formal and informal sectors, along with the relative strength of the ruler’s defense, play a key role for the initiation of a war. This observation is used to explain the timing of the two wars analyzed in this article. The model also shows that once a war has commenced, the abundance of natural resources and the ruler’s kleptocratic tendencies determine conflict intensity. This result is also well in line with experience from the most recent Congolese war. Paper 2: “Endogenous Institutional Change After Independence” Abstract: Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly-independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries. Paper 3: “Island Status, Country Size and Institutional Quality in Former Colonies” Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of island status and country size on institutional quality, and to determine if these institutional effects can explain the relatively strong economic performance of islands and small countries. One of the main findings of this paper is that the relationship between island status and institutional quality is significantly positive, and that these results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Further, we find that country size is negatively related to institutional quality, which is in keeping with previous results. Finally, using an instrumental variable method we demonstrate that when Rule of Law is included in regressions on levels of per capita GDP, the positive effects of small country size and island status disappear. These results provide further support for our hypothesis that institutions account for these countries' relatively better economic performance. Paper 4: “The Determinants of Rural Child Labor: An Application to India” Abstract: There are several factors that may contribute to the decision to send a child to work, such as poverty, market imperfections and parental preferences. The aim of this paper is to determine empirically the relative importance of these diverse factors on the incidence of child labor in rural India. In order to examine several potentially influential factors separately, we outline a theoretical model of child labor in a peasant household based on the model presented in Bhalotra and Heady (2003) with modifications to allow for the child to participate in different types of labor. We then use the theoretical model to specify and estimate an empirical model of rural child labor participation. Our results indicate that there are significant income effects, and that market imperfections play an important role in determining whether the child participates in family labor. Parental education, however, appears to play the most important role in determining whether a child works, attends school or is idle.

A key event in economic history was the independence of nearly ninety former colonies after World War II. On the basis of qualitative and quantitative evidence, we argue that independence often constituted an institutional disequilibrium that the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post colonial ruler faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases his dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases his ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenuemaximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with actual developments in for instance DR Congo, Ghana, and Zambia.