Search

CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 333 II. OVERVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL 336 A. What is Venture Capital? 336 B. How are Venture Capital Funds Organized? 337 C. How do Venture Capital Funds [...]

On the Hook: Venue, Vicinage, and Double Jeopardy's Relationship with Modern Data Crimes Smith v. United States, 599 U.S. 236 (2023). I. INTRODUCTION Every fisherman has a place he holds [...]

Australia’s Federal Police (AFB) said it hacked into a dedicated encrypted communication platform, Ghost, to dismantle global criminal operations. The action was carried out as part of “Operation Kraken,” a [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 59 TABLE OF CONTENTS 61 I. INTRODUCTION 63 II. PART I: TODAY'S SOFTWARE CRISIS 66 A. The Financial Cost of Software Defects 66 B. Software Vulnerabilities [...], Warranty disclaimers, caps on damages, predispute mandatory arbitration, and anti-class action waivers constitute what I call, "no responsibility" or "rights foreclosure clauses" in computer contracts. This is the first empirical study of how the information industries, which include the 100 largest software companies and the 100 largest digital companies, deploy one-sided warranty disclaimers, caps on damages, and predispute mandatory arbitration clauses coupled with class action waivers to shift responsibility for defective software to the user communities. This gives the information industries carte blanche to release dangerously defective software without consequences. In their standard form contracts, the industries do whatever they wish by incorporating their designed terms and conditions. The software industry assert contractual rights without providing corresponding meaningful remedies for breach in their computer contracts. The net effect of these no responsibility clauses is to require users to waive their right to a judicial forum in favor of arbitration, where the stronger party is at a distinct advantage. Congress needs to enact a federal U.C.C. Article 2 reform that will invalidate no responsibility clauses, thus restoring mutuality in software license agreements.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. CYBER THREATS TO CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT 361 II. OLD LAW, NEW WEAPON 364 A. Offensive Cyber Operations in Armed Conflict 365 B. International Humanitarian Law, [...], Russia's use of offensive cyber operations to further its illegal war against Ukraine has prompted calls for a response to these cyber operations from the International Criminal Court. However, the International Criminal Court is an inadequate forum for adjudicating cyber conduct in armed conflict because cyber operations fit awkwardly into the traditional war crimes legal framework. Furthermore, the Rome Statute's strict substantive and procedural features provide strict limitations on the kinds of cyber conduct that might constitute a war crime against which the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court could bring an effective case. Because most cyber conduct does not produce kinetic effects, the established framework of international humanitarian law that the Rome Statute reflects does not comprehensively regulate the unique domain in which cyber operations occur. This Note argues that observers have overlooked a more promising way of addressing illegal cyber operations in armed conflict: the right to life under international human rights law. As a more malleable body of law that mutually reinforces international humanitarian law, human rights law--and the right to life, in particular--can capture more cyber conduct and hold armed actors accountable for their harmful effects on civilians. Addressing cyber operations through human rights law will also accelerate the development of the law governing cyber operations and encourage a more interdisciplinary approach to evaluating how the cyber domain is governed by complementary fields of international law.

I INTRODUCTION By 2017, when the Australian Government announced its intention to roll out an economy wide Consumer Data Right ('CDR'), over two million Australians were giving away their bank [...], Millions of Austr alians give th eir online banking cr edentials to th ir d par ties so as to gain access to financial products and services enabled by the analysis of the data in their bank accounts. This practice of Screen Scraping ('SS') has contributed significantly to the rise of the FinTech industry. While the risks SS entails are significant, nowhere has the practice been formally outlawed despite the availability of safer data transfer arrangements under Open Banking regimes. We examine approaches to SS in the European Union, the United Kingdom and Australia, and argue that the practice should be prohibited here. Such a ban would have two salutary effects it would protect consumers in financial hardship who use payday loans and it would accelerate uptake of the Consumer Data Right.

As Themistocles sailed along the coasts, wherever he saw places at which the enemy must necessarily put in for shelter and supplies, he inscribed conspicuous writings on stones, some of [...], This article explores the evolving landscape of foreign interference in domestic affairs, particularly in the context of 'information operations' facilitated by the internet. The primary focus of the article is on the lawful authority to respond to external information operations, and how this authority may be shaped by international law. Specifically, the article explores the royal prerogative in two manifestations--the war prerogative, and external affairs prerogative--as a potential source of authority. In doing so, the article employs an analytical framework by Winterton, distinguishing between the 'breadth' and 'depth' of constitutional executive power. The article acknowledges the limited case law and debates surrounding these prerogatives' scope and triggers, and slight nuances between British and Australian jurisprudence. It discusses the relationship between the war prerogative and the existence of armed conflict and touches on how international law can support the exercise of the war prerogative through the 'public policy test'. Drawing from international legal perspectives, the article references United Nations resolutions from 1976 and 1981 that emphasise the importance of domestic legal remedies against information operations. It stresses the duty of states to combat the dissemination of false or distorted news that interferes with other states' internal affairs. In sum, the article concludes that, while countering IOs is a matter requiring domestic legal authority, international law can likely extend the ambit of the royal prerogative and should also, as a matter of public policy, apply to such campaigns.