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We study list price competition when firms can individually target consumer discounts (at a cost) afterwards, and we address recent privacy regulation (like the GDPR) allowing consumers to choose whether to opt-in to targeting. Targeted consumers receive poaching and retention discount offers. Equilibrium discount offers are in mixed strategies, but only two firms vie for each contested consumer and final profits on them are Bertrand-like. When targeting is unrestricted, firm list pricing resembles monopoly. For plausible demand conditions and if targeting costs are not too low, firms and consumers are worse off with unrestricted targeting than banning it. However, targeting induces higher (lower) list prices if demand is convex (concave), and either side of the market can benefit if list prices shift enough in its favour. Given the choice, consumers opt in only when expected discounts exceed privacy costs. Under empirically plausible conditions, opt-in choice makes all consumers better off. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some firms use a curious pricing mechanism called 'pay as you wish' pricing (PAYW). When PAYW is used, a firm lets consumers decide what a product is worth to them and how much they want to pay to get the product. This practice has been observed in a number of industries. In this paper, we theoretically investigate why and where PAYW can be a profitable pricing strategy relative to the conventional 'pay as asked' pricing (PAAP) strategy. We show that PAYW has a number of advantages over PAAP such that it is well suited for some industries but not for others. These advantages are as follows: (1) PAYW helps a firm to maximally penetrate a market; (2) it allows a firm to price discriminate among heterogenous consumers; (3) it helps to moderate price competition. We derive conditions under which PAYW dominates PAAP and discuss ways to improve the profitability of PAYW. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines firms' product policies when they sell an add-on (e.g., Internet service) in addition to a base product (e.g., hotel rooms) under vertical differentiation (e.g., four- versus three-star hotels). I show that the role of an add-on differs; higher-quality firms prefer to sell it as optional to discriminate consumers, and lower-quality firms trade off discrimination and differentiation, trying to lure consumers from higher-quality rivals with a lower-price add-on. Equilibrium policies of lower-quality firms are more sensitive to the cost-to-value ratio of an add-on. If the ratio is sufficiently small, then they sell it to all consumers, potentially explaining why lower-end hotels are more likely than higher-end ones to offer free Internet service. Contrary to consensus in the literature, optional add-ons can intensify price competition over consumers who trade off a higher-quality base product versus a lower-quality base including an add-on. Hence, higher-quality firms are incentivized to commit to bundling, while lower-quality firms prefer to commit to not selling it. Add-ons can further reduce lower-quality firms' profits if consumers cannot observe the prices, because holding up consumers ex post encourages them to switch to higher-quality rivals, which then become better off. Therefore, lower-quality firms are incentivized to advertise add-on prices, and higher-quality firms are not. The online appendix is available at . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms often cite cost savings as a reason why they charge separately for add-ons. Firms also often face situations where consumers' price sensitivity is correlated with their valuation of add-ons. While cost savings may directly translate into profit gains in some scenarios, this study examines the strategic implications of add-on pricing and is the first to suggest that cost savings from add-on pricing may in fact result in profit loss for firms when consumers are heterogeneous in price sensitivity. This is because add-on pricing can trigger a revenue loss that exceeds any cost savings, thus leading to a negative net profit change for competing firms. Even if firms have the capability to pre-commit to not adopting add-on pricing, we show that competing firms can be locked in a prisoner's dilemma where all choose to adopt add-on pricing and lose profits (as compared to none adopting add-on pricing). We further show the possibility that the greater the cost of providing the add-on (and the greater the cost savings generated from add-on pricing), the worse this profit loss gets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U-shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]