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Bees have been excellent model systems to study social learning – the ability of animals to change their behaviour based on observations of other individuals. Researchers have investigated several aspects of social learning in bees, including how it can lead to cultural traditions. A recent study also argues that bees have the capacity to socially learn behaviours that they could not innovate on their own. To understand these findings better, I review what we know about the mechanisms underlying social learning in bees and use these findings to compare social learning and culture in bees and humans. The findings suggest that the seemingly complex social behaviours of bees could arise from simple mechanisms underlying learning in general. I highlight the importance of investigating cognitive mechanisms and how they might differ across animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counterfactuals are alternative outcomes to past events. Curiosity for the counterfactual acts as an important driver of learning under uncertainty and helps to improve on past behaviors by informing future choices. Humans have demonstrated the desire to collect counterfactual information when it is perceived as useful, during times of uncertainty, and even when it comes at a cost. The comparative literature on counterfactual use and curiosity is small but suggests that rhesus macaques may possess similar tendencies to humans. The goal of the current study was to add a new species, capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), to the comparative counterfactual literature and to test capuchins and humans on nearly identical tasks. This study involved a three-choice gambling task that consisted of one hidden and two visible reward values. Visible reward values were always equivalent but had differently colored borders to indicate whether participants would view the counterfactual information associated with the gamble or not on trials when they chose not to gamble. Only humans showed evidence of counterfactual curiosity and collected the information at levels different than chance. Humans also collected counterfactual information significantly more than capuchins, indicating a species difference. However, it is not clear whether this difference is simply due to the capuchins’ lack of curiosity surrounding this particular task or whether there is a broader species difference for seeking counterfactuals resulting from different evolutionary histories of these species.

Largely due to the small number of individuals in captivity, birds of prey remain an understudied, but promising, group for animal cognition research. Variations on the classic string-pulling task have been applied across species to evaluate abilities such as associative learning, means-end understanding, and insight problem solving. Previous research has examined only a few species of raptor on the task such as the Harris’s hawk, great grey owl, and turkey vulture. Here, we explored how 1-3 individuals from each of seven raptor species (turkey vulture, Cathartes aura; barn owl, Tyto alba; western screech owl, Megascops kennicottii; eastern screech owl, Megascops asio; red-tailed hawk, Buteo jamaicensis; Swainson’s hawk, Buteo swainsoni; and Harris’s hawk, Parabuteo unicinctus) responded to a standardized vertical apparatus. Our goal was to replicate, diversify, and extend the literature by documenting how these different species approached the same problem. Two strings were tied around a perch, one of which was baited. Birds underwent multiple 60-min trials. At least one bird from four of the seven species retrieved the food reward. Three individuals retrieved the food consistently across trials, including the first recorded solving by a western screech owl. Birds displayed diverse apparatus-directed behaviors and solving methods which supported our predictions regarding sociality and predation method. We frame our findings as a roadmap for future researchers studying physical problem-solving by raptors.

Abstract Humans categorize body parts, reflecting our knowledge about bodies, and this could be useful in higher-level activities involving bodies. We tested whether humans’ closest living relatives—chimpanzees—have the same ability using touchscreen tasks, focusing on the major parts: heads, torsos, arms, and legs. Six chimpanzees were trained to perform a body part matching-to-sample task using sets of pictures of chimpanzee bodies, where in each trial, the sample and choice pictures were the same. Five passed the training and received the test sessions, where three trial types were mixed: trained same-individual picture pairs; novel same-individual picture pairs; and novel different-individual picture pairs. All participants performed better than the chance level in all conditions and for all body parts. Further analyses showed differences in performance when the samples were different body parts. For example, the results revealed better performances for heads and torsos than arms and legs in “novel different-individual pairs”. The study showed that chimpanzees can visually match and categorize body parts in this experiment setting, even across different chimpanzees’ bodies, suggesting potential biological understanding. Different performances for body parts suggested a deviated categorization from humans. We hope this study will inspire future research on the evolution of body perception.

A central challenge in understanding the evolution of cognition is the ability to compare a set of species differing in a trait of interest while being ecologically and phylogenetically close. Here, we examine whether differences in bower‐building flexibility are related to differences in cognitive flexibility between two Tanganyikan cichlids. Cognitive flexibility enables animals to modify their decision rules when faced with new situations, and inhibitory control, the ability to inhibit a normally favoured response, is an essential component of this capacity. We tested male Aulonocranus dewindti and Cyathopharynx furcifer in a choice‐against‐preference paradigm. Both species clean their bowers of foreign objects and we found that both preferred to remove a snail shell over a stone. We tested their ability to modify this preference and learned to preferably select the stone instead of the shell. Although neither species showed clear learning of the new preference rule, both demonstrated inhibitory control through increased decision times and manipulations of the objects when selecting the stone. Specifically, A. dewindti, the species exhibiting greater behavioural flexibility in the construction of their bowers, selected the stone in fewer trials than C. furcifer, providing support for a link between behavioural flexibility in bower construction and cognitive flexibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under certain conditions, multiple nonhuman species have been observed engaging in choice behavior that resulted in less food earned when compared to the amount of food that was available to be earned over the course of a session. This phenomenon is particularly strong in pigeons, but has also been observed in rats and nonhuman primates. Conversely, human participants have demonstrated a propensity to choose more optimally. However, human participants do not exclusively choose the alternative associated with more reinforcement. Framing a task in a real-world narrative has been effective in improving problem-solving on other tasks such as the Wason Four-Card problem. The present study gave human participants a choice task with either abstract stimuli or with a real-world narrative. In addition, participants were given terminal stimuli that were either predictive or unpredictive of reinforcement. Thus, participants were assigned to one of four conditions: Abstract Predictive, Abstract Unpredictive, Narrative Predictive, or Narrative Unpredictive. In contrast to the improved performance on the Wason Four-Card task, the current study found no evidence that the addition of a real-world narrative improved optimal choice performance. Rather, it may have interfered with optimal choice selection in that participants who received the narrative and unpredictive terminal stimuli were at chance performance at the end of the experimental session. Conversely, participants in the Abstract Unpredictive, Abstract Predictive, and Narrative Predictive conditions all demonstrated a preference for the optimal alternative. Possible mechanisms for these findings and future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperation is common in animals, yet the specific mechanisms driving collaborative behaviour in different species remain unclear. We investigated the proximate mechanisms underlying the cooperative behaviour of bumblebees in two different tasks, where bees had to simultaneously push a block in an arena or a door at the end of a tunnel for access to reward. In both tasks, when their partner's entry into the arena/tunnel was delayed, bees took longer to first push the block/door compared with control bees that learned to push alone. In the tunnel task, just before gaining access to reward, bees were more likely to face towards their partner than expected by chance or compared with controls. These results show that bumblebees' cooperative behaviour is not simply a by-product of individual efforts but is socially influenced. We discuss how bees' turning behaviours, e.g. turning around before first reaching the door when their partner was delayed and turning back towards the door in response to seeing their partner heading towards the door, suggest the potential for active coordination. However, because these behaviours could also be interpreted as combined responses to social and secondary reinforcement cues, future studies are needed to help clarify whether bumblebees truly use active coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans spontaneously and consistently map information coming from different sensory modalities. Surprisingly, the phylogenetic origin of such cross‐modal correspondences has been under‐investigated. A notable exception is the study of Ludwig et al. (Visuoauditory mappings between high luminance and high pitch are shared by chimpanzees [Pan troglodytes] and humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(51), 20661–20665) which reports that both humans and chimpanzees spontaneously map high‐pitched sounds with bright objects and low‐pitched sounds with dark objects. Our pre‐registered study aimed to directly replicate this research on both humans and baboons (Papio papio), an old world monkey which is more phylogenetically distant from humans than chimpanzees. Following Ludwig et al. participants were presented with a visual classification task where they had to sort black and white square (low and high luminance), while background sounds (low or high‐pitched tones) were playing. Whereas we replicated the finding that humans' performance on the visual task was affected by congruency between sound and luminance of the target, we did not find any of those effects on baboons' performance. These results question the presence of a shared cross‐modal pitch‐luminance mapping in other nonhuman primates. Research highlights: Humans and chimpanzees spontaneously associate high‐pitched sounds with bright objects and low‐pitched sounds with dark objects.This effect was not seen in baboons (Papio papio).This result questions the presence of a shared cross‐modal pitch‐luminance mapping between humans and all nonhuman primates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does ecological complexity influence decision making? To facilitate interpretation, laboratory studies often focus on decision tasks with limited options, but animals presumably face more variety in the wild. For example, sometimes species must choose between ephemeral and permanent options, as with choosing between mobile prey and stationary food. The optimal choice is to prioritize the ephemeral option, because it will disappear if not selected first, whereas the permanent option will always be available. In experimental tasks with just these two choices, capuchin monkeys (Sapajus (Cebus) apella) learn to maximize their rewards. However, in the wild, animals presumably face additional sets of choices, for instance two ephemeral or two permanent options, which may make it more difficult to learn the best way to maximize their payouts. Here we show that adding configurations during learning lowers the capuchins' preference for choosing the ephemeral option first. Because recent theoretical work suggests that this more complex version could be solved by grouping the elements through configural learning, half of our subjects underwent training proposed to aid in the configural learning process prior to experiencing the added complexity. This training did not improve the capuchins' ability to pick the ephemeral option first. We consider both what this means for capuchins' and other species' decision making in more complex environments and how we use experimental results to understand animals' cognition and behaviour. • Capuchins and cleaner fish can solve a dichotomous choice to maximize rewards. • Capuchins failed to do so when complexity was added, even after training. • Capuchins' decisions might differ in more complex natural environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Where does arithmetic come from, and why are addition and multiplication its fundamental operations? Although we know that arithmetic is true, no explanation that meets standards of scientific rigor is available from philosophy, mathematical logic, or the cognitive sciences. We propose a new approach based on the assumption that arithmetic has a biological origin: Many examples of adaptive behavior such as spatial navigation suggest that organisms can perform arithmetic-like operations on represented magnitudes. If so, these operations—nonsymbolic precursors of addition and multiplication—might be optimal due to evolution and thus identifiable according to an appropriate criterion. We frame this as a metamathematical question, and using an order-theoretic criterion, prove that four qualitative conditions—monotonicity, convexity, continuity, and isomorphism—are sufficient to identify addition and multiplication over the real numbers uniquely from the uncountably infinite class of possible operations. Our results show that numbers and algebraic structure emerge from purely qualitative conditions, and as a construction of arithmetic, provide a rigorous explanation for why addition and multiplication are its fundamental operations. We argue that these conditions are preverbal psychological intuitions or principles of perceptual organization that are biologically based and shape how humans and nonhumans alike perceive the world. This is a Kantian view and suggests that arithmetic need not be regarded as an immutable truth of the universe but rather as a natural consequence of our perception. Algebraic structure may be inherent in the representations of the world formed by our perceptual system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the invention and development of photography and movie in the 19th century, schools of contemporary art, such as Futurism, have emerged that express the dynamism of motion in painting. Painting techniques such as multiple stroboscopic images, motion blur, and motion lines are culturally based, but the biological basis of their perception has also been intensively investigated recently. Then what are the evolutionary origins of such pictorial representations of motion? Do nonhuman animals also have sensitivity to such representations? To address this question, we examined the effects of motion blur and motion lines on the judgments of global motion directions in chimpanzees. The results showed that the motion lines biased the chimpanzees' judgments toward the direction of motion implied by them, whereas the effect of the motion blur was either absent or weak (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, we manipulated the length and number of motion lines to examine the effect of "speed" and "distance" in addition to the motion direction implied by the motion lines. The results showed that the effect of motion lines became stronger as the length and the number of lines increased within a specific range. These results indicate that the motion lines also imply the direction of motion in chimpanzees and provide a clue to the evolutionary basis for the pictorial representations of motion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract A central challenge in understanding the evolution of cognition is the ability to compare a set of species differing in a trait of interest while being ecologically and phylogenetically close. Here, we examine whether differences in bower‐building flexibility are related to differences in cognitive flexibility between two Tanganyikan cichlids. Cognitive flexibility enables animals to modify their decision rules when faced with new situations, and inhibitory control, the ability to inhibit a normally favoured response, is an essential component of this capacity. We tested male Aulonocranus dewindti and Cyathopharynx furcifer in a choice‐against‐preference paradigm. Both species clean their bowers of foreign objects and we found that both preferred to remove a snail shell over a stone. We tested their ability to modify this preference and learned to preferably select the stone instead of the shell. Although neither species showed clear learning of the new preference rule, both demonstrated inhibitory control through increased decision times and manipulations of the objects when selecting the stone. Specifically, A. dewindti, the species exhibiting greater behavioural flexibility in the construction of their bowers, selected the stone in fewer trials than C. furcifer, providing support for a link between behavioural flexibility in bower construction and cognitive flexibility.

The phenomenon of domesticated dogs looking to humans for information is ubiquitous, yet infrequently observed among other interspecies interactions. Dogs’ inclination to solicit information from humans is in large part a result of the two species’ shared social evolution and niche. Perhaps a more compelling aspect of this relationship is how dogs respond in the face of unexpected, uncertain, and/or novel cues from humans, from whom they frequently solicit information. The influence of human presence on canines’ curiosity about and engagement with their immediate environment is understudied, in part due to challenges in study design. SomeS of these challenges are common to working with and learning from babies of our own species. And, as dogs have developed many mental processes and behaviors similar to preverbal human infants, illuminating strategies for understanding curiosity in babies may prove useful in learning more about how dogs experience the world, with and without people.

Magic is an art form that has fascinated humans for centuries. Recently, the techniques used by magicians to make their audience experience the impossible have attracted the attention of psychologists, who, in just a couple of decades, have produced a large amount of research regarding how these effects operate, focusing on the blind spots in perception and roadblocks in cognition that magic techniques exploit. Most recently, this investigation has given a pathway to a new line of research that uses magic effects to explore the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. This new branch of the scientific study of magic has already yielded new evidence illustrating the power of magic effects as a psychological tool for nonhuman animals. This review aims to give a thorough overview of the research on both the human and nonhuman perception of magic effects by critically illustrating the most prominent works of both fields of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multimodality is a virtually ubiquitous feature of communication. With the increasing interest in how animals, including humans, use multimodal and multicomponent signals in social interactions, there is an acute need for standardized and rigorous tools that will allow us to visualize and analyse these signals as they occur in naturalistic interactions as a complex, integrated system. Network theory is a powerful methodology for intuitively visualizing and investigating the relationships between entities. Here, we propose a new framework for analysing multimodal communication. Using a case study of natural multimodal interactions in wild plains zebras, Equus quagga , we introduce the descriptive power of network metrics by providing an objective set of metrics to (1) describe the relationships between simultaneously produced signals within and between modalities and (2) infer signal meaning and function. We embed these tools in a theoretical framework that can be used to interpret and describe both the global structure of the repertoire and the role individual signals play in shaping and modulating meaning. Next, we review an array of common questions in animal behaviour that could benefit from the use of multimodal networks to facilitate meaningful comparisons of communication across social and environmental contexts, timescales and species. Finally, we discuss extending the use of network analyses to multimodal communication through the use of directed networks and the challenges to be overcome from this application. • Networks can describe relations between simultaneously produced multimodal signals. • We propose a framework for using network theory to analyse multimodal communication. • We use multimodal interactions in plains zebras to illustrate these techniques. • Network theory can be applied to a range of interdisciplinary, comparative questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many pollinators, such as bees, hummingbirds and bats, use multi-destination routes (traplines) to exploit familiar plant resources. However, it is not clear to what extent the mechanisms underpinning trapline development and optimisation are comparable across species. Here we compared route formation, repeatability and efficiency by foragers of two social bee species, the solo foraging bumblebee Bombus terrestris and the mass foraging honey bee Apis mellifera, in the same laboratory conditions. In a simple routing task (with four artificial flowers), all bumblebees and honey bees developed a route, although honey bees were slower to do so. In a more complex routing task (with six flowers), however, only bumblebees developed a route between the 6 flowers. Honey bees took a longer time to discover all flowers and developed routes between fewer flowers. Comparing bumblebees and honey bees using the same experimental paradigm thus revealed key behavioural differences likely resulting from their contrasting collective foraging strategies. Significance statement: Pollinators face some of the most complex foraging challenge among animals: collecting small amounts of nectar from large numbers of flowers in a minimum of time. Previous studies report bees, birds and bats rely on spatial memory to develop routes optimising foraging efficiency. Here we compared this routing behaviour in two major pollinators, the buff-tailed bumblebee and the Western honey bee, in the same experimental conditions. We found that bumblebees were much faster and more efficient at visiting flowers following repeatable sequences than honey bees. This behavioural difference suggests bee cognition is shaped by their social ecology and illuminates about the known complementarity of different bee species for pollination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I report my efforts to investigate what animals perceive, with a focus on one of my comparative cognitive studies in which my colleagues and I examined whether pigeons would perceive Ebbinghaus--Titchener illusion. The results of the first two experiments were consistent with the previous studies, supporting the hypothesis that pigeons, known for their local precedence of visual information, might perceive a reversed version of Ebbinghaus- Titchener illusion (i.e., the size of the circle surrounded by larger circles is perceived larger than surrounded by smaller circles). However, further investigation in the two subsequent experiments provided a more plausible, non-illusory account for both previous and present results. Hasty acceptances of evidence that appears to align with the hypothesis or prediction can be a "pitfall", whereas careful investigation with a healthy dose of skepticism to avoid such pitfalls can contribute to studies involving human participants, for whom verbal instructions and introspection are believed to work well, as well studies involving nonhuman animal subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Tomasello (2016) prominently defends the view that there are uniquely human capacities required for shared intentions, therefore great apes do not share intentions. I show that these uniquely human capacities for abstraction are not necessary for shared intentionality. Excluding great apes from shared intentions because they lack certain capacities for abstraction assumes a specific interpretation of shared intentionality, which I call the Roleplaying Model. I undermine the necessity of abstraction for shared intentionality by presenting an alternative model of shared intentionality, which I call the Normative Model. It is a modification of Margaret Gilbert's (2013) Plural Subject theory, which I modify such that it is, in principle, compatible with nonhuman shared intentionality. To do this, I substitute Gilbert's account of obligation for Kristin Andrews' (2020) account of animal social norms. In this Normative Model, uniquely human capacities for abstraction are not required for shared intentionality. By undermining the necessity of uniquely human abstraction, I make cases of prima-facie cooperation in chimpanzees plausible instances of shared intentionality. The Roleplaying Model's denial of nonhuman shared intentionality creates a problem insofar as apparent shared intentional activity cannot be fully analyzed. The Normative Model resolves this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scatter-hoarding birds find their caches using spatial memory and have an enlarged hippocampus. Finding a cache site could be achieved using either Recollection (a discrete recalling of previously experienced information) or Familiarity (a feeling of "having encountered something before"). In humans, these two processes can be distinguished using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. ROC curves for olfactory memory in rats have shown the hippocampus is involved in Recollection, but not Familiarity. We test the hypothesis that food-hoarding birds, having a larger hippocampus, primarily use Recollection to find their caches. We validate a novel method of constructing ROC curves in humans and apply this method to cache retrieval by coal tits (Periparus ater). Both humans and birds mainly use Familiarity in finding their caches, with lower contribution of Recollection. This contribution is not significantly different from chance in birds, but a small contribution cannot be ruled out. Memory performance decreases with increasing retention interval in birds. The ecology of food-hoarding Parids makes it plausible that they mainly use Familiarity in the memory for caches. The larger hippocampus could be related to associating cache contents and temporal context with cache locations, rather than Recollection of the spatial information itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individual recognition underlies social behaviors in many species and is essential for complex social interactions commonly occurring between conspecifics. Focusing on visual perception, we explored this process in African grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) using the matching-to-sample (MTS) method commonly used in primate research. We used cards made from photographs of familiar conspecific in four consecutive experiments, first testing the ability of our subjects (two male and one female adult) to match the photographs of familiar individuals and then creating modified stimuli cards to determine which visual aspects and features were crucial for successful recognition of a familiar conspecific. All three subjects were able to successfully match different photographs of familiar conspecifics in Experiment 1. Experiments 2-4 showed that modification of the facial area in the photograph had only a weak effect on subjects' success rates in MTS tasks. On the other hand, changes in the plumage color or obscuring of abdominal cues impaired their ability to successfully match conspecifics' photographs in some tasks. This study implies that African grey parrots process visual information holistically. Moreover, the process of individual recognition in this species differs from what we find in primates, including humans, where faces play a crucial role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across human and animal societies, punishment is used as a means of responding to cheating and modifying the behaviour of others. A growing body of work shows that human punishment decisions involve representing both the outcomes of transgressions as well as whether a transgressor chose to do wrong. An important question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals demonstrate a similar sensitivity to choice when punishing. Understanding whether and to what extent animals integrate information about choice into their punishment decisions can shed light on the selective pressures and cognitive mechanisms that shape punishment. Here we explore this question by comparing punishment in cooperative pairs of reef-dwelling cleaner wrasses, Labroides dimidiatus , and humans, Homo sapiens. In study 1, we investigate whether punishment in adult male cleaners is influenced by whether females had a choice to cheat. In study 2, we ask the same question of human adults, using a novel task inspired by the cooperative interactions between pairs of cleaners and their client fish. Our results support previous work finding that punishment of cheating in humans is sensitive to whether transgressors chose to cheat: they punished more when the alternative option was cooperation. However, we did not find a similar sensitivity to alternative options in cleaners. Our results provide a direct comparison of the role of alternative options in punishment decisions in humans and a distantly related cooperative species. We suggest that important cognitive constraints may be in place that limit cleaners' ability to simultaneously represent both the choice a transgressor makes as well as the choices they could have made. • We examined punishment in cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus). • We investigated whether cleaners are sensitive to others' options when punishing. • We compared cleaners to humans in a task modelled on cleaner fish–client mutualism. • Punishment was sensitive to alternative options in humans but not in cleaner fish. • Cleaners might be unable to represent others' choices based on alternative options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Facial communication is important in both human-human interactions and human-dog interactions. Individual factors, such as experience, relationship history, and mood, to name a few, influence the reception of facial signals/expressions. But superficial facial features are also significant in human communication, and likely impact communication between dogs and humans. For example, humans are better at evaluating the frequency and intensity of facial expressions in dogs that have plainer faces, if the dog is familiar to them, which could be related to a preference for non-complexity (human faces are generally much less physically diverse than dog faces). This study explored the effect of the physical complexity of dog and human faces on the perceived expressiveness of neutral-faced, unknown individuals of both species. Results indicate that when looking at static images of unknown dogs and humans, facial complexity has minimal impact on how expressive people perceive them to be. However, dogs are consistently ranked as more expressive than humans, and people who live with dogs tend to rank neutral-face dogs of all facial complexity levels as more expressive compared to the rankings of humans who do not live with dogs – which we hypothesize may be the result of a desire/tendency of dog owners to “read meaning” into dog faces.

Roberts (2020, Learning & Behavior, 48[2], 191-192) discussed research claiming honeybees can do arithmetic. Some readers of this research might regard such claims as unlikely. The present authors used this example as a basis for a debate on the criterion that ought to be used for publication of results or conclusions that could be viewed as unlikely by a significant number of readers, editors, or reviewers.

Humans readily recognize familiar rhythmic patterns, such as isochrony (equal timing between events) across a wide range of rates. This reflects a facility with perceiving the relative timing of events, not just absolute interval durations. Several lines of evidence suggest this ability is supported by precise temporal predictions arising from forebrain auditory–motor interactions. We have shown previously that male zebra finches, Taeniopygia guttata , which possess specialized auditory–motor networks and communicate with rhythmically patterned sequences, share our ability to flexibly recognize isochrony across rates. To test the hypothesis that flexible rhythm pattern perception is linked to vocal learning, we ask whether female zebra finches, which do not learn to sing, can also recognize global temporal patterns. We find that females can flexibly recognize isochrony across a wide range of rates but perform slightly worse than males on average. These findings are consistent with recent work showing that while females have reduced forebrain song regions, the overall network connectivity of vocal premotor regions is similar to males and may support predictions of upcoming events. Comparative studies of male and female songbirds thus offer an opportunity to study how individual differences in auditory–motor connectivity influence perception of relative timing, a hallmark of human music perception. • Female zebra finches can recognize temporal regularity across a wide range of rates. • Regularity detection extends to tempi far outside conspecific male song rates. • Females were slightly worse than males at flexibly detecting temporal regularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chunking is an important cognitive process allowing the compression of information in short-term memory. The aim of this study is to compare the dynamics of chunking during the learning of a visuomotor sequence in humans (Homo sapiens) and Guinea baboons (Papio papio). We duplicated in humans an experimental paradigm that has been used previously in baboons. On each trial, human participants had to point to a moving target on a touch screen. The experiment involved the repetition of the same sequence of nine items over a 1,000 trials. To reproduce as much as possible the conditions under which baboons performed the task, human participants were tested at their own pace. Results revealed that baboons and humans shared similar chunking dynamics: In both species, the sequence was initially parsed into small chunks that became longer and fewer with practice through two reorganization mechanisms (recombinations and concatenations). Differences were also observed regarding the global decrease in response times that was faster and more pronounced in humans compared with baboons. Analyses of these similarities and differences provide new empirical evidence for understanding the general properties of chunking mechanisms in sequence learning and its evolution across species. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countless discussions have been generated by the animal language studies, specifically those utilizing mechanical interfaces, termed here Augmentative Interspecies Communication (AIC) devices (e.g., lexigrams; magnetic chips; keyboards). Overall, three concerns dominate the field: (1) claims that AIC device using animals manifest linguistic skills remain nebulous, and simpler alternative mechanisms have been proposed (e.g., associative learning); (2) such methodology may be unsuitable as some theorize AIC device interfaces are not sufficiently ecologically relevant to foster meaningful use; (3) data may be considered dubious due to potential cueing from experimenters and lack of systematicity in reporting training and performance. Despite such controversy—which eventually led to the field's deterioration around the last quarter of the twentieth century—this research also saw important successes, such as improvements in captive animal welfare, the outcomes of which hold promise for future interspecies communication work. This article is categorized under:Linguistics > Evolution of Language [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pollinators, such as bees, develop flexible memories of colors, patterns, and shapes, for efficient flower recognition. Here we tested whether other flower-foraging insects have evolved similar cognitive abilities underpinning flexible visual learning. We trained wild hornets from two species commonly found in Europe, the invasive yellow-legged hornet (Vespa velutina nigrithorax) and the European hornet (Vespa crabro), to associate sucrose solution rewards to color stimuli in a Y-maze. Hornets from both species succeeded in differential and reversal learning and developed short-term memories of the learnt associations. Thus, just like bees, hornets can learn various visual cue-reward associations and remember them for at least 1 h for selecting flowers. Our study in non-model species illustrates how standard conditioning approaches can be used to explore and compare the cognitive abilities of animals sharing similar foraging ecologies. Significance statement: Bees can learn an impressive diversity of visual cues to recognize the best rewarding flowers. This can be studied using Y-maze in which individual insects must learn to associate visual stimuli to the presence or absence of nectar rewards. Here, using the same approach, we show that hornets are also capable of these associations. We compared the learning abilities of hornets from two common species in Europe and found that they could similarly learn to discriminate two colors and keep this information in memory for at least 1 h. Hornets thus evolved visual cognition facilitating robust flower foraging, like bees and many other pollinators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of music has long been of interest to researchers from various disciplines. Scholars have put forth numerous hypotheses regarding the evolution of music. With the rise of cross-species research on music cognition, researchers hope to gain a deeper understanding of the phylogenic evolution, behavioral manifestation, and physiological limitations of the biological ability behind music, known as musicality. This paper presents the progress of beat perception and synchronization (BPS) research in cross-species settings and offers varying views on the relevant hypothesis of BPS. The BPS ability observed in rats and other mammals as well as recent neurobiological findings presents a significant challenge to the vocal learning and rhythm synchronization hypothesis if taken literally. An integrative neural-circuit model of BPS is proposed to accommodate the findings. In future research, it is recommended that greater consideration be given to the social attributes of musicality and to the behavioral and physiological changes that occur across different species in response to music characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human adolescence is characterized by a suite of changes in decision-making and emotional regulation that promote risky and impulsive behavior. Accumulating evidence suggests that behavioral and physiological shifts seen in human adolescence are shared by some primates, yet it is unclear if the same cognitive mechanisms are recruited. We examined developmental changes in risky choice, intertemporal choice, and emotional responses to decision outcomes in chimpanzees, our closest-living relatives. We found that adolescent chimpanzees were more risk-seeking than adults, as in humans. However, chimpanzees showed no developmental change in intertemporal choice, unlike humans, although younger chimpanzees did exhibit elevated emotional reactivity to waiting compared to adults. Comparisons of cortisol and testosterone indicated robust age-related variation in these biomarkers, and patterns of individual differences in choices, emotional reactivity, and hormones also supported a developmental dissociation between risk and choice impulsivity. These results show that some but not all core features of human adolescent decision-making are shared with chimpanzees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans rely on dogs for countless tasks, ranging from companionship to highly specialized detection work. In their daily lives, dogs must navigate a human-built visual world, yet comparatively little is known about what dogs visually attend to as they move through their environment. Real-world eye-tracking, or head-mounted eye-tracking, allows participants to freely move through their environment, providing more naturalistic results about visual attention while interacting with objects and agents. In dogs, real-world eye-tracking has the potential to inform our understanding of cross-species cognitive abilities as well as working dog training; however, a robust and easily deployed head-mounted eye-tracking method for dogs has not previously been developed and tested. We present a novel method for real-world eye-tracking in dogs, using a simple head-mounted mobile apparatus mounted onto goggles designed for dogs. This new method, adapted from systems that are widely used in humans, allows for eye-tracking during more naturalistic behaviors, namely walking around and interacting with real-world stimuli, as well as reduced training time as compared to traditional stationary eye-tracking methods. We found that while completing a simple forced-choice treat finding task, dogs look primarily to the treat, and we demonstrated the accuracy of this method using alternative gaze-tracking methods. Additionally, eye-tracking revealed more fine-grained time course information and individual differences in looking patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Model of Hierarchical Complexity is a behavioral model of development and evolution of the complexity of behavior. It is based on task analysis. Tasks are ordered in terms of their hierarchical complexity, which is an ordinal scale that measures difficulty. The hierarchical difficulty of tasks is categorized as the order of hierarchical complexity. Successful performance on a task is called the behavioral stage. This model can be applied to non-human animals, and humans. Using data from some of the simplest animals and also somewhat more complex ones, this analysis describes the four lowest behavioral stages and illustrate them using the behaviors of a range of simple organisms. For example, Stage 1 tasks, and performance on them, are addressed with automatic unconditioned responses. Behavior at this Stage includes sensing, tropisms, habituation and, other automatic behaviors. Single cell organisms operate at this Stage. Stage 2 tasks include these earlier behaviors, but also include respondent conditioning but not operant conditioning. Animals such as some simple invertebrates have shown respondent conditioning, but not operant conditioning. Stage 3 tasks coordinate three instances of these earlier tasks to make possible operant conditioning. These stage 3 performances are similar to those of some invertebrates and also insects. Stage 4 tasks organisms coordinate 2 or more circular sensory-motor task actions into a superordinate “concept”. This explanation of the early stages of the Model of Hierarchical Complexity may help future research in animal behavior, and comparative psychology.

Simple Summary: The traditional view of cognition is that it is something that differentiates humans from other species. There is growing evidence, however, that if one "asks" other animals appropriately, they often show evidence that they too are capable of cognitive processes thought to be unique to humans. Furthermore, several behaviors thought to involve complex human cognition that are presumed to be culturally learned can be shown to occur in other species as well. Results such as these suggest that simpler processes are likely to be involved. Together, these lines of research demonstrate that the cognitive distinctions that have been made between humans and other animals may be greatly exaggerated. The present review focuses on several cognitive phenomena that can be demonstrated in animals. The review focuses primarily on pigeons (because they are not thought to be especially cognitive compared to primates) out of convenience, because they are a highly visual species. A better understanding of the similarities between humans and other animals should help foster improved treatment of nonhuman species, as well as, in some cases, improved treatment of disordered human behavior. The field of comparative cognition represents the interface between the cognitive behavior of humans and other animals. In some cases, research demonstrates that other animals are capable of showing similar cognitive processes. In other cases, when animals show behavior thought to be culturally determined in humans, it suggests that simpler processes may be involved. This review examines research primarily with pigeons (out of convenience because of their visual ability). I start with the concept of sameness and follow with the concept of stimulus equivalence, the building blocks of human language. This is followed by research on directed forgetting, the cognitive ability to maintain or forget information. A hallmark of cognition is transitive inference performance (if A < B, and B < C, the understanding that A < C), but the variety of species that show this ability suggests that there may be simpler accounts of this behavior. Similarly, experiments that demonstrate a form of cognitive dissonance in animals suggest that dissonance may not be necessary to explain this biased behavior. Furthermore, examples of sunk cost in pigeons suggests that the human need to continue working on a failing project may also have a biological basis. Finally, pigeons show a preference for a suboptimal choice that is similar to unskilled human gambling, a finding that may clarify why humans are so prone to engage in this typically losing activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Helping behavior are actions aiming at assisting another individual in need or to relieve their distress. The occurrence of this behavior not only depends on automated physiological mechanisms, such as imitation or emotional contagion, that is, the individual's emotion and physiological state matching with others, but also needs motivation to sustain. From a comparative and developmental perspective, we discover that the motivation for helping behavior has a deep foundation both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. For example, empathic concern for others, relieving personal distress and the desire for social contact are universal motivations across rodents, non-human primates and human early childhoods. Therefore, a circle-layered model integrating evidences for motivation for helping behavior from rodent to human early childhood research is proposed: the inner circle contains the emotional-behavioral system and the outer circle contains the affective-cognitive system. The application of this model has significance for both behavioral neuroscience research and cultivating prosocial behavior in human society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For this special issue in honor of Dr. Sarah (Sally) Boysen's career, we review studies on point following in nonhuman animals. Of the 126 papers that we documented on this topic published since the publication of Povinelli, Nelson, and Boysen (1990, Journal of Comparative Psychology, 104, 203–210), 94 (75%) were published in the past 15 years, including 22 in the past 5 years, indicating that this topic is still an active area of interest in the field of animal behavior and cognition. We present results of a survey of publication trends, discussing the species tested and the sample sizes, and we note methodological considerations and current multilaboratory approaches. We then categorize and synthesize the research questions addressed in these studies, which have been at both the ultimate level (e.g., questions related to evolutionary adaptiveness and phylogenetic differences) and proximate level (e.g., questions related to experiential and temperamental processes). Throughout, we consider future directions for this area of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interconnection of behaviors is a process that describes how independently acquired behavioral repertoires can be combined together as a new sequence of behaviors. Manipulations of training, training context and experience of failure in the test situation can hinder this interconnection of previously acquired behaviors. We tested whether wild New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) could perform a sequence of six independently acquired behaviors in order to fetch a stone from inside a box in a nearby room and use it to gain food from a stone dropping apparatus. However, crows were only trained on three or four of the six behaviors required, and these prerequisites were trained in different contexts. One of the crows that learned four prerequisites solved the task. Neither of the crows that learned three prerequisites solved the task. The crows that learned four prerequisites, but did not solve the problem, were later trained in an additional behavior and then were able to solve the task. These results shows that New Caledonian crows are able to produce novel behavioral solutions to new problems by interconnecting behaviors learned in different contexts, with different consequences and despite experience of failure after the first exposure to the task.

Did the boy bite the cat or was it the other way around? When processing a sentence with several objects, one has to establish ‘who did what to whom’. When a sentence cannot be interpreted by recalling an image from memory, we rely on the special type of voluntary constructive imagination called Prefrontal synthesis (PFS). PFS is defined as the ability to juxtapose mental visuospatial objects at will. We hypothesised that PFS has fundamental importance for language acquisition. To test this hypothesis, we designed a PFS-targeting intervention and administered it to 6,454 children with language deficiencies (age 2 to 12 years). The results from the three-year-long study demonstrated that children who engaged with the PFS intervention showed 2.2-fold improvement in combinatorial language comprehension compared to children with similar initial evaluations. These findings suggest that language can be improved by training the PFS and exposes the importance of the visuospatial component of language. This manuscript reflects on the experimental findings from the point of view of human language evolution. When used as a proxy for evolutionary language acquisition, the study results suggest a dichotomy of language evolution, with its speech component and its visuospatial component developing in parallel. The study highlights the radical idea that evolutionary acquisition of language was driven primarily by improvements of voluntary imagination rather than by improvements in the speech apparatus.

Studies of animal cognition struggle frequently with the question of how representative results from small samples are for a species. A recent article by Farrar et al. (2021), in this journal, highlights some of the major problems and suggests some solutions to these with cautionary examples drawn from the animal cognition literature. One such example comes from a study of inhibitory control in the great tit, Parus major, by the authors of this commentary. Although we recognize, and agree, that there are issues regarding representativeness in studies of animal cognition, we disagree with the use of our inhibitory control study as a cautionary example. Here, we explain why we think that our study is representative of Great tit inhibitory control. In fact, some of our arguments as to why our study is representative are in agreement with suggestions by Farrar et al (2021), e.g., comparing individuals with different levels of previous experiences in the cognitive paradigm under investigation. Moreover, we also add to Farrar et al.’s (2021) conclusion on how to approach studies with ambiguous representativeness by highlighting the importance of recognizing and discussing methodological differences in studies of cognitive ability. In summary, we do not argue against the valid points laid out by Farrar et al (2021), but discuss important nuances of the representativeness issue to also consider and, most importantly, add an additional point of scrutiny to account for in comparative animal cognition research.

The extent to which dogs (Canis familiaris) as a domesticated species understand human intentions is still a matter of debate. The unwilling–unable paradigm has been developed to examine whether nonhuman animals are sensitive to intentions underlying human actions. In this paradigm, subjects tended to wait longer in the testing area when presented with a human that appeared willing but unable to transfer food to them compared to an unwilling (teasing) human. In the present study, we conducted the unwilling–unable paradigm with dogs using a detailed behavioural analysis based on machine-learning driven three-dimensional tracking. Throughout two preregistered experiments, we found evidence, in line with our prediction, that dogs reacted more impatiently to actions signalling unwillingness to transfer food rather than inability. These differences were consistent through two different samples of pet dogs (total n = 96) and they were evident also in the machine-learning generated three-dimensional tracking data. Our results therefore provide robust evidence that dogs distinguish between similar actions (leading to the same outcome) associated with different intentions. However, their reactions did not lead to any measurable preference for one experimenter over the other in a subsequent transfer phase. We discuss different cognitive mechanisms that might underlie dogs' performance in this paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attentional set shifting is a core ingredient of cognition, allowing for fast adaptation to changes in the environment. How this skill compares between humans and other primates is not well known. We examined performance of 3- to 5-year-old children and chimpanzees on a new attentional set shifting task. We presented participants with two shelves holding the same set of four boxes. To choose the correct box on each shelf, one has to switch attention depending on which shelf one is currently presented with. Experiment 1 (forty-six 3- to 5-year olds, predominantly European White) established content validity, showing that the majority of errors were specific switching mistakes indicating failure to shift attention. Experiment 2 (one hundred and seventy-eight 3- to 6-year olds, predominantly European White) showed that older children made fewer mistakes, but if mistakes were made, a larger proportion were switching mistakes rather than 'random' errors. Experiment 3 (52 chimpanzees) established suitability of the task for non-human great apes and showed that chimpanzees' performance was comparable to the performance of 3- and 4-year olds, but worse than 5-year olds. These results suggest that chimpanzees and young children share attentional set shifting capacities, but that there are unique changes in the human lineage from 5 years of age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communication to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species' social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species comparisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmatics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important question in the study of canine cognition is how dogs understand humans, given that they show impressive abilities for interacting and communicating with us. In this review, we describe and discuss studies that have investigated dogs' perspective-taking abilities. There is solid evidence that dogs are not only sensitive to the gaze of others, but also their attention. We specifically address the question whether dogs have the ability to take the perspective of others and thus come to understand what others can or cannot perceive. From the latter, they may then infer what others know and use this representation to anticipate what others do next. Still, dogs might simply rely on directly observable cues and on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what others can perceive. And instead of making inferences from representations of others' mental states, they may have just learned that certain behaviours of ours lead to certain outcomes. However, recent research seems to challenge this low-level explanation. Dogs have solved several perspective-taking tasks instantly and reliably across a large number of variations, including geometrical gaze-following, stealing in the dark, concealing information from others, and Guesser/Knower differentiation. In the latter studies, dogs' choices between two human informants were strongly influenced by cues related to the humans' visual access to the food, even when the two informants behaved identically. And finally, we review a recent study that found dogs reacting differently to misleading suggestions of human informants that have either a true or false belief about the location of food. We discuss this surprising result in terms of the comprehension of reality-incongruent mental states, which is considered as a hallmark of Theory of Mind acquisition in human development. Especially on the basis of the latter findings, we conclude that pet dogs might be sensitive to what others see, know, intend, and believe. Therefore, this ability seems to have evolved not just in the corvid and primate lineages, but also in dogs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]