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Ranking decision making units (DMUs) is an important topic in data en-velopment analysis (DEA). When efficient DMUs or inefficient DMUs have the same efficiency score, the traditional DEA model usually fails to rank all DMUs. For the sake of comparing and improving the discrimination power of DMUs, some proposed approaches use cooperative game theory for rank-ing DMUs. In this paper, communication game theory, which includes a transferable utility cooperative game and an undirected graph describing limited cooperation between players, can be used to rank DMUs. The idea is that the ranking of DMUs can be done by measuring the effect of remov-ing a subset of DMUs on the total share of the remaining DMUs obtained by the reference frontier share model. In the proposed approach, the play-ers are the DMUs, and the characteristic function measures the increase and decrease in the total share of each DMU. The current paper considers the total share for efficient and inefficient DMUs to rank all DMUs. The proposed approach has been tested on several datasets and compared with the results of the previous ranking methods, which sometimes coincide. In the empirical study, a complete ranking of DMUs is useful and reasonable.

Ranking decision making units (DMUs) is an important topic in data envelopment analysis (DEA). When efficient DMUs or inefficient DMUs have the same efficiency score, the traditional DEA model usually fails to rank all DMUs. For the sake of comparing and improving the discrimination power of DMUs, some proposed approaches use cooperative game theory for ranking DMUs. In this paper, communication game theory, which includes a transferable utility cooperative game and an undirected graph describing limited cooperation between players, can be used to rank DMUs. The idea is that the ranking of DMUs can be done by measuring the effect of removing a subset of DMUs on the total share of the remaining DMUs obtained by the reference frontier share model. In the proposed approach, the players are the DMUs, and the characteristic function measures the increase and decrease in the total share of each DMU. The current paper considers the total share for efficient and inefficient DMUs to rank all DMUs. The proposed approach has been tested on several datasets and compared with the results of the previous ranking methods, which sometimes coincide. In the empirical study, a complete ranking of DMUs is useful and reasonable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Randomized response survey methods use noise to mask respondents' answers to stigmatizing questions in an attempt to elicit honest responses. Respondents weigh the preference for honesty against the disutility of stigmatization when deciding how to answer. Since the disutility of stigmatization depends on the degree of noise, the interviewer designs the survey to balance two goals: (i) honest reporting by respondents and (ii) maximization of the accuracy of estimates based on the survey. We fully characterize the non-linear set of design parameters that lead to truth-telling, as well as the interviewer's equilibrium survey design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Standard approaches to model interaction networks are limited in their capacity to describe the nuances of real communication. We present a game theoretical framework to quantify the effect of intermediaries on the interaction between agents. Inspired by the seminal work Myerson (1977). on cooperative structures in cooperative games, we set the basis for multidimensional network analysis within game theory. More specifically, an extension of the point-arc game Feltkamp and van den Nouwe51 land (1992). is introduced, generalizing the analysis of cooperative games to multigraphs. An efficient algorithm is proposed for the computation of Shapley value of this game. We prove the validity of our approach by applying it to a intermediaries network model. We are able to recover meaningful results on the dependence of the game outcome on the intermediaries network. This work contributes to the optimal design of networks in economic environments and allows the ranking of players in complex networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vowel systems exhibit organization, and several theoretical ac-counts have been proposed to explain this. A prominent ac-count explains organization in terms of maximizing the disper-sion of vowels, increasing acoustic perceptibility while reduc-ing articulatory effort. This implies modality-independence,but leaves open questions about the extent to which dispersionis driven by articulatory or acoustic pressures. We investigatedwhether vowel-like organization would emerge in a novel vi-sual communication system in the laboratory, in which partic-ipants took turns to send color signals to communicate a set ofanimal referents by moving their fingers around a color space.We manipulated the extent to which sender and receiver needswere aligned. Overall, systems exhibited significant levels ofdispersion; participants also took into account receiver needs,withconsequences for the structure of the resulting systems.

This study aims to improve students’ speaking skills using the combined strategies of communication game, recorded role play and peer feedback activities. This action research took place at an English institution in Jakarta, Indonesia and collected the data by observing the learning process with the collaborator, analyzing the video during the class, making field notes, conducting tests (pretest and post test) and interviewing students. There were three cycles in this study. Results of the tests showed that students’ speaking skills improved. The mean score of pre-test was 3.1, while the mean score of post-test in cycle one was 3.3, cycle two 3.5 and cycle three 3.6. Based on the interview, all students were interested in and excited about the use of the three strategies above. However, there was a problem with the implementation of peer feedback activities; it was time consuming. The results of this study can not only promote an idea for EFL teachers to use the strategies as an alternative approach to teaching speaking skills but also inspire EFL teachers to be more creative in using these three strategies

The subtle threads between Mankind and Nature involve all our senses and more particularly our auditive sensitivity. Capturing tonalities, rhythms, and melodies, we can like a bird fly down from the celestial vault to the Earth, dwelling-place of Highlander-islanders known as the Palawan who live in the southern part of the island by the same name. This aural voyage will take us to the realm of words, poetry, and music as human creations which the Palawan use to communicate in order to live harmoniously in this world.

A seller wants a buyer to choose a good whose value is the seller's private information. The buyer's memory is limited, and she decides whether to remember the good conditional on a signal about the value. The seller then decides whether to send a costless message that can remind the buyer of the good. Since the reminder could convey the seller's private information in equilibrium, whether to send a reminder is a non-trivial question. It is shown that costless messages can be informative in equilibrium in spite of the strong conflict of interest between the players. In any informative equilibrium, silence conveys positive information about the value, whereas the reminder conveys negative information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the relation between important concepts, Myerson value developed in economics (bargaining theory) and betweenness centrality widely used in sociology. In the communication game in which a value is generated only from a connected pair of players, I give a network-based interpretation for the Myerson value of a player as his average betweenness centrality in a network. I also propose various concepts of betweenness centrality (betweenness centrality, weighted betwecnness centrality and generalized weighted betweenness centrality), and show that generalized weighted betweenness ccntrality converges to weighted betweenness centrality as the discount factor approaches one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game as Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of words and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Anti-jamming games have become a popular research topic. However, there are not many publications devoted to such games in the case of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). We considered a VANET anti-jamming game on the road using a realistic driving model. Further, we assumed the quadratic power function in both vehicle and jammer utility functions instead of the standard linear term. This makes the game model more realistic. Using mathematical methods, we expressed the Nash equilibrium through the system parameters in single-channel and multi-channel cases. Since the network parameters are usually unknown, we also compared the performance of several reinforcement learning algorithms that iteratively converge to the Nash equilibrium predicted analytically without having any information about the environment in the static and dynamic scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]