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Public employee pension management is the nexus of public and private financial management systems that are significant long-term components of public finance. The idea that these pension systems can look quite similar yet perform in quite different and conflicting ways is significant when designing policy; system design templates are not successful in complex systems. Even pension systems within the same city can have radically different states of actuarial health based upon small differences in the rules (or adherence to the rules) establishing them. To better understand such systems, viewing them from a common pool resource perspective is useful. Elinor Ostrom (1990) , in her seminal book Governing the Commons, provides eight principles that facilitate governing common pool resources. The general theme running through Ostrom's principles is the need to facilitate the building and channeling of social capital. By facilitating constructive collective choice, the goal of effective, sustainable collective action is achievable. In this study, we examine the political, cultural, and institutional structures that are in place in the pension systems of Dallas and Houston, Texas. We examine the pensions' governance practices to determine which appear to violate Ostrom's ideal institutional arrangements and their impact on the pensions' long-term sustainability. Pertinent survey information from pension beneficiaries conducted as part of this research are provided [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a lab-in-the-field experiment with Ugandan fishers, we study if and how the use of a common pool resource changes when the resource is either scarce or abundant and when the number of users increases over time. Both resource scarcity and a growing group require users to be more constrained, that is, more cooperative, in order to maintain the resource. However, the results show that fishers do not curtail their harvesting behavior under increased pressure, leading to rapid overexploitation when scarce resources are used by a growing group. This implies a particular need for sustainable management when scarce resources are exposed to in-migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nudges are widely used and a broad literature documents that they successfully affect individual behavior. However, in most settings where nudges are needed to change collective action, teams – not individuals – determine outcomes. Because team decision making is pervasive, learning whether nudges work with teams in social dilemmas is important, especially when formal enforcement is difficult. Here, we show that a nudge increases team cooperation by 14 to 16 percentage points in a social dilemma among fishing crews at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The nudge is particularly effective when team decisions are made by a team member with leadership experience. Our findings are a proof of concept that expands the toolkit of empirical researchers and policy makers that address social dilemmas among teams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a worldwide increasing interest in forest ecosystem services (FESs), especially regulating and cultural ones. Providing FESs requires the shift towards a multifunctional forest management approach, and forest owners are key figures in this process. Current research on motivations and attitudes of forest owners towards provision of regulating and cultural FES focuses on non-industrial private forest owners but neglects community-owned forests, despite them being often innovative and multifunctional models of forest resource management. The paper explores the views of community-owned forest institutions to provide forest recreation. Sixteen cases have been studied in an alpine valley in Italy, where these institutions have been existing since hundreds of years. Q methodology was used. Q methodology is a semi-qualitative technique used to systematically analyze diverse points of view among individuals or groups by having them rank statements on a topic, allowing for the identification of similar views. Results show a general positive view of community-owned forest institutions towards providing recreation but with nuanced positions, which could be clustered in two groups. The first and largest group looked favourably at providing more forest recreation; the change towards forest recreation was however conditional to maintain adequate levels of income and receiving external support from public authorities. The latter and smaller group was more sceptical, being concerned about the potential negative impacts of visitors in the forest. Both groups stressed that sensitivity and respect of the visitors towards the property are decisive factors for accepting and improving public accessibility. The paper reflects on the challenges for these traditional forms of forest ownership in front of new societal demands, and concludes that, regarding forest recreation, the attitudes of community-owned forest institutions are not very different than those of other private forest owners.

This paper presents a first conceptualization for decentralized project delivery through the combination of blockchain technology and common pool resource governance theory, also known as the ”crypto commons”. While previous literature on project delivery models identifies the use of decentralized governance, there is not yet a holistic conceptualization nor a specific overview of governance applications that can be applied. To develop the concept, we use a literature review to synthesize fourteen blockchain governance mechanisms useful for managing the crypto-commons. Subsequently, we use systematic combining to identify twenty-two specific applications for decentralized project delivery in the construction industry, one of the largest project-based industries. Each application is briefly reviewed, and examples of their relevance to realize decentralized project delivery models are provided. We discuss the potential for novel forms of project delivery, but also the need for future research on the applications, as well as on the system level implications, the system design challenges, and the implementation barriers in the specific context of the construction industry. Overall, the concepts and mechanisms presented provide a theoretical foundation upon which future researchers can use to design novel decentralized project delivery models.

In this article, we argue that many contemporary challenges to democracy can be traced back to how political organizations compete for attention. We begin with the idea that these organizations appeal for attention both by mobilizing their own members, and also through media that reaches a wider audience, such as social media and mass media. But since many organizations are competing for the limited attention of this wider audience, they all have an incentive to send "too many" and "too sensational" messages. This overwhelms the audience and leads to polarization and populism. Our article describes the conditions necessary for this "tragedy of the commons" to occur and also reviews empirical evidence demonstrating that these conditions are met. We find that social media is not a necessary condition for the model, but does accelerate it. We conclude that Elinor Ostrom's theories of the commons are important for understanding political communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of O Social em Questão is the property of Faculdades Catolicas - Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, we analyze how public monitoring and enforcement (M&E) efforts affect the success of a collective property right. We develop a bioeconomic model to generate several theoretical predictions, which we test empirically by assembling and analyzing novel data on public patrolling and fishing activity in the Chilean abalone fishery. Consistent with our model, we find robust evidence that patrolling increases abalone stocks and harvest for nearby fishers' organizations. In our preferred (conservative) specifications, a 10% increase in patrolling increases stock density by 0.95% and harvest by 1.2%, which translates roughly to an increase in annual revenues of 6770 USD on average within a port captainship jurisdiction. Our work provides new empirical evidence on the determinants of success for collective property rights regimes, revealing the pivotal role that public M&E can play in helping sustain these institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Water supply from a common pool resource based on productivity indicators for different uses is one of the goals of planning in dry areas. Productivity indicators are defined based on time, geographical location and hydrological conditions in the form of food security, economic benefits and ecosystem restoration. This study was conducted in order to evaluate the contrast between economic criteria and food security in the exploitation of water resources in Lu'an city in Anhui province of China. Probabilistic modeling based on the prediction of uncertain values using the Latin hypercube technique was used for hydrological variables and water resources. The method of data mining and trend analysis of dependent variables was also simulated to estimate economic values in the water cycle. Statistical information of 32 years from 1991 to 2022 has been collected and used as an annual average per population. The results showed that the economic value of water consumption in the tourism industry has increased compared to agriculture. The total water provided for food security is equal to 6.5 m3 per person, the excess of which can be allocated to other uses through weighting indicators based on ecosystem and quality. HIGHLIGHTS The bargaining approach in water supply between the two beneficiaries of agriculture and tourism has been evaluated.; The results showed that the increase in water permits in the tourism industry has increased the economic value of water allocation.; The bargaining model showed that the weight of food security is more in the desirable functions of the ecosystem.;

Creating a structure for allocating water from common pool resources is a serious problem in agricultural water management. In this research, an attempt has been made based on bi-objective optimization and the non-dominated theory to create the water allocation models for the cultivation pattern. The water allocated in each irrigation event was defined as the decision variable in this structure. Two objective functions include the following: (1) maximizing and minimizing the water allocation and (2) minimizing conflicts between beneficiaries in the Hebei Plain. Conflicts between beneficiaries were formulated based on the ratio between the crop area and water allocation and were defined by an inertia weight to increase its effect on the final iterations of the process. The Whale Optimization Algorithm was included as a bi-objective algorithm in the decision-making process. The number of decision variables and feasible domains in each decision model is different and creates a crowding distance for competition between operators. The results showed that the water allocation planning structure based on the evaluation index had the best solution front. HIGHLIGHTS An optimization model based on conflict resolution has been developed for agricultural water allocation.; The whale optimization algorithm has been used to minimize the conflict and extract underground water.; Planning based on water variables is the most important factor in saving groundwater resources.;

Scholarship shows that community forests can be sustainably self-governed through collective action. In the Western Ghats (India), many NGOs have risen to support communities with this task. Few scientific studies explore NGO interventions in CPR governance. As a result, we observe a risk of over-generalising scientific knowledge over many different contexts when designing interventions, resulting in prescriptive institutional panaceas. We ask: Can design principles be applied by practitioners, NGOs in particular, in designing forest CPR interventions while avoiding institutional panaceas? We identified 12 design principles for sustainable community CPR governance in literature. We compared these conditions against NGO interventions in the Western Ghats. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews and document analysis of 10 NGOs. We found that NGOs applied most design principles through a range of particular activities. By combining these activities in different ways based on local contexts and intervention stage, we show how the concern about over-generalisation of design principles could be avoided.

Common pool groundwater resources may be susceptible to overexploitation but can potentially be managed collectively. However, few studies explore the potential for successful collective action ex-ante. We conduct an ex-ante assessment of the potential for collective action by users of a groundwater body, to identify whether necessary conditions are in place, using a mixed methods approach based on literature, expert consultation, and Q methodology. While some aspects were conducive to collective action, under current conditions it appears unlikely that users will self-organize. Four user sub-groups were identified, differing in terms of resource perceptions and prosocial behavior, with potential for tapping into the skills of potential leaders and capitalizing on the prosocial intent of team players, while building bridges for cooperation with sceptics and non-users. Such ex-ante assessment can serve to identify which conditions need to be cultivated to foster cooperation and to identify strategies for engaging with different user sub-groups.

This study investigates the roles of informal gatekeepers in the context of First Nations health care in Canada. While existing literature focuses on gatekeeping by professionals, such as corporate board members, auditors, general practitioners, and specialists, we present empirical evidence on the role of informal First Nations' gatekeepers in a health care system. Gatekeepers engage with government and First Nations along a continuum of gatekeeping functions. Drawing on common pool theory, we use a case study to understand the gatekeepers' roles. We identify First Nations gatekeepers' roles to include health care program control, resource control, and ecosystem control. We also find that these gatekeepers constitute a viable long‐enduring common pool resource institution that can be useful for the federal government's phased approach in transitioning health care governance to the First Nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sharing resources between members of different tribes and collectives is common and well-documented. Surprisingly, little is known about factors that are conducive to building social relationships between groups. We design a common-pool resource experiment, where after harvesting, groups can send some of their harvest to augment the resource of the outgroup. We compare donations made by individuals collectively and independently of other group members, under the conditions of equal and unequal resources. We find that individuals acting as decision-makers, but not groups, donate harvests frequently even though it is payoff-reducing. We conduct an additional treatment, where each donation is matched (doubled) by an equivalent transfer of resources, making sharing between groups payoff-improving. Under matching donations, sharing between groups flourishes, but fails to prevent resource decline in most groups. Finally, our experiment reveals that members of low-endowment groups overharvest resources in expectation of donations from affluent groups, which leads to the tragedy of the commons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this work we study problems of common-pool resources from a cooperative point of view. In particular we analyse whether it is possible for agents to agree to form a coalition to coordinate their level of appropriation and thus, avoid the tragedy of the commons. For this purpose, we investigate how agents in a coalition choose their joint level of appropriation (depending on the behavior of appropriators outside such coalition). Finally, we propose a way of associating with each problem (of common-pool resources) a game with externalities and studied its Core. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pervasive overuse and degradation of common pool resources (CPRs) is a global concern. To sustainably manage CPRs, effective governance institutions are essential. A large literature has developed to describe the institutional design features employed by communities that successfully manage their CPRs. Yet, these designs remain far from universally adopted. We focus on one prominent institutional design feature, community monitoring, and ask whether nongovernmental organizations or governments can facilitate its adoption and whether adoption of monitoring affects CPR use. To answer these questions, we implemented randomized controlled trials in six countries. The harmonized trials randomly assigned the introduction of community monitoring to 400 communities, with data collection in an additional 347 control communities. Most of the 400 communities adopted regular monitoring practices over the course of a year. In a meta-analysis of the experimental results from the six sites, we find that the community monitoring reduced CPR use and increased user satisfaction and knowledge by modest amounts. Our findings demonstrate that community monitoring can improve CPR management in disparate contexts, even when monitoring is externally initiated rather than homegrown. These findings provide guidance for the design of future programs and policies intended to develop monitoring capabilities in communities. Furthermore, our harmonized, multisite trial provides sustainability science with a new way to study the complexity of socioecological systems and builds generalizable insights about how to improve CPR management.

• We study the endogenous formation of common pool resource coalitions. • The experiment participants were Chilean fishers and university students. • Fishers often formed the grand coalition when the cost of deterring poaching was low. • Fishers invested in deterrence frequently and these investments reduced poaching. • Students formed coalitions less frequently and these coalitions tended to be small. We present the results of framed field (lab-in-field) experiments designed to investigate the endogenous formation of common pool resource (CPR) coalitions when the resource is co-defended with costly monitoring by coalition members and sanctions for encroachment imposed by the government. The experiments were conducted with fishers who were members of Chile's territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs) and in the lab with Chilean university students. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the fishers frequently formed CPR coalitions, even when they could not deter outsider poaching. When the cost of monitoring was low, fishers frequently formed the grand coalition. Coalitions tended to be smaller when monitoring was more costly, but not significantly so. However, coalitions were significantly smaller when monitoring was not available relative to when the cost of monitoring was low. Fishers also invested in monitoring frequently and these investments reduced poaching. When coalitions formed, total harvest effort was curtailed and earnings for coalition members generally increased. Students formed coalitions less frequently, these coalitions tended to be small, and they infrequently invested in monitoring, even when it was profitable to do so. Consequently, student coalition members were not better off on average than under open access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Artefactos: Revista de Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La Tecnologia is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Common Pool Resources (CPRs) pose a challenge to find balance between individual self-interest and collective cooperation. The current state of art tries to solve the problem using classical Reinforcement Learning techniques. However, due to exponential search space, the training time of these algorithms is very high. On the other hand, quantum computing offers parallel processing that makes it suitable for such complex scenarios. The purpose of this study is to explore Quantum Reinforcement Learning to solve the CPR challenge. We introduced a Variational Quantum Algorithm for attaining quantum speedup in resolving CPR dilemmas and developing cooperative behaviors among agents. The proposed method shows significantly better performance then classical reinforcement learning algorithms in terms of training time and training parameters. This study offers valuable insights into harnessing the quantum advantage in real-life multi-agent scenarios, including cooperative robotics, peer-to-peer networks, and traffic optimization.

This study aims to conceptualise the organisational framing of tourism management in touristified cities, focusing on the assessment of participatory processes of tourism planning. A grounded theory approach is used to analyse and discuss the role of the newly created consultive Tourism Council of Barcelona. An analysis of in-depth interviews undertaken with representatives of local stakeholders led to Common Pool Resources and policy cycle theories as conceptual framework to support a precise characterisation of tourism-related conflicts in Barcelona. The results reveal difficulties to obtain consensual strategic views for tourism development, although working groups contribute to cooperation between stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this field study we implemented a fishnet exchange program to investigate the actual willingness of fishermen to reduce overfishing in Brazilian artisanal fishing villages. Fishermen who use fishnets with small mesh sizes were invited to take part in an auction to exchange their fishnet for a fishnet with a bigger mesh size. Interestingly, we observe that the majority of fishermen are willing to exchange their fishnets without further compensation. Importantly, we observe that environmental perceptions and experiences with fishnets help explain the heterogeneity in bids. These findings provide useful information about limitations and possibilities of changing the behavior of individuals who strongly exploit resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs have taken a variety of forms that depend on many mediating factors, such as national and local politics, land tenure, regional collective action, the capacity of intermediaries, and socio-ecological context. This diversity has produced unsurprisingly mixed experiences, with many falling short of achieving the twin goals of environmental and social benefits and some causing adverse consequences. This study examines one rare PES case that has contributed both to forest conservation and to community livelihoods. In this study, community forest owners from four indigenous communities in the Mexican cloud forest evaluate their participation in ten years of a public PES program to support watershed stewardship. We argue that attention to indigenous sovereignty and selfdetermination in program implementation contributed to widely appreciated socioenvironmental benefits. Though many PES programs are implemented in indigenous communities, scholarly debates have rarely dealt directly with these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although exclusive common pool resource management regimes have locally been applied since time immemorial in many coastal and fjord areas, in the legal conceptualization of space, the oceans and their living resources were traditionally treated as a "global commons." The idea of restricting access to coastal oceanic resources and delegating their governance to state instruments has become increasingly popular since the middle of the previous century when political economy models predicted the eventual overexploitation or degradation of all resources used in common. While state jurisdictions overall continue to preserve the idea of common access to marine living resources for a state's people, the rapid privatization of marine living resources and the subsequent development of aquaculture over the last few decades, often confront this understanding, leading to enclosure of a delineated maritime area that was initially intended to be accessible to the public. Enclosing the sea for the purpose of aquaculture development leads to a semantic change in property institutions that govern coastal areas and provides for a form of enclosure of the commons in key locations designated for marine aquaculture development. This article explores the concept of "ocean commons" and debates how the enclosure of common areas for the purposes of aquaculture development may collide with Indigenous and local conceptions of common pool resource management. The article applies this theoretical investigation on two examples from Canada and Norway, and suggests that rethinking aquaculture development in coastal waters through the lens of "ocean commons" may provide a guiding ethos for revisiting current approaches of access to the sea and ensuring the harmonious coexistence between aquaculture development and local/Indigenous traditional activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID−19 vaccination is a fundamental step toward controlling the COVID−19 pandemic and defusing the public health crisis it has caused. Existing studies have demonstrated that equitable distribution of COVID−19 vaccines can only be achieved if these vaccines are treated as public goods. The question remains how to transform COVID−19 vaccines into public goods. In this paper, based on the theory of commons governance, the theoretical mechanism is analyzed to realize the adequate distribution of COVID−19 vaccines. Furthermore, feasible methods on how COVID−19 vaccines can benefit the people through the successful popularization of these vaccines in China are summarized. The results show that to ensure adequate supply of COVID−19 vaccines, government intervention is required because the government can expand the supply of the vaccine by balancing individual benefits for producing enterprises and the overall benefits for society. The government can also guarantee the right of every member in society to receive COVID−19 vaccines, thus enabling these vaccines to benefit the whole nation. By analyzing how COVID−19 vaccines benefit the people, this paper further verifies that national intervention plays an essential role in the supply and distribution of COVID−19 vaccines in both developed and developing countries. It may further mean that state intervention can play an essential role in continuing to respond to major public health events in the possible future.

The Regenerative Finance (ReFi) movement aims to fundamentally transform the governance of global common pool resources (CPRs), such as the atmosphere, which are being degraded despite international efforts. The ReFi movement seeks to achieve this by utilizing digital monitoring, reporting, and verification (D-MRV); tokenization of assets; and decentralized governance approaches. However, there is currently a lack of a clear path forward to create and implement models that actually drive the “Re-” in ReFi beyond perpetuating the existing extractive economics and toward actual regeneration. In addition, ReFi suffers from growing pains, lacking a common interoperability framework and definition for determining what a ReFi project is and how the individual components align toward the grand ambition. This paper provides a definition of the ReFi stack of interconnected components and examines how it can address limitations in climate change accounting, finance and markets, and governance. The authors also examine the theory of regenerative economics and CPRs to encourage further discussions and advancements in the ReFi space. The crucial question remains if and how ReFi can drive a change in paradigm toward the effective regeneration of global CPRs.

Bilateral conflicts, e.g., common pool resource allocation, pollution prevention, collusion of markets, or share transboundary water, often involve more than one issue that requires solution. The theoretical literature suggests that linking conflictive issues opens new opportunities for cooperation. We present a new experimental setting of bilateral conflicts, in which each issue is modeled as a separate Prisoner's Dilemma game. In two experiments, the effect of issue-linkage on cooperation is evaluated by comparing a treatment in which the two games are played sequentially (isolated treatment) with one where they are played simultaneously (linked treatment). Specifically, in the linked treatment each agent observes the payoffs from playing the different paths across games (e.g., cooperate in game1 but defect in game2) and then acts accordingly by committing to one of these paths. We differentiate the case where issue linkage implies symmetrical payoffs across games (Experiment 1), from the asymmetric case where one agent receives higher benefits from issue-linkage (Experiment 2). We find that issue linkage increases mutual cooperation and decreases mutual defection. Asymmetry reduces the level of cooperation in both isolated and linked games, yet issue linkage facilitates cooperation even when payoffs are asymmetric.

Bilateral conflicts, e.g., common pool resource allocation, pollution prevention, collusion of markets, or share transboundary water, often involve more than one issue that requires solution. The theoretical literature suggests that linking conflictive issues opens new opportunities for cooperation. We present a new experimental setting of bilateral conflicts, in which each issue is modeled as a separate Prisoner's Dilemma game. In two experiments, the effect of issue-linkage on cooperation is evaluated by comparing a treatment in which the two games are played sequentially (isolated treatment) with one where they are played simultaneously (linked treatment). Specifically, in the linked treatment each agent observes the payoffs from playing the different paths across games (e.g., cooperate in game1 but defect in game2) and then acts accordingly by committing to one of these paths. We differentiate the case where issue linkage implies symmetrical payoffs across games (Experiment 1), from the asymmetric case where one agent receives higher benefits from issue-linkage (Experiment 2). We find that issue linkage increases mutual cooperation and decreases mutual defection. Asymmetry reduces the level of cooperation in both isolated and linked games, yet issue linkage facilitates cooperation even when payoffs are asymmetric.

The data is collected through laboratory experiments on a dynamic common pool resource game, where, in an infinitely repeated number of rounds (i.e., game ended randomly), individuals made decisions about whether to exert a high or a low effort level to extract resources. Experiments were conducted using the student sample (consent provided and ethics approved) at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. A total of 8 sessions, 2 for each of the 4 treatments, were run with exactly 20 participants within a session. Individuals made decisions in groups of 10. Communication between any participant was not allowed. A session is randomly assigned (1) to vary whether the inflow of resources at the beginning of each round is high or low, and (2) to allow participants to either financially punish or socially punish defectors. A financial punishment resulted to a loss in profit for the punished while a social punishment displayed the words “You have extracted too much! You're being greedy!” on the computer screen of the punished. Individuals were assigned subject ID numbers and interacted using their subject IDs. The data is useful in understanding how resource inflow and type of punishment affects individual resource extraction behavior. The data could also be combined with other publicly available common pool resource datasets for a meta-analysis on individual behavior in the commons.

The main objective of this article is to study the local governance dynamics around natural resources in the delimitated Marine reserve Kaliakra, on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. Our research focuses mainly on formal/informal institutional arrangements for that zone. This article aims to achieve several objectives. First, it seeks to contribute to the common pool resources (CPR) theories, applying Ostrom's socio-ecological framework and broaden its scope to the larger institutional context. Second, it will focus specifically on one marine protected area and the harvesting of the invasive species Rapana Venosa in the Bulgarian Black Sea. Although formal institutions are important in setting the rules for natural resource governance, this study finds that informal institutions, specific to the country's context, tend to shape the results and objectives of this governance and reflects the socio-economic characteristics of the macro context in which it is embedded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we develop a method to estimate the relationship between monitoring and enforcement (M&E) effort and a key but unobserved variable: non-recorded extraction of a natural resource (e.g., illegal fishing). We use a stochastic frontier model for the growth rate of the resource and decompose the technical inefficiency term into non-recorded extraction and true-inefficiency. In cases where true-inefficiency is independent of M&E, the parameter estimate for M&E effort directly identifies its marginal effect on non-recorded extraction. This approach is applicable to a wide range of natural resources, where the observed growth rate of the resource depends heavily on factors beyond human control, such as environmental conditions. Thus, this method provides a promising means for identifying illegal extraction that is typically unobservable to analysts and regulators. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach through simulation and by applying the econometric framework to the Chilean abalone fishery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Identify the factors that limit the capacity of users belonging to Civil Associations of Users, also known as irrigation modules: Valle de Santiago and Cortazar of D.R. 011, to manage water as a common resource, conserve hydroagricultural infrastructure, and achieve efficient water use. Methodological design: A qualitative methodology was used in which users’ behavior was observed by group and individual interviews. Results: The results show that users are not able to manage water as a common pool resource, nor are interested in preserving or restoring the irrigation formerly transferred infrastructure because they do not consider it as theirs but as State property. Research limitations: The research was carried out in two of the main modules, it is necessary to extend the analysis to the rest of the irrigation district. Findings: Along with the participation of the government as a regulatory entity, it is necessary to promote the strengthening of Users’ Associations to improve water management and conservation of irrigation works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study of the Andean town of Chuschi and its surrounding district of the same name, we consider the impacts of the proliferation of fencing on once open land. The paper contributes to a growing body of literature on the practice and impact of land fragmentation through fencing around the world, with positive and negative impacts having been noted. The analysis is based on 23 semi-structured interviews with community members and community leaders of Chuschi and the surrounding towns of Yanaccocha, Huaracco, Chaquiccocha, Pucruhuasi, Wacraccocha, Lerqona and Yupana. Some of the interviewees considered the fencing off of parcels of the communal land to be beneficial for land management, while others felt the practice was not ecologically or socially beneficial overall and created tensions in the community. In particular, some interviewees noted resentment towards those perceived to be 'ambitious' in terms of acquiring exclusive use of additional land. In conclusion, it appears that fencing, as practiced in Chuschi, may be a calculated approach to land management that some perceive to have overall collective benefits but, if not well governed, it also has the potential to be invasive and disruptive for communal Andean life. The paper addresses a gap in the literature on the motivations for, and impacts of, fencing in rural communities in Peru and contributes to wider debates on the social justice implications of enclosures. • A study of indigenous groups in the Andean town of Chuschi and surrounding district. • Considers the impacts of the proliferation of fencing on once open land. • Speaks to a debate on the practice and impact of land fragmentation through fencing. • To date, there are very few of these studies in Latin America. • The analysis is based on interviews with local community members and leaders. • Some interviewees felt the fencing of once communal land caused grassland degradation. • Some reported increasing tensions in the community arising from exclusive land use. • Fencing, as practiced in Chuschi, may be a well calculated approach to land management that has some collective benefits. • However, it needs to be well governed to avoid disruption to communal Andean life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cadernos de Gestão Pública e Cidadania is the property of Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Escola Brasileira de Administracao Publica e de Empresas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Public Money & Management is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We study the effectiveness of delegation as a conflict resolution mechanism for managing common pool resources (CPR). Delegation involves empowering stakeholders to make collective decisions on behalf of resource users. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, a delegation approval mechanism (DAM) in a three-player common-pool resource (CPR) game in which players can vote for extractions. In case of disapproval, in stage 2, one player is randomly selected to choose authoritatively the uniform extraction for the group, putting the disapproval arbitration at an endogenous level. Backwards elimination of weakly dominated strategies (B E W D S) predicts the socially optimum extraction under unanimity, but not under majority. Our experimental findings show that the DAM strongly reduces extractions and that most selected delegates choose the optimal extraction. • We explore a three-player common pool resource game using approval voting. • We compare unanimity vs. majority voting, both theoretically and experimentally. • We study a delegation mechanism to resolve CPR conflicts when disapproval occurs. • The delegation mechanism often leads to the optimal level of extraction of the CPR. • The delegation mechanism is more effective with unanimity than with majority rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To prevent the overfishing of marine fish populations, governments often limit fishing access through the allocation of fishing opportunities. While some studies have linked particular systems of fishing opportunities to sustainable outcomes (particularly individual transferable quota), it remains unclear whether it is the use of exclusive access (individual allocation), the use of a market (tradability), the duration of this access or the quota limits themselves that drive the sustainable outcomes. To determine which attributes of fishing opportunities are associated with sustainable fishing, we developed a novel method to systematically classify how fishing opportunities are allocated for 443 global fish stocks from 1990 to 2018 to produce the longest and most comprehensive dataset and longitudinal study of its kind. Our results revealed that quota limits and individual allocation are linked to a reduced probability of overfishing, with the most robust result for quota limits. No attributes were robustly linked to a reduced probability of overfished biomass. Whereas some previous studies have found that systems with market‐based features or strong property rights (i.e. a long duration) were linked to sustainable fishing, these benefits were found to be small or not significant once proper controls for other system attributes were introduced. These results highlight the importance of considering all attributes of institutional design in the governance of common pool resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent history has been marked by a shift from rural to urban living. Studies show that urbanization is most prevalent at coastal areas and river basins and these are the locations where most megacities are established. However, in the African context, there is a deficit of research in this area. The focus of studies in the 'urban' field show the expansion of cities towards waterbodies but with little or no attention to the implications of this expansion—'the rural to urban shift'—particularly as they concern lakes as commons in a rapidly urbanizing world, such as African countries and the Global South. Thus, using the case of lakes in Ethiopia, this study explores the trend of urbanization vis-à-vis lakes and its implications for the management of lakes, where historically the Ethiopian urban system has been characterized by settlements on mountain areas as strategic places located far from water bodies, particularly lakes. Using secondary data on population of urban centers and distribution of lakes in Ethiopia, this paper finds that urban centers that are located adjacent to lakes have been growing faster than those cities and towns that are not. The study argues that lakes are an attraction factor for urbanization. Moreover, rapid urban expansion around lakes implies that, in the future, the management of lakes (as common pool resources) critically depends on how urban centers are planned and managed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]