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This article examines the current state of the global jihad movement and offers reflections on its likely trajectory in the foreseeable future. It concludes that while the global jihad temporarily has been set back by the relative decline of the Islamic State, the movement overall benefits from al-Qaeda's regeneration; its ongoing ideological appeal; and its structural decentralization. In the next years, the movement likely will continue to evolve from its current bipolar structure toward an increasingly multipolar entity. Furthermore, it argues that the future jihadi movement will contain a large number of jihadi actors whose relationships will span cooperative, competitive, or mixed engagements, with implications for the movement as a whole. The article highlights several challenges for counterterrorism, including dealing with a complex movement structure; radicalization; socio-political disenfranchisement; the counter-response of societies targeted by jihadist violence; and technological changes. The article concludes with an assessment that in the next two to five years, the global jihad will remain a potent, although not an existential, threat. This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/ .

At its peak, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, controlled more than 100,000 square kilometres of territory containing more than 11 million people.1 The United States, and the West in g...

In their work on the black-market economy in the 21st century, Gilman, Goldhammer, and Weber explore the topic of “deviant globalization,” which analyzes the dark side of global trade. Their description includes the illicit flows, black markets, and trafficking in drugs and human bodies that are as much a part of the new world disorder as multinational corporations and instant financial transfers. This article will look at one specific element of deviant globalization: the diaspora flows resulting from the collapse of a transnational insurgent organization. This article seeks to answer three important questions: First, what is the terrorist diaspora? Second, what are the implications of this diaspora, or more precisely, what is the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters? And finally, what can the United States do to mitigate the threat posed by foreign fighters fleeing the battlefields in Iraq and Syria? The term “terrorist diaspora,” as currently used, more accurately describes foreign fighters who traveled from more than eighty different countries to fight with militant groups in Iraq and Syria, but have moved on, or soon will move on, to other countries. While some of these fighters might go on to provide support to Salafi-jihadist insurgencies, the part of the terrorist diaspora we are most concerned with are the foreign fighters who will move on from Syria and Iraq to participate in other civil wars or organize terrorist cells that plot to attack the West.

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.

To date, much of the literature on the financing of terrorism and insurgency has focused at the macro-level on groups involved in financing their organizations through involvement in the drug trade. This paper discusses some of those implications, but argues that to better understand the threat faced by the new generation of jihadists in the West, security forces and intelligence services must also look at the micro-level of how lower level trafficking, drug dealing and petty criminal activity, combined with prison radicalization and ties to the black market and illicit underworld, combine to present a new spin on a longstanding threat. To be sure, the micro-level is even more difficult to counter, given already poor community-police cooperation and relations in the marginalized communities throughout the West. Further, the threat from drug trafficking at the micro-level can be equally as nefarious, as smaller cells are given greater autonomy to finance plots, recruit new members and ultimately conduct attacks in developed democracies. The paper concludes with some policy recommendations geared toward helping host-nations build capacity in critical areas, including law enforcement and intelligence, from the local to the state to the federal level. Disclaimer The analysis and opinions contained in this article are those of the author solely and do not represent the analysis and opinions of The RAND Corporation or any of the other institutions or organizations he is affiliated with. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss3/2

Testimony presented before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance on September 7, 2018.

Every military activity has informational aspects, but the information environment (IE) is not well integrated into military planning, doctrine, or processes. Better understanding of the IE will improve command and control and situational awareness.

The authors study the 30 insurgencies occurring between 1978 and 2008 using four methods crossing the qualitative/quantitative divide. The four approaches are narrative, bivariate comparison, compa...

Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States on July 13, 2017.

These video conference proceedings present panel discussions from a daylong conference on the evolving terrorist threat, which took place on June 27, 2017, in the Washington office of the RAND Corporation. RAND researchers Seth Jones, Colin Clarke, Lynn Davis, Ben Connable, Andrew Hoehn, Jack Riley, and Linda Robinson, along with experts from the larger national security community discuss the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), al-Qa'ida, and other terrorist groups.

Document submitted August 11, 2017, as an addendum to testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States on July 13, 2017.

This report describes the likely evolution of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) finances under three specific scenarios: a continuation of the current campaign, a negotiated settlement in Syria and political accommodation in Iraq, and military victory without negotiated settlement or political accommodation. Discussion of these scenarios offered ways to counter fundraising in ISIL territory and use financial information to damage ISIL.

Narcotics have long been one of the most valuable illicit markets, and government efforts to stem both their supply and demand face on-going challenges. This chapter describes the global distribution of major illegal narcotics from source to destination with a focus on heroin and cocaine routes. It explains how traffickers seek out states with weak administrative structures, law enforcement and customs as it is less costly to move illegal wares through states that suffer from weak institutions and a significant informal economy. The links to such areas has grown with the spread of globalisation, and collaboration between criminal enterprises to terrorist organisation has become more prominent. The author concludes that State building and enhancement of good governance practices are key complements to punitive approaches and sanctions.