Search

Tulving's introduction of episodic memory and the metaphor of mental time travel has immensely enriched our understanding of human cognition. However, his focus on human psychology, with limited consideration of evolutionary perspectives, led to the entrenched notion that mental time travel is uniquely human. We contend that adopting a phylogenetic perspective offers a deeper insight into cognition, revealing it as a continuous evolutionary process. Adherence to the uniqueness of pre-defined psychological concepts obstructs a more complete understanding. We offer a concise natural history to elucidate how events that occurred hundreds of millions of years ago have been pivotal for our ability to mentally time travel. We discuss how the human brain, utilizing parts with ancient origins in a networked manner, enables mental time travel. This underscores that episodic memories and mental time travel are not isolated mental constructs but integral to our perception and representation of the world. We conclude by examining recent evidence of neuroanatomical correlates found only in great apes, which show great variability, indicating the ongoing evolution of mental time travel in humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Endotherms have 20–75 times more brain neurons than similarly sized ectotherms, marking one of the greatest transformations in brain history. Costly neurons no longer stand in strong competition with somatic processes, but pay for themselves and help meet the 20 times higher energy requirement of endothermy. A major difference between ectotherms and endotherms is the latter's extreme reliance on food. To secure necessary amounts, new foraging strategies are required. Birds and mammals evolved similar neurocognitive functions, absent in ectotherms, providing cognitive maps for highly efficient foraging. We argue for studies of cognition and brain anatomy in extant ectotherms and endotherms to identify key differences. Additionally, we call for studies of dinosaur brains, informed by the findings in the extant species, to trace the cognitive transition related to the evolution of endothermy. The evolution of whole-body endothermy occurred independently in dinosaurs and mammals and was associated with some of the most significant neurocognitive shifts in life's history. These included a 20-fold increase in neurons and the evolution of new brain structures, supporting similar functions in both lineages. We propose the endothermic brain hypothesis, which holds that elaborations in endotherm brains were geared towards increasing caloric intake through efficient foraging. The hypothesis is grounded in the intrinsic coupling of cognition and organismic self-maintenance. We argue that coevolution of increased metabolism and new forms of cognition should be jointly investigated in comparative studies of behaviors and brain anatomy, along with studies of fossil species. We suggest avenues for such research and highlight critical open questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The environmental complexity hypothesis suggests that cognition evolves to allow animals to negotiate a complex and changing environment. By contrast, signal detection theory suggests cognition exploits environmental regularities by containing biases (e.g. to avoid dangerous predators). Therefore, two significant bodies of theory on cognitive evolution may be in tension: one foregrounds environmental complexity, the other regularity. Difficulty in reconciling these theories stems from their focus on different aspects of cognition. The environmental complexity hypothesis focuses on the reliability of sensors in the origin of cognition, while signal detection theory focuses on decision making in cognitively sophisticated animals. Here, we extend the signal detection model to examine the joint evolution of mechanisms for detecting information (sensory systems) and those that process information to produce behaviour (decision-making systems). We find that the transition to cognition can only occur if processing compensates for unreliable sensors by trading-off errors. Further, we provide an explanation for why animals with sophisticated sensory systems nonetheless disregard the reliable information it provides, by having biases for particular behaviours. Our model suggests that there is greater nuance than has been previously appreciated, and that both complexity and regularity can promote cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive evolution, as the core subject of fields like paleoanthropology, cognitive archeology, and neuropsychology, has begun to gain more interest in psychology in recent years. Executive functions are viewed from the perspective of cognitive evolution as basic advancements that are crucial to the evolution of language and contemporary cognition. As a metaphor, executive functions refer to advanced cognitive processes (working memory, inhibition, organization, cognitive flexibility, etc.) in the context of complex goal-directed behaviors. Sophisticated cognitive traits like executive functions emerged because of solutions to adaptive issues (survival, reproduction, and social group life) that human ancestors confronted over millions of years and passed them on to their offspring. Although it is accepted that Homo sapiens owes its evolutionary success to Paleolithic living conditions, explaining this process has not always been easy. In this review article, general information about executive functions is presented, followed by a review of scientific explanations about the evolution of executive functions. Evaluations have shown that these alternative scientific explanations based on archaeological, anthropological, and neuropsychological evidence for the evolutionary origins of executive functions do not fit all the pieces of the puzzle. It is believed that novel research models will clarify which of these alternative explanations are proximate causes and which are ultimate causes.

The history of how Homo sapiens out-survived the Neanderthals is recalled here with the goal of conceiving an edge in our coming competition with a faster, stronger artificial intelligence (AI) who has far greater capacity for information storage. The social and cognitive differences between the two hominid species, Homo sapiens and Homo neanderthalensis, are described. Based on findings from genomics, neuroscience, archaeology, and paleobiology, it appears possible that the capacities of Homo sapiens could outreach those of AIs in some ways. Especially important are human visuospatial, cultural, and, oddly enough, theological capacities, and the interaction of these capacities in group problem-solving. While communication between AIs is fast and can be widespread, the authors ask whether this is the right kind of communication for solving problems of survival. An important question is explored throughout: Is it ethical to withhold from AIs human-like capacities that may become possible to install? Finally, a worrisome question is broached: Is it the best course to create AIs in our own image to safeguard our existence in unknown future interactions with extraterrestrial species, both organic and inorganic?

Cognitive evolution, as the core subject of fields like paleoanthropology, cognitive archeology, and neuropsychology, has begun to gain more interest in psychology in recent years. Executive functions are viewed from the perspective of cognitive evolution as basic advancements that are crucial to the evolution of language and contemporary cognition. As a metaphor, executive functions refer to advanced cognitive processes (working memory, inhibition, organization, cognitive flexibility, etc.) in the context of complex goal-directed behaviors. Sophisticated cognitive traits like executive functions emerged because of solutions to adaptive issues (survival, reproduction, and social group life) that human ancestors confronted over millions of years and passed them on to their offspring. Although it is accepted that Homo sapiens owes its evolutionary success to Paleolithic living conditions, explaining this process has not always been easy. In this review article, general information about executive functions is presented, followed by a review of scientific explanations about the evolution of executive functions. Evaluations have shown that these alternative scientific explanations based on archaeological, anthropological, and neuropsychological evidence for the evolutionary origins of executive functions do not fit all the pieces of the puzzle. It is believed that novel research models will clarify which of these alternative explanations are proximate causes and which are ultimate causes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A well-established field of research in vertebrates focuses on the variability of cognitive abilities within species. From mammals to fish, numerous studies have revealed remarkable differences in the cognitive phenotype among individuals, particularly in terms of sex or personality. However, many aspects of the mechanisms, genetics, and selective pressures that underlie individual cognitive variation remain unclear. Surprisingly, intraspecific variability in cognition has received much less attention in invertebrates, despite the increasing evidence of remarkable cognitive abilities in this group and the insights that could be gained from examining simultaneously two distinct taxa, namely vertebrates and invertebrates. In this review, we provide evidence that certain invertebrate species exhibit all the key features of cognitive variation observed in vertebrates, including differences related to sex and personality. In many cases, invertebrate studies have provided insights into the genetic basis, evolvability and response to selection of cognitive variability. Moreover, we highlight evidence for caste differences in eusocial insects, which are linked to task specialisation within the colony. This makes insect eusociality a valuable system for understanding how selection influences cognitive variation. We propose that cognitive variation in invertebrates may be more widespread than currently thought, and that selection may operate in a similar manner on two distantly related cognitive systems (vertebrates and invertebrates). Finally, we suggest that invertebrates hold the potential to serve both as alternative and complementary models to vertebrates, contributing to a deeper understanding of cognitive evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recognition and memory of familiar conspecifics provides the foundation for complex sociality and is vital to navigating an unpredictable social world [Tibbetts and Dale, Trends Ecol. Evol. 22, 529-537 (2007)]. Human social memory incorporates content about interactions and relationships and can last for decades [Sherry and Schacter, Psychol. Rev. 94, 439-454 (1987)]. Long-term social memory likely played a key role throughout human evolution, as our ancestors increasingly built relationships that operated across distant space and time [Malone et al., Int. J. Primatol. 33, 1251-1277 (2012)]. Although individual recognition is widespread among animals and sometimes lasts for years, little is known about social memory in nonhuman apes and the shared evolutionary foundations of human social memory. In a preferential-looking eye-tracking task, we presented chimpanzees and bonobos (N = 26) with side-by-side images of a previous groupmate and a conspecific stranger of the same sex. Apes' attention was biased toward former groupmates, indicating long-term memory for past social partners. The strength of biases toward former groupmates was not impacted by the duration apart, and our results suggest that recognition may persist for at least 26 y beyond separation. We also found significant but weak evidence that, like humans, apes may remember the quality or content of these past relationships: apes' looking biases were stronger for individuals with whom they had more positive histories of social interaction. Long-lasting social memory likely provided key foundations for the evolution of human culture and sociality as they extended across time, space, and group boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely thought that causal cognition underpins technical reasoning. Here we suggest that understanding causal cognition as a thinking system that includes theory of mind (i.e., social cognition) can be a productive theoretical tool for the field of evolutionary cognitive archaeology. With this contribution, we expand on an earlier model that distinguishes seven grades of causal cognition, explicitly presenting it together with a new analysis of the theory of mind involved in the different grades. We then suggest how such thinking may manifest in the archaeological or stone tool record and techno-behaviors of the last three million years or so. Our thesis is threefold: (a) theory of mind is an integral element of causal cognition; (b) generally speaking, the more advanced causal cognition is, the more it is dependent on theory of mind; and (c) the evolution of causal cognition depends more and more on mental representations of hidden variables. Ultimately, the final or seventh grade of causal cognition allows us to reason from a network of hidden variables that, amongst other things, enables the learning, manufacture, and use of complex technological systems. It also facilitates the seamless mapping of knowledge between personal (egocentric), physical, and social networks that allows for newly devised and innovative technical and social outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Biohacking's emergence has reshaped scientific research, especially within transhumanism and biological manipulation. Evaluating its impact on the scientific community is crucial for defining future research directions and communication in this field. Objective: To critically examine perspectives, approaches, and debates in academic literature to develop a comprehensive understanding of the ethical, social, and cultural implications of technological advancement within the transhumanist context. Methods: SCOPUS and bibliometric analysis were employed to quantify biohacking's influence. Social Network Analysis identified key themes and research focus areas. Results: North American and European countries led in scientific productivity. Published articles and citation impact showed a moderate to low index. Social Network Analysis highlighted ethical considerations, social implications, and an emerging discourse on cognitive evolution. Conclusion: The results highlight the need for comprehensive education and communication strategies to ensure that the public is well-informed about the risks, benefits, and ethical considerations associated with genetic modification technologies. Therefore, more research on legislation and regulations is required.

Background: The global population is experiencing accelerated biopsychosocial aging. Cognitive impairment is frequently associated with functional impairment in basic and instrumental daily living activities. To maintain optimal cognitive and functional functioning, health professionals recommend that older adults participate in cognitive training. Aims: This study examines the cognitive and functional evolution of older adults with and without Intellectual Disability and the factors associated with favourable evolution following the intervention of a multicomponent programme based on the human occupational model and the person-centred care model. Methods and procedures: 247 people participated. Descriptive and univariate analyses were performed to examine baseline data. The Wilcoxon paired samples test was used to compare cognitive and functional evolution one year after the intervention. Linear regression was used to detect factors predicting favourable evolution. Outcomes and results: Both populations improved cognitively. There was no change in basic activities of daily living. There was an improvement in instrumental activities of daily living in the group with Intellectual Disability. None of the variables collected was a predictor of greater improvement. Conclusions and implications: This study demonstrated that older people with Intellectual Disability who have supports to cope with this life stage can improve their cognitive and functional abilities.

Scatter-hoarding birds find their caches using spatial memory and have an enlarged hippocampus. Finding a cache site could be achieved using either Recollection (a discrete recalling of previously experienced information) or Familiarity (a feeling of "having encountered something before"). In humans, these two processes can be distinguished using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. ROC curves for olfactory memory in rats have shown the hippocampus is involved in Recollection, but not Familiarity. We test the hypothesis that food-hoarding birds, having a larger hippocampus, primarily use Recollection to find their caches. We validate a novel method of constructing ROC curves in humans and apply this method to cache retrieval by coal tits (Periparus ater). Both humans and birds mainly use Familiarity in finding their caches, with lower contribution of Recollection. This contribution is not significantly different from chance in birds, but a small contribution cannot be ruled out. Memory performance decreases with increasing retention interval in birds. The ecology of food-hoarding Parids makes it plausible that they mainly use Familiarity in the memory for caches. The larger hippocampus could be related to associating cache contents and temporal context with cache locations, rather than Recollection of the spatial information itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brain evolution is a key topic in evolutionary anthropology. Unfortunately, in this sense the fossil record can usually support limited anatomical and behavioral inferences. Nonetheless, information from fossil species is, in any case, particularly valuable, because it represents the only direct proof of cerebral and behavioral changes throughout the human phylogeny. Recently, archeology and psychology have been integrated in the field of cognitive archeology, which aims to interpret current cognitive models according to the evidence we have on extinct human species. In this article, such evidence is reviewed in order to consider whether and to what extent the archeological record can supply information regarding changes of the attentional system in different taxa of the human genus. In particular, behavioral correlates associated with the fronto-parietal system and working memory are employed to consider recent changes in our species, Homo sapiens, and a mismatch between attentional and visuospatial ability is hypothesized. These two functional systems support present-moment awareness and mind-wandering, respectively, and their evolutionary unbalance can explain a structural sensitivity to psychological distress in our species. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolutionary origins of deception and its functional role in our species is a major focus of research in the science of human origins. Several hypotheses have been proposed for its evolution, often packaged under either the Social Brain Hypothesis, which emphasizes the role that the evolution of our social systems may have played in scaffolding our cognitive traits, and the Foraging Brain Hypothesis, which emphasizes how changes in the human dietary niche were met with subsequent changes in cognition to facilitate foraging of difficult-to-acquire foods. Despite substantive overlap, these hypotheses are often presented as competing schools of thought, and there have been few explicitly proposed theoretical links unifying the two. Utilizing cross-cultural data gathered from the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), we identify numerous (n = 357) examples of the application of deception toward prey across 145 cultures. By comparing similar behaviors in nonhuman animals that utilize a hunting strategy known as aggressive mimicry, we suggest a potential pathway through which the evolution of deception may have taken place. Rather than deception evolving as a tactic for deceiving conspecifics, we suggest social applications of deception in humans could have evolved from an original context of directing these behaviors toward prey. We discuss this framework with regard to the evolution of other mental traits, including language, Theory of Mind, and empathy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Archaeological discoveries describing the first abstract engravings and ornamentations of the body, through objects of adornment and the use of pigments, suggest that the use of signs and/or symbols is not limited to Homo sapiens. From a neuro-archaeological perspective, our study aims to infer the neural bases required for the emergence of these first potentially symbolic types of behaviour. We used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to record participants' brain activity when we presented them with stimuli from potentially symbolic cultural innovations. These were schematic versions and photographs of early Palaeolithic engravings, followed by faces that were culturally ornamented with wooden beads and red paint strokes. Their perception involved associative visual brain areas. The salience network was mobilized to attribute a human origin to abstract patterns and a social status to ornamented faces. The latter also involved frontal regions belonging to the "social brain". My work suggests that the neural bases that not only enable relevant elements of the environment to be selected in order to recognize intentional productions of others, but also probably culturally determined meaning to be attached to these productions, were already functional in the Middle Palaeolithic, in the context of an increasingly complex social organization.

What explains the unique features of human culture? Culture is not uniquely human, but human culture is uniquely cumulative. Cumulative culture is a product of our collective intelligence and is supported by cognitive processes and learning strategies that enable people to acquire, transform, and transmit information and technologies within and across generations. Technological and social innovations are currently driving unprecedented changes in cultural complexity and diversity. Innovation is a cognitively and socially complex, multistep process that typically requires (cumulative) cultural learning to achieve. I argue that the technological solutions that characterize twenty‐first‐century innovation can only be explained by understanding both the capacity to learn from and build upon the insights of others and the transmission systems that store the knowledge and technologies of previous generations. Human uniqueness is a product of cumulative cultural learning, transmission, and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Short-term memory is implicated in a range of cognitive abilities and is critical for understanding primate cognitive evolution. To investigate the effects of phylogeny, ecology and sociality on short-term memory, we tested the largest and most diverse primate sample to date (421 non-human primates across 41 species) in an experimental delayed-response task. Our results confirm previous findings that longer delays decrease memory performance across species and taxa. Our analyses demonstrate a considerable contribution of phylogeny over ecological and social factors on the distribution of short-term memory performance in primates; closely related species had more similar short-term memory abilities. Overall, individuals in the branch of Hominoidea performed better compared to Cercopithecoidea, who in turn performed above Platyrrhini and Strepsirrhini. Interdependencies between phylogeny and socioecology of a given species presented an obstacle to disentangling the effects of each of these factors on the evolution of short-term memory capacity. However, this study offers an important step forward in understanding the interspecies and individual variation in short-term memory ability by providing the first phylogenetic reconstruction of this trait’s evolutionary history. The dataset constitutes a unique resource for studying the evolution of primate cognition and the role of short-term memory in other cognitive abilities.

Aesthetic phenomena have been intertwined with the life of humans to a significant degree that is not observed in non-human animals. The complexity and subtlety of it have long been regarded as one symbol of human’s exceptional cognitive power. This power can sometimes be misrepresented by a view that regards human aesthetic behaviours as innate/encoded and automated settings that are brought along with the human brain. In scenarios like this, the naturally selected brain takes up a role as some super explanator—by appealing to the configurations of the neural connectivity as reasons/causations for observed phenotypic traits. Therefore, this line of thinking can sometimes obscure the role played by the sociocultural background in affecting those configurations. By drawing upon the notion of niche construction, I will propose a nature-nurture coevolving framework for understanding human cognitive evolution. It will be argued that the evolutionary trajectory of human cognition is heavily defined by and is, therefore, better understood through the lens of a human cultural niche and of contextualised/context-dependent expressions of human behavioural traits. This view will be delivered by highlighting the dynamics between selective pressures and the differential expression of human phenotypic traits and acknowledging the evolutionary causal role of human cultural behaviours and practices. Finally, I argue that a major evolution of social cognition was brought about through an aesthetic tradition of the Acheulean and conclude by briefly proposing a potential subject for future study. The basic research method applied in this article is theoretical deduction. Specifically, a restricted interdisciplinary investigation that concerns academic literature from relevant fields (centring on the topic of niche construction) of archaeology, evolutionary biology and human cognition was used. Furthermore, through a process of assessing and identifying of plausible evidence, the abovementioned arguments of this study are generated.

Following Pain’s (2021) critical assessment of the prospects of minimal capacity inferences within cognitive archeology based on ‘classical’ cognitive science, I elaborate on the chances of these inferences within so-called embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted (4E) frameworks. Cognitive archeologists infer the cognitive abilities of past hominins from the remains found in the archeological record. Here they face the problem of choosing a theory from the cognitive sciences. Results vary considerably, depending on one’s cognitive theory, so choice matters. Where classical views conceive cognition as mainly involving representations and computing, more recent 4E approaches focus on interactions between environment, body, and brain: hence the same trace, like a stone tool, might require capacities like a mental ‘blueprint’ according to the former, but only environmentally guided perception according to the latter. Given this crucial choice of theory, what are the prospects of 4E then? I present a model of cognitive hominin evolution based on 4E and niche construction theory. Based on this model, I argue that we should be guardedly optimistic: contrary to first impressions, minimal capacity inferences work well within the 4E framework, and adopting 4E might give us a methodological advantage, too.

Large brains support numerous cognitive adaptations and therefore may appear to be highly beneficial. Nonetheless, the high energetic costs of brain tissue may have prevented the evolution of large brains in many species. This problem may also have a developmental dimension: juveniles, with their immature and therefore poorly perform- ing brains, would face a major energetic hurdle if they were to pay for the construction of their own brain, especially in larger-brained species. Here, we explore the possible role of parental provisioning for the development and evolution of adult brain size in birds. A comparative analysis of 1,176 bird species shows that various measures of paren- tal provisioning (precocial vs. altricial state at hatching, relative egg mass, time spent provisioning the young) strongly predict relative brain size across species. The parental provisioning hypothesis also provides an explanation for the well-documented but so far unexplained pattern that altricial birds have larger brains than precocial ones. We there- fore conclude that the evolution of parental provisioning allowed species to overcome the seemingly insurmountable energetic constraint on growing large brains, which in turn enabled bird species to increase survival and population stability. Because including adult eco- and socio-cognitive predictors only marginally improved the explanatory value of our models, these findings also suggest that the traditionally assessed cognitive abilities largely support successful parental provisioning. Our results therefore indicate that the cognitive adaptations underlying successful parental provisioning also provide the behavioral flexibility facilitating reproductive success and survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eörs Szathmáry and John Maynard Smith famously argued that the evolution of life on earth has been marked by a series of transitions to greater complexity, the last being from primate to human societies. I argue that this last transition, covering all of human evolutionary history, in turn comprises two phases: the first defined by increases in the capacity of the human brain/mind to structurally integrate causal inferences and selectively apply them to construct increasingly sophisticated sociocultural niches; the second defined by manipulation of the universal Darwinian mechanisms driving sociocultural evolution. During the first phase, hominin cognitive structure passed through three key transitions to produce the brain/mind of archaic Homo sapiens. The fourth transition, to fully modern Homo sapiens sapiens equipped with symbolic cognition and language, marks the fulcrum that leveraged the second phase in which changes in the scope and rate of niche construction were primarily driven by manipulation of sociocultural evolutionary mechanisms. The fifth transition to sedentary living enabled new selection pressures to be exerted through the concentration and application of social power, while the sixth transition multiplied the cognitive variation available to construct more elaborate sociocultural niches. Finally I note that decreasing intervals between transitions creates a pattern of accelerating sociocultural change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important question in the study of canine cognition is how dogs understand humans, given that they show impressive abilities for interacting and communicating with us. In this review, we describe and discuss studies that have investigated dogs' perspective-taking abilities. There is solid evidence that dogs are not only sensitive to the gaze of others, but also their attention. We specifically address the question whether dogs have the ability to take the perspective of others and thus come to understand what others can or cannot perceive. From the latter, they may then infer what others know and use this representation to anticipate what others do next. Still, dogs might simply rely on directly observable cues and on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what others can perceive. And instead of making inferences from representations of others' mental states, they may have just learned that certain behaviours of ours lead to certain outcomes. However, recent research seems to challenge this low-level explanation. Dogs have solved several perspective-taking tasks instantly and reliably across a large number of variations, including geometrical gaze-following, stealing in the dark, concealing information from others, and Guesser/Knower differentiation. In the latter studies, dogs' choices between two human informants were strongly influenced by cues related to the humans' visual access to the food, even when the two informants behaved identically. And finally, we review a recent study that found dogs reacting differently to misleading suggestions of human informants that have either a true or false belief about the location of food. We discuss this surprising result in terms of the comprehension of reality-incongruent mental states, which is considered as a hallmark of Theory of Mind acquisition in human development. Especially on the basis of the latter findings, we conclude that pet dogs might be sensitive to what others see, know, intend, and believe. Therefore, this ability seems to have evolved not just in the corvid and primate lineages, but also in dogs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-control, the ability to resist temptation and wait for better but delayed possibilities, is an important cognitive skill that underpins decision-making and planning. The capacity to exert self-control has been linked to intelligence in humans, chimpanzees and most recently cuttlefish. Here, we presented 10 Eurasian jays, Garrulus glandarius, with a delayed maintenance task, which measured the ability to choose a preferred outcome as well as the ability to sustain the delay prior to that outcome. Jays were able to wait for better possibilities, but maximum wait times varied across the subjects. We also presented them with five cognitive tasks that assessed spatial memory, spatial relationships and learning capacity. These tasks are commonly used as measures of general intelligence within an ecological context. Individual performance was correlated across the cognitive tasks, which suggests that there was a general intelligence factor underlying their performance. Performance in these tasks was correlated significantly with the jays' capacity to wait for better possibilities. This study demonstrates that self-control and intelligence are correlated in jays. The fact that this correlation exists in diverse species suggests that self-control is a fundamental feature of cognition. Our results are discussed in the context of convergent evolution. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The remarkable similarities in cognitive performance between teleosts and mammals suggest that the underlying cognitive mechanisms might also be similar in these two groups. We tested this hypothesis by assessing the effects of the brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), which is critical for mammalian cognitive functioning, on fish's cognitive abilities. We found that individual differences in zebrafish's learning abilities were positively correlated with bdnf expression. Moreover, a CRISPR/Cas9 mutant zebrafish line that lacks the BDNF gene (bdnf−/−) showed remarkable learning deficits. Half of the mutants failed a colour discrimination task, whereas the remaining mutants learned the task slowly, taking three times longer than control bdnf+/+ zebrafish. The mutants also took twice as long to acquire a T-maze task compared to control zebrafish and showed difficulties exerting inhibitory control. An analysis of habituation learning revealed that cognitive impairment in mutants emerges early during development, but could be rescued with a synthetic BDNF agonist. Overall, our study indicates that BDNF has a similar activational effect on cognitive performance in zebrafish and in mammals, supporting the idea that its function is conserved in vertebrates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brain evolution is a key topic in evolutionary anthropology. Unfortunately, in this sense the fossil record can usually support limited anatomical and behavioral inferences. Nonetheless, information from fossil species is, in any case, particularly valuable, because it represents the only direct proof of cerebral and behavioral changes throughout the human phylogeny. Recently, archeology and psychology have been integrated in the field of cognitive archeology, which aims to interpret current cognitive models according to the evidence we have on extinct human species. In this article, such evidence is reviewed in order to consider whether and to what extent the archeological record can supply information regarding changes of the attentional system in different taxa of the human genus. In particular, behavioral correlates associated with the fronto-parietal system and working memory are employed to consider recent changes in our species, Homo sapiens, and a mismatch between attentional and visuospatial ability is hypothesized. These two functional systems support present-moment awareness and mind-wandering, respectively, and their evolutionary unbalance can explain a structural sensitivity to psychological distress in our species.

Cognitive flexibility is a core component of executive function, a suite of cognitive capacities that enables individuals to update their behavior in dynamic environments. Human executive functions are proposed to be enhanced compared to other species, but this inference is based primarily on neuroanatomical studies. To address this, we examined the nature and origins of cognitive flexibility in chimpanzees, our closest living relatives. Across three studies, we examined different components of cognitive flexibility using reversal learning tasks where individuals first learned one contingency and then had to shift responses when contingencies flipped. In Study 1, we tested n = 82 chimpanzees ranging from juvenility to adulthood on a spatial reversal task, to characterize the development of basic shifting skills. In Study 2, we tested how n = 24 chimpanzees use spatial versus arbitrary perceptual information to shift, a proposed difference between human and nonhuman cognition. In Study 3, we tested n = 40 chimpanzees on a probabilistic reversal task. We found an extended developmental trajectory for basic shifting and shifting in response to probabilistic feedback—chimpanzees did not reach mature performance until late in ontogeny. Additionally, females were faster to shift than males were. We also found that chimpanzees were much more successful when using spatial versus perceptual cues, and highly perseverative when faced with probabilistic versus consistent outcomes. These results identify both core features of chimpanzee cognitive flexibility that are shared with humans, as well as constraints on chimpanzee cognitive flexibility that may represent evolutionary changes in human cognitive development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive control, or executive function, is a key feature of human cognition, allowing individuals to plan, acquire new information, or adopt new strategies when the circumstances change. Yet it is unclear which factors promote the evolution of more sophisticated executive-function abilities such as those possessed by humans. Examining cognitive control in nonhuman primates, our closest relatives, can help to identify these evolutionary processes. Here, we developed a novel battery to experimentally measure multiple aspects of cognitive control in primates: temporal discounting, motor inhibition, short-term memory, reversal learning, novelty responses, and persistence. We tested lemur species with targeted, independent variation in both ecological and social features (ruffed lemurs, Coquerel's sifakas, ring-tailed lemurs, and mongoose lemurs; N = 39) and found that ecological rather than social characteristics best predicted patterns of cognitive control across these species. This highlights the importance of integrating cognitive data with species' natural history to understand the origins of complex cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among-individual variation in performance on cognitive tasks is ubiquitous across species that have been examined, and understanding the evolution of cognitive abilities requires investigating among-individual variation because natural selection acts on individual differences. However, relatively little is known about the extent to which individual differences in cognition are determined by domain-specific compared with domain-general cognitive abilities. We examined individual differences in learning speed of zebra finches across seven different tasks to determine the extent of domain-specific versus domain-general learning abilities, as well as the relationship between learning speed and learning generalization. Thirty-two zebra finches completed a foraging board experiment that included visual and structural discriminations, and then these same birds went through an acoustic operant discrimination experiment that required discriminating between different natural categories of acoustic stimuli. We found evidence of domain-general learning abilities as birds' relative performance on the seven learning tasks was weakly repeatable and a principal components analysis found a first principal component that explained 36% of the variance in performance across tasks with all tasks loading unidirectionally on this component. However, the few significant correlations between tasks and high repeatability within each experiment suggest the potential for domain-specific abilities. Learning speed did not influence an individual's ability to generalize learning. These results suggest that zebra finch performance across visual, structural, and auditory learning relies upon some common mechanism; some might call this evidence of "general intelligence"(g), but it is also possible that this finding is due to other noncognitive mechanisms such as motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Featured Application: The present paper contributes to improve the knowledge about the role of the diet and its functional components in human development and health. The factors analyzed in the present review could also help in understanding dietetic factors mainly associated with neuroprotection. Although diet has contributed significantly to the evolution of human beings, the composition of the diet that has most affected this phenomenon is still an open issue. Diet has undoubtedly participated in the acquisition of the skills that underlie the differentiation of humans from other animal species and in this context the development of the nervous system has played a primary role. This paper aimed to: (1) outline the relationship between diet and human evolution; (2) evaluate how a variation in food consumption may have contributed to the enhancement of cognitive and adaptive capacities. The most widespread diet among the ancient populations that showed the highest levels of civilization (that is well-organized societies, using advanced technical tools, and promoting art and science) was very close to what is now defined as the Mediterranean diet. This suggests that a dietary approach typical of the Mediterranean basin (little meat and some fish; abundant cereals, legumes, fruit, vegetables and wine) significantly increased the intake of antioxidant molecules, including polyphenols, which along with other factors may have modulated the cognitive evolution of humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accepting the idea that the mental representations of concepts, diagrams, relations, plans, etc., are thought-shapers, I suggest going a bit further. Any kind of representation, be it mental or public, i.e., accessible to others, bears thought-shaping potential, albeit not in the same manner. Just as the idea of embodied cognition takes into consideration environmental facilities and obstacles, I suggest investigating thought processes in a broader context, i.e., placing thought-shapers in the context of their formation. I propose that the elements of the above mentioned definition of thoughtshapers are built upon a structure that consists of representational skills, means, and institutions. In accordance with the idea of embeddedness and enactment, the need for communication and the given cognitive and physical aptitudes result in different kinds of expression, i.e., different kinds of representations available to others. When an expressional mode solidifies, it opens up new possibilities and limitations. I propose that mundane, almost unnoticeable affordances and their accompanying limits do shape our thoughts thoroughly. In my argument for the thought-shaper potential of the generative technique of public representations, I will delineate a historical overview of representational means in tandem with the main characteristics of different eras’ crucial ideals and patterns of reasoning. I will close the historical overview with a terminological excursion exploring how publicly available representation and mental representation relate to each other and the kinds of ambiguities that accompany the latter term’s use. Accordingly, embedding thought-shapers, I will outline the evolution of different representational techniques and skills. Then, because language is a decisive representational means, I will investigate its orientating and distortive potential. I will rely on some of Bergson’s lesser-known remarks. I will illuminate how ocular-centrism was able to be a decisive metaphor in science and philosophy for long centuries, until recently even. In conclusion, as a case study, I will illuminate how the term “mental representation” as a highly abstract term facilitates and at the same time hinders philosophical and scientific inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nest-building behaviour in birds may be particularly relevant to investigating the evolution of physical cognition, as nest building engages cognitive mechanisms for the use and manipulation of materials. We hypothesized that nest-building ecology may be related to physical cognitive abilities. To test our hypothesis, we used zebra finches, which have sex-differentiated roles in nest building. We tested 16 male and 16 female zebra finches on three discrimination tasks in the following order: length discrimination, flexibility discrimination, and color discrimination, using different types of string. We predicted that male zebra finches, which select and deposit the majority of nesting material and are the primary nest builders in this species, would learn to discriminate string length and flexibility-structural traits relevant to nest building-in fewer trials compared to females, but that the sexes would learn color discrimination (not structurally relevant to nest building) in a similar number of trials. Contrary to these predictions, male and female zebra finches did not differ in their speed to learn any of the three tasks. There was, however, consistent among-individual variation in performance: learning speed was positively correlated across the tasks. Our findings suggest that male and female zebra finches either (1) do not differ in their physical cognitive abilities, or (2) any cognitive sex differences in zebra finches are more specific to tasks more closely associated with nest building. Our experiment is the first to examine the potential evolutionary relationship between nest building and physical cognitive abilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fire has substantially altered the course of human evolution. Cooking kindled brain expansion through improved energy and time budgets. However, little is known about the origins of fire use and its cognitive underpinnings (pyrocognition). Debates on how hominins innovated cooking focus on archaeological findings, but should also be informed by the response of animals towards heat sources. Here, we report six observations on two captive New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) contacting heat lamps with tools or placing raw food on them. The tools became singed or melted and the food had browned (and was removed). These results suggest that New Caledonian crows can use tools to investigate hot objects, which extends earlier findings that they use tools to examine potential hazards (pericular tool use), and place food on a heat source as play or exploration. Further research on animals will provide novel insights into the pyrocognitive origins of early humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accepting the idea that the mental representations of concepts, diagrams, relations, plans, etc., are thought-shapers, I suggest going a bit further. Any kind of representation, be it mental or public, i.e., accessible to others, bears thought-shaping potential, albeit not in the same manner. Just as the idea of embodied cognition takes into consideration environmental facilities and obstacles, I suggest investigating thought processes in a broader context, i.e., placing thought-shapers in the context of their formation. I propose that the elements of the above mentioned definition of thought-shapers are built upon a structure that consists of representational skills, means, and institutions. In accordance with the idea of embeddedness and enactment, the need for communication and the given cognitive and physical aptitudes result in different kinds of expression, i.e., different kinds of representations available to others. When an expressional mode solidifies, it opens up new possibilities and limitations. I propose that mundane, almost unnoticeable affordances and their accompanying limits do shape our thoughts thoroughly. In my argument for the thought-shaper potential of the generative technique of public representations, I will delineate a historical overview of representational means in tandem with the main characteristics of different eras’ crucial ideals and patterns of reasoning. I will close the historical overview with a terminological excursion exploring how publicly available representation and mental representation relate to each other and the kinds of ambiguities that accompany the latter term’s use. Accordingly, embedding thought-shapers, I will outline the evolution of different representational techniques and skills. Then, because language is a decisive representational means, I will investigate its orientating and distortive potential. I will rely on some of Bergson’s lesser-known remarks. I will illuminate how ocular-centrism was able to be a decisive metaphor in science and philosophy for long centuries, until recently even. In conclusion, as a case study, I will illuminate how the term “mental representation” as a highly abstract term facilitates and at the same time hinders philosophical and scientific inquiry.

Psychological essentialism is the ability to recognize that the class or kind to which an object belongs remains unaltered despite changes to its superficial perceptual features. It is unclear whether humans are unique in possessing this ability or whether it is present in nonhuman primates. A recent study with three great ape species found suggestive evidence of psychological essentialism, but further research is needed to rule out the alternative explanation that the apes used locational information to pass the test. We tested a bonobo (Pan paniscus) with specialized symbolic skills, Kanzi, using a modified procedure that avoided this alternative explanation. Kanzi passed the test, which required him to indicate which of two superficially identical but essentially different kinds of items was actually the item requested by the experimenter (e.g., successfully indicating the banana when both items looked like carrots). A control test indicated that he had not passed the essentialism test simply by detecting differences in the superficial appearance of the items. Our findings support the conclusion that great apes are capable of psychological essentialism; however, Kanzi is unique in that he is able to comprehend some simple spoken English and use lexigram symbols to communicate with humans. The extent to which these skills contributed to his essentialism is unknown. Further research designed to specify the limits of essentialism in bonobos, and other great apes, that are not symbol-proficient can inform debates about the phylogenetics of essentialism and the role of language in its development and expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have demonstrated a correlation between longevity and brain size in a variety of taxa. Little research has been devoted to understanding this link in parrots; yet parrots are well-known for both their exceptionally long lives and cognitive complexity. We employed a large-scale comparative analysis that investigated the influence of brain size and life-history variables on longevity in parrots. Specifically, we addressed two hypotheses for evolutionary drivers of longevity: the cognitivebuffer hypothesis, which proposes that increased cognitive abilities enable longer lifespans, and the expensive brain hypothesis, which holds that increases in lifespan are caused by prolonged developmental time of, and increased parental investment in, large-brained offspring. We estimated life expectancy from detailed zoo records for 133 818 individuals across 244 parrot species. Using a principled Bayesian approach that addresses data uncertainty and imputation of missing values, we found a consistent correlation between relative brain size and life expectancy in parrots. This correlation was best explained by a direct effect of relative brain size. Notably, we found no effects of developmental time, clutch size or age at first reproduction. Our results suggest that selection for enhanced cognitive abilities in parrots has in turn promoted longer lifespans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]