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Do managers take advantage of asymmetric information in human capital intensive industries through management buyouts? Asymmetric information is great when targets draw on human capital or knowledge-based assets and, therefore, the threat of such opportunism may be greater. This is important because knowledge-based theories of the firm explicitly minimize the threat of opportunism. An efficient market for corporate control requires that competing bidders emerge in such situations to assure that shareholders get an appropriate price. Findings suggest that rival bidders emerge in management buyouts as theory suggests. However multiple bidders are especially likely when management buyouts occur in human capital intensive industries. Such transactions may signal that: 1) management is entrenched and acting opportunistically, and 2) the firm may be greatly under-priced (since management has better information). As such, the threat of rival bidders may limit management buyouts as a vehicle to take advantage of information asymmetries stemming from knowledge-based assets. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role of opportunism in knowledge-based theories of the firm and for the management of knowledge-based assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]