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This research reveals the ways that salespeople manage intrafirm relationships by acting as intermediaries, connecting intrafirm members that would otherwise be unconnected. Using a two-study, multimethod design, the authors establish that (1) salespeople act as representative intermediaries positioned between peers in sales and those in marketing and product development; (2) the effects of representative positions with marketing and product development on performance are non-linear; and (3) selling-related knowledge moderates representative effects on performance. Representative salespeople act as the exclusive connection between a peer salesperson and a non-sales contact (marketing or product development), controlling non-redundant knowledge to gain influence over their peers. This research contributes to marketing by identifying non-linear effects for how salespeople mediate relationships between their peers and others in key intrafirm functions, and showing that salespeople with high selling-related knowledge realize enhanced effects of the representative position on sales performance., Author(s): Gabriel R. Gonzalez [sup.1] , Danny P. Claro [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) 0000 0001 0790 1491, grid.263081.e, Department of Marketing, Fowler College of Business, San Diego State University, , [...]

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00748.x Byline: Sergio G. Lazzarini (1), Danny P. Claro (1), Luiz F. Mesquita (2) Abstract: abstract Previous research has portrayed buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances as important mechanisms to foster learning and exchange efficiencies. Controversy remains, however, as to how these alliances interact. While some propose they reinforce one another (e.g. learning in horizontal ties generates positive spillovers to vertical ties), others propose a negative interplay (e.g. when increasing vertical-tie intensity, suppliers may weaken horizontal ties to avoid retaliation from buyers who wish to preserve bargaining power). We empirically test these competing views using survey data from the Brazilian auto-parts industry. In an attempt at reconciliation, we propose that the positive or negative interaction between vertical and horizontal alliances depends on the level of technological uncertainty of goods exchanged. Vertical ties seem to inhibit horizontal ties when technological uncertainty is low; when technological uncertainty is higher, vertical and horizontal ties do not seem to have any meaningful form of interaction. We discuss implications for theory and practice. Author Affiliation: (1)Ibmec Sao Paulo; (2)Arizona State University Article note: Sergio G. Lazzarini, Associate Professor of Organization and Strategy, Ibmec Sao Paulo, R. Quata 300, Sao Paulo, SP Brazil 04546-042 (SergioGL1@isp.edu.br).