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Twenty years after 9/11, with the United States withdrawn from Afghanistan, the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and a shift in focus and resources to great power competition, jihadi terrorism appears to have been demoted to a second-tier priority. But complacency is dangerous. While al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State have been weakened, their affiliates and branches remain active. And even though the violent excesses of Islamic State rule in Syria and Iraq disgusted very many Muslims, jihadi ideology continues to resonate throughout the Arab and Islamic world, fueled by a lack of political and economic progress and sectarian animosities. The fall of Kabul, and the perception of a dramatic victory over a second superpower in Afghanistan, has sent a jolt of energy through the global jihadi movement. With new battlefields in Africa and the potential for Afghanistan now back under Taliban control to once again become a magnet for foreign fighters, there is a significant risk of a jihadi resurgence. In the future, a range of advancing or emerging technologies from autonomous weapons to artificial intelligence to synthetic biology may offer small groups of jihadi terrorists the potential to carry out highly destructive and even catastrophic terrorism, while climate change looks set to create the destabilized conditions in which jihadis thrive., Are we serious about dealing with the al Q[a]ida threat?... Is al Q[a]ida a big deal?' Those were questions posed by Richard Clarke, the National Counterterrorism Coordinator at the National [...]

On December 6, 2019, Saudi Air Force Second Lieutenant Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani killed three U.S. Navy sailors and injured another eight individuals at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida. In early February 2020, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed resp onsibility for the attack. It is not yet clear whether the group had a direct role in the attack, but if it did, it would make the shooting the first deadly terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11 directed by a foreign terrorist organization. Alshamrani's repurposing of the words of Usama bin Ladin and Anwar al-Awlaki in a social media posting just prior to the attack point to the enduring influence of al-Qa'ida propaganda. As the Federal Bureau of Investigation seeks to gain access to Alshamrani's Apple iPhones, which may help it ascertain what role, if any, AQAP played in the attack, the U.S. Department of Defense is conducting a comprehensive review of security cooperation activities with foreign countries., On Friday, December 6, 2019, a 21-year-old Saudi Air Force Second Lieutenant named Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani murdered three U.S. Navy sailors and injured eight others in an unprovoked attack at [...]

The article discusses the potential approach of a second Trump administration towards U.S. foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. It highlights the rise of jihadism in the Sahel, the presence of foreign military contractors, and the strategic competition with China and Russia on the continent. The text also explores the possibility of a securitization-focused approach, increased weapons sales, and the battle for control of rare earth elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Additionally, it mentions the potential involvement in regional disputes, such as the situation in Somaliland. [Extracted from the article]

In response to theCapitol assault, the Biden administration released astrategy to counter domestic terrorism, correctlyfocusing on preventing recruitment and mobilization toviolence. The Biden administration needs to begin preparing for apost-pandemic world, by looking at how terrorism haschanged in order to assess how it could further evolve. Domestically, in addition to theadministration's newly unveiled strategy on counteringdomestic terrorism, it would be worth pushing forhearings in Congress where subject matter experts ondomestic extremism and homegrown terrorism can debate themerits of a new domestic terrorism statute. [Extracted from the article]

The Joint Doctrine section of JFQ 58 (3d Quarter 2010) contained a lively exchange between Colonel Gian Gentile, USA, and Dr. John Nagl over the principles advanced in Field Manual [...]

China has been observing Russia and Iran's use of non-state actors, or proxies, to achieve their strategic goals. Russia has employed private military companies like the Wagner Group, while Iran has utilized the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force to support militias and political factions in the Middle East. China has recognized the risks and benefits of this proxy model and has developed its own industry of private military contractors, which are primarily state-owned and unarmed. While China is unlikely to create an autonomous non-state actor like Wagner PMC, it may consider embedding military advisors with non-state actors and using tactics like Russia's "little green men" in certain scenarios. The United States needs to understand China's perspective on proxies and private military contractors to be prepared for future developments. [Extracted from the article]