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This paper provides evidence on the role of non-base wage components as a channel for firms to adjust labour costs in the event of adverse shocks. It uses data from a firm-level survey for 25 European countries that covers the period 2010–2013. We find that firms subject to nominal wage rigidities, which prevent them from adjusting base wages, are more likely to cut non-base wage components when they are hit by negative shocks. Firms thus use non-base wage components as a strategic margin to overcome base wage rigidity. We also show that while non-base wage components exhibit some degree of downward rigidity this is smaller than that observed for base wages.

International audience; In this work, we assess how the organization of recruitment in large companies affects ethnic discrimination. We consider large multi-establishment companies and distinguish two types of organization of recruitment: hiring made through a human resources (HR) department at a centralized level of the company and hiring made at only the level of the establishment concerned by the position, generally by managers in charge of recruitment. Our results indicate that access to a centralized HR department in the selection of applications has an important effect on the level of discrimination, i.e., this type of organization of recruitment results in a significant decrease in the probability that applicants with native-sounding names are solely selected.

We explore the impact of wage adjustment on employment with a focus on the role of downward nominal wage rigidities. We use a harmonised survey dataset, which covers 25 European countries in the period 2010–2013. These data are particularly useful for this paper given the firm-level information on the change in economic conditions and collective pay agreements. Our findings confirm the presence of wage rigidities in Europe: first, collective pay agreements reduce the probability of downward wage adjustment; second, wage responses to demand developments are asymmetric with a weaker downward response. Estimation results show that a wage reduction significantly lowers the probability of a decrease in employment at the firm level when demand falls and thereby point to a negative effect of downward wage rigidities on employment at the firm level.

Some recent literature about the U.S. shows that wage dynamics are more influenced by job-to-job flows than by flows into or out of employment. In this paper, we evaluate whether this result holds also for France and Italy, characterized by a different labor market structure. Using comparable administrative data we find that, as in the U.S., in both France and Italy realized job-to-job transitions contribute positively to wage growth. However, since these flows are smaller and display much lower cyclicality than in the U.S., their contribution to aggregate wage dynamics is low, while the contribution of flows into and out of employment remains sizeable. We then look closely at the heterogeneity in the probability of changing job and in the associated wage premium by types of workers and firms. We find that job-to-job flows and the associated gain tend to be larger in high-skilled occupations and for permanent workers. Moreover, as in the U.S., individuals are more likely to move to younger firms, which intensively poach workers from other firms.

The French labor market is segmented between permanent and temporary workers. The second category has difficulty in getting an open-ended contract. This paper aims at depicting workers on short-term contracts and shows the consequences on their professional career are negative and significant. A large part of the wage gap between permanent and temporary workers remains unexplained by observable characteristics. They receive less on-the-job training and their likelihood of obtaining a stable job is lower than 30% after 1 year and a half. They have also a higher probability of being the adjustment variable in case of an economic negative shock. These different findings show the importance of using public policies to encourage transitions from fixed-term to permanent employment and reducing labor-market duality.

What Effects have ANIMeasures had in Reducing LabourMarket Segmentation ? A MatchingModel Simulation. The French labour market is segmented between people who enjoy stable employment and those who alternate between temporary contracts and periods of unemployment. Using a simulation run on a matching model calibrated to France, the reform that resulted from the national multisector agreement (ANI) signed in 2013 appears able to reduce this divergence. The ANI, signed on 11 January 2013, introduced modulated social contributions, with surcharges on temporary contracts (CDDs) and exemptions for hiring young people on permanent contracts (CDIs). The estimated effects of these modulated social contributions are positive but not as significant as in the fairly similar “ Italian-style” reform studied in Berson and Ferrari (2015)., Le marché du travail français est segmenté entre les personnes bénéficiant d’un emploi stable et celles alternant contrats temporaires et périodes de chômage. À partir de simulations sur un modèle d’appariement calibré sur la France, la réforme issue de l’accord national interprofessionnel de 2013 apparaît pertinente pour réduire cette dualité. L’estimation des effets des majorations de cotisation sur les CDD et des exonérations pour les embauches de jeunes en CDI introduites par l’ANI du 11 janvier 2013montre en effet un impact positif mais faible au regard de la réforme relativement similaire dite à l’italienne et étudiée dans Berson et Ferrari (2015)., Berson Clémence, Ferrari Nicolas. Une simulation sur un modèle d’appariement : l’impact de l’article 4 de l’ANI de 2013 sur la segmentation du marché du travail. In: Économie & prévision, n°211-212, 2017. Evaluation des politiques publiques. Conférence AFSE-DG Trésor du 17 décembre 2015. pp. 115-137.

The integration of immigrants and their children is a burning issue in France. Governments mainly build their integration policies on the labour market. The public sector is reputed to better assimilate minorities because of its entrance exams and pay scales. In this article, using a switching model, a comparison of the public and private sectors shows that second-generation immigrants are not treated equally in both sectors. A wage gap is observed between workers of French origin and those of Southern European origin. The wage differential between workers of French and North African origins is mostly explained by observable variables.

This paper provides evidence on the role of non-base wage components as a channel for firms to adjust labour costs in the event of adverse shocks. It uses data from a firm-level survey for 25 European countries that covers the period 2010–2013. We find that firms subject to nominal wage rigidities, which prevent them from adjusting base wages, are more likely to cut non-base wage components in order to adjust labour costs when needed. Firms thus use non-base wage components as a buffer to overcome base wage rigidity. We further show that while non-base wage components exhibit some degree of downward rigidity, they do so to a lesser extent than base wages.

The French labour market is divided between workers in permanent jobs and those who alternate fixed-term contracts with unemployment spells. Among other public policies aiming at reducing this duality, financial incentives could induce employers to lengthen contract duration or favour permanent contracts. This article develops a matching model fitted to the French labour market characteristics and calibrated on French data. A gradual decrease in unemployment contributions or a firing tax reduces the share of short-term contract in total employment but increases market rigidity and lowers labour productivity. However, decreasing unemployment contributions gradually is less favourable for new entrants than a firing tax and lengthens unemployment spells. An additional contribution levied on short-term contracts to finance a bonus for permanent-contract hirings also decreases labour market duality and increases activity by 0.13% but without negative impacts on labour market flexibility and productivity.

We explore the impact of wage adjustment on employment with a focus on the role of downward nominal wage rigidities. We use a harmonised survey dataset, which covers 25 European countries in the period 2010-2013. These data are particularly useful for this paper given the firm-level information on the change in economic conditions and collective pay agreements. Our findings confirm the presence of wage rigidities in Europe: first, collective pay agreements reduce the probability of downward wage adjustment; second, the rise in the probability of downward base wage responses following a decrease in demand is significantly smaller than the rise in the probability of an upward wage response associated with an increase in demand. Estimation results point to a negative effect of downward wage rigidities on employment at the firm level.

A partir d’une experimentation de testing realisee sur le metier d’hote de caisse dans le secteur de la grande distribution, une discrimination est etablie a l’encontre des hommes et plus fortement encore, a l’encontre des Francais d’origine marocaine. Une etude econometrique prenant en compte l’environnement economique et social des magasins testes montre qu’il est possible d’identifier et d’interpreter une discrimination par gout a la Becker lorsque le protocole experimental a ete realise dans ce but. Les resultats tendent a attester d’une discrimination statistique envers les hommes car les femmes leur sont preferees en raison de la faible elasticite de leur offre de travail aux conditions de travail. La discrimination a l’encontre des candidats d’origine marocaine semble au contraire etre due aux « gouts » du client ou de l’employeur.

This article appeals to heterogeneity in workers’ non-wage preferences to model taste-based discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay lower wages to minority workers, whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm in the market produces a substantial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, discrimination allows unprejudiced firms to make non-zero profits, so that they have little incentive to drive out prejudiced firms. As the market does not eliminate discrimination, state intervention is required. Indirect policies do not affect the absolute wage gap between the two groups, but may be more likely to be used than direct policies.

This paper tests the impact of competition on the hiring process in the French retail sector. Following the Becker's theory, higher the competition, lower is discrimination. Using local Herfindhal-Hirschman indexes, a correspondence study ensures to observe how competition affects discrimination. A strong employment gap is observable between French natives and second generation immigrants. Concerning gender, women are favored as cashiers. The impact of competition depends on the target population : competition reinforces preference for women, whereas discrimination due to origin is follows the Becker's theory. However, increasing competition to fight against discrimination is not a solution, as it will enhance bad condition of women in the labor market and an increase of awareness of human resources department to equality of treatment is more efficient., Une large littérature s'accorde sur un effet de la concurrence sur le marché des biens sur la discrimination. Mais l'ensemble de ces études se focalisent sur les salaires et les postes, sans s'intéresser à l'embauche. Cet article teste l'impact de la concurrence sur le processus d'embauche et ses conséquences sur les écarts d'emploi. Deux types de discrimination sont étudiés : le genre et l'origine. Le secteur choisi est celui de la grande distribution. En utilisant des niveaux locaux de concurrence, un testing permet d'observer comment la concurrence affecte la discrimination. Les résultats montrent que la concurrence peut accentuer la discrimination statique dans le cas du genre. De plus, elle n'est pas forcément un bon outil pour lutter contre la discrimination, le cas de l'origine montrant un impact plus fort de la centralisation du recrutement et de la sensibilisation des recruteurs.

Discrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a nonzero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms., Les modèles de discrimination sur le marché du travail reproduisent difficilement sa persistance sans faire d'hypothèses fortes. Cela conduit de surcroît à une ségrégation des travailleurs selon leurs caractéristiques non productives. Dans cet article, le modèle se sert de l'oligopsonie et de l'hétérogénéité des préférences des travailleurs pour obtenir une persistance de la discrimination. Les entreprises embauchent les deux types de travailleurs et offrent un salaire plus faible aux travailleurs discriminés. Par conséquent, l'existence de discrimination sur le marché permet aux entreprises n'ayant pas de goût pour la discrimination de faire des profits non nuls. Elles n'ont donc pas d'incitation à faire sortir les entreprises discriminantes du marché.

Discrimination models have diffivulties to study discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. In this article, the model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both thpes of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm leads to a substancial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a non-zero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms. Moreover, the wage gap is affected by firms' spread out as well as by the number of prejudiced firms in the market. Government policies decrease the impact of taste for discrimination on wages but governments are not interested in., Les modèles de discrimination sur le marché du travail reproduisent difficilement sa persistance sans faire d'hypothèses fortes. Cela conduit de surcroît à une ségrégation des travailleurs selon leurs caractéristiques non-productives. Dans cet article, le modèle se sert de l'oligopsonie et de l'hétérogénéité des préférences des travailleurs pour obtenir une persistance de la discrimination. Un seul employeur discriminant induit un différentiel de salaire substantiel sur le marché. Les entreprises embauchent les deux types de travailleurs et offrent un salaire plus faible aux travailleurs discriminés. Par conséquent, l'existence de discrimination sur le marché permet aux entreprises n'ayant pas de goût pour la discrimination de faire des profits non-nuls. Elles n'ont donc pas d'incitation à faire sortir les entreprises discriminantes du marché.

The integration of immigrants and their children is a burning issue in France. Governments build a large part of their assimilation policies on the labor market. The public sector is reputed to better assimilate minorities because of its entrance exams and pay-scales. In this paper, a comparison of the public and private sectors shows that second-generation immigrants are not treated equally. However, the wage gap is determined by the number and gender of immigrant parents and not by the country of origin., L'intégration des immigrés et de leurs enfants est un sujet important en France. Les différents gouvernements successifs ont principalement construit leurs politiques d'assimilation sur le marché du travail et l'éducation. Le secteur public est réputé mieux intégrer les minorités en raison des concours d'entrée et des grilles salariales. Dans cet article, une comparaison des secteurs publics et privés montre que les immigrés de seconde génération ne sont pas traités de manière égale. Cependant, le différentiel de salaire est déterminé par le nombre et le sexe des parents de l'immigrés et non par le pays d'origine.