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Abstract The 2013–2016 West Africa Ebola Epidemic is the largest outbreak of Ebola in history. By September, 2014 the outbreak was worsening significantly, and the international president of Médecins Sans Frontières called for military assistance. In Sierra Leone, the British and Sierra Leonean militaries intervened. They quickly established a National Ebola Response Centre and a constituent network of District Ebola Response Centres. Thereafter, these inherently militarised centres are where almost all Ebola response activities were coordinated. In order to examine perspectives on the nature of the militaries’ intervention, 110 semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted and analysed. Military support to Sierra Leone’s Ebola response was felt by most respondents to be a valuable contribution to the overall effort to contain the outbreak, especially in light of the perceived weakness of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation to effectively do so. However, a smaller number of respondents emphasised that the military deployments facilitated various structural harms, including for how the perceived exclusion of public institutions (as above) and other local actors from Ebola response decision making was felt to prevent capacity building, and in turn, to limit resilience to future crises. The concurrent provision of life-saving assistance and rendering of structural harm resulting from the militaries’ intervention is ultimately found to be part of a vicious cycle, which this article conceptualises as the ‘political economy of expedience’, a paradox that should be considered inherent in any militarised intervention during humanitarian and public health crises.

The 2013–2016 West Africa Ebola Epidemic is the largest outbreak of Ebola in history. By September, 2014 the outbreak was worsening significantly, and the international president of Médecins Sans Frontières called for military assistance. In Sierra Leone, the British and Sierra Leonean militaries intervened. They quickly established a National Ebola Response Centre and a constituent network of District Ebola Response Centres. Thereafter, these inherently militarised centres are where almost all Ebola response activities were coordinated. In order to examine perspectives on the nature of the militaries' intervention, 110 semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted and analysed. Military support to Sierra Leone's Ebola response was felt by most respondents to be a valuable contribution to the overall effort to contain the outbreak, especially in light of the perceived weakness of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation to effectively do so. However, a smaller number of respondents emphasised that the military deployments facilitated various structural harms, including for how the perceived exclusion of public institutions (as above) and other local actors from Ebola response decision making was felt to prevent capacity building, and in turn, to limit resilience to future crises. The concurrent provision of life-saving assistance and rendering of structural harm resulting from the militaries' intervention is ultimately found to be part of a vicious cycle, which this article conceptualises as the 'political economy of expedience', a paradox that should be considered inherent in any militarised intervention during humanitarian and public health crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines one narrowly focused aspect of the government interagency cooperation on cyber defense that serves as a basis to achieve a cyber power. It reviews the civil-military interagency cooperation and aims to identify factors that could jeopardize it. First, it provides a theoretical background for the research and then according to interviews and surveys, the factors with the highest negative impact are recognized. Based on this research, the most significant challenges in bridging the gap between civilian and military worlds seems to be power and budget struggles and a lack of political direction on cyber matters from leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study purpose to describe the civil-military synergy in the management of Indonesia's national resources, a case study in the province of West Sumatra. Design/Method/Approach: The method used is descriptive with a qualitative approach. Informants were taken using purposive sampling; data was collected through observation, interviews, and collection of documentation. Findings: The study results found that there are 3 (three) pillars that must be interrelated, namely the government, the people, and the military. The three are woven in a knot to strengthen a country. Practical implications (if applicable): It is established that good cooperation and coordination between the relevant agencies is needed to mobilize national resources for defense in a certain area. Paper type: theoretical.

Current events warrant a review of US civil-military relations doctrine. This special commentary examines eight principles of military subordination to elected civilian officials and addresses the fundamental question at the heart of civil-military relations theory and practice, namely, what options, if any, does the military professional have when civilian leadership disregards military advice? Examples drawn from US history can provide an important framework for understanding the complex interrelational dynamics at play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The heated public debate on the mandatory draft in Israel invites a broad discussion of the legitimacy crisis of the model, particularly as the majority of the Jewish public support abolishing compulsory service. The conscription model is beset and weakened by contradictions that have resulted from in-depth social processes, including a growing civil-liberal and neoliberal socioeconomic discourse and a decline of the republican ethos. Moreover, the military itself exacerbates these and other contradictions, mainly the incongruence between the ethos of egalitarian enlistment and the rise in the non-enlistment rate. The IDF is not aware of the intensity of the crisis and, rather, defends the model in the name of its social and economic contribution. However, this line of defense is flawed, as not only is this not normative justification for conscription, but it is not grounded in research findings and it ignores the negative impact of conscription and the military's abilities to contribute to society, even if conscription is abolished. Accordingly, the article proposes a transition to an official, overt selective conscription model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Doc On-Line: Revista Digital de Cinema Documentário is the property of Doc On-Line: Revista Digital de Cinema Documentario and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores how military 'frontline workers' use their discretion to interpret and then comply, breach or bypass policies that reach into the tactical level, and why. Based on extensive primary sources including in-depth interviews, end-of-tour reports and data from records, the case study explores the implementation of policies on civil-military relations by military commanders in the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan in 2005–2012. This article finds that the commanders used their considerable discretion to implement policies that parted from national directives. In doing so, the Norwegian military strove to align their approach with close allies and NATO and became actual policy-makers. This article contributes to the debate on how western militaries behave at the tactical level by employing the concept of 'discretion'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In most of today’s crises, humanitarian organisations operate in the same environment as a range of military and non-state armed actors. The effective engagement between militaries and humanitarian aid agencies can be beneficial for the timely delivery of aid and is also often unavoidable when trying to gain access to areas controlled by military or non-state armed actors. However, such engagement also comes with risks. Previous literature on the subject has described some of the benefits and potential risks of different types of engagement between military and humanitarian actors. To date, however, quantifiable data on how civil–military engagement unfolds and which factors influence the effectiveness of coordination is lacking. This paper proposes an indicator framework for measuring the effectiveness of civil–military coordination in humanitarian response. It provides nineteen descriptive level and twenty perception and effectiveness indicators that may be used at any stage of a response to a humanitarian emergency, from mission planning and assessment through the various stages of a response and post-response assessment. The full set of questions, or a more targeted subset of these questions, may also be used as periodic polls to actively monitor developments in theatre.

The majority of literature on civil–military relations has focused on coups d'état. Yet, studying lesser forms of military insubordination can offer valuable insight into the true condition of states' civil–military relations. This paper introduces a data collection effort on mutinies across Africa from 1950 to 2018, revealing several interesting trends. First, most African countries have experienced mutinies, with these events increasing in frequency in the post-Cold War period. Second, while mutinies rarely escalate into coups, they are associated with an increased likelihood of coups in the future. This dataset provides a useful tool to explore the complexity of states' civil–military relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Phil Klay’s fiction, the telling of one’s tale is fraught with personal peril. Exposing one’s actions to the scrutiny and possible condemnation of others is a difficult task requiring the embracing of one’s own vulnerability. This trepidation, combined with a strong suspicion that one will be misunderstood, creates conditions where miscommunication is more likely to occur than not. This tenuous dynamic explains the ambivalent stance towards narrative adopted by Klay’s veteran-narrators in Redeployment – perhaps best reflected in their repeated use of the word “bullshit” (over a dozen times) in a variety of instances throughout the collection. Examining three stories from the collection – “Bodies,” “War Stories,” and “Psychological Operations” – I consider the extent to which Klay’s invocation of “bullshit” announces that one carries no illusions about the truth-bearing quality of one’s narrative and that one is subsequently seeking a different kind of contract with the listener. In Klay’s stories, then, bullshit acts as both a defense mechanism and an instigation. Urging the reader to truly listen, Klay seeks to open new avenues for civil-military connection and an acceptance of mutual responsibility.

Objectives: Civil–military relationships are necessary in humanitarian emergencies but, if poorly managed, may be detrimental to the efforts of humanitarian organizations. Awareness of guidelines and understanding of risks relating to the relationship among deployed military personnel have not been evaluated. Methods: Fifty-five military and 12 humanitarian healthcare workers in South Sudan completed questionnaires covering experience, training and role, agreement with statements about the deployment, and free text comments. Results: Both cohorts were equally aware of current guidance. Eight themes defined the relationship. There was disagreement about the benefit to the South Sudanese people of the military deployment, and whether military service was compatible with beneficial health impacts. Two key obstacles to the relationship and 3 areas the relationship could be developed were identified. Conclusion: This study shows that United Kingdom military personnel are effectively trained and understand the constraints on the civil–military relationship. Seven themes in common between the groups describe the relationship. Current guidance could be adapted to allow a different relationship for healthcare workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military assets, which include personnel, make an important contribution to disaster relief. However, military deployments can be politically sensitive, and the relevant international law is contested and not binding. This article compares two sets of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Guidelines on this issue. The 2007 Oslo Guidelines1 state that military assets should be used in disaster relief only as a last resort, while the 2014 Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines2 acknowledge that military assets are often the first to respond to disasters in the region. Drawing on examples primarily from Asia, this article explores the apparent conflict between these two UN Guidelines and asks two questions about the deployment of foreign military assets in disaster relief. First, to what extent does international law authorize or limit the deployment of foreign military assets in disaster relief? Second, what are the politics of deploying military assets in disaster relief? This article argues that, rather than representing a global standard, the Oslo Guidelines better reflect European practice within Europe, while the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines are more representative of practice worldwide. It concludes that the type of military aid provided is key to its compliance with international law and its political acceptance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the formation of the Popular Front in 1934, French generals feared that the alliance, which included the French Communist Party (PCF), could foreshadow a coming revolt in Paris. Generals Maxime Weygand and Maurice Gamelin responded by preparing to implement Plan Z, a plan to defeat a Parisian revolt. Given politicians' fear that many French officers were antirepublican, the French Army would have faced a major political crisis if Plan Z had leaked. Plan Z called for a multidivisional assault on Paris, which showed that the General Staff believed a large-scale revolution was possible. Understanding the development of Plan Z adds to scholars' recognition of French officers' long-term fear of communism and mistrust of civilians. It reveals that senior officers were more politicized and afraid of civilians than most scholars have realized and helps explain the military's central role in betraying the Third Republic and creating the Vichy Regime in 1940. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Malaysia, the increasing frequency and severity of disasters emphasize the urgent need for enhancing disaster management. Given their significant impact on public health and healthcare, effective disaster management becomes a top priority. This study focuses on urban disasters and aims to identify health needs, assess multi-sectorial response gaps, and propose civil-military coordination mechanisms. To achieve this, a qualitative single-case approach will be employed, involving document reviews, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions with representatives from key governmental agencies responsible for disaster management. The study will specifically concentrate on Kuala Lumpur, the densely populated and commercially active city. Thematic analysis will be used to systematize and verify the collected data, providing comprehensive insights into the current state of civil-military coordination in disaster response and management from stakeholders' perspectives. By examining their perceptions and experiences, the study will identify existing gaps and challenges in civil-military coordination. Ultimately, the findings will contribute to evidence-based policies and strategies aimed at improving disaster management coordination throughout Malaysia., Competing Interests: The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (© 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Airpower, drones and cyber-weapons are employed by states in conjunction with local armed non-state actors in an effort to coercively intervene in the crises of the twenty-first century. While the externalization of the burden of warfare is a return to pre-modern war, it is the change in the underlying socio-political relations between the state and its military agent that is a novel phenomenon in surrogate warfare. This article demonstrates that in a post-Westphalian era characterized by non-state violence, globalized conflicts, a prioritization of risk management in a mediatized environment, the state has to explore new ways to remain relevant as the primary communal security provider. Thereby, the organization of violence has departed from the employment of the state’s soldier as the primary bearer of the burden of warfare to a mode of war where technological and human surrogates enable the state to manage the risks of post-modern conflict remotely. In this article, we conceptually explore surrogate warfare as a socio-political phenomenon within the context of globalized, privatized, securitized and mediatized war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislatures in separation of powers systems like the US are often portrayed as having far greater capabilities and willingness to change defence policy than are parliaments in Westminster systems. This paper uses principal‒agent models and hypotheses on legislative will to review the role of defence committees in the US Congress and Britain’s parliament during each country’s most recent, significant change in civil‒military relations. Congressional committees drafted the 1986 Goldwater‒Nichols Act over the objections of the president, fundamentally changing US civil‒military relations. We would expect the British House of Commons to be at the opposite end of the spectrum, unable and unwilling to act without the prime minister’s blessing. At first glance, this is indeed what happened during Britain’s 2011 Defence Reform effort. Parliament took no concrete, independent action. A closer examination, however, suggests that parliamentary committees helped set the agenda for the 2011 reforms. These results point to the need to carefully assess both legislative capabilities and will when examining the role of legislatures in foreign policy, as well as the indirect means by which parliaments affect security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military organizations are well suited to contend with the uncertainty of the operating environment and collection and analysis of large amounts of information after a natural disaster. However, due to their finely tuned decision-making processes, militaries tend to be isolated from other relevant actors in the humanitarian space, not always aware of the technologies developed to overcome the gap of information that humanitarian actors confront in face of natural catastrophes and complex emergencies. Analysis of the natural disasters that occurred in Thailand in 2004; Pakistan, 2005; Haiti, 2010; and Chile, 2010 and 2014 provide examples of best practices and lesson learned that can help improve future disaster relief operations. This is especially true when militaries are called to augment the existing civilian humanitarian response. It also highlights the prevailing role that the local Military community plays in humanitarian response. This paper highlights the need for the Military community must learn how to better incorporate their unique capabilities into the humanitarian space, and to find ways to more effectively share and assess information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guyana and Suriname both re-assumed the path to democracy in the early 1990s. Guyana had from 1968 to 1992 experienced an authoritarian regime with the People’s National Congress (PNC), led by Forbes Burnham, maintaining power by rigged elections and the support of the security forces. In Suriname, on the other hand, the elected government of Prime Minister Henck Arron was overthrown by a military coup in 1980. This article traces the establishment of authoritarianism in these two countries and examines the factors which propelled each country towards the restoration of democracy. The central argument is that authoritarianism in Guyana resulted from the success of Forbes Burnham in subordinating the military to party rule while the military take-over in Suriname resulted from the mismanagement of civil-military relations by the government of Henck Arron. However, maintaining an authoritarian regime proved costly in both cases. The need for external aid rendered the regimes susceptible to foreign pressure for a return to free and fair elections. All of this occurred in a new hemispheric context shaped by the end of the Cold War, the stated goal of the United States to have the area become a zone of democracy, and impending foreign military intervention to restore the ousted Aristide government to power in Haiti. Resumen: Redemocratización en Guyana y Suriname: Comparaciones CríticasTanto Guyana como Suriname retomaron el camino hacia la democracia a comienzos de la década de los noventa. Desde 1968 hasta 1992, Guyana tuvo un régimen autoritario con el Congreso Nacional del Pueblo (People’s National Congress o PNC), liderado por Forbes Burnham, que se mantuvo en el poder gracias a la manipulación de las elecciones y al apoyo de las fuerzas de seguridad. En Suriname, por otro lado, el gobierno electo del primer ministro Henck Arron fue derrocado por un golpe de estado militar en el año 1980. Este artículo describe el establecimiento del autoritarismo en estos dos países y examina los factores que empujaron a cada uno de ellos hacia la restauración de la democracia. El argumento central es que el autoritarismo en Guyana fue consecuencia del éxito de Forbes Burnham a la hora de subordinar el ejército al partido, mientras que en Suriname el golpe de estado militar fue el resultado de la negligencia en el manejo de las relaciones civiles-militares por parte del gobierno de Henck Arron. Sin embargo, el mantenimiento de un régimen autoritario demostró ser costoso en ambos casos. La necesidad de ayuda externa hizo que ambos regímenes fueran vulnerables a la presión extranjera a favor de un retorno a las elecciones libres y justas. Todo esto ocurrió en un contexto hemisférico delineado por el fin de la Guerra Fría, el claro objetivo de los Estados Unidos de hacer que el área se convirtiera en una zona de democracia, y una inminente intervención militar para restaurar en el gobierno de Haití al derrocado Aristide.

The twenty-first century has seen a significant rise in all forms of disasters and this has resulted in military and humanitarian organisations becoming more frequently engaged in the provision of support to those affected. Achieving an efficient and effective logistic preparation and response is one of the key elements in mitigating the impact of such events, but the establishment of mechanisms to deliver an appropriately integrated civil-military approach remains elusive. Not least because of the high percentage of assistance budgets spent on logistics, this area is considered to represent fertile ground for developing improved processes and understanding. In practice, the demands placed on civilian and military logisticians are broadly similar, as is the solution space. Speaking a common language and using common concepts, it is argued, therefore, that the logistic profession should be in the vanguard of the development of an improved civil-military interface. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the growing involvement of militaries in the delivery of assistance in conflict-affected areas under the rubric of stabilisation or comprehensive approaches has become a key concern for humanitarian agencies, raising questions about the adequacy of existing guidance and current approaches to civil-military coordination. In order to better understand the challenges of principled and effective dialogue between military forces and independent humanitarian actors in the context of combined international and national military forces pursuing stabilisation, this article charts the evolution of the civil-military dialogue in Afghanistan from 2002 until 2012. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with a range of former staff of aid agency, military, and donor organisations who were present in Afghanistan in this period as well as audits, official guidelines, and other written documents, this article provides an analytical overview of the development of stabilisation approaches in Afghanistan and the strategies aid agencies pursued in response, in particular the trajectory of mechanisms for structured dialogue. Lastly, it identifies several implications that can be drawn from this experience for aid agencies, NATO, and troop contributing nations.

Saleh's solution to ‘the civil-military problematic’ (to borrow Peter Feaver's phrase) was to build powerful praetorian units and place his relatives in command of them, a counter-productive approach that ultimately increased the risk that Saleh faced. During Yemen's Arab Spring uprisings, sections of the armed forces not controlled by President Ali Abd'allah Saleh's siblings and cousins sought to ride the wave of popular revolt and emerge as a cohesive power-base in the post-Saleh period. To achieve these aims the military establishment made a conscious effort to let the tribes and civil society activists lead the assault on the Saleh government. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Estudos Ibero-Americanos is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the evolution of international stabilisation agendas and their significance for humanitarian action. Stabilisation includes a combination of military, humanitarian, political and economic activities to control, contain and manage areas affected by armed conflict and complex emergencies. Encompassing narrow security objectives and broader peace-building efforts, stabilisation is both a conservative and potentially transformative, comprehensive and long-term agenda. The open-ended approach allows for widely varying interpretations and applications in different circumstances and by different actors with an assortment of implications for humanitarian action. The relationship between the two is highly uncertain and contentious, due not only to the controversies surrounding stabilisation policies, but also to deep-seated ambiguities at the heart of humanitarianism. While humanitarian actors are preoccupied with the growing involvement of the military in the humanitarian sphere, the paper argues that it is trends in the humanitarian–political interface that represent the more fundamental dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]