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Table of Contents Introduction I. Assimilative Colonialism and Tribal Political Power A. Manufacturing Assimilative Colonialism B. Fears and Denials of Collective Native Political Power Within States 1. Native citizenship and [...], There are 574 federally recognized domestic dependent tribal nations in the United States. Each tribe is separate from its respective surrounding state(s) and governs itself. And yet, none of them have the power to send representatives to Congress. Our democratic representative structures function as if tribal governments and the reservations they govern do not exist. But tribal citizens do not simply live within a state and are not simply governed by that state like any other state citizen. Rather, it is tribal law and tribal governments--not state law or state governments--that primarily govern and shape the lives of tribal citizens living on reservations. Tribal governments are not complementary or subsidiary to state governments--they are frequent rivals for power and resources. This system, simply put, doesn't make sense. Tribes should have their own representation in the federal government. This Article makes the case for why and examines how this seemingly obvious omission in our democratic structuring came to pass. This Article examines the democratic mismatch between existing governments--which include not only 50 states, but also 574 federally recognized tribes--and the representative democratic structure that is built into the Constitution around the institution of the state. It details the failed attempts of tribal governments to obtain representation, either as states or outside of statehood. This history reveals a story about race, power, colonialism, and institutions. Attempts by white majorities to hold onto political power within states included denying Native peoples' individual rights and denying statehood to largely Native areas until Native people assimilated or white citizens outnumbered them. These dynamics, which this Article dubs "assimilative colonialism," have not only shaped our existing democratic structures but have also had a lasting effect on Native relationships with political power. The nefarious brilliance of assimilative colonialism was to offer American political power to Native peoples--whether citizenship, statehood, or delegates--only and always at the cost of what made them Native. As a result, many Native people justifiably view American political power not as empowering but as dangerous. Assimilative colonialism has thus held back the emergence of Native movements for political reform by making it impossible to even imagine tribal representation in a real sense since it seemed only possible through assimilation. It is long overdue that we step back and examine the legacy of assimilative colonialism in American representative democracy. We ought to think about structural reform and what representative structures could--and maybe should--have been on the table for tribal governments and their citizens since the beginning. We ought to be asking: What would American democratic structures look like if we truly incorporated tribal governments as equal sovereigns within the United States?

INTRODUCTION I. CREDIBILITY AT THE COURT A. Garland v. Dai B. Patel v. Garland II. FOUR CONCEPTIONS OF CREDIBILITY A. Credibility as Persuasiveness B. Credibility as Capacity, Being Worthy of [...], Credibility determinations often seal people's fates. They can determine outcomes at trial; they condition the provision of benefits, like social security; and they play an increasingly dispositive role in immigration proceedings. Yet there is no stable definition of credibility in the law. Courts and agencies diverge at the most basic definitional level in their use of the category. Consider a real-world example. An immigration judge denies asylum despite the applicant's plausible and unrefuted account of persecution in their country of origin. The applicant appeals, pointing to the fact that Congress enacted a "rebuttable presumption of credibility" for asylum-seekers "on appeal." This presumption, the applicant argues, means that the Court of Appeals must credit his testimony and reverse the decision below. Should the applicant win? Clearly, the answer depends on what "credibility" (and its presumption) entails. But the Supreme Court, confronting this question in Garland v. Dai, declined to provide an answer. Instead, it showcased the analytic confusion that surrounds credibility writ large. At oral argument, the Justices canvassed four distinct ideas of credibility. In their unanimous opinion, they offered a "definition" of credibility that managed to replicate, rather than resolve, the ambiguity among the four. Meanwhile, the everyday work of adjudication continues. Every year, thousands of cases are resolved on credibility grounds--many with life-altering consequences--despite the confusion at the heart of the legal concept. The time has come for our legal system to clarify what it means by "credibility." While the term can be an umbrella for different ideas, within any given adjudication--like an immigration proceeding--precision about how we are using it is a must. To that end, this Article explores different ideas of credibility, taking the Garland v. Dai argument and opinion as a source of (cautionary) inspiration. It explains why credibility is necessarily distinct from truth, and the malleable nature of the concept. Is credibility a synonym for persuasiveness? Does it refer to the likelihood that someone is telling the truth in this case? To the likelihood that they generally tend to tell the truth? To whether they seem like they're telling the truth? Ultimately, there is no ideal definition of credibility; it depends on what work the concept is trying to do. What is far from ideal, however, is the current state of affairs, in which credibility means everything and nothing--notwithstanding its role in shaping people's lives.