Search

The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of fairness concerns in the alternating-offer bargaining game. Alternating-offer bargaining with fairness concerns is developed. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium and show its uniqueness. Then, it is shown that players’ payoffs in the subgame perfect equilibrium are positively related to their own fairness concern coefficient and bargaining power and negatively to the opponents’ fairness concern coefficient. Moreover, it is shown that the limited equilibrium partition depends on the ratio of discount rates of the two players when the time lapse between two offers goes to zero. Finally, the proposed model is applied to the bilateral monopoly market of professional basketball players, and some properties of equilibrium price are shown. Our result provides the implication that players should carefully weigh their own fairness concerns, bargaining power and fairness concerns of their opponents, and then make proposals, rather than simply follow the suggestion that the proposal at the current stage is higher than that at the past stages.

(1) Background: With the development of blockchain technology and fierce competition between tourism platforms, tourism platforms can adopt blockchain technology to disclose product information to enhance their core competitiveness. As for a tourism O2O, i.e., online to offline, supply chain, the tourism platform sells the product online, and the tour operator provides services offline. (2) Methods: We establish a game theory model and study the optimal strategies of supply chain members in two scenarios (decentralized and centralized) when the online platform does not adopt or adopts blockchain technology. Then, we introduce a two-part tariff contract for coordination. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of the cost of adopting blockchain technology, disclosing information and the proportion of information-sensitive consumers on the optimal strategies. (3) Conclusions: When the costs of adopting blockchain technology and information disclosure are low, if the proportion of information-sensitive consumers is large, adopting blockchain technology is beneficial to supply chain members. Compared with a wholesale price contract, a two-part tariff contract can encourage the platform to improve information disclosure quality, so the tour operator can adjust their cooperation contract to achieve Pareto improvements. Under a two-part tariff contract, the tourism platforms are more likely to disclose information and can effectively regulate the operational performance of the tourism O2O supply chain.

Order picking is the part with the highest proportion of operation cost and time in the warehouse. The characteristics of small-batch and multi-frequency current orders reduce the applicability of the traditional layout in the warehouse. Besides this, the improvement of the layout will also affect the picking path, such as the Chevron warehouse layout, and at present, there is a lack of research on order picking with multiple picking locations under non-traditional layouts. In order to minimize the order picking cost and time, and expand the research in this field, this paper selects the Chevron layout to design and describe the warehouse layout, constructs the picking walking distance model of Return-type, S-type and Mixed-type path strategies in the random storage Chevron layout warehouse, and uses the Cuckoo Search (CS) algorithm to solve the picking walking distance generated by the Mixed-type path. Compared with the existing single-command order picking research, the order picking problem of multi picking locations is more suitable for the reality of e-commerce warehouses. Moreover, numerical experiments are carried out on the above three path strategies to study the impact of different walking paths on the picking walking distance, and the performance of different path strategies is evaluated by comparing the order picking walking distance with the different number of locations to be picked. The results show that, among the three path strategies, the Mixed-type path strategy is better than the Return-type path strategy, and the average optimization proportion is higher than 20%. When the number of locations to be picked is less than 36, the Mixed-type path is better than the S-type path. With the increase of the number of locations to be picked, the Mixed-type path is gradually worse than the S-type path. When the number of locations to be picked is less than 5, the Return-type path is better than the S-type path. With the increase of the number of locations to be picked in the order, the S-type path is gradually better than the Return-type path.

This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the CD scenario; (b) the decentralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the DD scenario; (c) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the manufacturer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆m ≥ πm) scenario; (d) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the retailer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆r ≥ πr) scenario. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies and profits in these four scenarios is conducted, and the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products (GECP) on the GSC are also performed. The results show that (i) GECP has a critical influence on the retail price and the wholesale price; (ii) the GSC with loss aversion provide green products with the lowest green degree; (iii) the retail price, the wholesale price and product green degree are decreasing monotonically with the loss aversion level of the GSC member without incurring loss; (iv) furthermore, the effect of the loss aversion level of the GSC member with incurring loss on the optimal strategies is related to GECP and the gap between the GSC members’ loss aversion levels.

Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we investigate the effect of loss aversion and initial reference points on subgame perfect equilibrium. Firstly, a subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed. And its uniqueness is shown. Furthermore, we analyze this equilibrium with respect to initial reference points, loss aversion coefficients, and discount factor. It is shown that one benefits from his opponent’s loss aversion coefficient and his own initial reference point and is hurt by loss aversion coefficient of himself and the opponent’s initial reference point. Moreover, it is found that, for a player who has a higher level of loss aversion than the other, although this player has a higher initial reference point than the opponent, this player can(not) obtain a high share of the pie if the level of loss aversion of this player is sufficiently low (high). Finally, a relation with asymmetric Nash bargaining is established, where player’s bargaining power is negatively related to his own loss aversion and the initial reference point of the other and positively related to loss aversion of the opponent and his own initial reference point.

The classical Bertrand game is assumed that players are perfectly rational. However, many empirical researches indicate that people have bounded rational behavior with fairness concern, which is important in the two-person game and has attracted much attention. In this paper, fairness concern is incorporated into the Bertrand game with two homogeneous products and the effect of fairness concern on this extended Bertrand game is explored. Nash bargaining solution of player is applied to be his own fairness reference point. Then, a Bertrand game model with fairness concern is established, and its equilibrium price is also derived and analyzed. It is shown from some numerical examples that fairness concern and bargaining power of players have a significant influence on their equilibrium price, expected profits, and utilities. As a player gets more fair-minded, if the other player has a less focus on fairness, the price competition between them will be intensified and both of them suffer loss. Thus, fairness concern may be advantageous or disadvantageous for players. In most situations, the fairness concern behavior is not beneficial for players. Additionally, the effect of bargaining power is relative to fairness concern. A player who manufactures a low-cost product should have a weak bargaining power if he terribly focuses on fairness and should have a strong bargaining power if he pays little attention to fairness. However, a player who manufactures a high-cost product should have a weak bargaining power if he is rarely concerned about fairness. Anyway, the same bargaining power is the best for two players.

By using Moore’s subtraction operator and a total order on the set of closed intervals, we introduce a new variation of the Banzhaf value for cooperative interval games called the interval Banzhaf-like value which may accommodate the shortcomings of the interval Banzhaf value. We first reveal the relation between this introduced value and the interval Banzhaf value. Then, we present two sets of properties that may be used to determine whether an interval value is median-indifferent to the interval Banzhaf-like value. Finally, in order to overcome the disadvantages of the interval Banzhaf-like value, we propose the contracted interval Banzhaf-like value and give an axiomatization of this proposed value.

Inspired by Shalev’s model of loss aversion, we investigate the effect of loss aversion on a bimatrix game where the payoffs in the bimatrix game are characterized by triangular fuzzy variables. First, we define three solution concepts of credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria, and their existence theorems are presented. Then, three sufficient and necessary conditions are given to find the credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria. Moreover, the relationship among the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria is discussed in detail. Finally, for 2×2 bimatix game with triangular fuzzy payoffs, we investigate the effect of loss aversion coefficients and confidence levels on the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria. It is found that an increase of loss aversion levels of a player leads to a decrease of his/her own payoff. We also find that the equilibrium utilities of players are decreasing (increasing) as their own confidence levels when players employ the optimistic (pessimistic) value criterion.

The consumer environmental awareness promotes green manufacturing and the behavioral preferences of members become prevailing in supply chain management. To promote further development of green supply chains, a two-echelon green supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer is considered, where the manufacturer is loss-averse and the retailer is risk-neutral. We use a Stackelberg game to investigate the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient on retail price, wholesale price, green degree, profits of members, and profit of the green supply chain under the assumption that manufacturer’s reference point of loss aversion is equal to the subgame perfect equilibrium partition. It is shown that, in the centralized decision-making setting (CDS), green degree and profit of the green supply chain are higher than those in the decentralized decision-making setting (DDS), while in the decentralized decision-making setting with a loss-averse manufacturer (DDS-LAM) loss aversion of manufacturer further decreases green degree and profit of green supply chain. It is also found that profits of the manufacturer and the retailer decrease with levels of loss aversion of manufacturer. Furthermore, it is also shown that wholesale price and retail price in the three decision-making settings depend on the green efficiency coefficient. Wholesale price and retail price in DDS-LAM are always the lowest (highest) if the green efficiency coefficient is sufficiently high (low). Finally, executing a greening cost-sharing contract can improve chain members’ profits if the retailer shares an appropriate proportion with the loss-averse manufacturer.

Prospect theory is a very effective method to express behavioral decision making under uncertainty. This paper attempts to develop a method to multi-attribute decision making with Atanassov's interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy information using prospect theory. This method first transforms Atanassov's interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy variables into the prospect values using the value function in prospect theory. Based on the aspiration levels, Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy prospect gain and loss matrices are obtained. Then, using the Atanassov's interval-valued intuitionistic hybrid weight averaging (IVIHWA) operator or the Atanassov's interval-valued intuitionistic hybrid Shapley weight averaging (IVIHSWA) operator, the comprehensive Atanassov's interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy prospect value of each alternative is calculated. According to the comprehensive Atanassov's interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy prospect values, a ranking method of alternatives is presented. Finally, two illustrative examples are selected to show the feasibility and availability of the proposed method.

A generalized fuzzy Shapley function for fuzzy games is proposed. First, a game with fuzzy characteristic function is introduced. Based on Hukuhara difference, the fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley function is proposed as a solution concept to this class of fuzzy games. Some of its properties are shown. An equivalent axiomatic characterization of the fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley function is given. Furthermore, a generalized fuzzy Shapley function for games with fuzzy coalition and fuzzy characteristic function is developed. It is shown that the simplified expression of the generalized fuzzy Shapley function can be regarded as the generalization of the fuzzy Shapley function defined for some particular games with fuzzy coalition and fuzzy characteristic function.

An effective decision making approach based on VIKOR and Choquet integral is developed to solve multicriteria group decision making problem with conflicting criteria and interdependent subjective preference of decision makers in a fuzzy environment where preferences of decision makers with respect to criteria are represented by interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets. First, an interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy Choquet integral operator is given. Some of its properties are investigated in detail. The extended VIKOR decision procedure based on the proposed operator is developed for solving the multicriteria group decision making problem where the interactive criteria weight is measured by Shapley value. An illustrative example is given for demonstrating the applicability of the proposed decision procedure for solving the multi-criteria group decision making problem in interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy environment.