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The paper presents a theoretical framework of recruitment by organizations of political violence as an alternative approach to traditional accounts of collective action. The framework is then applied to a case study of recruitment by the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA from its inception as an anti-colonial movement for self-determination in the 1950s (referred to as EOKA A') to its transformation into a radicalized nationalist organization in the 1970s (referred to as EOKA B'). The paper illustrates the role of social networks and social norms in facilitating recruitment and the evolution of the organization of political violence from EOKA A' to B'..x000d.The study will fill a lacuna in the study of this particular conflict. Even though many aspects of the conflict have been examined, there is no in-depth study of the organization with an emphasis on recruitment. The particular aim of this project is to provide a theoretical explanation as well as empirical data on the organizational aspects of the transformation. In what ways did the pool of participants, recruitment patterns and the conduct of political violence change over time? To answer these questions, the project relies on data collected through interviews of ex-combatants. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a theory of recruitment by organizations that engage in political violence and presents an analysis of the Sierra Leonean civil war as an illustrative case study of the theoretical framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The First Russo-Chechen War (1994-1996) was characterized as an ethnonationalistic war of secession.The ethnically distinct Chechens unilaterally proclaimed independence from the newly reconfigured Russian Federation in 1991 and then resisted the Russian incursion to preserve that independence on the basis of ethnic sovereignty. This was mirrored both in the organization and operation of political violence during the war. The teip (clan) structure played a role in military strategy and tactics; small mobile offensive bands were recruited by local clan leaders (at times consisting of nothing more than extended family members and neighbors at each village), and fought a guerrilla war of rapid incursions from and then retreat to mountainous terrain. Moreover, ethnic symbolism and rhetoric were prominent in the mobilization and recruitment phases of the conflict. The disastrous war ended in humiliation for Russia and costly de facto independence for a Chechnya unable to overcome the burden of the war.Yet following the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev’s incursion into Dagestan in 1999 and the subsequent outbreak of the Second Russo-Chechen War, many elements of the Chechen organization of political violence changed. The ethnonationalist rhetoric had been supplanted by religious pronouncements with a corresponding change in the basis of recruitment. Operational tactics also shifted to reflect this change: terrorist tactics typically associated with Islamic fundamentalist organizations were adopted by Chechen insurgents. Terrorist actions such as the Moscow theaterhostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan school siege in 2004 as well as a string of suicide attacks had a considerably deleterious effect on (up to that point generally sympathetic) international opinion of the Chechen struggle and shifted emphasis on the Islamic dimension of the conflict. The “Wahhabi connection” received increasing scholarly and media attention. What explains this seemingly abrupt shift in both strategy and tactics in the organization of political violence by Chechen insurgents?This paper explains the shift in focus from ethnonationalism to religious fundamentalism as astrategic move on the part of Chechen warlords like Shamil Basayev in order to remain relevant inthe changing Chechen political landscape after the end of the First Chechen War and as a way topreserve external support and funding from Islamic sources through active mediators such as Ibnal-Khattab and the string of successors that followed after his demise. The move to adopt terrorist tactics reminiscent of Islamic organizations in the Middle East similarly represents a tactical adaptation observant of the success of those tactics in other contexts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]