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Objective To evaluate bronchopulmonary dysplasia (BPD), serious brain injury, and severe retinopathy of prematurity (ROP) as predictors of poor long-term outcome in very low birth weight infants. Study design We examined the associations between counts of the 3 morbidities and long-term outcomes in 1514 of 1791 (85%) infants with birth weights of 500-1250 g who were enrolled in the Caffeine for Apnea of Prematurity trial from October 1999, to October 2004, had complete morbidity data, and were alive at 36 weeks postmenstrual age (PMA). BPD was defined as use of supplemental oxygen at 36 weeks PMA. Serious brain injury on cranial ultrasound included grade 3 and 4 hemorrhage, cystic periventricular leucomalacia, porencephalic cysts, or ventriculomegaly of any cause. Poor long-term outcome was death after 36 weeks PMA or survival to 5 years with 1 or more of the following disabilities: motor impairment, cognitive impairment, behavior problems, poor general health, deafness, and blindness. Results BPD, serious brain injury, and severe ROP occurred in 43%, 13%, and 6% of the infants, respectively. Each of the 3 morbidities was similarly and independently correlated with poor 5-year outcome. Rates of death or disability (95% CI) in children with none, any 1, any 2, and all 3 morbidities were 11.2% (9.0%-13.7%), 22.9% (19.6%-26.5%), 43.9% (35.5%-52.6%), and 61.5% (40.6%-79.8%), respectively. Conclusions In very low birth weight infants who survive to 36 weeks PMA, a count of BPD, serious brain injury, and severe ROP predicts the risk of a late death or survival with disability at 5 years.

Cooperation in 2-person social dilemmas was examined when people frame outcomes as gains or as losses. It was argued that losses loom larger than gains and that depending on people's social motive, behavioral options in social dilemmas are valued differently. Results of 3 experiments supported the predictions based on prospect theory and interdependence theory: Pro-socials (cooperators) cooperated more in a loss than in a gain frame, whereas individualists cooperated less in a loss than in a gain frame. Unexpectedly, competitors cooperated as little in a loss as in a gain frame, which was attributed to a floor effect. It was concluded that this research explains inconsistent findings from previous research on gain-loss frames and shows that loss-framed individuals pursue their cooperative or individualistic goals to a greater extent than gain-framed individuals but pursue their competitive goals to about the same extent. The way people frame information influences their judgments and decisions. The effects of framing have been found in medical decision making (e.g., Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987), consumer behavior (e.g., Puto, 1987), personnel selection (Huber, Neale, & Northcraft, 1987), marketing (Bettman & Sujan, 1987), auditing (Johnson, Jamal, & Berryman, 1991 ), and security dilemmas (Kramer, Meyerson, & Davis, 1990). Our research was concerned with the effects of framing in settings of outcome interdependence, which arises when individual outcomes are the confluence of individual decisions and the decisions of others (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). We wanted to integrate social dilemma research that considers cooperative behavior to be a function of the outcome frame (i.e., the coding of prospective outcomes as gains or losses) with theory that considers cooperative behavior to be a function of social motives (i.e., preferences for particular patterns of self-other outcome distributions; Messick & McClintock, 1968).

Two resource dilemmas, the commons dilemma, in which individuals take from a common resource, and the public goods problem, in which individuals give to a common good, were experimentally compared. Although they provide equivalent outcomes, the two dilemmas involve different frames of reference and are not psychologically equivalent. We also examined sanction systems, which involve contributions by individuals in the dilemma to provide rewards and penalties for cooperation. The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that public goods problems ("give dilemmas") activate greater loss aversion and less cooperation than commons dilemmas ("take dilemmas"), and that this effect is moderated by sanction systems. No difference between dilemmas was obtained when either the reward or penalty sanction was present, indicating that sanctions cause a shift in frame of reference to the aspiration of obtaining the reward or avoiding the penalty. The penalty sanction and especially the reward sanction produced greater cooperation. Also, as expected, loss aversion heightened exploitation: when the others were cooperative, a give dilemma generated less cooperation than a take dilemma. In Experiment 2, we extended the concept of frame and loss aversion to the structure of sanction systems, finding that subjects were more likely to contribute to a "take sanction" than to a "give sanction." We discuss potential sources of reference points and loss aversion in resource dilemmas and the likely impact on cooperation.

This research concerned satisfaction with outcome-differences (advantageous inequity, equity, or disadvantageous inequity) as a function of the individual's gain or loss frame, other's gain or loss frame, the cooperative or noncooperative nature of the relationship, and their interactions. After reading a scenario, subjects rated on a satisfaction-dissatisfaction soak a series of outcome-pairs providing themselves and another party with outcomes. Consistent with Equity Theory, results showed that gain framed individuals found equity more pleasing than advantageous inequity, which in turn was preferred over disadvantageous inequity, but only when the decision making context was cooperative rather than noncooperative. In a noncooperative context, gain framed individuals were as pleased with equity as with advantageous inequity. Contrary to Equity Theory, but consistent with Prospect Theory, loss framed individuals were relatively insensitive to outcome-differences and the nature of the relationship. Results finally suggested that advantageous inequity was preferred less when the other party had a loss rather than gain frame, albeit only under cooperative circumstances.

An analysis of the responses of 1,614 subjects from 10 cultures shows that the Leung Bond procedure provides illuminating ways of extracting both strong (Separation From In-Groups, Independence, and Personal Competence) and weak (Task Orientation) eticsrelevant to individualism, and weak etics (Dependence on Others, Sociability) relevant to collectivism. Additional richness in the available information is provided when intracultural factor analyses are carried out in each culture. It appears that the most complete picture is obtained when both etics and emics are examined.

Two psychometric models with very different parametric formulas and item response functions can make virtually the same predictions in all applications. By applying some basic results from the theory of hypothesis testing and from signal detection theory, the power of the most powerful test for distinguishing the models can be com puted. Measuring model misspecification by com puting the power of the most powerful test is proposed. If the power of the most powerful test is low, then the two models will make nearly the same prediction in every application. If the power is high, there will be applications in which the models will make different predictions. This measure, that is, the power of the most powerful test, places various types of model misspecifica tion— item parameter estimation error, multidi mensionality, local independence failure, learning and/or fatigue during testing—on a common scale. The theory supporting the method is presented and illustrated with a systematic study of misspecifica tion due to item response function estimation error. In these studies, two joint maximum likelihood estimation methods (LOGIST 2B and LOGIST 5) and two marginal maximum likelihood estimation methods (BILOG and ForScore) were contrasted by measuring the difference between a simulation model and a model obtained by applying an estimation method to simulation data. Marginal estimation was found generally to be superior to joint estimation. The parametric marginal method (BILOG) was superior to the nonparametric method only for three- parameter logistic models. The nonparametric mar ginal method (ForScore) excelled for more general models. Of the two joint maximum likelihood methods studied, LOGIST s appeared to be more accurate than LOGIST 2B.

OBJECTIVE: To determine the extent that social variables influence cognitive development of very low birth weight (VLBW) infants across the preschool years. STUDY DESIGN: Participants were VLBW (500-1250 g) children enrolled in the Caffeine for Apnea of Prematurity randomized trial between 1999 and 2004. We investigated the relationships between 4 potential social advantages: higher maternal education, higher paternal education, caregiver employment, and 2 biologic parents in the same home--and gain in cognitive scores. Cognitive assessments were performed at the corrected ages of 18 months (Mental Development Index score on the Bayley Scales of Infant Development II) and 5 years (Full Scale IQ on the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence III). Cognitive gain was computed by subtracting each individual 18-month Mental Development Index score from the corresponding Full Scale IQ at 5 years. RESULTS: Data were available for 1347 children. Mean (SD) cognitive scores were 90.8 (15.7) at 18 months and 98.9 (14.5) at 5 years. Multivariable regression showed that higher maternal education, higher paternal education, and caregiver employment had independent and additive effects of similar size on cognitive gain (P < .001); the mean cognitive gain between 18 months and 5 years increased by 3.6 points in the presence of each of these advantages. When all 3 were present, cognitive scores improved on average by 10.9 points compared with children without any of these advantages. CONCLUSION: In VLBW children, a count of 3 social advantages strongly predicts gains in cognitive scores across the preschool years.

This chapter examines the role of time pressure in negotiation and mediation. Negotiation can be defined as discussion between two or more parties and joint decision making with the goal of reaching agreement. Mediation is a variation on negotiation in which one or more outsiders (“third parties”) assist the parties in their efforts to reach agreement.