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We construct a monetary economy with aggregate liquidity shocks and heterogeneous idiosyncratic preference shocks. In this environment, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound (ZLB) even when the Friedman rule is the best interest‐rate policy the central bank can implement. As a consequence, central bank stabilization policy, which takes the form of repo arrangements in response to aggregate demand shocks, temporarily relaxes the liquidity constraint of impatient agents at the ZLB. Due to a pecuniary externality, this policy may have beneficial general equilibrium effects for patient agents even if they are unconstrained in their money balances.

We investigate the essentiality of credit and banking in a microfounded monetary model in which agents face heterogeneous idiosyncratic time preference shocks. Three main results arise from our analysis. First, the constrained-efficient allocation is unattainable without banks. Second, financial intermediation can improve the equilibrium allocation even at the Friedman rule because it relaxes the liquidity constraints of impatient borrowers. Third, changes in credit conditions are not necessarily neutral in a monetary equilibrium at the Friedman rule. If the debt limit is sufficiently low, money and credit are perfect substitutes and tightening the debt limit is neutral. As the debt limit increases, however, patient agents always hold money but impatient agents prefer not to since it is costly for them to do so given they are facing a positive shadow rate. Borrowing instead is costless when interest rates are zero and increasing the debt limit improves the allocation.

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents use nominal government bonds as collateral in secured lending arrangements. If the collateral constraint binds, agents price in a liquidity premium on bonds that lowers the real rate on bonds. In equilibrium, the price level is determined according to the …fiscal theory of the price level. However, the market value of government debt exceeds its fundamental value. We then examine the dynamic properties of the model and show that the market value of the government debt can ‡fluctuate even though there are no changes to current or future taxes or spending. The price dynamics are driven solely by the liquidity premium on the debt.

The modern model of central bank communication suggests that central bankers prefer to err on the side of saying too much rather than too little. The reason is that most central bankers believe that clear and concise communication of monetary policy helps achieve their goals. For the Federal Reserve, this means to achieve its goals of price stability, maximum employment, and stable long-term interest rates. This article examines the various dimensions of Fed communication with the public and financial markets and how Fed communication with the public has evolved over time. We use daily and intraday data to document how Fed communication affects key financial market variables. We find that Fed communication is associated with changes in prices of financial market instruments such as Treasury securities and equity prices. However, this effect varies by type of communication, by type of instrument, and by who is doing the speaking.

We construct a search model where sellers post prices and produce goods of unknown quality. A match between a buyer and a seller reveals the quality of the seller. We look at the pricing decisions of the sellers in this environment. We then introduce a rating system whereby buyers reveal the seller's type by giving them a “star” if they are a high quality seller. We show that new sellers charge a low price to attract buyers and if they receive a star they post a high price. Furthermore, high quality sellers sell with a higher probability than new sellers. We show that welfare is higher with a ratings system. Using data on Airbnb rentals to compare the pricing decisions of Superhosts (elite rentals) to non-Superhosts we show that Superhosts: 1) charge higher prices, 2) have a higher occupancy rate and 3) higher revenue than non-Super hosts.

We study the use of asset-backed money in a neoclassical growth model with illiquid capital. A mechanism is delegated control of productive capital and issues claims against the revenue it earns. These claims constitute a form of asset-backed money. The mechanism determines (i) the number of claims outstanding, (ii) the dividends paid to claim holders, and (iii) the structure of redemption fees. We find that for capital-rich economies, the first-best allocation can be implemented and price stability is optimal. However, for sufficiently capital-poor economies, achieving the first-best allocation requires a strictly positive rate of inflation. In general, the minimum inflation necessary to implement the first-best allocation is decreasing in capital wealth.

What is the value of having microfoundations for monetary exchange in a macro model? In this article, the author attempts to answer this question by listing what he considers the major accomplishments of the field. He argues that the evidence overwhelmingly shows that microfoundations matter for many questions of first-order importance in macroeconomics.

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents use nominal government bonds as collateral in secured lending arrangements. If the collateral constraint binds, agents price in a liquidity premium on bonds that lowers the real rate on bonds. In equilibrium, the price level is determined according to the fiscal theory of the price level. However, the market value of government debt exceeds its fundamental value. We then examine the dynamic properties of the model and show that the market value of the government debt can fluctuate even though there are no changes to current or future taxes or spending. The price dynamics are driven solely by the liquidity premium on the debt.

We consider an overlapping generation framework with search and private information to study optimal taxation. Agents sequentially trade in markets that are characterized by different frictions and trading protocols. In frictional decentralized markets, agents receive shocks that determine if they are going to be consumers or producers. Shocks are private information. Mechanism design is used to solve for the constrained optimal allocation. We then study whether a government can replicate the constrained optimal allocation with an array of policy instruments including fiat money. We show that if the government has a full set of non-linear taxes, then lump-sum taxes and inflation are irrelevant for the allocation. However, if the government is constrained to use linear taxes, then using the inflation tax is optimal even if lump-sum taxes are available.

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose to report some of their income. Unreported income requires using a payment method that avoids recordkeeping in some markets—cash. Trade using cash to avoid taxes is the ‘shadow economy’ in our model. We then calibrate our model using money, interest rate and GDP data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a sample of countries and compare our measures to traditional reduced form estimates.

Information about asset quality is often not disclosed to asset markets. What principles determine when a financial regulator should disclose or withhold information? We explore this question using a risk-sharing model with intertemporal trade and limited commitment. Information about future asset returns is available to society, but legislation dictates whether this information is disclosed or not. In our environment, nondisclosure is generally desirable except when individuals can access hidden information – what we call undue diligence – at sufficiently low cost. Ironically, information disclosure is desirable only when individuals have a strong incentive to discover it for themselves.

The authors construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary stabilization policy. Prices are fully flexible and money is essential for trade. The authors’ main result is that if the central bank pursues a price-level target, it can control inflation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short-run shocks to the economy. The optimal policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates that effectively smooths consumption across states.

When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist – sell assets or borrow. We compare the allocations arising in two economies: in one, agents can sell government (outside) bonds and in the other they can borrow by issuing (inside) bonds. All transactions are voluntary, implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds but that the converse is not true. However, the optimal policy in each economy makes the allocations equivalent.

I use the monetary version of the neoclassical growth model developed by Aruoba, Waller, and Wright [Journal of Monetary Economics (2011)] to study the properties of the model when there is exogenous growth. I first consider the planner's problem, and then the equilibrium outcome in a monetary economy. I do so by first using proportional bargaining to determine the terms of trade and then considering competitive price taking. I obtain closed-form solutions for all variables along the balanced growth path in all cases. I then derive closed-form solutions for the transition paths under the assumption of full depreciation and, in the monetary economy, a particular nonstationary interest rate policy. The key result is that inflation is damaging to per capita income levels along the balanced growth path and to short-run growth of the economy.

We introduce ex ante heterogeneity into the Berentsen, Molico, and Wright monetary search model with lotteries. We show that their three main results regarding lotteries do not survive this modification of the environment.

We construct a monetary economy in which agents face aggregate demand shocks and hetero- geneous idiosyncratic preference shocks. We show that, even when the Friedman rule is the best interest rate policy the central bank can implement, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound and therefore there is scope for central bank policies of liquidity provision. Indeed, we find that quantitative easing can be welfare improving even at the zero lower bound. This is because such policy temporarily relaxes the liquidity constraint of impatient agents, without harming the patient ones. Moreover, due to a pricing externality, quantitative easing may also have beneficial general equilibrium effects for the patient agents even if they are unconstrained in their holdings of real balances. Last, our model suggests that it can be optimal for the central bank to buy private debt claims instead of government debt.

We study the endogenous choice to accept fiat objects as media of exchange and their implications for nominal exchange rate determination. We consider a two-country environment with two currencies which can be used to settle any transactions. However, currencies can be counterfeited at a fixed cost and the decision to counterfeit is private information. This induces equilibrium liquidity constraints on the currencies in circulation. We show that the threat of counterfeiting can pin down the nominal exchange rate even when the currencies are perfect substitutes, thus breaking the Kareken-Wallace indeterminacy result. When the two currencies are not perfect substitutes, an international currency can exist whereby one country has two currencies circulating while the other country uses only one. We also find that with appropriate fiscal policies we can enlarge the set of monetary equilibria with determinate nominal exchange rates. Finally, we show that the threat of counterfeiting can also help determine nominal exchange rates in a variety of different trading environments.

We study the use of intermediated assets as media of exchange in a neo- classical growth model. An intermediary is delegated control over productive capital and finances itself by issuing claims against the revenue generated by its operations. Unlike physical capital, intermediated claims are assumed to be liquid-they constitute a form of asset-backed money. The intermediary is assumed to control 1) the number of claims outstanding, 2) the dividends paid out to claim holders and 3) the fee charged for collecting the dividend. We find that for patient economies, the first-best allocation can always be implemented as a competitive equilibrium through an appropriately designed intermediary policy rule. The optimal policy requires strictly positive inflation. While it is also possible to implement the first-best by introducing at money and a lump- sum tax instrument, our results demonstrate that neither of these interventions are necessary for efficiency.

We study the use of asset-backed money in a neoclassical growth model with illiquid capital. A mechanism is delegated control of productive capital and issues claims against the revenue it earns. These claims constitute a form of asset-backed money. The mechanism determines (i) the number of claims outstanding, (ii) the dividends paid to claim holders, and (iii) the structure of redemption fees. We find that for capital-rich economies, the first-best allocation can be implemented and price stability is optimal. However, for sufficiently capital-poor economies, achieving the first-best allocation requires a strictly positive rate of inflation. In general, the minimum inflation necessary to implement the first-best allocation is above the Friedman rule and varies with capital wealth.

We construct a monetary economy in which agents face aggregate demand shocks and heterogeneous idiosyncratic preference shocks. We show that, in this environment, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound even when the Friedman rule is the best interest rate policy the central bank can implement. Therefore, there is scope for central bank policies of liquidity provision even at the zero lower bound. This is because such policies temporarily relax the liquidity constraint of impatient agents without harming the patient ones, thus improving welfare. Due to a pricing externality, this may also have beneficial general equilibrium effects for the patient agents even if they are unconstrained in their holdings of real balances.

We construct a monetary economy in which agents face aggregate demand shocks and hetero- generous idiosyncratic preference shocks. We show that, even when the Friedman rule is the best interest rate policy, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound. Thus, quantitative easing can be welfare improving since it temporarily relaxes the liquidity constraint of some agents, without harming others. Moreover, due to a pricing externality, quantitative easing may also have beneficial general equilibrium effects for the unconstrained agents. Lastly, our model suggests that it can be optimal for the central bank to buy private debt claims instead of government debt.

We study the use of money for sharing consumption risk. In our model, agents randomly receive endowments at some points in time and produce at other points. Due to information frictions, agents cannot use intertemporal contracts to share risk. The use of money allows agents to overcome these information frictions. The Friedman rule is shown to generate efficient risk sharing. Furthermore, we quantify the welfare costs of incomplete risk sharing and find that with 10% inflation, the welfare cost of inefficient risk sharing is approximately 1%-1.5% of steady-state consumption.

We study how two fiat monies, one safe and one risky, compete in a decentralized trading environment. The currencies' equilibrium values, their transaction velocities and agents' spending patterns are endogenously determined. We derive conditions under which agents holding diversified currency portfolios spend the safe currency first and hold the risky one for later purchases. We also examine when the reverse spending pattern is optimal. Traders generally favor dealing in the safe currency, unless trade frictions and the currency risk is low. As risk increases or trading becomes more difficult, the transaction velocity and value of the safe money increases.

Summary.: We construct a tractable ‘fundamental' model of money with equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible ‘tokens' and can offer lotteries on monetary transfers. By studying a simple trading pattern, we can analytically characterize the monetary distribution. Interestingly, such distributions match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price heterogeneity

We use a dual currency money search model to study dollarization. Agents hold portfolios consisting of two currencies, one of which is risky. We use numerical methods to solve for the steady-state distributions of currency portfolios, transaction patterns, and value functions. As risk increases, agents increasingly use the safe currency as a medium of exchange—dollarization occurs. Furthermore, the safe currency trades for multiple units of the risky currency. This type of currency exchange, and the corresponding nominal exchange rate, are often observed in black market or unofficial currency exchange markets in developing countries. Due to decentralized trading, a distribution of exchange rates arises, whose mean and variance change in predictable ways when currency risk increases.

We study the effects of alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in the context of a capital-theoretic, general equilibrium economy. In the absence of an institutional arrangement, there is a continuum of steady state equilibria indexed by rates of inflation ranging from the Friedman rule to high a high level. The social optimum is associated with the Friedman rule.. We consider three institutional arrangements for determining monetary policy. The first, unconditional majority voting, always leads to a substantial inflation bias. The second, a simple form of bargaining which we interpret as a policy board, generally improves on the unconditional majority voting outcome. Finally, we consider a form of constitutional rule which always achieves the social optimum.

In decentralized trade individuals self-insure against consumption risk via costly diversification of skills. Although money acts as consumption insurance, it may lead to a moral hazard problem. If the problem is severe, monetizing trade can lower welfare relative to barter.

Before giving my general comments on the paper, I think that it would be useful to describe the evolution of monetary search models for those who have not followed recent developments in the literature. In this way, one has a better sense of the contribution made by Aruoba and Wright (2003, this issue of JMCB). Most people are familiar with the basic monetary search model developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993), and for many this may be the extent of their knowledge of money search models. In this first generation of models, goods and money are indivisible and agents can only hold one unit of goods or money. The key contribution of the models was to carefully describe the decentralized trading environment that gives rise to a double coincidence of wants problem and to endogenize the decision to accept money as payment for goods and services. In all search models, assumptions regarding anonymity of trading histories and imperfect record keeping mean that credit is not feasible, thus money is "essential" for trade, i.e., better allocations can be achieved through the use of money than without it. While analyzing the decision to accept money as a medium of exchange does not hinge on indivisibilities or inventory restrictions, other questions such as how

We study how currency restrictions and government transaction policies affect the values of fiat currencies in a two country, divisible good, search model. We show that these policies can generate equilibria where both currencies circulate as medium of exchange and where currency exchange occurs between citizens of different countries. Restrictions on the internal use of foreign currency can cause the domestic currency to be relatively more valuable to domestic agents while taxes on domestic currency create an incentive for home agents to hold foreign currency. We demonstrate that some policies increase prices and lower welfare while others do the reverse.

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.

We study the endogenous choice to accept at objects as media of exchange and their implications for nominal exchange rate determination. We consider a two-country environment with two currencies which can be used to settle any transactions. However, currencies can be counterfeited at a xed cost and the decision to counterfeit is private information. This induces equilibrium liquidity constraints on the currencies in circulation. We show that the threat of counterfeiting can pin down the nominal exchange rate even when the currencies are perfect substitutes, thus breaking the Kareken-Wallace indeterminacy result. When the two currencies are not perfect substitutes, an international currency can exist whereby one country has two currencies circulating while the other country uses only one. We also nd that with appropriate scal policies we can enlarge the set of monetary equilibria with determinate nominal exchange rates. Finally, we show that the threat of counterfeiting can also help determine nominal exchange rates in a variety of dierent trading environments.

An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via a channel system or a floor system. We construct a general equilibrium model to study the properties of these systems. We find that a floor system is weakly optimal if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Unfortunately, the optimal floor system requires either transfers from the fiscal authority to the central bank or a reduction in seigniorage payments from the central bank to the government. This is the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system. When the central bank faces financing constraints on its interest expense, we show that it is strictly optimal to operate a channel system., COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

Partisan politics and random election outcomes generate policy uncertainty and partisan business cycles. To reduce policy uncertainty, society must design the policy-making environment to overcome electoral uncertainty and partisanship. I show that delegating policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers will produce substantial policy smoothing and lower policy uncertainty relative to a simple model in which elected officials set policy. Board members are chosen in a partisan, noncooperative environment; yet in the benchmark model, policy variability is eliminated, and the cooperative bargaining solution is replicated.

Using a search-theoretic model of money, we explore the conditions under which two currencies, domestic and foreign, will co-exist despite legal restrictions on the use of foreign currency for internal trade. We study how changes in government policy (i.e., its enforcement of currency laws through fines or the rate of enforcement) affects the acceptability of illegal currency, the equilibrium value of both currencies and the implicit exchange rate. First we construct a model with indivisible goods to show conditions under which legal currency is fully acceptable but illegal currency circulates with varying acceptability. We then introduce bargaining to determine prices in legal and illegal currency. We show that some enforcement polices can create multiple equilibria while others will not. Also, some methods of enforcement are capable of driving the illegal currency out of circulation while others are not.

I. INTRODUCTION In recent years, the debate on establishing price stability as the sole objective of monetary policy has intensified. Advocates of price stability argue that monetary policy has only a transitory effect on real variables such as output or unemployment. They argue that the monetary authority thus should focus on price stability to reap the benefits of a stable and predictable price path. Because the current U.S. inflation rate is positive, the Federal Reserve would have to reduce the inflation rate - disinflate, in other words - to stabilize the price level. Opponents of price stability argue that various rigidities in the economy would cause such a policy to generate a recession whose costs would exceed the benefits. One way to measure the costs of disinflation is to estimate "sacrifice ratios," the quantity of output lost for each percentage-point reduction in the inflation rate. However, sacrifice ratios are not true cost-benefit ratios: They gauge the costs of lost output, but do not assess the benefits from the lower inflation rate. This is a serious problem that causes sacrifice ratios to overstate the net costs of disinflation (see Ball, 1994; Fuhrer, 1994). Although the concept of sacrifice ratios is not new, the recent pursuit of price stability by central banks around the globe has renewed interest in, and research on, the subject. This study presents a benefit-cost analysis of disinflation and critiques of two common methods for computing these statistics. The analysis first replicates Ball's (1994) estimates of sacrifice ratios for the United States and other industrialized countries. It then extends these results by changing the methodology in several plausible ways, including estimating three alternate measures of trend output and applying two methods of timing disinflations. Ball's estimates are theoretically objectionable and are very fragile to minor changes in technique but worthy of study because of the interest they have elicited. Robert Barro (1995) calculates the benefits of disinflation and estimates the growth benefits from lower inflation (or, perhaps more accurately, the costs of inflation). Barro's estimates are better constructed from an econometric perspective than are Ball's estimates. However, the authors of the study here remain skeptical as to the validity of Barro's estimates, as well. Despite the uncertainty associated with Ball's sacrifice ratio estimates and Barro's growth estimates, relating them does permit one to obtain a rough measure of the net cost of disinflation. Findings of the analysis here indicate that, contrary to popular opinion, disinflation probably produces a net benefit, not a net cost. Additionally, the output losses associated with a typical U.S. disinflation likely are made up in 10-20 years - less than one generation. II. THE CONCEPT OF A SACRIFICE RATIO A. Stylized Time-Series Plot of Inflation and GDP - Ideal Case The sacrifice ratio is the cumulative loss of output during a disinflation episode as a percentage of initial output divided by the cumulative reduction in the inflation rate. Thus, a sacrifice ratio of three implies that a one-point reduction in the trend inflation rate is associated with a loss equivalent to 3% of initial output. The easiest way to understand sacrifice ratios is to look at a stylized picture of how GDP and inflation evolve over time, according to a simple, textbook model of the economy in which changes in money growth have real effects. Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the economy's reaction over time to a decrease in the growth rate of money. Figure 1A shows output initially growing steadily over time along the trendline, Y. Likewise, Figure lB shows that the inflation rate is at [[Pi].sub.0] until time [t.sub.0], when the monetary authority slows money growth to reduce the inflation rate to [[Pi].sub.1]. If the slowdown in money growth causes a recession, then output would fall below its trendline. …

In this paper we study the endogenous choice to accept fiat objects as media of exchange, the fundamentals that drive their acceptance, and their implications for their bilateral nominal exchange rate. To this end, we consider a small open economy where agents have no restrictions on what divisible fiat currency can be used to settle transactions (i.e. no currency control). We build on Li, Rocheteau and Weill (2013) and allow both fiat currencies to be counterfeited at some fixed costs. The two currencies can coexist, even if one of the currencies is dominated by the other in rate of return. This is driven by an equilibrium outcome in which private information and threats of counterfeiting imposes an equilibrium liquidity constraint on currencies in circulation. Thus, threats of counterfeiting help to pin down a determinate nominal exchange rate, and, to break the Kareken-Wallace indeterminacy result in an environment without ad-hoc currency controls. Finally, we show that with appropriate fiscal policies we can enlarge the set of monetary equilibria with determinate nominal exchange rate.

We study optimal monetary stabilization policy in a DSGE model with microfounded money demand. A search externality creates “congestion,” which causes aggregate output to be inefficient. Because of the informational frictions that give rise to money, households are unable to insure themselves perfectly against aggregate shocks. This gives rise to a welfare-improving role for monetary policy that works by adjusting the nominal interest rate in response to these shocks. Optimal policy is determined by choosing a set of state-contingent nominal interest rates to maximize the expected lifetime utility of the agents subject to the constraints of being an equilibrium.

An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via a channel system or a floor system. We construct a general equilibrium model to study the properties of these systems. We find that a floor system is weakly optimal if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Unfortunately, the optimal floor system requires either transfers from the fiscal authority to the central bank or a reduction in seigniorage payments from the central bank to the government. This is the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system. When the central bank faces financing constraints on its interest expense, we show that it is strictly optimal to operate a channel system.

The authors of this article provide a general introduction to the concept of sovereign debt—including the seductive nature of borrowing and the strategies associated with default—before analyzing the cur rent debt crises in Europe. They focus on Greece’s current woes but also discuss Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. The authors also discuss the environment in the United States, which has a high debt burden of its own, and present fiscal choices for policymakers and taxpayers. (JEL E52, E61, E62, H63)

This article reviews the recent book by Matthew Canzoneri and Dale Henderson on international monetary policy. The review discusses the basic model used by the authors to illustrate the welfare losses that arise as a result of non-cooperative behavior and the proposed solutions for moving closer to the socially optimal cooperative solutions. The proposed solutions are then examined in detail and the reviewer asks whether these solutions accurately describe the way he believes cooperation has occurred in the last two decades. Finally, this work is compared to recent research on policy cooperation that does not have game-theoretic foundations.

This paper presents a simple exposition of the main results behind more complicated credit rationing models. It uses a standard, static model of the banking firm to analyze the effects of changing the interest rate on loans and the probability of repayment. Using simple elasticity arguments we demonstrate how “natural” credit rationing can arise.

We construct a dynamic, general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose to report some of their income. Unreported income requires using a payment method that avoids recordkeeping – cash. Trade using cash to avoid taxes is the theoretical measure of the shadow economy from our model. We then calibrate our model using money, interest rate and GDP data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a sample of 30 countries and compare our estimates to traditional ad hoc estimates. Our results generate reasonably larger estimates for the size of the shadow economy than exist in previous literature.

We construct a dynamic, general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose to report some of their income. Unreported income requires using a payment method that avoids recordkeeping – cash. Trade using cash to avoid taxes is the theoretical measure of the shadow economy from our model. We then calibrate our model using money, interest rate and GDP data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a sample of 30 countries and compare our estimates to traditional ad hoc estimates. Our results generate reasonably larger estimates for the size of the shadow economy than exist in previous literature.>