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We quantify how market integration affects the economic propagation of sectoral supply shocks at the example of a Russian gas shutoff to the European Union. An open-economy, multisector general equilibrium model suggests that the adverse output impact on the European Union shrinks fourfold if integration with the global liquified natural gas (LNG) market is considered. On the flip side, other LNG importers also see adverse output effects. Due to nonlinearities, the combined total economic damage is less than half with integration, compared to the counterfactual case without. Governments should foster further integration to make economies more resilient to supply shocks.

ehavioral public administration was coined as a term to describe a field focused on the psychologically based study of individual level behavior and attitudes with relevance for the public sector. Although it holds im-portant insights on human behavior, the literature on behavioral genetics has so far largely been missing in this field. In this paper, I propose that behavioral genetics is concurrent with the scope of behavioral public administration and that it complements the popular theory of bounded rationality. Next, I outline the logics of the twin studies that underlie much of behavioral genetics, and synthesize relevant existing results both inside and outside public administration that relies on behavioral genetics. Functionally, I arrange these insights as they relate to citizens, employees, and managers and present examples of how gene-environment interactions allow for integration of behavioral public administration and behavioral genetics. I argue that insights from behavioral genetics are needed to maximize explanatory power and avoid biased estimates of the effects of socialization when examining these three groups. I conclude by presenting points for practi-tioners.

During the 2008–09 financial crisis, the U.S. government arranged bailouts of major banks to prevent a suspension of bank deposits, where banks cease paying checks and refuse depositors’ requests to withdraw funds. Although these bailouts likely helped firms and households continue to make payments, they have been debated due to potential moral hazard concerns as well as the high cost to taxpayers. Assessing the costs and benefits of preventing deposit suspensions is difficult, as nationwide bank suspensions have not occurred since the Great Depression. To circumvent this challenge, Qian Chen, Christoffer Koch, Gary Richardson, and Padma Sharma study the effects of more recent deposit suspensions at the state level (Nebraska in 1983, Ohio and Maryland in 1985, and Rhode Island in 1991). They find that the suspension in Rhode Island, which occurred during a recession, lowered employment, gross state product, and per capital personal income. Their results suggest that interventions that prevent large deposit suspensions during recessions, such as those undertaken after 2008, are likely worth the costs. Effective interventions not only help avoid economic losses during recessions, but also prevent losses to output and employment several years into the future.

Banking-system shutdowns during contractions scar economies. Four times in the last forty years, governors suspended payments from state-insured depository institutions. Suspensions of payments in Nebraska (1983), Ohio (1985), and Maryland (1985), which were short and occurred during expansions, had little measurable impact on macroeconomic aggregates. Rhode Island’s payments crisis (1991), which was prolonged and occurred during a recession, lengthened and deepened the downturn. Unemployment increased. Output declined, possibly permanently relative to what might have been. We document these effects using a novel Bayesian method for synthetic control that characterizes the principal types of uncertainty in this form of analysis. Our findings suggest policies that ensure banks continue to process payments during contractions – including the bailouts of financial institutions in 2008 and the unprecedented support of the financial system during the COVID crisis – have substantial value.

We develop a Social Distancing Index (SDI) based on a range of mobility metrics from Safegraph geolocation data, and validate the index with mobility data from Google and Unacast. We construct SDIs at the county, MSA, state and nationwide level, and link these measures to indicators of economic activity. According to our measures, the bulk of social distancing occurred during the week of March 15 and simultaneously across the U.S. At the national peak of social distancing in early April, localities that engaged in 10% more social distancing than average saw an additional 0.6% of their populations claiming unemployment insurance, an additional 2.8 pp reduction in small businesses employment, an additional 2.6 pp increase in small business closures, and an additional 3.2 pp reduction in new-business applications. A gradual and broad-based reduction in social distancing started in the third week of April.

Countercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs) are an old idea recently resurrected. CCyBs compel banks at the core of financial systems to accumulate capital during expansions so that they are better able to sustain operations during downturns. To gauge the potential impact of modern CCyBs, we compare the behavior of large and highly-connected commercial banks during booms before the Great Depression and Great Recession. Before the former, core banks did not expect bailouts and were subject to regulations that incentivized capital accumulation during booms. Before the later, core banks expected bailouts and kept capital levels close to regulatory minima. Our analysis indicates that the pre-Depression regulatory regime induced money-center banks to build capital buffers between 3% and 5% of total assets during economic expansions, which is up to double the maximum modern CCyB. These buffers enabled those banks to continue operations without government assistance during severe crises. This historical analogy indicates that modern countercyclical buffers may achieve their immediate goals of protecting core banks during crises but raises questions about whether they will contribute to overall financial stability.

Banking-system shutdowns during contractions scar economies. Four times in the last forty years, governors suspended payments from state-insured depository institutions. Suspensions of payments in Nebraska (1983), Ohio (1985), and Maryland (1985), which were short and occurred during expansions, had little measurable impact on macroeconomic aggregates. Rhode Island’s payments crisis (1991), which was prolonged and occurred during a recession, lengthened and deepened the downturn. Unemployment increased. Output declined, possibly permanently relative to what might have been. We document these effects using a novel Bayesian method for synthetic control that characterizes the principal types of uncertainty in this form of analysis. Our findings suggest policies that ensurebanks continue to process payments during contractions – including the bailouts of financial institutions in 2008 and the unprecedented support of the financial system during the COVID crisis – have substantial value.

Starting in the 1990s, US bank assets grew more concentrated among a few large institutions. We explore the changing role of idiosyncratic volatility as a shaping force of the bank asset power law distribution. Our results reveal that idiosyncratic asset volatilities for bank-holding companies declined since the 1990s. To the extent that firm-specific shocks can have significant macroeconomic consequences, this result implies that even as one obvious source of aggregate risk and contagion--bank asset concentration--has increased, another important source--idiosyncratic volatility--has diminished.

Denmark’s cultural and linguistic homogeneity is reflected in its highly proportional electoral system and governing institutions that are designed for consensual power sharing. Governments are formed according to the principle of negative parliamentarism which does not require a majority of parliament supporting a government, as long as there is not a majority opposing it. As a result of this system, Denmark has the highest occurrence of minority governments in the world. The main political divide in Denmark has traditionally been redistribution, often labelled the economic dimension of politics. Recently, however, the country has seen a trend felt throughout Europe according to which immigration has played an increasingly important role in political competition. Hence party competition in Denmark is increasingly two dimensional as the dimension of new politics has evolved.

Bank asset concentration has risen in the U.S. since the 1980s and declined in Europe since 2008. We decompose this rise and fall of big banks using rank-based empirical methods that characterize dynamic power law distributions into two shaping factors: the growth rates and idiosyncratic volatilities of assets for different size-ranked banks. Higher relative growth rates for the largest U.S. banks led to greater asset concentration. Idiosyncratic volatilities for U.S. banks declined, resulting in lower fundamental volatility of bank assets — the aggregate volatility due to idiosyncratic, bank-specific shocks — despite the rise in concentration since the 1990s. In contrast, the relative growth rates for the largest European banks declined and this led to the lower concentration of European bank assets. Over this same time period, the idiosyncratic volatilities and fundamental volatility of European bank assets have been stable.

Economic policy uncertainty affects decisions of households, businesses, policy makers and financial intermediaries. We first examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on aggregate bank credit growth. Then we analyze commercial bank entity level data to gauge the effects of policy uncertainty on financial intermediaries’ lending. We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity to back out indirect evidence of its effects on businesses and households. We ask (i) whether, conditional on standard macroeconomic controls, economic policy uncertainty affected bank level credit growth, and (ii) whether there is variation in the impact related to banks’ balance sheet conditions; that is, whether the effects are attributable to loan demand or, if impact varies with bank level financial constraints, loan supply. We find that policy uncertainty has a significant negative effect on bank credit growth. Since this impact varies meaningfully with some bank characteristics – particularly the overall capital-to-assets ratio and bank asset liquidity-loan supply factors at least partially (and significantly) help determine the influence of policy uncertainty. Because other studies have found important macroeconomic effects of bank lending growth on the macroeconomy, our findings are consistent with the possibility that high economic policy uncertainty may have slowed the U.S. economic recovery from the Great Recession by restraining overall credit growth through the bank lending channel.

In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.

Trust in the reported data of contagious diseases in real time is important for policy makers. Media and politicians have cast doubt on Chinese reported data on COVID-19 cases. We find Chinese confirmed infections match the distribution expected in Benford’s Law and are similar to that seen in the U.S. and Italy. We identify a more likely candidate for problems in the policy making process: Poor multilateral data sharing on testing and sampling., Highlights • We find no evidence of manipulation of Chinese COVID-19 data using Benford’s Law. • Models on the trade-off between growth and deaths can be calibrated with Chinese data. • Multilateral data sharing on testing and sampling will improve policy responses.

Shocks emanating from and propagating through the banking system have recently gained interest in the macroeconomics literature, yet they are not a feature unique to the 2008/09 financial crisis. Banking disintermediation shocks occured frequently during the Great Inflation era due to fixed deposit rate ceilings. I estimate the effect of deposit rate ceilings inscribed in Regulation Q on the transmission of federal funds rate changes to bank level credit growth using a historic bank level data set spanning half a century from 1959 to 2013 with about two million observations. Measures of the degree of bindingness of Regulation Q suggest that individual banks’ lending growth was smaller the more binding the legally fixed rate ceiling. Interaction terms with monetary policy suggest that the policy impact on bank level credit growth was non-linear at the ceiling “kink” and significantly larger when rate ceilings were in place. At the bank level, short-term interest rates exceeding the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings identify bank loan supply shifts that disappeared with deposit rate deregulation and thus weakened the credit channel of monetary transmission since the early 1980s.

Cases the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursues against the directors and officers of failed commercial banks for (gross) negligence are important for the corporate governance of U.S. commercial banks. These cases shape the kernel of bank corporate governance, as they guide expectations of bankers and regulators in defining the limits of unacceptable behaviour under financial distress, such as risk shifting. We examine the differences in behaviour of all 408 U.S. commercial banks that were taken into receivership between 2007 and 2012. Sued banks had different balance sheet dynamics relative to those who are not sued in the three years prior to failure. These banks were generally larger, faster growing, obtained riskier funding and tended to underprovision. We find evidence that boards of failing banks respond to litigation by reducing the use of riskier funding in an out-of-sample set of banks. Our results suggest the FDIC does set corporate governance standards for all banks by suing negligent directors and officers.

We present new evidence on how heterogeneity in banks interacts with monetary policy changes to impact bank lending, at both the bank and U.S. state levels. We use a new policy measure identified from narratives on FOMC intentions and real-time economic forecasts. This policy measure eliminates some of the movements in the actual federal funds rate that are endogenous to expected economic conditions. We find much stronger dynamic effects, and greater heterogeneity, in U.S. bank lending responses to the new monetary policy measure compared to the standard measure based on realized federal funds rate changes. Our findings suggest that studies using realized monetary policy changes confound monetary policy’s effects with those of changes in expected macrofundamentals. In fact, estimates from identified monetary policy changes lead to a reversal of U.S. states’ ranking by credit’s sensitivity to policy. We also extend Romer and Romer (2004)’s identification scheme, and expand the time and balance sheet coverage of the U.S. banking sample.

The U.S. banking sector has become substantially more concentrated since the 1990s, raising questions about both the causes and implications of this consolidation. We address these questions using nonparametric empirical methods that characterize dynamic power law distributions in terms of two shaping factors — the reversion rates (a measure of crosssectional mean reversion) and idiosyncratic volatilities of assets for different size-ranked banks. Using quarterly data for subsidiary commercial banks and thrifts and their parent bank-holding companies, we show that the greater concentration of U.S. bank-holding company assets is a result of lower mean reversion, a result consistent with policy changes such as interstate branching deregulation and the repeal of Glass-Steagall. In contrast, the greater concentration of both U.S. commercial bank and thrift assets is a result of higher idiosyncratic volatility, yet, idiosyncratic volatility of parent bank-holding company assets fell. This contrast suggests that diversification through non-banking activities has reduced the idiosyncratic asset volatilities of the largest bank-holding companies and affected systemic risk.

With short-term policy interest rates constrained by their effective zero lower bound (ZLB), monetary policy relied on communicating the future path of policy conditional on incoming macroeconomic data. Motivated by this, we exploit intra-day prices to investigate how updates on the state of the U.S. economy affect interest rates and exchange rates before and after the ZLB. We find that releases reflecting the dual mandate of the Fed rose in importance and – as an ex-post acknowledgement of the sources of the Great Recession – additional housing market indicators and GDP revisions, that hitherto left markets unaffected, became market movers.

This article analyses the growth rates of the complete population of UK-registered firms for the period 2001 to 2005. We estimate Gibrat's law – that growth rates are independent of firm size – by deciles of the firm size distribution. Whether we are able to reject Gibrat's law varies across deciles. We also show how estimates vary according to the measure of firm size, time period and sample selection.

Cases the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursues against the directors and officers of failed commercial banks for (gross) negligence are important for the corporate governance of U.S. commercial banks. These cases shape the kernel of bank corporate governance, as they guide expectations of bankers and regulators. Ours is the first empirical study of such legal cases that define the limits of acceptable behavior under financial distress. We examine the differences in behavior of all 408 U.S. commercial banks that were taken into receivership between 2007–2012. Sued banks had different balance sheet dynamics in the three years prior to failure. These generally larger banks were faster growing, obtained riskier funding and were more “optimistic”. We find evidence that the behavior of bank boards adjusts in an out-of-sample set of banks. Our results suggest the FDIC does not only pursue “deep pockets”, but sets corporate governance standards for all banks by suing negligent directors and officers.

A substantial body of work has highlighted the distinctive personality trait levels of elected officials, but very little is known about the personality of those who actually implement the political will of these officials, namely, bureaucrats. We sent surveys to all Danish municipal politicians and high-level bureaucrats for whom contact information could be obtained (92% of total). With response rates of 53% and 40% for politicians and bureaucrats, respectively, our sample of political elites across the two groups represents the best-powered study of political elites to date. Responses to our 30-item Big Five survey (the BFI-2-S; Soto and John, 2017a; Vedel et al., 2020) highlighted substantial similarity among various categories of political elites. For example, differences between bureaucrats and elected officials were small on average, and less than half that observed in a recent study comparing Danish elected officials with a representative population sample (Nørgaard & Klemmensen, 2018). Comparisons between bureaucrats of different rank partially aligned with results on executive personality (Ones & Dilchert, 2009). Potential implications for effective political functioning and for meeting the needs of those with personalities diverging from those of political elites are briefly discussed.