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Made for each other: Donald Trump and Twitter

Although the European Union has been pursuing media policy for decades, its legal competence for the media sector remains limited. Since its inception in the 1980s, the EU had to base its media policy on its responsibility to enforce the internal market and the direct application of competition law, which has led to a one-sided economic perspective on the media. With references to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the enshrinement of European values in the EU Treaty, the rule of law mechanism, and driven by the European Parliament, the EU Commission has recently shown a new direction in its media-related activities, which acknowledge the important role of the media in democracy and increasingly place media freedom and media pluralism at the center of its media policy. The draft European Media Freedom Act presented by the Commission in autumn 2022 brings together the numerous activities aimed at protecting the freedom of the media and their independence, and at the same time seems to test the limits of the scope for its media policy.

With the surge of populism in Europe, public service broadcasting has come under increased pressure. The established media are considered part of the corrupt elite not serving the interests of the people. The public service media, for which pluralism is at the core of their remit, are a particular thorn in the side of the populists. Therefore, they attack the financial basis of public service, which is supposed to guarantee their independence. The populist attacks on the traditional broadcasting corporations meet with the interests of neoliberal politics and of those political actors who want to evade public scrutiny and democratic control and do no longer feel committed to democratic accountability. The assaults on the public service media are thus an assault on freedom of the media and further increase the pressure on the democratic system.

Confronted with a situation that was new to everyone, world leaders sought the best way to contain the pandemic caused by the coronavirus. The measures introduced, with lockdowns and curfews, affected fundamental rights such as freedom of movement and assembly, with implications for freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Demonstrations against the governments’ COVID-19 policies and the associated encroachments on citizens’ fundamental rights in turn led to attacks on media representatives and thus on the freedom of reporting. They were also further proof that attacks on the freedom of the media no longer come only from the state. The restrictions on journalistic work were by no means a surprise attack on the media, but the continuation of a worldwide trend that has been evident for several years, not only in authoritarian systems, but also in established democracies. For those who fear the free press and its watchdog function, the pandemic provided a welcome opportunity, under the pretext of public health, to tighten the reins a bit more and create facts that will endure beyond the pandemic. Financial support for the media, especially the printed press, to cushion the economic consequences of the pandemic and to secure newspapers for the future, establishes new dependencies that can affect free reporting in the long term.

Ausgehend von einem Dreieck wechselseitiger Abhangigkeiten zur Mobilisation in Europawahlkampfen, sichtet dieser Beitrag die neuere kommunikationswissenschaftliche Forschung zu den Kampagnen, der Medienberichterstattung und ihrer Resonanz bei der Wahlerschaft. Der Uberblick fokussiert auf die international vergleichenden Studien, fur die Europawahlen aufgrund ihrer besonderen Konstellation eine einzigartige Gelegenheit bieten. In der Bilanz zeigt sich, dass das Interesse der Forschung zu Europawahlen deutlich gewachsen ist, Fragestellungen und methodisches Vorgehen sind jedoch heterogen, sodass nur bedingt allgemeine Schlusse uber das Zusammenwirken der verschiedenen Einfluss nehmenden Faktoren zu ziehen sind.

In the United States electoral advertising on television has always been the most important campaign tool. Even though social media are gaining relevance, a major share of the campaign budget still goes into TV advertising. In other parts of the world, electoral advertising on television is much more regulated, which may be the reason why this campaign tool has not reached the same relevance as in the U.S. Th is article provides a comprehensive overview of the different research perspectives and in particular discusses differences between the role of electoral advertising in the U.S. and other countries, which also pose a challenge for international comparisons.

Noch nie zuvor waren kurz vor dem Wahltermin am 24. September 2017 so viele Wahlberechtigte unentschlossen, welcher Partei sie ihre Stimme geben sollten. Im Wahlkampf bestanden also Chancen, die Wahlentscheidung zu beeinflussen. Dennoch galt der Bundestagswahlkampf vielen als langweilig, das Wahlergebnis indessen war es gewiss nicht. Dieser Ruckblick zeichnet die Kampagne nach und zeigt vor allem am Beispiel von SPD und AfD, dass der Wahlkampf womoglich doch nicht so uninteressant war, wie er oberflachlich aussah.

Negative campaigning, with its focus on the shortcomings of the policies/ideologies or the character of political opponent(s), has always been a part of political campaigning. Technological developments and digitalization have also taken negativity online. This chapter analyzes the development of campaigning using election posters in Germany and Sweden as empirical illustrations of how digitalization changes the prerequisites and use of negative campaigning. The results show how old campaign tools like election posters do not disappear, but rather adapt to digitalization, both in terms of production and dissemination. The conclusion highlights that there are good reasons to expect an increase of negativity in (online) electoral campaigning. Negative appeals can strategically be used to mobilize target groups in social media, without the risk of putting off other voters. The web and social network sites have also increased the possibility of counterattacks when being attacked by opponents. Negativity might also increase when voters have the possibility to change, replace, or comment on the messages.

Plakate werden als Kampagneninstrument vormoderner Wahlkampfe immer wieder totgesagt, das Strasenbild und die Mittel, die die Parteien fur die Plakatkampagne aufwenden, sprechen dagegen. Zudem erzielt kein anderes Wahlwerbemittel eine so grose Reichweite wie die Plakate. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Gestaltung und die Strategien der Parteienplakate, die im Wahlkampf 2017 bei den Parteien zum Einsatz kamen, die in den Bundestag einziehen konnten.

Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Werbespots, die die Parteien im Bundestagswahlkampf 2017 fur die Ausstrahlung auf den offentlich-rechtlichen und privat-kommerziellen Fernsehkanalen sowie die Verbreitung uber das Internet produziert haben. Wie schon 2013 lassen die Befunde auf ein geringes Interesse zumal der beiden Volksparteien an der Fernsehwerbung schliesen, obwohl sie sich als einzige sogar zusatzlich Sendezeiten im privaten Fernsehen kaufen. Neben den traditionellen Spots im Fernsehen nutzen die Parteien zunehmend das Internet fur ihre Werbekampagne, wobei sie dessen Moglichkeiten allerdings nicht ausschopfen und in unterschiedlichem Umfang Kreativitat an den Tag legen.

Nach dem uberraschenden Brexit-Votum in Grosbritannien im Juni 2016 diagnostizierte das Handelsblatt eine „Blamage fur das britische Orakel“ (Herz 2016), denn neben den Remain-Befurwortern mussten sich „auch die Meinungsforscher als Verlierer fuhlen“. Ahnlich war der Tenor nach der US-Prasidentschaftswahl knapp funf Monate spater. Dass Donald Trump die Wahl gewinnen wurde, hatten die wenigsten erwartet.

This timely publication offers a fresh scholarly assessment of political advertising across the EU, as well as an insight into differing political and regulatory systems related to political advertising in the individual member states. With a detailed focus on the images and communication styles that characterised the 2014 European Parliament election campaign, this edited collection evaluates political advertising across the EU using empirical data to compare and contrast styles and approaches in different members. This work allows the authors to offer an important evaluation of the similarities and differences in the posters and broadcasts used to win public support in the 2014 campaign at the time of the great European recession and financial crisis, specifically looking at the place of posters and video commercials. This book will appeal to researchers and students of political communication, political science, history, European studies as well as candidates and campaign workers who want a more comprehensive understanding of the representation of Europe in political adverts at the 2014 elections.

This chapter draws on a study of poster and audiovisual spot advertisements in the 2014 elections (see Holtz-Bacha et al. in press). The project involved the collection of 1,023 posters and 422 videos produced by political parties and candidates in the 28 member states. Posters and spots were coded according to a common codebook. Despite the extensive collection, the database does not represent all electoral materials produced in the 2014 election and consequently cannot be considered fully representative. Nevertheless, this comprehensive database does allow for detailed assessment of the principal characteristics of poster and audiovisual commercials employed by political parties in the 2014 election and allows us draw some interesting comparative conclusions across the different member states. In section one of this chapter, relevant findings on the posters included in the study are discussed before the results for video spot advertising are examined in section two. The following section specifically explores how the EU and wider European issues were represented in these posters and videos.