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Regulating the use of facial recognition and face analysis in public spaces is undoubtedlyone of the most pressing issues today when it comes to the regulation of artificial intelligencein democratic societies. There is an important debate going on worldwide about the “redlines” that should be established by regulators in order to prevent people’s freedoms beingendangered as the result of the use of facial recognition technologies (FRT). In Europeespecially, where privacy, data protection and human rights lie at the very heart of theEuropean integration project, this debate is more necessary and pressing than ever. Theimportance of this issue is reflected in the ongoing legislative work that has followed theEuropean Commission’s introduction, in April 2021, of the draft AI regulation, which includesseveral important proposals to regulate the use of facial recognition.Curiously, though, the debate about these fundamental questions is taking place in theabsence of a profound assessment of how existing European law is being applied to theseissues. Furthermore, the debate on these issues in Europe is also characterised by a high levelof imprecision. Journalists, activists and politicians sometimes have a tendency to treat“facial recognition” as a single monolithic bloc, lumping the different functionalities anduses of facial recognition together. In contrast, in an important Opinion published in 2019the French DPA, CNIL, stressed the importance of clarity and precision to fostering theconditions necessary for an informed and useful debate. “Behind the catch-all term, thereare multiple use cases” said the CNIL, adding that “in this context, a use-by-use approachmust be applied”.This is precisely the main objective of the “MAPping the use of Facial Recognition inpublic spaces in Europe” (MAPFRE) project. Our intention is to offer a detailed independentstudy that separately presents and analyses the different categories of FRT use in publiclyaccessible places in the European Union and the UK.

Part 1 of our “MAPping the use of Facial Recognition in public spaces in Europe” (MAPFRE) project reports explained in detail what “facial recognition” means, addressed the issues surrounding definitions, presented the political landscape and set out the exact material and geographical scope of the study. Part 2 of our Reports presented, in the most accessible way possible, how facial recognition works and produced a “Classification Table” with illustrations, explanations and examples, detailing the uses of facial recognition/analysis in public spaces, in order to help avoid conflating the diverse ways in which facial recognition is used and to bring nuance and precision to the public debate. This 3rd Report focuses on what is, undoubtedly, the most widespread way in which Facial Recognition Technologies (FRT) are used in public (and private) spaces: Facial Recognitionfor authorisation purposes.Facial recognition is often used to authorise access to a space (e.g. access control) or to a service (e.g. to make a payment). Depending on the situation, both verification and identi fication functionalities (terms that are explained in our 2nd Report) can be used. Millions of people use FRT to unlock their phones every day. Private entities (such as banks) or public authorities (such as the French government in terms of the now abandoned ALICEM pro ject) increasingly envisage using FRT as a means of providing strong authentication in or der to control access to private or public online services, such as e-banking, or administra tive websites that concern income, health or other personal matters. FRT is increasingly being considered as a means of improving security when controlling and managing access to private areas (building entrances, goods warehouses, etc.). In public spaces, FRT is being used as an authentication tool for automated international border controls (for example at airports) or to manage access in places as diverse as airports, stadiums or schools. Pre Covid-19, there were a lot of projects to use in the future FRT in order to “accelerate people flows”, “improve the customer experience”, “speed up opera tions” and “reduce queuing time” for users of different services (e.g. passengers boarding a plane or shopping) but the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic has further boosted calls for investment in FRTs in order to provide contactless services and reduce the risk of contam ination. Supermarkets, such as Carrefour, which was involved in a pilot project in Romania, or transport utilities in “smart cities”, such as the EMT bus network in Madrid, which teamed with Mastercard to conduct a pilot project that enables users to pay on EMT buses using FRT, have implemented facial recognition payment systems that permit consumers to complete transactions by simply having their faces scanned. In Europe, similar pilot pro jects are currently being tested enabling the management of payments in restaurants, cafés and shops. Despite this widespread existing use or projected use of FRT for authorisation purposes we are not aware of any detailed study that is focusing on this specific issue. We hope that the present analytic study will help fill this gap by focusing on the specific issue of the use of FRT for authorisation purposes in public spaces in Europe. We have examined in detail seven “emblematic” cases of FRT being used for authorisation purposes in public spaces in Europe. We have reviewed the documents disseminated by data controllers concerning all of these cases (and several others). We have sought out the reactions of civil society and other actors. We have dived into EU and Member State laws. We have analysed a number of Data Protection Authority (DPA) opinions. We have iden tified Court decisions of relevance to this matter.

It is debated whether the EU's general regulation on data protection of 25th May 2016 (GDPR), applicable as from 25th May 2018, prevents a firm that has been the addressee of an injunction form an authority in the US from communicating personal data held within EU territory. Does the fact that the US CLOUD Act allows such injunctions irrespective of where the data are located create a conflict with the GDPR? At the heart of this debate are articles 48 and 49 of the latter text, whose content is less than clear. In order to contribute usefully to this discussion, this study aims at clarifying the meaning of these articles, with a specific focus on the thrust of article 49(1)(d) of the GDPR, that provides for a derogation for important reasons of public policy., Un débat s'est engagé sur la question de savoir si le règlement général sur la protection des données adopté par l'Union européenne (RGPD) le 24 mai 2016, applicable à partir du 25 mai 2018, empêche une entreprise destinataire d'une injonction américaine de communiquer des données personnelles détenues sur le territoire de l'Union européenne. Le fait que le Cloud Act autorise de telles injonctions indépendamment du lieu de détention des données crée-t-il un conflit entre le RGPD et le Cloud Act ? Au coeur de ces discussions se trouvent les articles 48 et 49 RGPD dont le sens n'est pas des plus clairs. En vue d'apporter quelques éléments de réponse il importe donc de clarifier le sens de ces articles et, surtout, la portée de l'article 49(1)(d) du RGPD prévoyant une dérogation pour des raisons importantes d'intérêt public, sur laquelle la présente étude se concentre.

International audience

International audience

International audience

The present book aims to conceptualize and present, in a concise manner, the main questions raised in the field of international law regarding the role of the States and private actors in the prevention and the reaction to cyber-attacks. It has been prepared within the framework of the French Cybersecurity Initiative launched in 2017 by the Secretary General for National Defense and Security and the French National Cyber-Security Agency (ANSSI) and it will be presented for the International Conference to be held at UNESCO on 6 and 7 April 2017 on the theme: "Building International Peace and Security in a Digital Society – Public Actors, Private Actors: Duties and Responsibilities". This study strictly expresses the personal opinions of its authors in the framework of their academic research.The point of departure for this book is that the dramatic rise of cyber-attacks involving States and non-State actors could constitute a real threat to international peace and security. In 2013, the members of the UN GGE recognized the application of International Law in the cyberspace. The cyberspace is not a "No Law’s Land"; rather, it can be regulated by International Law, as are virtually all international activities. But the task in this field is infinitely more complex, not only because of the very nature of the cyberspace but also because the great diversity of the actors involved. These actors include potential perpetrators of cyber-attacks (States, "proxies", private actors supported or tolerated by States, terrorists, cybercriminals, companies conducting espionage or wanting to gain a competitive advantage, individual hackers, patriotic hacker groups, etc.); potential victims of attacks (States, administrations and communities, companies, media, individuals, etc.); those involved in these attacks (eg. the States through which cyber-attacks transit, companies and individuals whose systems are used by the attackers without the knowledge of the owners); and, finally, those to be potentially involved in a response to a cyber-attack (States, private companies acting for their own benefits, private companies undertaking a response on behalf of another company, etc.). This situation creates an impressive number of combinations, which in their respective turns affect the type and appropriateness of a response.The first part of this book focuses on the issue of prevention and argues that the concept of "cyber-diligence", which we have forged on the basis of existing international law and the obligation of any State not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States, provides a satisfactory answer to the question of vigilance that States should exercise with regard to cyber-operations developed from their territory by private actors.The second part of this book, examines those responses to cyber-attacks which can be developed in accordance with international law. It proceeds to a classification of the possible reactions to cyber-attacks, by proposing a kind of "user's manual" for victim States that wish to react within the limits of international legality. It distinguishes between reactions always permitted and other reactions that are permissible only if it can be established that a State has committed an "internationally wrongful act" by action or omission. It stresses the need for international cooperation in this area, and warns against any "trivialization" of responses that are in principle violations of international law but are "excused" as circumstances precluding wrongfulness or responsibility.In the third part of this book, we focus on the very important role that the private sector plays in this field, from preventing cyber-attacks and securing digital infrastructures to "active cyber defense" measures, passing through activities such as the attribution of cyber-attacks. Private sector activities in the area of cyber-security raise several issues and controversies, of political, ethical, technical and legal nature. We carry out a detailed study of the problems of "active cyber defense" and "hack-back" from the point of view of both international and comparative law. After analyzing the advantages, disadvantages and risks of hack-back, we answer to the question of whether private actors can unilaterally undertake cyber-offensive measures in accordance with the law, and examine to what extent States can authorize a hack-back operation and/or rely on private actors to conduct counter-attacks. Our conclusion is that private actors would be better off investing in cyber hygiene and the implementation of good safety practices, rather than trying to acquire offensive tools. If, nevertheless, they are victims of a cyber-attack, instead of launching a - technically and legally - hazardous hack-back, it would be better if they notified the State authorities of the attack and asked them to act, and also exercised their legal rights against the perpetrator of the cyber-attack, assuming that the perpetrator can be identified. States should act within the framework of international law (and especially human rights law) to enhance their proactive and reactive capabilities in order to avoid giving the impression that proper legal forms of reaction are either nonexistent or insufficient. Indeed, the impression of inadequate and inefficient government gatekeeping in the field of cyber-security serves the interests of those who call for cyber-vigilantism. States could, if needed, rely on private actors to conduct counter-attacks under certain circumstances, but this should be done under States' close control, with the risk of triggering their international responsibility., Le présent livre se propose de conceptualiser et de présenter de façon concise les principales questions que posent, du point de vue du droit international, le rôle des Etats et des acteurs privés dans la prévention et la réaction aux cyberattaques. Il a été préparé dans le cadre de l’initiative française en matière de cyber-sécurité lancée en 2017 par le Secrétaire Général pour la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale (SGDSN) et l’AgenceNationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI) et a été présenté comme étude préparatoire pour la conférence internationale organisée par le gouvernement français à l’UNESCO les 6 et 7 avril 2017 sur le thème : « Construire la paix et la sécurité internationales de la société numérique – Acteurs publics, acteurs privés : rôles et responsabilités ».Cet ouvrage représente le résultat de recherches conduites par ses auteurs sur les questions relatives à la sécurité de l’espace numérique, la protection des données et de la vie privée. Elle vise à contribuer à la réflexion d’un lecteur averti (expert en droit ou en cybersécurité) tout en souhaitant rester accessible à des non-spécialistes et au grand public afin de dissiper certaines confusions ou erreurs de perception qui pourraient exister à propos du rôle central que le droit international doit avoir dans ce domaine. La sécurité de l’espace numérique, la lutte contre la cyber-criminalité, la gouvernance et la protection des données, sont des enjeux majeurs pour la sécurité internationale et nationale. Alors que les organisations internationales, les Etats et le secteur privé se mobilisent pour adopter de nouvelles normes et codes de conduite dans ce domaine, le droit international existant apporte déjà un grand nombre de réponses pour assurer la coexistence pacifique et la coopération des nations à l’heure du numérique.La première partie de cette étude met l’accent sur les enjeux de la prévention. Elle examine, entre autres, la question de la protection des infrastructures critiques numériques et le devoir de diligence due (ou de "cyber-diligence") que les Etats doivent exercer à l’égard des acteurs non-étatiques qui opèrent depuis leur territoire (qu’il s’agisse de groupes terroristes, de cybercriminels, d’entreprises ou d’autres acteurs privés). Ce devoir découle directement de l’obligation, pour tout Etat, « de ne pas laisser utiliser son territoire aux fins d'actes contraires aux droits d'autres Etats ».La deuxième partie de cette étude se penche sur les réponses aux cyberattaques qui peuvent être développées dans le respect du droit international. Elle procède à une classification des réactions possibles aux cyberattaques et propose une sorte de « mode d’emploi » pour des Etats victimes d’attaques qui souhaitent réagir dans le cadre de la légalité internationale. Elle met l’accent sur la nécessité de la coopération internationale dans ce domaine et met en garde contre toute « banalisation » de ripostes qui constitueraient des violations du droit international mais qui seraient exceptionnellement « excusées » comme circonstances excluant l’illicéité ou la responsabilité.La troisième partie de l’étude présente une analyse détaillée des questions relatives au « hack-back » et à la « cyberdéfense active ». Après avoir montré les avantages, les inconvénients et les risques du hack-back, elle examine dans quelle mesure les acteurs privés peuvent déclencher unilatéralement des mesures cyber-offensives en conformité avec le droit et dans quelle mesure les Etats peuvent autoriser le hack-back et/ou s’appuyer sur des acteurs privés pour conduire des contre-attaques. Elle en conclut que les acteurs privés auraient intérêt à investir dans de bonnes pratiques d’hygiène et de sécurité informatiques – plutôt que chercher à acquérir des outils offensifs. Si, malgré tout, ils sont victimes d’une cyberattaque, plutôt que de se lancer dans un hack-back hasardeux et risqué tant sur le plan technique que sur le plan juridique, il serait préférable qu’ils puissent notifier cette attaque à leurs autorités en leur demandant d’agir et qu’ils puissent aussi exercer leurs droits légaux contre l’auteur de la cyberattaque (à supposer que ce dernier puisse être identifié). Les Etats devraient renforcer leurs capacités de réaction afin d’éviter de donner l’impression que l’action gouvernementale est lente, semée d’embuches et n’offre in fine que peu de garanties aux victimes – impression qui ne peut que servir les intérêts de ceux qui prônent le recours à la « justice privée » dans l’espace numérique. Les Etats pourraient, enfin, s’appuyer sur des acteurs privés pour conduire des contre-attaques dans certaines circonstances, mais ceci devrait se faire sous leur contrôle étroit et pourrait engager leur responsabilité internationale.Cette étude exprime les opinions strictement personnelles de ses auteurs dans le cadre de leurs recherches académiques et n’engage qu’eux.

International audience; States are increasingly invoking reasons relating to “national security” as a premise both for the use of various exemptions to the rule of law, as well as in order to avoid their international obligations. As a reaction to the threat of terrorist attacks, in recent years several States have enacted laws that have allowed various exemptions to the rule of law. Prominent among them are surveillance laws providing intelligence services with sweeping new spying and surveillance powers. While it is perfectly legitimate to provide room for security exceptions in order to effectively counter threats such as terrorism, history has revealed that national security is a concept with a significant potential for abuse. The new surveillance laws, coming in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, therefore raise major questions for International Law. This chapter focuses on the new surveillance laws adopted by France after the 2015 Paris attacks, which are now facing international legal challenges, including several applications lodged with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), by journalists, lawyers and others. The first part of the chapter discusses how States are increasingly using the “national security” argument in order to enact new laws authorizing cyber-surveillance. The second part of the chapter focuses on the main characteristics of the new French Intelligence Laws and presents, under the prism of International and European Human Rights Law, some of the main legal issues raised by these laws.

International audience; The present book aims to conceptualize and present, in a concise manner, the main questions raised in the field of international law regarding the role of the States and private actors in the prevention and the reaction to cyber-attacks. It has been prepared within the framework of the French Cybersecurity Initiative launched in 2017 by the Secretary General for National Defense and Security and the French National Cyber-Security Agency (ANSSI) and it will be presented for the International Conference to be held at UNESCO on 6 and 7 April 2017 on the theme: "Building International Peace and Security in a Digital Society – Public Actors, Private Actors: Duties and Responsibilities". This study strictly expresses the personal opinions of its authors in the framework of their academic research.The point of departure for this book is that the dramatic rise of cyber-attacks involving States and non-State actors could constitute a real threat to international peace and security. In 2013, the members of the UN GGE recognized the application of International Law in the cyberspace. The cyberspace is not a "No Law’s Land"; rather, it can be regulated by International Law, as are virtually all international activities. But the task in this field is infinitely more complex, not only because of the very nature of the cyberspace but also because the great diversity of the actors involved. These actors include potential perpetrators of cyber-attacks (States, "proxies", private actors supported or tolerated by States, terrorists, cybercriminals, companies conducting espionage or wanting to gain a competitive advantage, individual hackers, patriotic hacker groups, etc.); potential victims of attacks (States, administrations and communities, companies, media, individuals, etc.); those involved in these attacks (eg. the States through which cyber-attacks transit, companies and individuals whose systems are used by the attackers without the knowledge of the owners); and, finally, those to be potentially involved in a response to a cyber-attack (States, private companies acting for their own benefits, private companies undertaking a response on behalf of another company, etc.). This situation creates an impressive number of combinations, which in their respective turns affect the type and appropriateness of a response.The first part of this book focuses on the issue of prevention and argues that the concept of "cyber-diligence", which we have forged on the basis of existing international law and the obligation of any State not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States, provides a satisfactory answer to the question of vigilance that States should exercise with regard to cyber-operations developed from their territory by private actors.The second part of this book, examines those responses to cyber-attacks which can be developed in accordance with international law. It proceeds to a classification of the possible reactions to cyber-attacks, by proposing a kind of "user's manual" for victim States that wish to react within the limits of international legality. It distinguishes between reactions always permitted and other reactions that are permissible only if it can be established that a State has committed an "internationally wrongful act" by action or omission. It stresses the need for international cooperation in this area, and warns against any "trivialization" of responses that are in principle violations of international law but are "excused" as circumstances precluding wrongfulness or responsibility.In the third part of this book, we focus on the very important role that the private sector plays in this field, from preventing cyber-attacks and securing digital infrastructures to "active cyber defense" measures, passing through activities such as the attribution of cyber-attacks. Private sector activities in the area of cyber-security raise several issues and controversies, of political, ethical, technical and legal nature. We carry out a detailed study of the problems of "active cyber defense" and "hack-back" from the point of view of both international and comparative law. After analyzing the advantages, disadvantages and risks of hack-back, we answer to the question of whether private actors can unilaterally undertake cyber-offensive measures in accordance with the law, and examine to what extent States can authorize a hack-back operation and/or rely on private actors to conduct counter-attacks. Our conclusion is that private actors would be better off investing in cyber hygiene and the implementation of good safety practices, rather than trying to acquire offensive tools. If, nevertheless, they are victims of a cyber-attack, instead of launching a - technically and legally - hazardous hack-back, it would be better if they notified the State authorities of the attack and asked them to act, and also exercised their legal rights against the perpetrator of the cyber-attack, assuming that the perpetrator can be identified. States should act within the framework of international law (and especially human rights law) to enhance their proactive and reactive capabilities in order to avoid giving the impression that proper legal forms of reaction are either nonexistent or insufficient. Indeed, the impression of inadequate and inefficient government gatekeeping in the field of cyber-security serves the interests of those who call for cyber-vigilantism. States could, if needed, rely on private actors to conduct counter-attacks under certain circumstances, but this should be done under States' close control, with the risk of triggering their international responsibility.; Le présent livre se propose de conceptualiser et de présenter de façon concise les principales questions que posent, du point de vue du droit international, le rôle des Etats et des acteurs privés dans la prévention et la réaction aux cyberattaques. Il a été préparé dans le cadre de l’initiative française en matière de cyber-sécurité lancée en 2017 par le Secrétaire Général pour la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale (SGDSN) et l’AgenceNationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI) et a été présenté comme étude préparatoire pour la conférence internationale organisée par le gouvernement français à l’UNESCO les 6 et 7 avril 2017 sur le thème : « Construire la paix et la sécurité internationales de la société numérique – Acteurs publics, acteurs privés : rôles et responsabilités ».Cet ouvrage représente le résultat de recherches conduites par ses auteurs sur les questions relatives à la sécurité de l’espace numérique, la protection des données et de la vie privée. Elle vise à contribuer à la réflexion d’un lecteur averti (expert en droit ou en cybersécurité) tout en souhaitant rester accessible à des non-spécialistes et au grand public afin de dissiper certaines confusions ou erreurs de perception qui pourraient exister à propos du rôle central que le droit international doit avoir dans ce domaine. La sécurité de l’espace numérique, la lutte contre la cyber-criminalité, la gouvernance et la protection des données, sont des enjeux majeurs pour la sécurité internationale et nationale. Alors que les organisations internationales, les Etats et le secteur privé se mobilisent pour adopter de nouvelles normes et codes de conduite dans ce domaine, le droit international existant apporte déjà un grand nombre de réponses pour assurer la coexistence pacifique et la coopération des nations à l’heure du numérique.La première partie de cette étude met l’accent sur les enjeux de la prévention. Elle examine, entre autres, la question de la protection des infrastructures critiques numériques et le devoir de diligence due (ou de "cyber-diligence") que les Etats doivent exercer à l’égard des acteurs non-étatiques qui opèrent depuis leur territoire (qu’il s’agisse de groupes terroristes, de cybercriminels, d’entreprises ou d’autres acteurs privés). Ce devoir découle directement de l’obligation, pour tout Etat, « de ne pas laisser utiliser son territoire aux fins d'actes contraires aux droits d'autres Etats ».La deuxième partie de cette étude se penche sur les réponses aux cyberattaques qui peuvent être développées dans le respect du droit international. Elle procède à une classification des réactions possibles aux cyberattaques et propose une sorte de « mode d’emploi » pour des Etats victimes d’attaques qui souhaitent réagir dans le cadre de la légalité internationale. Elle met l’accent sur la nécessité de la coopération internationale dans ce domaine et met en garde contre toute « banalisation » de ripostes qui constitueraient des violations du droit international mais qui seraient exceptionnellement « excusées » comme circonstances excluant l’illicéité ou la responsabilité.La troisième partie de l’étude présente une analyse détaillée des questions relatives au « hack-back » et à la « cyberdéfense active ». Après avoir montré les avantages, les inconvénients et les risques du hack-back, elle examine dans quelle mesure les acteurs privés peuvent déclencher unilatéralement des mesures cyber-offensives en conformité avec le droit et dans quelle mesure les Etats peuvent autoriser le hack-back et/ou s’appuyer sur des acteurs privés pour conduire des contre-attaques. Elle en conclut que les acteurs privés auraient intérêt à investir dans de bonnes pratiques d’hygiène et de sécurité informatiques – plutôt que chercher à acquérir des outils offensifs. Si, malgré tout, ils sont victimes d’une cyberattaque, plutôt que de se lancer dans un hack-back hasardeux et risqué tant sur le plan technique que sur le plan juridique, il serait préférable qu’ils puissent notifier cette attaque à leurs autorités en leur demandant d’agir et qu’ils puissent aussi exercer leurs droits légaux contre l’auteur de la cyberattaque (à supposer que ce dernier puisse être identifié). Les Etats devraient renforcer leurs capacités de réaction afin d’éviter de donner l’impression que l’action gouvernementale est lente, semée d’embuches et n’offre in fine que peu de garanties aux victimes – impression qui ne peut que servir les intérêts de ceux qui prônent le recours à la « justice privée » dans l’espace numérique. Les Etats pourraient, enfin, s’appuyer sur des acteurs privés pour conduire des contre-attaques dans certaines circonstances, mais ceci devrait se faire sous leur contrôle étroit et pourrait engager leur responsabilité internationale.Cette étude exprime les opinions strictement personnelles de ses auteurs dans le cadre de leurs recherches académiques et n’engage qu’eux.

International audience

International audience; The choice between self-determination and territorial integrity is one of the oldest false dilemmas of International Law. It sets the problem of secession under two contradictory and mutually exclusive options, neither of which is true as such under positive International Law: either a specific group within a State constitutes a "people" and has a right to "external" self-determination; or the territorial integrity of the parent State must be respected and prohibits secession by such a group. This dilemma is very convenient from a political point of view. It provides States with the opportunity to "ride two horses at the same time". States could thus embrace 'self-determination' of some groups and encourage in one way or another separatist claims compatible with their interests, while proclaiming that the principle of territorial integrity prevails at home or in the territory of friends and allies.The case of Crimea highlighted these contradictions once again. Russia, which for years was a big champion of the principle of respect of territorial integrity of States (especially during the 90s when it was fighting the separatist attempts in Chechnya and Tatarstan), suddenly started claiming that the principle of self-determination of Russian speaking populations in Crimea prevails over the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Western States, which constantly backed in one way or another the Kosovo separatist movement since 1998 and which recognized Kosovo just a few hours after the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, suddenly rediscovered, because of the crisis in Ukraine, the merits of the principle of territorial integrity and other basic principles of International Law often violated by these same Western States during these last years.In this article we focus on the relevance of the principle of self-determination in the Crimean conflict. We try to explain why the "dilemma" between self-determination and territorial integrity is a false one. We explain that there is no "right" to external self-determination and unilateral secession for any "people" or ethnic group outside the colonial context. But while secession is not authorized by international law neither is it in principle prohibited by the principle of territorial integrity, save in the event of violation of a fundamental rule of international law, which raises the crucial issue of the unlawfulness of Russian military intervention in Crimea and the possible solutions to the fierce conflict between unlawful effectivités and the law.

International audience

International audience; "L'année 2015 marquera le 70e anniversaire de l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte des Nations Unies. Au cours de ces 70 ans l'Organisation des Nations Unies a connu un développement sans cesse croissant de ses activités et de ses missions. Entre oscillations et critiques, entre réussites et échecs, l'Organisation des Nations Unies est devenue un centre d'impulsion majeur de la coopération internationale. Les principes ayant conduit à la création de l'ONU semblent aujourd'hui plus importants que jamais pour assurer la coexistence pacifique et la coopération entre les États, tout en s'intéressant aux droits de l'homme et en faisant face aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires, économiques, environnementaux d'un monde plus que jamais « connecté », « globalisé » et interdépendant. Le présent ouvrage propose au lecteur quelques morceaux choisis permettant de rendre compte de l'évolution des missions et du rôle des Nations Unies en ce début du XXe siècle et de s'interroger sur les perspectives d'avenir de l'Organisation. Il regroupe les contributions présentées lors de la journée d'études organisée le 18 octobre 2013 à Aix-en-Provence en l'honneur du Professeur Yves Daudet, lequel a dédié une grande partie de sa carrière à l'étude des Nations Unies. Un hommage, avant tout, rendu par ses anciens élèves, à l'origine même de la manifestation."

The secession and de facto annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 and the ongoing conflict between pro-russian separatists and the government in Eastern Ukraine raise major issues of international law. This article first shows that, contrary to Russian claims, the inhabitants of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine cannot rely on a « right to external self-determination » because this right was only granted to colonized peoples on the basis of the « salt-water » test. The article then examines whether the secession of Crimea should be considered illegal. Normally, outside the colonial context, « secession is not a question of law, but a question of fact » and the decisive criterion becomes thus the principle of effectiveness and ultimate success. Nonetheless, International Law is not « neutral » and does not put the State and the separatist movement on an equal footing. It allows Ukraine to use all lawful means at its disposal in order to fight against secession and it clearly prohibits external military intervention in favor of the separatists. It is precisely the illegality of the Russian military intervention in Crimea that renders illegal the process of secession and annexation. Consequently States have the obligation not to recognize the resulting unlawful situation. This article examines the practical implications of this obligation, analyses its relationship with the sanctions adopted by some states and highlights several difficulties for the future. It concludes with some remarks about the possible solutions to the expected high tensions between the principle Ex Iniuria Ius Non Oritur, which requires not to accept the « fait accompli », and the principle Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium, which calls for some dose of realism., Les conflits séparatistes en Ukraine (sécession et annexion de facto de la Crimée par la Russie en mars 2014 puis insurrection des pro-russes dans l'Est) soulèvent d'importantes questions de droit international que cet article se propose d'examiner. Il montre, tout d'abord, que, contrairement aux déclarations russes, les habitants de Crimée et les Russes de l'Est de l'Ukraine ne peuvent pas s'appuyer sur un « droit à l'autodétermination externe », pas plus d'ailleurs que n'importe quel autre « peuple » ou groupe ethnique en dehors des situations de décolonisation. L'article rappelle ensuite que la sécession dans le monde post-colonial n'est pas tant une question de « droit » que de « fait ». Toutefois, le droit international n'est pas pour autant « neutre », il favorise le Gouvernement central qui lutte contre la sécession et interdit une sécession lorsque celle-ci résulte d'une violation d'une norme fondamentale, telle que l'interdiction du recours à la force. Or, c'est précisément l'illicéité de l'intervention militaire russe en Crimée qui rend le processus de sécession et son annexion illicites. La conséquence qui en résulte est une obligation de non-reconnaissance de la nouvelle situation. Cet article examine les implications pratiques et les difficultés de mise en œuvre de cette obligation en analysant son articulation avec les sanctions adoptées par certains États. L'article s'achève par quelques remarques concernant la résolution des tensions fortes entre les effectivités illicites et le droit, entre le principe Ex Iniuria Ius Non Oritur, qui exige de ne pas accepter le « fait accompli », et le principe Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium, qui appelle à une certaine dose de réalisme.

International audience

International audience

International audience

International audience; Responding to an urgent request by the authorities of Mali, France launched in January 2013 “Operation Serval” against several terrorist armed groups. The French troops were assisted by a Chadian contingent and by forces progressively deployed by other African countries within a UNSC authorized African force (resolution 2085). While the French and African military Operations in Mali were clearly legal, they raise important questions of jus ad bellum in relation with the two legal arguments put forward to justify them: intervention by invitation and UNSC authorization. In this paper we first discuss the general rules of international law applying on intervention by invitation. We explain that such an intervention could sometimes be contrary to the principle of self-determination and we propose a purpose-based approach. We then apply these rules to the situation in Mali and conclude that the French and Chadian interventions were legal because, on the one hand, the request was validly formulated by the internationally recognised government of Mali and, on the other hand, their legitimate purpose was to fight terrorism. The UNSC approved this legal basis and “helped” France and Chad appeal validly to it by listing the enemy as “terrorist groups”. It gave its “blessing” to these interventions, without authorizing them and observed the events with relief. The adoption of resolution 2100 on 25 April 2013 raises new legal questions. The Council creates a UN peace enforcement mission in Mali, MINUSMA, which has a robust use of force mandate. Created just a few weeks after the DRC “Intervention Brigade”, this force seems to indicate an ongoing evolution (revolution?) in UN peacekeeping, notwithstanding the assurances by some UNSC member States that MINUSMA will avoid “offensive counter-terrorism operations”. At the same time resolution 2100 gives a restricted use of force mandate to France (to protect MINUSMA), without challenging the legal validity of intervention by invitation for all other tasks! The conflict in Mali might thus remain for some time yet between the latitude of UNSC authorization and the longitude of unilateral intervention by invitation.

Atelier n°2 - Souveraineté en matière migratoire; International audience

International audience

International audience

International audience; In 1949 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its first judgment in the Corfu Channel Case. In diffusing an early Cold War dispute, the Court articulated a set of legal principles which continue to shape our appreciation of the international legal order. Many of the issues dealt with by the Court in 1949 remain central questions of international law, including due diligence, forcible intervention and self-help, maritime operations, navigation in international straits and the concept of elementary considerations of humanity. The Court’s decision has been cited on numerous occasions in subsequent international litigation. Indeed, the relevance of this judgment goes far beyond the subject matter dealt with by the Court in 1949, extending to pressing problems such as trans-boundary pollution, terrorism and piracy. In short, it was and remains a thoroughly modern decision — a landmark for international law; and one which today warrants reconsideration.Taking a critical approach, this book examines the decision’s influence on international law generally and on some fields of international law like the law of the sea and the law of international responsibility specifically. The book collects the commentary of a distinguished set of international law scholars, including four well-known international judges. The contributors consider not only the history of the Corfu Channel Judgment and its contribution to the development of international law, but also its resonance in many contemporary issues in the field of international law.This book will be of particular interest to academics and students of International Law, International Relations and Legal History

International audience

International audience

International audience

International audience