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Published online: 11 November 2022 Modern systems of governance are increasingly adopting measures aimed at fostering public participation in policymaking, while embedding decisions in scientific evidence under the label of Better Regulation policy. Existing research identifies tensions between participatory and evidence-based approaches. This prompts questions about one of the most ambitious reforms to combine and enhance participatory and evidence-based tools of policymaking, initiated by the European Commission in 2016. We assess the extent to which this reform successfully combined and expanded the participatory layer of supranational policymaking while also strengthening its evidence-based credentials by analysing stakeholders’ evaluations. We find that stakeholders assess both sets of measures as part of a single, integrated dimension. Participatory measures received slightly better appraisals and were better known, but both sets of measures were evaluated positively and there are no significant differences in evaluations across stakeholder categories. This points to the complementarity of measures from a stakeholder perspective.

[Synopsis and motivation] In recent decades, most OECD countries have seen a significant decline in the labour share, as well as an increase in inequality. The decline in the labour share and the rise in inequality poses several problems for such countries, whether related to distributive justice, economic and social outcomes, such as deficient aggregate income and demand, or democratic politics. In this report, we focus on the role of technological change as a central driver of the decline in the labour share and explore its contingency: both across contexts and across definitions/operationalisations of technology. With respect to the latter, we distinguish between perspectives that place physical capital and investment in automation and ICT at the centre of technological change on the one hand, and the growth of the knowledge economy and intangible capital on the other. Meanwhile, following work by Baccaro and Pontusson (2016), and more recently Hassel and Palier (2021), we utilise the concept of 'growth regimes' to analyse how the effects of technology are mediated and moderated by national political-economic institutions. This approach allows us to test more nuanced arguments about the role of technological change in the decline in the labour share and to discuss the likely effects, and political feasibility, of policy solutions such as universal basic income (UBI) that are often advanced as an answer to increased automation and lower returns to labour. The following issues provide the basis for our research questions: 1. To what extent is technological change responsible for the decline in the labour share? 2. What is the role of growth regimes in moderating the effect of technology on the labour share? 3. Are results consistent across different conceptions and definitions of technological change? 4. What policy solutions are available to tackle these trends and issues? 5. Does technological change strengthen the case for and the feasibility of a universal basic income? This work builds on previous policy briefs and reports by the Institute for Policy Research (IPR) on UBI and technological change, namely the September 2019 report by Dr Luke Martinelli entitled 'Basic income, automation and labour market change' (Martinelli, 2019a). That report summarised the evidence regarding the effects of technology on labour markets and the case for UBI in such a light. Empirical analysis, however, focused on political economy questions concerning the political constituency for a UBI and policy trade-offs in design across EU countries using microsimulation analysis. Here, our empirical strategy is instead focused on questions about the effect of technology on the labour share, enabling us to re-pose the question of how a UBI could serve as a tool for combating growing inequality, income and demand deficiency, and labour market dysfunction in global economies. Future empirical research at the IPR will focus more comprehensively on the fifth and final research question above, namely estimating the macroeconomic effects of a UBI, including one funded using sovereign money. Next, we introduce three central ideas in the report - the decline in the labour share, technological change and growth regimes - before briefly outlining the consequences for policy debates.

This registration is for part of the public acceptability component of NIHR Award ID: NIHR154451 ‘Understanding the health impact and social feasibility of Universal Basic Income’. It deals with a conjoint experiment used to establish a public acceptability model for welfare schemes.

The intensification of behavioural requirements and punitive measures in unemployment benefits by UK governments has been popular and instrumental to the politics of welfare reform. Yet there is scant research into the politics of extending this approach to working households, known as ‘in-work conditionality’ (IWC), which was introduced in the UK under Universal Credit in 2012. Addressing this gap, we examine the preferences of political parties and voters towards IWC, using data from an online survey of 1,111 adults in 2017, party manifestos and parliamentary debates. While we find evidence of a partisan split between voters and politicians on the left (oppose IWC) and right (support IWC), intra-party divides and the relative infancy of IWC suggests the politics of IWC is not set in stone. This helps to explain the blame avoidance strategies of current and previous Conservative governments responsible for IWC. publishedVersion

Since 2015, the idea of a universal basic income (UBI) has inspired an increasing number ofexperiments in OECD countries. In this report, we provide a rapid evidence review of thecharacteristics, indicators and outcomes of these basic income experiments in order to informpolicymakers about gaps in knowledge and to make suggestions for future experimental design.We found 38 experiments across Europe, North America and Asia that met inclusion criteria.Most experiments involve cash benefits targeted at a relatively small number of low-incomehouseholds for a period of roughly two years dispersed across a relatively large area. We consider thatthis makes a sound case for the development of more heterogenous target groups, a longer time periodand a greater examination of community effects. We also provide some suggestions for more policy-and political-oriented goals, which we argue are an oft-ignored elements of these experiments inpolicymaking and research.

Since 2015, the idea of a universal basic income (UBI) has inspired an increasing number of experiments in OECD countries. In this report, we provide a rapid evidence review of the characteristics, indicators and outcomes of these basic income experiments in order to inform policymakers about gaps in knowledge and to make suggestions for future experimental design. We found 38 experiments across Europe, North America and Asia that met inclusion criteria. Most experiments involve cash benefits targeted at a relatively small number of low-income households for a period of roughly two years dispersed across a relatively large area. We consider that this makes a sound case for the development of more heterogenous target groups, a longer time period and a greater examination of community effects. We also provide some suggestions for more policy- and political-oriented goals, which we argue are oft-ignored elements of these experiments in policymaking and research.

In this paper, we update a previous analysis of the age divide in British politics to examine the trends over recent general elections. We revisit our analysis by interacting turnout by age with other key variables, such as gender, education, ethnicity and housing tenure, before examining how support for the main political parties varies by age. In the final section we respond to a tendency to explain away age differences as either simply about education or homeownership by interacting age, education and housing tenure tocreate 8 sub-groups of voters. We examine their voting patterns and their policy preferences to assess the relative independent weight of each factor in determining the main divides of our politics and the possible direction of travel in future elections. We conclude with a discussion of how the age divide in UK politics is theorised in the political science literature and where it could and should go next.