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Risks connected with AI systems have become a recurrent topic in public and academic debates, and the European proposal for the AI Act explicitly adopts a risk-based tiered approach that associates different levels of regulation with different levels of risk. However, a comprehensive and general framework to think about AI-related risk is still lacking. In this work, we aim to provide an epistemological analysis of such risk building upon the existing literature on disaster risk analysis and reduction. We show how a multi-component analysis of risk, that distinguishes between the dimensions of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability, allows us to better understand the sources of AI-related risks and effectively intervene to mitigate them. This multi-component analysis also turns out to be particularly useful in the case of general-purpose and experimental AI systems, for which it is often hard to perform both ex-ante and ex-post risk analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance of epistemic values in science is universally recognized, whereas the role of non-epistemic values is sometimes considered disputable. It has often been argued that non-epistemic values are more relevant in applied sciences, where the goals are often practical and not merely scientific. In this paper, we present a case study concerning earthquake engineering. So far, the philosophical literature has considered various branches of engineering, but very rarely earthquake engineering. We claim that the assessment of seismic hazard models is sensitive to both epistemic and non-epistemic values. In particular, we argue that the selection and evaluation of these models are justified by epistemic values, even if they may be contingently influenced by non-epistemic values. By contrast, the aggregation of different models into an ensemble is justified by non-epistemic values, even if epistemic values may play an instrumental role in the attainment of these non-epistemic values. A careful consideration of the different epistemic and non-epistemic values at play in the choice of seismic hazard models is thus practically important when alternative models are available and there is uncertainty in the scientific community about which model should be used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technological innovation is almost always investigated from an economic perspective; with few exceptions, the specific technological and social nature of innovation is often ignored. We argue that a novel way to characterise and make sense of different types of technological innovation is to start considering uncertainty. This seems plausible since technological development and innovation almost always occur under conditions of uncertainty. We rely on the distinction between, on the one hand, uncertainty that can be quantified (e.g. probabilistic risk) and, on the other, deep forms of uncertainty that may resist the possibility of being quantified (e.g. severe or fundamental uncertainties). On the basis of these different ingredients of uncertainty in technological innovation, we propose a new taxonomy that reveals the technological nature of innovation. Unlike previous taxonomies employed to handle different types of technological innovations, our taxonomy does not consider the economic value of innovation alone; it is much more oriented towards societal preferences and forms of technological uncertainty. Finally, we investigate the coherence of our proposal with the dual nature of technological artefacts, showing that innovation can be grounded on structural and functional factors and not just on economic ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thus, the concept of normative uncertainty involves value-based considerations in those aspects of decision-making related to epistemology, ethics, law, and planning. As such, philosophy has much to add to our understanding of future risks in science and technology and, more specifically, the role of uncertainties. In this Special Issue, we will focus on the class that Rumsfeld calls I unknown unknowns i . This Special Issue titled "Severe Uncertainty in Science, Medicine and Technology" aims to shed new light on the understanding of severe uncertainty and its multifaceted implications. [Extracted from the article]

Decision-making under uncertainty is sometimes investigated as a homogeneous problem, independently of the type of decision-maker and the level and nature of the decision itself. However, when the decision-maker is a public authority, there immediately arise problems additional to those that concern any other (private) decision-maker. This is not always clearly recognised in orthodox discussions on decisions under conditions of uncertainty. This article investigates the methodological, strategic and procedural challenges of taking public decisions in such conditions. It focuses mainly on decisions involving urban contexts, such as planning decisions regarding land use and building transformations, by trying to develop some pioneering research studies in this field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents and defends an integrated view of the placebo effect, termed "affective-meaning-making" model, which draws from theoretical reflection, clinical outcomes, and neurophysiological findings. We consider the theoretical limitations of those proposals associated with the "meaning view" on the placebo effect which (a) leave the general aspects of meaning unspecified, (b) fail to analyze fully the role of emotions and affect, and (c) establish no clear connection between the theoretical, physiological, and psychological aspects of the effect. We point out that a promising way to overcome these limitations is given by grounding the placebo effect on Peirce's theory of meaning, in which the role of the meaning constitution and change is placed in logical and objective structures. We also show the connection between our theoretical proposal and the appraisal theory and integrate it with emotion regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about Peirce's understanding and notational realization of the relationship between the logical content of conjunction and the illocutionary force of assertion. The argument moves from an imaginary, subtextual dialogue between several authors in the history of logic and the philosophy of language (Aristotle, Ammonius, Boethius, Frege, Peirce, Geach, and Dummett) and shows that the problem of the relationship between conjunction and assertion is quite old and has received distinct and irreconcilable treatments. Peirce has an original take on the problem, which he addresses, as often happens in his mature writings, in notational terms: the anomaly of conjunction (i.e., the fact that, unlike the other connectives, conjunction is subject to assertion distribution) is not to be hidden behind a uniform notation, like standard sentential calculus, in which the conjunction connective is treated on a par with the other connectives. Rather, a sentential language is possible that embodies rather than conceals the anomaly, and this is Peirce's system of Existential Graphs, which from 1896 onwards understandably becomes his preferred instrument of logical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peirce's theory of assertions articulates the original commitment theory of assertions. Commitment theories of assertion have gained considerable recent interest not only in the Peirce scholarship but also in studies of history and philosophy of language, logic and communication. In this preface we point out some recent work on the topic and provide a brief introduction to the papers published in this Transactions symposium. These papers consist of a selection of those presented in the workshop "Peirce on Assertion" held in Lecce, Italy, on 13 September 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In clinical diagnosis, both causal attribution and the interaction between different types of probability may take place. We deal with a hypothetical, but quite realistic, clinical case and go through various idealized ways in which the case can be framed. In the diverse scenarios linked to our proposed case, the possibility of causal attributions will be taken into account and each one of them will correspond to a distinct role of probabilistic evaluation. For some of these scenarios, it will be necessary to comply with certain requirements such as the construction of a specific partition that serves as a point of reference for the diagnostic analysis. The interaction between probabilities occuring within these scenarios will be critically investigated, as it may shed light on some causality claims in clinical diagnosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patients are interested in receiving accurate diagnostic and prognostic information. Models and reasoning about diagnoses have been extensively investigated from a foundational perspective; however, for all its importance, prognosis has yet to receive a comparable degree of philosophical and methodological attention, and this may be due to the difficulties inherent in accurate prognostics. In the light of these considerations, we discuss a considerable body of critical thinking on the topic of prognostication and its strict relations with diagnostic reasoning, pointing out the distinction between nosographic and pathophysiological types of diagnosis and prognosis, underlying the importance of the explication and explanation processes. We then distinguish between various forms of hypothetical reasoning applied to reach diagnostic and prognostic judgments, comparing them with specific forms of abductive reasoning. The main thesis is that creative abduction regarding clinical hypotheses in diagnostic process is very unlikely to occur, whereas this seems to be often the case for prognostic judgments. The reasons behind this distinction are due to the different types of uncertainty involved in diagnostic and prognostic judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nursing knowledge stems from a dynamic interplay between population-based scientific knowledge (the general) and specific clinical cases (the particular). We compared the 'cascade model of knowledge translation', also known as 'classical biomedical model' in clinical practice (in which knowledge gained at population level may be applied directly to a specific clinical context), with an emergentist model of knowledge translation. The structure and dynamics of nursing knowledge are outlined, adopting the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Then, a (moderately) emergentist approach to nursing knowledge is proposed, based on the assumption of a two-way flow from the general to the particular and vice versa. The case of the 'placebo effect' is analysed as an example of emergentist knowledge. The placebo effect is usually considered difficult to be explained within the classical biomedical model, and we underscore its importance in shaping nursing knowledge. In fact, nurses are primarily responsible for administering placebo in the clinical setting and have an essential role in promoting the placebo effect and reducing the nocebo effect. The beliefs responsible for the placebo effect are as follows: (1) interactive, because they depend on the relationship between patients and health care professionals; (2) situated, because they occur in a given clinical context related to certain rituals; and (3) grounded on higher order beliefs concerning what an individual thinks about the beliefs of others. It is essential to know the clinical context and to understand other people's beliefs to make sense of the placebo effect. The placebo effect only works when the (higher order) beliefs of doctors, nurses and patients interact in a given setting. Finally, we argue for a close relationship between placebo effect and nursing knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assertion candidate expresses a potential logical-linguistic object that can be asserted. It differs from both the act and the product of assertion; it needs not to be actually asserted and differs from the assertion made. We investigate the medieval origins of this notion, which are almost neglected in contemporary logic. Our historical analysis suggests an interpretation of the assertion candidate within the system of logic for pragmatics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The beliefs involved in the placebo effect are often assumed to be self-fulfilling, that is, the truth of these beliefs would merely require the patient to hold them. Such a view is commonly shared in epistemology. Many epistemologists focused, in fact, on the self-fulfilling nature of these beliefs, which have been investigated because they raise some important counterexamples to Nozick's "tracking theory of knowledge." We challenge the self-fulfilling nature of placebo-based beliefs in multi-agent contexts, analyzing their deep epistemological nature and the role of higher-order beliefs involved in the placebo effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Possibility is one of the most common modalities in reasoning and argumentation. Various kinds of modal concepts have been identified in philosophical and logical discussion of the metaphysics of modality. We focus here on the concept of clinical possibility. A critical analysis of what is intended as clinical possibility has not yet received sufficient examination, although the concept is extensively used in clinical reasoning. We present arguments to emphasize some desirable features associated with the concept of clinical possibility. We argue that almost all clinical possibilities are potentialities, that is, possibilities that may be actualized by effective, appropriate and feasible interventions. However, in some limited cases, even mere possibilities - which may or may not be actualized, since we do not have the required knowledge - may be involved in clinical reasoning, and we present some examples in this paper. We then introduce some basic views on the nature of possibility showing their validity and limitations when applied to the concept of clinical possibility. Lastly, we conjecture that clinical possibility is a normative modality that can be formalized in a multimodal system with epistemic and deontic logical operators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study addresses the question of normative analysis of the value‐based aspects of nursing. In our perspective, values in science may be distinguished into (i) epistemic when related to the goals of truth and objectivity and (ii) non‐epistemic when related to social, cultural or political aspects. Furthermore, values can be called constitutive when necessary for a scientific enterprise, or contextual when contingently associated with science. Analysis of the roles of the various forms of values and models of knowledge translation provides the ground to understand the specific role of values in nursing. A conceptual framework has been built to classify some of the classical perspectives on nursing knowledge and to examine the relationships between values and different forms of knowledge in nursing. It follows that adopting a normative perspective in the analysis of nursing knowledge provides key elements to identify its proper dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale Diagnostic systems exist in many disciplines. Strengths and weaknesses of such diagnostic systems vary considerably within and among disciplinary domains of the health sciences. The logical framework behind each diagnostic process involves identifying a condition, seeking causes, establishing a prognosis and a treatment. Notably, a clinical diagnosis is a judgment focused on the present, aiming to cluster events associated with a disease. Diagnostic judgment focuses on the past when it attempts to isolate possible causes, and towards the future when it indicates prognoses and treatments. Aims and objectives The paper suggests ways to differentiate nursing diagnosis from medical diagnoses, discussing ontology and abductive reasoning for doctors and nurses. Conclusions The proposed logical framework has been applied to a nursing taxonomy-based diagnostic system in order to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses consistently with the epistemology of a diagnostic judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diagnostic frameworks are essential to many scientific and technological activities and clinical practice. This study examines the main fundamental aspects of such frameworks. The three components required for all diagnoses are identified and examined, i.e. their normative dimension, temporal nature and structure, and teleological perspective. The normative dimension of a diagnosis is based on (1) epistemic values when associated with Hempel's inductive risk concerning the balance between false-positive and false-negative outcomes, leading to probabilistic judgements; and (2) non-epistemic values when related to ideas such as well-being, normality, illness, etc, as idealized norms or ideal points of reference. It should be noted that medical diagnoses match the three necessary components, while some essential diagnostic frameworks - the taxonomies of Gordon and NANDA - in nursing lack some components. The main lack is normative as the most popular frameworks in nursing diagnosis seem to be descriptions of observed reality rather than normative and value-based judgements in which both epistemic and non-epistemic values may coexist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential development of self-driving cars (also known as autonomous vehicles or AVs – particularly Level 5 AVs) has called the attention of different interested parties. Yet, there are still only a few relevant international regulations on them, no emergency patterns accepted by communities and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), and no publicly accepted solutions to some of their pending ethical problems. Thus, this paper aims to provide some possible answers to these moral and practical dilemmas. In particular, we focus on what AVs should do in no-win scenarios and on who should be held responsible for these types of decisions. A naturalistic perspective on ethics informs our proposal, which, we argue, could represent a pragmatic and realistic solution to the regulation of AVs. We discuss the proposals already set out in the current literature regarding both policy-making strategies and theoretical accounts. In fact, we consider and reject descriptive approaches to the problem as well as the option of using either a strict deontological view or a solely utilitarian one to set AVs' ethical choices. Instead, to provide concrete answers to AVs' ethical problems, we examine three hierarchical levels of decision-making processes: country-wide regulations, OEM policies, and buyers' moral attitudes. By appropriately distributing ethical decisions and considering their practical implications, we maintain that our proposal based on ethical naturalism recognizes the importance of all stakeholders and allows the most able of them to take actions (the OEMs and buyers) to reflect on the moral leeway and weight of their options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]