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The proliferation of images captured from millions of cameras and the advancement of facial recognition (FR) technology have made the abuse of FR a severe privacy threat. Existing works typically rely on obfuscation, synthesis, or adversarial examples to modify faces in images to achieve anti-facial recognition (AFR). However, the unmodified images captured by camera modules that contain sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) could still be leaked. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, CamPro, to capture inborn AFR images. CamPro enables well-packed commodity camera modules to produce images that contain little PII and yet still contain enough information to support other non-sensitive vision applications, such as person detection. Specifically, CamPro tunes the configuration setup inside the camera image signal processor (ISP), i.e., color correction matrix and gamma correction, to achieve AFR, and designs an image enhancer to keep the image quality for possible human viewers. We implemented and validated CamPro on a proof-of-concept camera, and our experiments demonstrate its effectiveness on ten state-of-the-art black-box FR models. The results show that CamPro images can significantly reduce face identification accuracy to 0.3\% while having little impact on the targeted non-sensitive vision application. Furthermore, we find that CamPro is resilient to adaptive attackers who have re-trained their FR models using images generated by CamPro, even with full knowledge of privacy-preserving ISP parameters., Comment: Accepted by NDSS Symposium 2024

Autonomous vehicles increasingly utilize the vision-based perception module to acquire information about driving environments and detect obstacles. Correct detection and classification are important to ensure safe driving decisions. Existing works have demonstrated the feasibility of fooling the perception models such as object detectors and image classifiers with printed adversarial patches. However, most of them are indiscriminately offensive to every passing autonomous vehicle. In this paper, we propose TPatch, a physical adversarial patch triggered by acoustic signals. Unlike other adversarial patches, TPatch remains benign under normal circumstances but can be triggered to launch a hiding, creating or altering attack by a designed distortion introduced by signal injection attacks towards cameras. To avoid the suspicion of human drivers and make the attack practical and robust in the real world, we propose a content-based camouflage method and an attack robustness enhancement method to strengthen it. Evaluations with three object detectors, YOLO V3/V5 and Faster R-CNN, and eight image classifiers demonstrate the effectiveness of TPatch in both the simulation and the real world. We also discuss possible defenses at the sensor, algorithm, and system levels., Comment: Appeared in 32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23)

Our study assesses the adversarial robustness of LiDAR-camera fusion models in 3D object detection. We introduce an attack technique that, by simply adding a limited number of physically constrained adversarial points above a car, can make the car undetectable by the fusion model. Experimental results reveal that even without changes to the image data channel, the fusion model can be deceived solely by manipulating the LiDAR data channel. This finding raises safety concerns in the field of autonomous driving. Further, we explore how the quantity of adversarial points, the distance between the front-near car and the LiDAR-equipped car, and various angular factors affect the attack success rate. We believe our research can contribute to the understanding of multi-sensor robustness, offering insights and guidance to enhance the safety of autonomous driving.

Automatic Speaker Recognition Systems (SRSs) have been widely used in voice applications for personal identification and access control. A typical SRS consists of three stages, i.e., training, enrollment, and recognition. Previous work has revealed that SRSs can be bypassed by backdoor attacks at the training stage or by adversarial example attacks at the recognition stage. In this paper, we propose Tuner, a new type of backdoor attack against the enrollment stage of SRS via adversarial ultrasound modulation, which is inaudible, synchronization-free, content-independent, and black-box. Our key idea is to first inject the backdoor into the SRS with modulated ultrasound when a legitimate user initiates the enrollment, and afterward, the polluted SRS will grant access to both the legitimate user and the adversary with high confidence. Our attack faces a major challenge of unpredictable user articulation at the enrollment stage. To overcome this challenge, we generate the ultrasonic backdoor by augmenting the optimization process with random speech content, vocalizing time, and volume of the user. Furthermore, to achieve real-world robustness, we improve the ultrasonic signal over traditional methods using sparse frequency points, pre-compensation, and single-sideband (SSB) modulation. We extensively evaluate Tuner on two common datasets and seven representative SRS models, as well as its robustness against seven kinds of defenses. Results show that our attack can successfully bypass speaker recognition systems while remaining effective to various speakers, speech content, etc. To mitigate this newly discovered threat, we also provide discussions on potential countermeasures, limitations, and future works of this new threat., Comment: Published in Internet of Things Journal (IoT-J)