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This thesis is an examination of whether the “egalitarian model” for political finance that has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada, other Canadian courts and legal scholars and commentators is actually egalitarian and has been applied consistently (in Chapter 2), and whether Canada’s political finance system measures up to the Court’s model (in Chapters 3 and 4), and how it could be changed to comply with a more egalitarian model that would also be ethical in terms of preventing even the appearance of a conflict of interest (in Chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 1 sets out a general theoretical framework for evaluating the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, and I develop and set out a more egalitarian model in Chapter 5. In the Chapter 8 conclusion, I summarize the findings and propose structural and positive Charter rights court cases as a way forward, given that the platforms federal politicians and political parties from the past few elections, and the reports of parliamentary committees, have not called for the most of the changes I propose are needed to make the system more egalitarian. The thesis addresses political finance broadly defined as money, property, use of property, gifts, services, favours and other benefits and advantages provided to nomination contestants, election candidates and political party leadership contestants, electoral district associations, political parties, politicians and their staff during election campaign periods and also during the time period between elections, including support provided by “third-party” interest groups, lobbyists and other individuals, and by media outlets. In Chapter 3, I examine the rules that apply to each of these political actors in the areas of registration, donations and loans, spending, public subsidies and disclosure (including auditing), including a separate section on the role of media and social media. Given that political systems include providers (whether as contractors or donors) of money, property and the use of property (including gifts and other benefits and advantages), and services (including favours) to politicians, and given that providers could be lobbyists, I also examine in Chapter 4 the rules concerning gifts, favours and other benefits and relations between voters, lobbyists and politicians, and concerning the conflicts of interest that can be caused by these activities. Other than disclosure and auditing, I do not cover enforcement measures or systems in any of the areas. However, I do note at various points in the thesis that, as several studies and history have shown clearly, effective enforcement measures, policies and practices are key to ensure compliance with such rules. The main contentions that I make are: that the key principles of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model have not been consistently upheld by the Court and other Canadian courts, that Canada’ federal political finance system does not fulfill the Court’s egalitarian model, and that several changes are needed to make the model and the system more egalitarian, only a few of which have been addressed by Canadian courts and scholars to date. These contentions counter the claim made in the Court’s rulings, and by many scholars and commentators, that Canada’s political finance system has developed and is based on an egalitarian model. In Chapters 5 through 7, I develop a more egalitarian model and set out specific proposed changes to make Canada’s systems more egalitarian, both in theory and in practice, within the framework of a democratic good government political system (meaning a system with separation of powers, elections, human rights protections, rule of law etc.) and a mixed market economy with both public sector institutions and private sector businesses, unions and other organizations (cooperatives, non-profit, religious organizations etc.). Both the model and many of the specific proposed measures should also be applicable in other jurisdictions with different political systems and economic systems. The framework of 19 standards for a more egalitarian model that I develop in Chapter 5 is based mainly on John Rawls’ theory of justice, but modified and expanded to incorporate critiques of Rawls’ theory, other legal principles and democratic good government theories, international standards, government ethics case law, behavioural psychology studies, and evidence of the public’s expectations. The 201 proposals I make in Chapters 6 and 7 for specific changes to the rules of Canada’s current federal political finance system (again, broadly defined), are based on the model, measures from various jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere, and international standards. I am not claiming that these changes would definitely result in “better” or more “public interest” policy-making decisions, however that would be determined. I am only contending that the framework I develop is more egalitarian than the Supreme Court’s model, and that the rule changes I suggest would make the political finance, gifts, favours, conflict of interest and lobbying systems align with the more egalitarian model I propose. I primarily use the doctrinal research methodology by examining scholarly research and, given I also examine aspects of the laws of Canadian provinces and municipalities, and other countries, I also deploy some aspects of the comparative methodology (most fully when comparing Canada’s federal rules to Quebec’s rules, and somewhat when comparing Canada’s rules to the U.S. and U.K. rules). The research results from these sources inform the conclusions I set out in my thesis. The thesis advances knowledge in the following areas: 1. It is the first complete evaluation of the federal Canadian political finance, gifts-favours-benefits, conflict of interest and lobbying rules and systems in their current state as of May 2023, based on the findings of extensive new research into key parts of these systems; 2. It sets out the first comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model has been applied by the Court and other courts inconsistently, in ways that do not comply with the model; 3. It sets out the first analysis of how Canada’s political finance statutory rules, again defined broadly to include rules that apply to donations, loans, gifts, services, favours and other benefits, lobbying and conflicts of interest, do not comply with the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, based in part on new statistical research set out in 28 charts, and; 4. It sets out a new theoretical framework based on 19 standards, and a comprehensive set of 201 innovative proposals for changes to make Canada’s political finance rules (again defined broadly) more egalitarian, and more ethical in terms of preventing conflicts of interest. Five comprehensive studies of key parts of the political finance, ethics and lobbying systems are also proposed to gather key information needed to inform the design of some of the 201 proposed changes. Eight structural and positive Charter rights cases are also proposed to challenge current rules that do not comply with the egalitarian model.

L’application extraterritoriale de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés soulève la question du rôle du principe de territorialité dans la détermination de l’étendue des droits constitutionnels. De façon plus générale, elle soulève la question du rapport entre territoire et droit. Cette thèse explore, dans un premier temps, les jalons de la méthodologie territorialiste en abordant les prémisses qui sous-tendent l’ascension du principe de territorialité comme paradigme juridique dominant. Les anomalies de ce paradigme sont par la suite présentées, de façon à illustrer un affaiblissement du principe de territorialité. Par la suite, l’auteure entreprend de déterminer le rôle du principe de territorialité dans l’établissement de l’espace occupé par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés en situation d’extraterritorialité. Les développements jurisprudentiels récents attestent de la prédominance du paradigme territorial, mais de nombreuses difficultés d’application sont rencontrées. Après avoir testé la viabilité de ce paradigme, l’auteure entreprend de définir un nouveau cadre analytique permettant de répondre à la question de l’application de la Charte en situation d’extraterritorialité sans se référer à la position géographique du demandeur, ni à son appartenance à une certaine communauté politique pré-déterminée. Ce cadre repose sur une conceptualisation de la notion d’autorité étatique transcendant l’exercice d’un pouvoir coercitif de l’État fixé à l’intérieur de ses limites territoriales. Une autorité relationnelle, qui s’appuie sur l’idée que tout pouvoir étatique tire sa source de la Constitution et, conséquemment, doit être assujetti à son contrôle., This thesis is about the relationship between law and territory, and more particularly, about the relationship between the principle of territoriality and the scope of Charter rights. The author first introduces territoriality as dominant legal paradigm and analyses its underlying premises. The challenges that territoriality and methodological territorialism have recently faced are also examined. The purpose of the first part of this thesis is to show that the territorial paradigm is not immune to challenge, and to provide conceptual tools to get out of the “territorial trap”. The author then looks at how, and to what extent, territoriality currently shapes the scope of Charter rights. By analysing cases on point, the author concludes that although territoriality is, officially, the answer to the question of the scope of Charter rights, in practice, the principle does not provide sufficient guidance to the judiciary. The territorial principle’s normative weaknesses are added to its practical inability to determine the scope of Charter rights. In order to examine potential alternatives to the territorial principle, the author examines the parallel debate regarding the extraterritorial scope of American constitutional rights. American courts, rather than endorsing strict territoriaity, emphasize either the membership of the claimant (the subject of constitutional litigation), the limitations on state actions (the object of constitutional litigation), or pragmatic concerns in order to determine whether a constitutional protection applies in an extraterritorial context. The author then proceeds to examining how an alternative model could be developed in Canada in the context of extraterritorial Charter cases. She argues that the personal entitlement approach, when superimposed on the territorial paradigm, brings more injustice, not less, in that people can be sufficiently related to Canada to trigger a state action, but insufficiently connected to trigger Charter protection, hence creating a state of asymmetry. She also argues that territoriality, if understood in Westphalian terms, leads to the belief that a state action is not an action within the authority of the Canadian government if it is conducted outside of Canada, hence shielding these actions from constitutional srcutiny. The model the author advocates is based on a notion of relational authority and it seeks to emphasize not the place where a government act is performed, nor the identity of the persons subject to it, but the idea that any exercise of government power is potentially amenable to constitutional scrutiny.

The "tribunal standing" question arises when an administrative body whose decision is being subjected to judicial review seeks standing rights before the reviewing court. After summarizing current law, I argue for a more liberal approach to tribunal standing. There is convincing evidence that the counsel for the tribunal= under review can contribute productively to the process. The traditional objections to tribunal standing do not withstand scrutiny. Nor does the recent proposal to apply the "pragmatic and functional approach" to the issue seem fruitful. Only two objections to tribunal participation in judicial review seem compelling - protection of procedural rights when the case involves individual's Charter rights, and ensuring that tribunal standing does not drive up legal costs for other participants in judicial review. So long as these factors are borne in mind, Canadian courts have little to lose and much to gain by permitting tribunal participation in judicial review.