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In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing – i.e. to what extent can we put participants back to the way we found them? This is essential to investigate, for both ethical and theoretical reasons. Participants (n = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the “Lost in the Mall” study (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment three days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be non-believed memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be “dehoaxed” and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

The seminal Lost in the Mall study (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995) has been enormously influential in psychology and is still cited in many legal cases. The current study directly replicated this paper, addressing key methodological weaknesses including increasing the sample size and preregistering detailed analysis plans. Participants (N = 123) completed a survey and two interviews where they discussed real and fabricated childhood events, based on information provided by an older relative. We replicated the findings of the original study, with 35% of participants reporting a false memory for getting lost in a mall as a child (compared to 25% in the original study). However, using a novel self-report measure, just 14% of participants declared that they remembered the fake event occurring, with a further 52% stating that they believed the fake event had occurred. The replication supports the claim that it is possible to plant a false memory of a childhood event.

Studies of eyewitness memory commonly employ variations on a standard misinformation paradigm. Participants are (a) exposed to an event (e.g., a simulated crime), (b) misled about certain details of the event and (c) questioned about their memory of the original event. Misinformation may be provided in the second step via a range of methods. Here, we directly compared the effectiveness of six misinformation delivery methods-leading questions, elaborate leading questions, doctored photographs, simple narratives, scrambled narratives, and missing word narratives. We presented 1182 participants with a video of a simulated robbery and randomly assigned them to receive misinformation about two out of four critical details via one of these methods. In line with the levels of processing account of memory, we report that methods that encourage deeper processing of misinformation result in more memory distortions. Contrary to previous reports, doctored photographs were not a successful method of implanting misinformation. The six delivery methods resulted in minimal differences in confidence and metamemory estimates, but participants were more likely to notice the presence of misinformation in the simple narrative condition. We conclude with suggestions for the selection of an appropriate method of misinformation delivery in future studies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).