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As a practicing clinical nurse, a phenomenon I experienced at times was the sudden acute sense that something was going wrong with a person in care at the sub-critical unit in the hospital where I worked. In fact, many hospital nurses have their story of somethings not right in relation to a person they were caring for/with, in that the day started with them on a coherent path to healing and then suddenly the nurse feels something is going very wrong, and yet there is nothing observable that would justify such a feeling. This feeling would be called intuition by many nurses, a concept most notably theorized in nursing by Patricia Benner in her extensive program of scholarship. Benner defines intuition as understanding without rationale. Benner opposes embodied intuition and rational abstract reasoning and creates criteria for the use of each by nursing depending on whether the clinical situation is familiar or novel. The philosophical idea is that the new must be reasoned with a different mode of thought than the familiar. Charles Sanders Peirce was a philosopher of reasoning. He defined logic as the theory of reasoning, which by the end of his career he was declaring was only another name for semiotic. Peirce argued that all reasoning/semiosis is done through signs, or more accurately sign-activity. Semiotic is the philosophical schema providing the concepts and methods by which semiosis - reasoning - happens. Importantly, semiotic does not oppose different modes of thought, and conceptualizes reasoning as a process that functions in familiar as well as novel situations. In this paper I describe Peirces philosophy of semiotic. I then provide an example relevant to nursing by conducting a semiosis of the nursing scenario above to show how nursing works chance, or novelty, in a way that doesnt need to resort to rational abstract reasoning and yet is different than Benners notion of intuition.

We propose a semiotic externalist approach that takes cognition as semiosis, gives central importance to the notion of temporal distribution, describes the elements of distributed cognitive systems (DCSs) as signs, and identifies the DCS itself as a system that enacts a sign. This is a semiosis-centered, and thus a non-agent-centered account of DCSs. In order to develop and illustrate our argument, we describe an example of DCS – the Brazilian verbo-musical improvisational tradition of repente – considering it first as embodiment of the formal structure of a cognitive task, and then as embodiment of a semiotic process. The latter corresponds to a semiotization of the description of repente sessions as DCSs, that focuses on how the DCS can embody a meta semiotic process, semiosis that supervenes on, and determines, distinct types of smaller-scale semiotic process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent shift in social science research toward philosophies of the more‐than‐human has pushed many scholars to question their understanding of units of analysis and agency. While many engage with agencies of the material, few have attempted to address what might be called the agency of ideas. Here, Alexander Pratt argues that engaging with the agency of ideas is particularly important when dealing with issues like racism, which is the focus of this article. He believes that one reason for the lack of such engagement is the seemingly undefined nature of what we might think of as ideas. In this article, Pratt offers a conception of agential ideas developed through his reading of the metaphysics of Charles S. Peirce and those who have utilized Peirce's theories. This conception will provide an entry point for posthuman researchers to incorporate the protean nature of ideas into their own research methodologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper, I outline a pragmatist epistemology of logic inspired by later work of Charles S. Peirce that shares many features with an anti-exceptionalism about logic but, I argue, can better respond to a key problem that plagues the anti-exceptionalist. I first lay out what I take to be the tenets of anti-exceptionalism, discussing some difficulties in formulating the position that make it difficult to definitively label the position discussed here. I then analyze a key problem for the anti-exceptionalist, the background logic problem, and suggest that when framed as a problem for certain types of inquiry, it shares a presupposition about the priority of logic with other problems in the epistemology of logic. Turning to a discussion of Peirce from the 1903 Lowell Lectures, I then outline a pragmatism about logic that rejects the priority claims underlying the problems for inquiry in logic and, I argue, can resolve the background logic problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Peirce developed Existential Graphs as a diagrammatic syntax for representing and reasoning about propositions, with three parts: Alpha for propositional logic, Beta for first-order predicate logic, and Gamma for aspects of modal logic, second-order logic, and metalanguage. He made several adjustments between 1909 and 1911 that merit further consideration: using heavy lines to denote possible states of things in which attached propositions would be true, drawing a red line just inside the edge of a page and writing postulates in the resulting margin, shading oddly enclosed areas instead of drawing thin lines as their boundaries, and using multiple sheets of paper to represent different subjects within the overall universe of discourse. These modifications can be combined to constitute a plausible candidate for Delta, a fourth part that Peirce intended to add but never spelled out. It implements modern formal systems of modal propositional logic in accordance with a version of possible worlds semantics in which the laws for the actual state of things are facts in every possible state of things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I analyze Peirce's reply in the 1903 Lowell Lectures to the "defendant argument" and show how his response provides a key to interpreting his later philosophy of logic and his views on the normative role of deductive logic in inquiry. I argue that in Peirce's discussion of self-control in reasoning and evaluation of reasoning, we find an underappreciated position on logical revision and how to understand rational choice between deductive theories. To defend this point, I reconstruct Peirce's reply by providing an interpretation of his comments on higher-order criticism and the soundness of our reasoning, arguing that the resulting position's ability to separate questions involving the role of logic in inquiry from questions better suited to the mathematical study of a logical theory provides a fruitful pragmatist reframing of problems in the epistemology of logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the Ukrainian semiotic metalanguage still remains a subject of controversy for those who are interested in the scholarly heritage of the greatest and an extraordinarily prolifi c American philosopher, logician (mathematical and general) and semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 – 1914). In the course of his polymathic researches he created numerous terminological neologisms. The latter are most commonly rendered into Ukrainian applying transliteration. Peirce was extremely fond of placing things into groups of three, of trichotomies, and of triadic relations. His theory of signs is also based on his ʻtriadism’. The article discusses the interpretation of the fundamental categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as presented in Peirceʼs work “A Guess at the Riddle” and focuses on the challenges of rendering these and other important terminological units of Peircean semiotics into Ukrainian. The article contains excerpts from the above mentioned Peirce’s work translated into Ukrainian by the author of this paper and the issues of translating Peircean neologisms are approached with the aim of revealing logic in the management of semiotic realities and specifi cally the logic of constructing diff erent Ukrainian equivalents. The lack of the generally accepted tradition of translating semiotic terms brings to life many terminological variants used by diff erent Ukrainian scholars and translators. The present paper reviews some terminological variants used by Ukrainian semioticians and seeks to provide arguments to support the necessity of selecting Ukrainian equivalents using the native stock of morphemes instead of applying transliteration of the original English terms. Following this line of thought, the author suggests her options for rendering such key semiotic terms as Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, representation and determination, representamen and interpretant and some others and claims that the suggested approach is justifi ed and can ensure the adequacy of the translation and the unifi cation of the Ukrainian terminology of semiotics.

O artigo examina o lugar da Semiótica e da Linguística, bem como de seus precursores históricos, no quadro geral das ciências. As classificações anteriores das ciências consideradas incluem aquelas de Aristóteles, dos escolásticos, de Francis Bacon e John Locke. O foco deste artigo está nos sistemas do século XIX. Após uma rápida leitura dos sistemas de André-Marie Ampère e de Roswell Park, o estudo volta-se para as classificações da Linguística e da Semiótica dentro dos sistemas de Adrien Naville, Ferdinand de Saussure e Charles S. Peirce. O artigo fornece um breve panorama das visões do século XX do lugar da Linguística em relação à Semiótica, antes de concluir com um estudo sobre a Semiótica entre as ciências do século XXI.

My aim in this essay is to shed light on the origins of Peircean vagueness. The intention is therefore primarily historical-philological, exploring the logical-semiotic roots of vagueness. First, I distinguish the two senses in which Peirce treats the notion of vagueness: one referring to the subject, the other to the predicate within a proposition, specifying that I am only concerned here with the first sense of vagueness. Second, I argue that Brock and Chauviré, while attempting to unravel the origins of Peircean vagueness through the notion of the individuum vagum , fail to fully resolve the problem. Third, I expound the medieval theory of suppositio , which concerns the denotation and quantification of the propositional subject. This medieval logical theory aimed to clarify the meaning of indefinite and indeterminate propositions. Fourth, I present textual evidence in which Peirce demonstrates his thorough knowledge of the medieval theory of suppositio , Peter of Spain's theory in particular. In the same section, I highlight a neglected detail within R 530, in which Peirce directly refers to the origins of the notion of vagueness. Finally, I argue that once the quantifiers (existential and universal) were discovered and formalized, Peirce gradually lost interest in the theory of suppositio as a useful tool for clarifying vague (indefinite) and general (indeterminate) propositions, since he had a better logical tool at his disposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses some of the possible connections between the principles of modeling in the new mechanical philosophy and the modeling used by Charles S. Peirce in his work on categories and evolutionary theory. The main goal is to show that the theoretical approaches used in the new mechanism can be beneficial for disciplines that are not clearly labelled as either humanities or natural science – for example, biosemiotics – and that this philosophical movement can help close the gap between natural science and the humanities. In individual chapters, this text deals with: the difference between the doctrine of the universal mechanism and the doctrine of the new mechanism, exploring the concept of the category of Thirdness and evolutionary theory in the work of Charles S. Peirce and finally focusing on the similarities between Peirce's work and the approach of the new mechanical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article asks to what extent, if at all, the methodological modus operandiof Erwin Panofsky’s three-level model for iconographic-iconological interpretation and analysis parallels that of semiotics as conceived by Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce. That this is the case has occasionally been asserted, for instance by Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, as well as Giulio Carlo Argan. The exposition begins with an outline of features of iconography and of semiotics pertinent to the argument. It then proceeds to relate the grounds on which the two systems have been taken to resemble each other. Lastly, the alleged correspondence is contested on the grounds of differences regarding both the practices and objectives of iconography and semiotics respectively.

Short's assertion that Peirce lacked a cohesive philosophical system is critically examined, and the interconnectedness of Peirce's 1884–1893 "cosmology" with other aspects of his work is explored, countering Short's claims of its limited systematic relevance. Additionally, Short's claim that Peirce "expanded empiricism empirically" is scrutinized, and his interpretation of Peirce's account of perception is criticized. By contrasting Short's anti-system reading, I highlight the importance of studying Peirce's philosophy holistically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

T.L. Short's Charles Peirce and Modern Science, in which he discusses Peirce's intimate relation to modern science, simultaneously functions as Short's own philosophical testament. Short's overall argument is that Peirce takes inquiry to be the main definition of science, implying that all other definition attempts or central issues of science are but products of inquiry: methods, experiments, observations, conclusions, results, syntheses, theory buildings, system constructions, laws, predictions, metaphysical assumptions, scientific values, etc. On this basis, Short develops central Peircean ideas such as inquiry into inquiry, phenomenology, and his "normative sciences" as elements of a reinvigorated and metaphysically ambitious version of empiricism. In this process, however, certain problems appear, such as Short's tendency to refute any relevance in scientific investigations of systematicity, the a priori, the strive for conclusions and results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract In 1909, Peirce recorded in a few pages of his logic notebook some experiments with matrices for three-valued propositional logic. These notes are today recognized as one of the first attempts to create non-classical formal systems. However, besides the articles published by Turquette in the 1970s and 1980s, very little progress has been made toward a comprehensive understanding of the formal aspects of Peirce's triadic logic (as he called it). This paper aims to propose a new approach to Peirce's matrices for three-valued propositional logic. We suggested that his logical matrices give rise to three different systems, one of them - which we called P3 - is an original and non-explosive logic. Besides that, we will show that the P3 system can easily be transformed into paraconsistent and paracomplete calculi, adding to it, respectively, unary operators of consistency and intuitionistic negation. We conclude with a discussion about philosophical motivations.

Para Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), fundador do pragmatismo filosófico e da semiótica moderna, não há antagonismo entre os discursos literário e científico. Ambos os textos literário e científico são signos que propõem argumentos por meio de símbolos, índices e ícones. De modo similar, argumentos científicos e literários exercem uma agência semiótica autônoma e criam suas próprias realidades. O artigo apresenta Peirce como um cientista, bem como um leitor e crítico da literatura mundial e faz um resumo do trívio semiótico peirceano da gramática especulativa, lógica crítica e retórica especulativa e da sua aplicabilidade ao estudo do discurso literário.

When confronted with moral dilemmas, Charles S. Peirce would recommend that we trust our sentiments, not our reasoning. A scientific exploration of ethics may affect our daily conduct but should only do so gradually. Some modern approaches take the opposite stance and deny the significance of moral sentiments. Considering both Peirce and his opponents, I aim to contribute to the discussion of a radical moral theory: effective altruism. Stating that we should strive to do the most objective good we can, effective altruism regularly conflicts with our moral sentiments. In response, effective altruists claim that our sentiments are misguided and should be overcome. Which side is right? Using Peirce's work to answer this question reveals that effective altruism cannot clearly define how it aims to affect our daily conduct. In addition, it seeks to change our sentiments, but may alter them for the worse. Taking Peirce's insights seriously leads us to conclude that we should be cautious of how we adopt effective altruism in our lives—and that while we deliberate this, we should instead trust our sentiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how adaptive creativity is continuously generated and sustained in living systems. The philosophical frame and motivations for this investigation will be introduced by juxtaposing an actual creative process with current cybernetic efforts to automate creativity. Past and present process philosophers that have critiqued the implicit commitments of these contemporary techniques will set the stage for further investigations. The litmus test of progress in this investigation will be measured against the extension of two concepts: virtuality, as introduced by Gilbert Simondon (On the Mode of the Existence of Technical Objects), and relevant noise, as introduced by Bacigalupi ("Semiogenesis: A Dynamic System Approach to Agency and Structure"). To refine the concepts of virtuality and relevant noise for our purposes, a rigorous theoretical model will be proposed whose intent is to explain veritable unbounded creativity. This model will then serve as a heuristic lens to explore additional extant models, such as the Kuramoto model (Strogatz), that are used to explain empirical observations of adaptive and creative behaviors in a diversity of biological phenomena. Based on these models of biological creativity and the critique of the contemporary cybernetic project, this paper will conclude by outlining the ethical implications of our culture's current commitments to a cybernetic world view and how we might evolve beyond it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After introducing the debate between substance philosophy and process philosophy, and clarifying the relevance of the category of ‘substance’ in Peirce’s thought, the present paper reconstructs the role of ‘substance’ and ‘being’ from Peirce’s early works to his theory of the proposition, provided after his studies on the logic of relatives. If those two categories apparently disappear in Peirce’s writings from the mid-1890s onwards, the account of ‘subject’ and ‘copula’ in Peirce’s analysis of the proposition allows one to grasp the reasons why Peirce omits ‘substance’ and ‘being’ in favor of his three categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness), and to understand why his philosophy cannot be considered as a substance philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]