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Tenodesis of the long head of the biceps tendon can be performed through arthroscopic and open techniques with various fixation methods and at different locations on the humerus. Many techniques have been described, with controversy surrounding the advantages and disadvantages of each. In this Technical Note, we describe an all-arthroscopic, intra-articular, single-portal, suprapectoral biceps tenodesis with an all-suture anchor. This technique also allows for suture passage through the biceps tendon before tenotomy to ensure proper maintenance of the length-tension relationship of the biceps musculotendinous unit.

With the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Mitterrand on the one hand perpetuated the Gaullist tradition of independence in defence as a gauge of national sovereignty. On the other hand, he inherited the Gaullist tradition with regard to NATO, especially in the matter of a European defence identity apart from NATO. Although fiercely protective of France's position outside NATO's integrated command, Mitterrand's official acceptance of the New Strategic Concept of NATO in 1991 and his participation in the Gulf War and other Western actions were such that arguably they helped pave the way for France's eventual rapprochement with NATO.

With the onset of the Sarkozy presidency, an ‘era of good feeling’ has set in for the often fraught French–American relationship. But it is also a hyper presidency, as there is no way of predicting what surprise initiatives Sarkozy will think up next, and this may create problems, or at least adjustments, in the way Washington views him. Sarkozy's stated aim to bring France fully back into NATO was fulfilled at the NATO summit in April 2009, although his ‘condition’ that the European Security and Defence Policy first be strengthened clearly fell short of his expectations, due in part to the current financial and economic crisis.

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.

Because of its origins in a sort of anti-Elizabethan paranoia against centralised government, the United States is poorly set up institutionally to cope with the major danger to itself in the twenty-first century: the threat posed by Islamist terrorism. The Director of Central Intelligence is neither central nor fully directing. A large part of the intelligence community, especially in terms of budgets and supervision, is outside his direct control. There is a 'waters edge' separation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA. Essentially the CIA collects foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence overseas. The FBI, primarily a crime-oriented organisation, has had only a secondary function of domestic counter-intelligence. It is a case-oriented agency focused on establishing past facts in order to bring suspects to justice. It is psychologically ill-adapted to conceptualising threats that lie upstream, that is, in the future. In this context, September 11 can be most properly descri...

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France's anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest “revisionist” works on French-German relations in the first decade of Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the article by Creswell and Trachtenberg and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.

The American administration was much influenced through the late 1950s by the consequences of decolonisation. Though a nation historically committed to anti-imperialism, members of the American administration became anxious at the extent to which recently independent states were coalescing into a large ‘neutralist’ bloc likely to threaten US interests, particularly in the UN. Washington feared in particular that this Afro-Asian grouping might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union. How best to solve this problem created divisions within the US government about dealing with the Algerian problem: some favoured closer contacts with the FLN; others wished to help the French. In the end by hedging their bets and wishing to broker a solution American governments displeased both sides.

Book reviewed in this article: Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance

This is an excellent “story” in the sense of a series of connected events—a chronological account of the, ultimately, successful North African campaign in 1942–1943—and in that it is eminently read...

This article seeks to establish, in a definitive manner, what the US knew about the Suez invasion plan of 1956. With the benefit of the CIA's U‐2 reconnaissance plane, the US was able to pinpoint, as of mid‐October, the existence of nearly three times the number of Mystere fighters in Israel than had previously been notified to Washington by the French government. That plus an information blackout on the part of the British and the French, and the breakdown of negotiations with the Egyptians at the UN, roused Washington's apprehensions that a military option was being considered. However, though there was suspicion on the part of the US that an Israeli‐French operation might be in the offing, Washington never seriously focused on the possibility of a tripartite operation involving the British, the French, and the Israelis. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles relied on the Anglo‐American special relationship and on British good sense not to get involved. In particular, Washington completely ...

John F. Neville, The Press, the Rosenbergs, and the Cold War (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1995). Pp.207, biblio, index. ISBN 0–275–94995–8. John E. Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996). Pp.214, biblio, index. $24.95. ISBN 1–56663–090–8.

Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1995). Pp.315, no index. $25.95 £20.95. ISBN 0–02–881122–4. Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counter‐intelligence (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1995). Pp.337, biblio. index. $24.95 £21.95. ISBN 0–02–881036–8.

Charles de Gaulle was born at Lille on November 22, 1890. He was the fourth, and the tallest (6 ft 5 ins) in a family of four boys and one girl. The family some generations back belonged to the so-called noblesse de robe, not blood nobility but rather those who were given juridical-related positions under the French kings. De Gaulle's father, Henri, was a history teacher in a French lycee, a position of dignity and prestige traditionally in France. He was a teacher in a Jesuit school, which necessitated the young Charles migrating for a year to Belgium to continue his studies, following the anti-clerical laws in France passed in 1905. Keywords: Europe; protests; Second World War

Covert action, i.e. covert operations whose main object is not the collection of intelligence, is a child of the Cold War. Almost haphazardly, it came to be conducted by the CIA, the nation's principal foreign intelligence service. Covert action, in its early years surrounded by secrecy, did not become legally subjected to congressional oversight until the Hughes‐Ryan Amendment, 14 years after the Bay of Pigs. In this legislation, and in the follow‐on Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, covert action came under a separate oversight process than the collection of intelligence. In the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, in which covert action for the first time was officially admitted by name as an activity of the U.S. Government, certain loopholes were addressed which had been revealed by Iran‐Contra (the issues of timely notification of Congress, involvement of third parties, and involvement of other U.S. Government agencies). Issues still remain, including the conduct of liaison with foreign...

(1991). The response of the strong to the weak: The American raid on Libya, 1986. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 608-620.

Ten years ago, in a devilish “soft war” scenario, Iranian militants seized 65 (later 53) innocent American officials in Tehran. The move was immediately endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who soon laid down his terms: no harm to the hostages but no release until Iran had gained satisfaction for its “grievances.” The Carter Administration hesitated, as a dialectic within the U. S. leadership emerged. One group held that the hostages would be released after they had served the purposes of the Iranian revolution, and that patient, dogged diplomacy was what was required. Another group held that Khomeini would respond to pressure and that U.S. national honor was being flouted. The extreme expression of the former group was that a way had to be found so that Khomeini could claim victory, in order to achieve the hostages’ release (whence is derived the principal significance of the title of the article). After months of tergiversations, during which sometimes promising but generally unsuccessful attempts a...

France at the close of 1944 presented an unpromising prospect for the United States. De Gaulle, now firmly in harness at the head of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Francaise (GPRF), enjoyed famously poor relations with President Roosevelt, who had recognised the GPRF late and reluctantly. The knowledge that the main alternative to de Gaulle was Western Europe’s strongest Communist Party (whose representatives sat in the GPRF) hardly improved matters. For his part, de Gaulle longed to break free from his country’s state of forced dependence on his British and American allies, and had already undertaken the first diplomatic step in this direction by signing a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union; France had no such treaty with either Britain or the United States.

Metamorphose a l’interieur, ,declin a l’exterieur : les Etats-Unis et le monde en 2030 Si a l’heure actuelle, les Etats-Unis demeurent indiscutablement la premiere puissance mondiale, ce statut ne leur est pas garanti par les analyses prospectives a moyen terme. Partant de ce constat, Charles Cogan met en lumiere les evolutions que pourrait connaitre l’hyper-puissance americaine, et ce, sur deux plans distincts. Au niveau interne, l’auteur pose la question du devenir de la culture anglo-protestante et de la societe americaine face aux enjeux demographiques et migratoires. Au niveau externe, l’auteur evalue l’impact de la montee en puissance des pays emergents, des echecs des dernieres interventions militaires americaines, et de l’orientation future de la politique de cooperation sur la recomposition des equilibres geopolitiques.

Introduction "The Russian Hope" and its Disappointments The Attempt at a Renewal of the Entente Cordiale The Turn toward Europe: The Brussels Treaty and the Western Union The Turn Toward Washington: The North Atlantic Treaty The Alliance Produces an Organization: NATO NATO Produces an Integrated Command The Return of the Supreme Commander Epilogue