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Key Facts • There was no significant change in per capita per day income from March 2020 (considered pre-COVID) to July 2020 for both rural and urban households. • Reasons for lack of observed impact could include economic disruptions prior to and unrelated to the pandemic and the fact that first lockdowns happened in March. • More than half of households reported reduced consumption of food in August-October 2020 compared to a year previous and reported also that the quality of their diets had worsened.

The 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has devastated health and economic systems worldwide with varying impacts across different economic sectors. Projections of its impact in early 2020 were that developing countries in the global south with historic system inefficiencies would be the worst hit, as weaknesses in their economies would be exposed by the pressure the pandemic would place on health, food and economic systems. Global evidence on the impacts of COVID-19 on economic livelihoods suggests that the most vulnerable income sources to COVID-related shocks would be temporary wage income as opposed to permanent wage income, primarily because casual work that requires day to day contact would be less due to social distancing requirements and movement restrictions (Diao and Mahrt, 2020). Also, national and household food security and nutrition would be negatively impacted, mostly through loss or reduction in household income (both formal and informal sectors) and disruption of supply chains due to movement restrictions within and across countries (Mofya-Mukuka et al., 2020; GRZb, 2020). In Zambia, it has been expected that food consumption would be reduced as the informal sector, which employs over 70 percent of the country’s population, would be hardest hit – particularly for those in agriculture and trade (wholesale and retail) (CUTS and UNDP, 2020). Current local evidence shows that urban households are bearing the brunt of impact compared to their rural counterparts and the sources of impact include price gouging, reduced customers, and reduced business income (Kabisa et al., 2020; Mulenga et al., 2020; Mofya-Mukuka et al., 2020). This brief aims to contribute to the local evidence on the impact that COVID-19 has had on incomes and food security in Zambia. This study complements nationwide-surveys documenting the impact the pandemic is having in real time on the economic livelihoods of Zambians in both rural and urban areas, and tracking food consumption changes during the course of the pandemic. This is in order to provide empirical evidence to guide government policy interventions. This brief is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of how the Zambian government has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic and this is followed by a summary of the data collection methods in Section 3. The survey results are discussed in Section 4 and conclusions of the findings and their policy implications are summarized in Section 5.

Zambia, through her long-term development objective (the Vision 2030), aspires to become a prosperous middle-income country that assures food and nutrition security and reduced poverty. Despite sustained efforts by successive governments, questions remain around policy coherence and consistency in the agricultural sector. This paper reports on the perceived changes in the quality and design of agriculture and food security policy processes, and on the quality of the institutional architecture supporting these processes in Zambia. This report compares 2017 baseline and 2019 endline results and tracks whether, and in which direction, stakeholder perceptions of the quality of agricultural and food security policy processes and institutional architecture in Zambia have changed over time. On the positive side, stakeholder perceptions on some elements of the policy process have improved over the two years from 2017 to 2019. For example, stakeholders now seem to perceive that policy analyses from research institutes are objective. This is important for evidence-based policymaking. Stakeholders are also more satisfied than at baseline with the quality and content of and participation in policy design and implementation in policy processes and the level of dialogue between government and other stakeholders. However, stakeholder perceptions of the overall quality of agricultural and food security policies marginally declined by 0.27 points (on a scale of 0 to 3 points) between 2017 and 2019. Although this difference is statistically significant at 95% confidence level, this test is unreliable given the small sample (n=23) at baseline. The change seems to suggest that stakeholders somewhat perceive a less satisfactory quality of dialogue, coordination, cooperation, and partnership between stakeholders in the agricultural sector and government for advancing policy reforms on agriculture and food security issues in Zambia. Stakeholder perceptions of the quality of the institutional architecture of agriculture and food policy processes in Zambia barely changed—declining just by 0.05 points on a scale of 0 to 3 points) between 2017 and 2019. Although tests for significant changes in perceptions between baseline and endline are unreliable, the downward trend in the overall perceptions of the quality of policy processes and institutional architecture indicate that, among other things, there is room for the agricultural and food security policy processes in Zambia to be more inclusive, engage more with stakeholders, and more effectively utilize the available empirical evidence to inform policy design. The perceived objectivity of current policy analyses in Zambia should strengthen the use of evidence to inform policy processes in the country. In addition, there is need to strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems of progress towards achieving agricultural development goals and to make resources available to support policy implementation.

While it is generally accepted that climate change will exacerbate poverty for small and medium sized farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the coming years, at least due to rising variability and rainfall shocks (Mulenga, Wineman, and Sitko 2017; Hallegatte et al. 2016), a number of questions remain unanswered. Which types of the poor are more exposed to climate risk and how do the impacts of climate and weather shocks vary across stochastically and structurally poor households? Addressing these questions is crucial for improved targeting of interventions intended to build the resilience of smallholder farmers. Smallholder farmers’ reliance almost entirely on rain-fed agriculture and their limited capacity to cope with weather shocks exposes them to climate risks. Weather shocks negatively impact smallholders through their effects on agricultural productivity, which is the mainstay of rural smallholder households. If left unchecked, weather shocks can lead to increased poverty incidence and intensity. In this paper, we utilize data from a nationally representative two-wave panel of recent agricultural household surveys to conduct a high resolution analysis of the spatial distribution of poverty, and how the different types of poverty are impacted by exposure to climate change variability. The data allows us to (a) control for observed and unobserved sources of household heterogeneity, and (b) distinguish between the structurally poor, i.e., those households that have very little assets or savings, and the stochastically poor, i.e., those households that have low savings but enough assets that they could liquidate if necessary to smooth consumption during a climate shock Out of the 14,508 rural households interviewed in Zambia in 2012 and 2015, about 51% were structurally poor (low income and assets) and 5% were stochastically poor (low income and high assets). About 23% of households that were structurally poor in 2012 remained structurally poor in 2015, hence, chronically poor. A third of the structurally not poor in 2012 fell into poverty in 2015, while about 19% of poor households in 2012 managed to escape poverty in 2015. Structurally poor households in Zambia are more exposed to drought risk. Lower than normal rainfall, as measured by a negative precipitation index, significantly increases the probability of being structurally poor by 2.3 percentage points. Three implications follow from our findings. First, there is a need for well-structured and targeted social promotion programs to lift the viable but chronically and structurally poor and stochastically poor households from poverty. This can be achieved within the agricultural sector by using the electronic voucher delivery systems to better target large-scale, anti-poverty programs such as the farmer input support program. Along with improved targeting, the use of the electronic based voucher systems crowds-in private sector investments, which make available diverse inputs for farmers and also help develop the rural nonfarm sector where farmers can earn extra incomes. Smart-subsidies should be flanked by output market linkages and/or market development in order to enhance market participation and help improve incomes from agricultural production. Second, for those not commercially viable, there is a need for a better targeted and sustained social welfare program specifically meant for this group. Thus there is need for sustained social protection (e.g., social cash transfers) in order to prevent the non-poor from falling into poverty. And lastly, the intricate linkages among climate variability, climate risk, and poverty call for more support to enable farmers not only adapt to, but also mitigate climate change and variability. Such support may be v directed towards climate-smart agriculture adoption, autonomous and planned adaptation, improved extension, and climate information services.

Conservation Agriculture (CA) aims to concurrently promote agricultural productivity, climate resilience and other environmental objectives related to sustainability. The evidence base for CA and other practices of climate-smart agriculture (CSA) in Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming better established. We review this evidence to address whether CA meets CSA objectives and why adoption rates by smallholders remain generally very low. As part of the review, we develop hypotheses for expected CA adoption under different socioeconomic and agro-ecological conditions, and consider promising options for enabling CA to better contribute to the CSA objectives. Our results are largely in agreement with the nascent literature where CA is found to contribute positively to CSA productivity and adaptation/resilience objectives, although the degree of success varies considerably by regional, farm and household characteristics. The evidence is equivocal on the potential for CA to enhance soil carbon sequestration and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Overall, we find that capital-intensive (mechanized) CA is more likely to be adopted in areas of economic dynamism where capital is cheap relative to labor. Labor-intensive CA practices are more likely to be adopted in regions of economic stagnation where capital is expensive and labor is abundant and cheap. The climate-smartness of CA can be enhanced in a number of ways: reframing and adapting CA to location-specific economic and biophysical conditions, integrating CA with other CSA practices such as agroforestry, and by increasing the use of complementary productivityenhancing inputs such as inorganic fertilizers and organic manure. Other options to make CA climate-smart include conditional subsidies, market and value chain development to improve farmers’ access to CSA-promoting inputs, linking CA to payments for environmental service schemes (e.g., carbon credits), greater and more effective public spending on research and development to build evidence on the adaptation and mitigation potential of CA, and an improved enabling policy environment for private investment in input and farm commodity markets.

A proper understanding of the risks faced by the agricultural sector and effective strategies to manage those risks is vital to creating a diversified and resilient economy for sustained growth and economic transformation. Increasing Agricultural Resilience through Better Risk Management in Zambia provides a rigorous analysis of the production, marketing, and enabling environment risks faced by Zambia’s agricultural sector and prioritizes solutions to manage the risks. In terms of the severity and frequency of adverse impacts, the analysis shows that droughts, floods, price volatilities, and trade restrictions are the principal risks affecting agriculture in the country. Exposure to the consequences of these and other risks can be effectively limited through risk management systems tailored to the country’s context. Three areas of risk management are found to warrant priority, with significant potential for synergizing actions undertaken across them: Strengthen early warning system to detect threats to food security; Develop climate-smart agriculture and increase resilience to climate-related shocks through diversification; and Develop the Zambian Commodity Exchange (ZAMACE) and build a shock-responsive safety net.

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Rapid population growth, urbanization, and income growth are triggering increased demand for high-value agricultural products across Southern Africa with scope for gains from trade and regional integration. We analyse the animal feed to poultry value chain in Zambia focusing on the industry capabilities with a view to enhancing its competitiveness and production for the regional market. The industry has exhibited rapid growth with investments, which has increased competition to consumers' benefit. However, challenges remain if it is to contribute to the regional market; animal feed input production and productivity remain low despite improvements. Similarly, produced poultry is in low quantities. Consequently, there is limited export of products due to higher prices. Enhancing value chain capabilities will require technology investments and public expenditure allocations that enhance productivity and production of animal feed inputs, and limited government intervention in maize marketing and trade which adversely impacts on maize prices.

Successive Zambian governments have committed to coordinated, all-inclusive developing planning to assure food and nutrition security and reduce poverty. Despite these efforts, questions remain around policy coherence and consistency in the agricultural sector and this—it is argued—is likely to crowd out private sector investment and engagement in the sector. This paper addresses several questions around the policy processes space in Zambia. What drives policy change? How does it happen? What accounts for the policy reversals or failure to fully adopt agreed upon policy changes?

A lack of electricity has devastating consequences for any economy. Since early 2015, Zambia experienced a 2,100 gigawatt-hours (GWh) power deficit triggering countrywide power rationing. We assess the impact of power rationing on Zambia’s agricultural sector, and the costs to firms operating in the agricultural sector. Our analysis reveals economy-wide losses amounting to ZMW 32,496,100,813 (representing 18.8% of the GDP). Losses to the agricultural sector are estimated at ZMW 2,827,160,771 (representing 1.6% of the GDP), and are likely to stifle future economic growth.

Conservation Agriculture (CA) has been actively promoted actively since the early 1990s among Zambian smallholder farmers as a practice that helps improve crop productivity, improve soil fertility, and mitigate against low and/or variable rainfall. However, nationwide survey data show that adoption rates by Zambian smallholder farmers have remained low, while dis-adoption is widespread despite years of promotion. Several empirical studies have investigated the determinants of adoption, dis-adoption, and non-adoption of CA with the focus being on human capital assets, farm assets, institutional factors, risks and economic factors, and climatic conditions.

The successive maize bumper harvests experienced by Zambia in recent years mean that the country has to find long lasting and sustainable ways to deal with persistent maize marketing challenges facing the smallholder farmers. The government has continued to struggle with the price-dilemma where they would like to keep the price of maize grain high for the maize producers, while at the same time try to maintain low mealie-meal prices for the consumers. In the process, the government has continued to alienate the private sector, which if promoted would help broaden the market for maize and save the national treasury millions of the Kwacha Rebased (K).

This paper examines the career trajectories of 66 distinguished African agricultural professionals. Based on in-depth qualitative interviews, the paper explores the answers to two critical questions: How can Africa motivate its youth to consider careers in agriculture and agribusiness? How can agricultural education and training (AET) institutions better prepare youth for productive careers in agribusiness?

This study assesses whether the recent public and private efforts to improve farmers’ access to mechanical power in Ghana have had the intended effects on the country’s agricultural sector. Using panel survey data, this paper analyses the drivers of farm mechanization and its net impacts on cropland expansion and farming system intensification in northern Ghana. Several factors explain the use and use intensity of agricultural mechanization, including landholding size, total labor and fertilizer use per hectare, chemical use, and amount of land left fallow. More importantly, the results suggest that farm mechanization did have a positive impact on cropland expansion during the survey period. The results presented here support the existence of a labor substitution effect resulting from tractor use.

This paper was written to help bolster the case and present visual evidence demonstrating why it is important to seriously consider spatial soil fertility variability in Ghana and to promote area-specific fertilizer recommendations. Using geostatistical analysis of soil samples collected from farmer plots in three districts (Tamale Municipality, Savelugu-Nanton, and West Mamprusi in northern Ghana), the paper analyzes spatial variations in soil fertility. The results clearly show that there are variations in soil pH, organic matter content, and available phosphorous even at the community level, supporting the need for Ghana to seriously consider location-specific fertilizer recommendations.

This study uses longitudinal household data collected in 2001, 2004, and 2008 to identify factors that influence Zambian smallholder farmers' participation in livestock markets. Although livestock ownership increased during the study period, not all provinces experienced the upward trend. While livestock populations increased in Southern and Central Provinces, they remained stagnant in Eastern, North western and Lusaka Provinces and reduced in Western Province. Not only has herd size remained stagnant over the years, but the level of participation of smallholder farmers in the livestock markets has also remained largely the same. Crop commercialization and participation in off-farm activities reduces the likelihood of participation in cattle markets but not in the markets for small livestock.

Although a majority of Zambians work in agriculture, only a small minority of smallholders succeed in transitioning to high-productivity, high-value commercial agriculture. Only 20% of cotton farmers and less than 5% of maize and horticulture farmers succeed as top-tier commercial growers (Table 1). By tracing the long-term agricultural trajectories of successful commercial cotton, maize and horticulture farmers, this study identifies two broad agricultural pathways out of poverty. The low road, exemplified by cotton production, involves a two-generation transition via low-value but with well-structured markets. The more restrictive high road, epitomized by horticulture production, offers a steeper ascent, enabling prosperity within a single generation, but requires commensurately higher levels of financing, management and risk. Personal characteristics that define successful commercial smallholders include: • strict discipline; • treatment of farming as a business; • good management of crop production, labor and finances; • a strong propensity to save; and • willingness to invest in their children’s education. Key institutions affecting smallholder performance include: • management and marketing support provided by the cotton companies to their contract farmers; • land allocation systems, particularly those permitting land consolidation in communal areas and smallholder transitions to farm blocks in state lands; • savings systems (both financial and livestock-based) that permit successful smallholders to rebound from period shocks.