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We study Asynchronous Dynamic games and show that in games with a finite state space and finite action sets, one can obtain the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium by using a simple backward induction method when the time period for the game is finite. The equilibrium strategies for games with an infinite horizon are then obtained as the point-wise limit of the equilibrium strategies of a sequence of finite horizon games, where the finite horizon games are truncated versions of the original game with successively longer time periods. We also show that if the game has a fixed K-period cycle, then there is a stationary Markov equilibrium. Using these results, we derive an algorithm to compute the equilibrium strategies. We test the algorithm in three experiments. The first is a two-player asynchronous game with three states and three actions. In the second experiment, we compute the equilibrium of a cybersecurity game in which there are two players, an attacker and a defender. In the third experiment, we compute the stationary equilibrium of a duopoly game with two firms that choose an output in alternate periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An examination of game theory through the use of stochastic games with numerous players is provided.

Non-cooperative tax policies imposed by independent jurisdictions in a chain of markets result to a decrease in trade volume, assuming that the different organizations set taxes at levels that maximizes their net revenues. A similar level of revenue and increased trade volume, however, could be achieved by monopolization of the chain of markets and sharing of revenues.

A dynamic model for characterizing capital accumulation in an 'infinite horizon setting' is developed to show the feasibility of a nonmonetary trust mechanism via the trading of commodities. Specifically, it demonstrates that recursive core allocations can occur provided that 'no coalition of agents will break the initial core contract' for the distributed capital stocks. As such, the model addresses questions related to trust and time inconsistency of intertemporal contracts.

The presence of Markov perfect equilibrium was demonstrated in stochastic games which feature a state space that is a complete separable metric space and action spaces which are compact metric spaces. These stochastic games have transition probabilities that are Markovian and product measurable. If the transition probability is weak-continuous in actions made the previous day, a Markov perfect equilibrium strategy can be found for finite horizon games. A similar equilibrium is also present in infinite horizon games if the transition probability in every period is v(sub t)-continuous, rely only on the immediate past and is norm continuous in the last period.

We study the association between the minimum wage and food establishment hygiene violations between Seattle (the treated city) and Bellevue (the control city), both cities located in King County and sharing the same health inspection department. An increase in the real minimum wage of $0.25 is associated with an increase of at least 8% in total and less severe (blue) hygiene violation scores for food establishments in Seattle. We find mixed support for the increase in more severe (red) violations. A decline in employment with an increase in minimum wage could be driving the increases in hygiene violations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]