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In this research, we examine the relationship between power and three characteristics of construal-abstraction, valence, and certainty-in individuals' verbatim reactions to the events of September 11, 2001, and during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks. We conceptualize power as a form of social distance and find that position power (but not expert power) was positively associated with the use of language that was more abstract (vs. concrete), positive (vs. negative), and certain (vs. uncertain). These effects persist after controlling for temporal distance, geographic distance, and impression management motivation. Our results support central and corollary predictions of Construal Level Theory (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003) in a high-consequence, real-world context, and our method provides a template for future research in this area outside of the laboratory.

Attitude theory has long proposed a mechanism through which antecedents of message elaboration produce attitude strength consequences. However, little direct evidence exists for the intervening process. The proposed thoughtfulness heuristic holds that perceiving that more thought has taken place leads to greater attitude certainty. Two roles were established for this heuristic: first as a mediator of the impact of antecedents of elaboration on attitude certainty and second as a way to influence attitude certainty independent of actual elaboration. In Studies 1 and 2, antecedents of elaboration (need for cognition, distraction) impacted attitude certainty because they impacted the actual amount of processing, which in turn affected perceptions of the amount of processing. In Studies 3 and 4, a manipulation of perceived thought impacted certainty independent of actual thought (i.e., after thinking had already occurred). Furthermore, the thoughtfulness heuristic was shown to influence behavioral intentions, establishing perceived amount of processing as both a mediator and an independent cause of attitude strength consequences. Keywords: heuristics, elaboration, attitude strength, certainty, persuasion

The 'certainty effect' (1,2) is a notable violation of expected utility theory by decision makers (3-6). It shows that people's tendency to select the safer of two prospects increases when [...]

The certainty of the present is a critical component in accounting for diminishing impatience. The modeling of diminishing impatience should use preferences that can be represented by a non-expected utility function.

In multiperiod control problems, one needs to sequentially choose the value of a set of multiple input variables, [x.sub.n], to keep the value of a single output variable, [y.sub.n], close [...]

Three studies investigated potential age-related differences in the reliance of healthy young and older adults on trace-access and inferential mechanisms in making feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments. In Experiment 1 young and older adults attempted to retrieve referents of rare-word definitions presented in a self-paced questionnaire. Recall failures were followed by FOK ratings and a report of partial knowledge of referent characteristics. Gamma coefficients revealed age equivalence in FOK accuracy, and the number of recall attempts and FOK ratings did not vary by age. Older adults reported fewer partial characteristics and made more commission errors, which suggests reliance on inferential mechanisms in addition to direct recall of target information. Experiments 2 and 3 examined age-related differences in reliance on trace-access or inferential processes via the influence of type of information primed prior to speeded recall attempt. Contrary to hypothesis, the influence of prime type did not vary by age. Reliance on trace-access and inferential mechanisms of FOK does not appear to vary by age. Individuals can be forced to rely on trace-access mechanisms for speeded FOK judgments.

Although we endorse the primacy of uncertainty in reasoning, we argue that a probabilistic framework cannot model the fundamental skill of proof administration. Furthermore, we are skeptical about the assumption that standard probability calculus is the appropriate formalism to represent human uncertainty. There are other models up to this task, so let us not repeat the excesses of the past.

The issue we want to resolve is whether or not the independence axiom of Savage (1954) is systematically violated by subjects in an Allais Paradox type of choice situation. The results of an experiment involving the Allais Paradox is presented. As with all Allais Paradox experiments the subjects were presented with choices involving hypothetical outcomes. It is concluded that the fault is not in utility theory but rather in the ability of research subjects to analyze complex probability problems without assistance, and that the framing of the problem heavily influences choices. Just as we are susceptible to optical illusions we are also susceptible to mental illusions. Once can obtain a wide range of outcomes using the the Allais Paradox depending on how the choices are framed.