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I INTRODUCTION In the decisions of Calver v Accident Compensation Corporation, the Courts have held that mesothelioma (a form of cancer contracted from the inhalation of asbestos fibres) constitutes a [...], This article examines the judgments of Calver v Accident Compensation Corporation and its appeal in the light of the legislative history behind New Zealand's accident compensation scheme. It posits that the Calver judgments reflect an ongoing principle of generous and expansive interpretation, which can be tracked through the case law in this area, and that an overriding principle of generosity does not fully accord with the legislative history. That history has involved intentional redrafting to curtail overly expansive judicial approaches, and legislative development in this area has been relatively stagnant in recent decades. Alternative approaches for interpreting the scheme are discussed. A more comprehensive set of principles for interpretation of accident compensation cases would make this area more predictable and better explain the outcomes of cases where the boundaries appear to be widened. It does not seem convincing, in light of the full history, to simply suggest that outcomes should reflect the Woodhouse vision. Credence should be paid to real policy issues, which have so far prevented a fully comprehensive scheme from being developed.

I. INTRODUCTION Who says the holiday spirit ever goes out of season? It is beginning to look a lot like Christmas year-round on many doorsteps as packages from online retailers [...]

Abstract Work-related psychiatric injury claims are frequent and costly. Workplace psychosocial hazards increase the risk of prolonged workplace stress, which can lead to physical and psychological injury. This article considers [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 145 I. SCIENCE AND LAW OF VARIANT RECLASSIFICATION 150 A. Scientific Background 150 1. Reclassification 150 2. Harms 157 B. Legal Background 162 1. Duties 162 [...], Most of our genetic information does not change, yet the results of our genetic tests might. Labs reclassify genetic variants in response to advances in genetic science. As a result, a person who took a test in 2010 could take the same test with the same lab in 2020 and get a different result. However, no legal duty requires labs or physicians to inform patients when a lab reclassifies a variant, even if the reclassification communicates clinically actionable information. This Article considers the need for such duties and their potential challenges. In so doing, it offers much-needed guidance to physicians and labs, who may face liability, and to courts, which will hear these cases.

I INTRODUCTION In 2017, the New Zealand Supreme Court in Scott v Williams considered s 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) for the first time. (1) All five [...], Scott v Williams concerned s 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. In situations of significant economic disparity post-separation, s 15 empowers courts to depart from the default rule of equal division of relationship property to compensate the disadvantaged partner. Causation is one of the jurisdictional hurdles. Only disparity "because of the division of functions (DOF) is compensable. Thus far, courts have adopted a strict causation approach by placing a costly and often unattainable evidential burden on claimants. Consequently, compensation has been beyond reach for deserving claimants. Responding to this disquiet, Scott's majority propounded a "working assumption" of causation in relationships conducted along traditional lines, where one party assumes primary responsibility for domestic duties and the other for income-earning. In such situations, scott's majority would assume causation at jurisdiction and attribute the entire disparity to the DOF when determining the quantum award. This article concludes that the working assumption is a positive development in terms of jurisdiction. However, unlike the majority, it argues that striking the correct balance between s 15's "because of wording and broad policy rationale requires an apportionment of causes at quantum. Furthermore, Scott's "traditional lines" and "non-career partner" terminology creates unnecessary confusion and should be eschewed.

Abstract: Until fairly recently, the narrative regarding employment retaliation plaintiffs has been that the federal courts--and the Supreme Court in particular--are generally sympathetic to employees claiming illegal workplace retaliation. This [...]

In data breach cases, the plaintiff typically alleges that the defendant used inadequate computer security to protect the plaintiffs personal data. In most, but not all cases, the plaintiff cannot [...]

3. Amgen: Materiality Need Not Be Proved at Class Certification Before Basic Is Invoked In between Halliburton I and Halliburton II, defendants argued that plaintiffs must prove materiality at the [...]

ABSTRACT Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role in the policing of securities fraud and the protection of securities markets. The theoretical understanding of these private enforcement claims [...]

Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). I. INTRODUCTION "There is nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or [...]

Abstract In light of previous inquiries identifying areas of concern in Australia's privacy law provisions, the Australian Law Reform Commission ('ALRC') recently devised a new tort that, if implemented, would [...]

Waiver of tort is an archaic legal doctrine through which a plaintiff can choose to relinquish the right to compensation for damages and instead receive disgorgement of the defendant's wrongful [...]

I. INTRODUCTION II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINES III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION THAT WEC FAILED TO ESTABLISH CAUSATION WAS INCORRECT A. The Ninth Circuit Misinterpreted "Special Solicitude" B. The [...], The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's recent decision in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon dealt a heavy blow to the ability of private parties to establish standing based on climate change-related injuries. Specifically, the decision established a 'particularly daunting' bar for such parties to demonstrate the causation prong of traditional Article III standing. First, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's preeminent climate change decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, on grounds that private parties were not entitled to 'special solicitude. ' Second, the Ninth Circuit implied that as a result, private parties were not able to demonstrate causation based on a theory of contribution. Third, the Ninth Circuit held that even if private parties were entitled to rely on contribution, they would have to demonstrate a 'meaningful contribution' to global greenhouse gas concentrations, which the Ninth Circuit implied was equal to six percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. The collective impact of these interpretations led Circuit Judge Gould, writing in dissent from the Ninth Circuit's order denying rehearing en banc, to conclude that the effect o/Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon is to effectively shut the door on the use of citizen suits to address climate change. This Chapter argues that the Ninth Circuit's basis for these three conclusions was unfounded, and therefore concludes that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the element of causation. Moving forward, however, this Chapter notes that Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon will pose a difficult barrier for parties of all types to establish causation based on climate change-related injuries.

ABSTRACT Many commentators credit the Supreme Court's decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, which allowed courts to presume reliance rather than requiring individualized proof, with spawning a vast industry of [...]

I. INTRODUCTION In the realm of medicine, which is inherently defined by uncertainty, telesurgery is particularly ambiguous. Telesurgery poses numerous questions about responsibility. Who should be held responsible if this [...]

INTRODUCTION Given the heated debate currently surrounding hydraulic fracturing, one might never guess that oil and gas developers have safely used the technique since before The Beatles' first American tour [...]

ARTICLE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE ALIGNMENT PRINCIPLE II. LOST INCOME A. The Misalignment B. Efficiency C. Non-Efficiency Considerations III. PROVING CAUSATION A. The Misalignment B. Efficiency C. Non-Efficiency Considerations IV. [...], In negligence law, the risks taken into account by courts when setting the standard of care are the same risks considered when imposing liability and awarding damages. I call this the 'alignment principle.' One objective of this Article is to expose exceptions to the alignment principle, which I call 'misalignments.' In cases of misalignment, the risks that are accounted for in setting the standard of care are different from the risks for which liability is imposed and damages are awarded. A second objective of this Article is to suggest modifications to the law when misalignments cannot be justified. The most important objective of this Article, however, is to offer a theory of how to evaluate and contend with misalignments. Five cases of misalignment are identified and discussed in the Article. The first case illustrates how courts set the standard of care independently of the victim's level of income, but award different amounts of damages to high- and low-income victims. The second case represents instances in which causation is inherently hard to prove. In such cases, courts set the standard of care according to the expected harm, but traditionally allow no compensation when the plaintiff suffers harm but cannot prove that it was caused by the defendant's negligence. In the third case, courts account for both risks increased and decreased by the injurer when setting the standard of care, but ignore the decreased risks when awarding damages. In the fourth case, courts set the standard of care by taking into account both ordinary and unusual risks, but often refuse to impose liability for harms that materialized from the ordinary risks. Finally, in the fifth case, courts set the standard of care by considering the risks the injurer created for others, but not the risks he created for himself, even though the negligent injurer bears harms that materialized from both the risks to others and the risks to self. In all five cases, the goals of tort law would be better served by removing misalignments and equally accounting for risks both in setting the standard of care and awarding damages.

I. INTRODUCTION II. CLIMATE CHANGE AS THE ANTI-TORT A. Duty/Proximate Cause B. Breach C. Causation D. Harm III. CLIMATE CHANGE AS TORT REFORM A. Duty/Proximate Cause B. Breach C. Causation [...], To date, scholars exploring the connection between climate change and tort law have tended to ask what the latter can do about the former. With a few notable exceptions, they have answered, 'Not much.' This Article first reviews a series of doctrinal hurdles facing climate change plaintiffs and concludes that the pessimism of legal scholars is justified. The Article then poses an inverse and previously unexplored question: what can climate change do about tort law? As it turns out, the answer is, 'Quite a bit. 'By forcing courts to confront questions of harm, causation, and responsibility that lie at the frontiers of science and ethics, climate change lawsuits hold potential to move the bar for what counts as exotic in the domain of tort. Radical though it may seem, such a recalibration should be welcomed: just as the administrative state is being forced to adapt to grapple with the global, complex, uncertain, and potentially catastrophic nature of twenty-first century threats to social welfare, the tort system also must shift in order to serve its role as the administrative state's traditional and necessary backdrop. Not only the climate is changing.