Search

In 2011, Portugal was one of the countries that were most dramatically hit by the emerging Eurozone crisis. As its cost of borrowing rose dramatically, the country faced both a political and an economic crisis, resulting in the fall of the government and in requesting a bailout. This bailout was conditional on Portugal undertaking public spending cuts and structural reforms across numerous sectors. In this chapter we show that, during this period, the Portuguese government had some room for manoeuvre to advocate for new policies, and to resist, shape or roll back some of the policies demanded by external actors. We also provide some examples of times when domestic actors were able to exploit the constraint of conditionality to their own advantage. The chapter concludes by looking at what happened after the bailout and showing that Portuguese governments could use their discretion to reverse measures in order to attain the greatest benefits at a lower cost.

In this article, we argue that the Costa I Socialist government (2015–2019) managed to combine responsiveness to voters with responsibility towards domestic and international actors by pursuing some kind of ‘austerity by stealth’, which we define as less visible fiscal contraction that is not displayed by the government in its public discourse. The radical left parties implicitly agreed with this strategy in exchange for the adoption of a long list of visible anti-austerity policies. This allowed the Costa I government to fulfil its electoral pledges and maintain the support of the radical left on the one hand, whilst also reducing the country’s deficit and consequently the costs of interest-debt repayments.

This article aims to identify the resilience of measures adopted during bailout programmes, and the conditions under which decisions-makers reverse them. Focusing on Spain and Portugal (201...

This article proposes a framework to understand and explain the occurrence of policy reversals. We argue that the occurrence and absence of policy reversals is shaped by the constraints of responsiveness (to voters) and responsibility (vis-à-vis creditors, international institutions and financial markets). We review the literature on reversals and their implications for Southern Europe. We finally summarise the main findings of the contributions in the volume, that address when and why governments prioritise responsiveness or responsibility, as well as the economic consequences of these choices.

The publication pattern of EPSR confirms the findings of established scholarship on gender and publishing; women publish less than men (roughly, 30% to 70%). This gap reflects a previous submission gap; i.e., men submit even much more than women do. EPSR editorial process does not show signs of discrimination: single or leading female authors have significantly lower desk rejection rates than their male counterparts in similar configurations. Women though, are underrepresented as peer reviewers and EPSR has taken measures to redress this situation. Looking at women authors perceptions, findings (that cannot be considered representative), are consistent with existing scholarship. Women authors perceive themselves as more perfectionist and more risk adverse, they also perceive that they can dedicate less time to research, and they express mistrust in the blind review process. As a general conclusion, whilst reversing the gender gap requires structural action beyond and before the editorial process, journal editors must consider forms to secure more extensive women inclusion in publications.

This article analyses the margin of manoeuvre of Portuguese executives after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010–2015. To obtain a full understanding of what happened behind the closed doors of international meetings, different types of data are triangulated: face-to-face interviews; investigations by journalists; and International Monetary Fund and European Union official documents. The findings are compared to the public discourse of Prime Ministers Jose Socrates and Pedro Passos-Coelho. It is shown that while the sovereign debt crisis and the bail-out limited the executive's autonomy, they also made them stronger in relation to other domestic actors. The perceived need for ‘credibility’ in order to avoid a ‘negative’ reaction from the markets – later associated with the conditions of the bail-out – concurrently gave the executives a legitimate justification to concentrate power in their hands and a strong argument to counter the opponents of their proposed reforms. Consequently, when Portuguese ministers favoured policies that were in congruence with those supported by international actors, they were able to use the crisis to advance their own agenda. Disagreement with Troika representatives implied the start of a negotiation process between the ministers and international lenders, the final outcome of which depended on the actors’ bargaining powers. These strategies, it is argued, constitute a tactic of depoliticisation in which both the material constraints and the discourse used to frame them are employed to construct imperatives around a narrow selection of policy alternatives.

This chapter examines the driving forces of the EP’s formal and informal institutional power gains in the EU’s legislative process. Over a period of around fifty years, the institutional rule went from giving the EP a merely consultative role in the legislative procedure to establishing it as a coequal legislator with the Council of Ministers under the ordinary legislative procedure. We assess the extent to which this development was accelerated by the EP itself and analyse which of its strategies succeeded or failed in widening the EP’s powers. The strategies of unilateral action, arena-linking and alliance are found to be most important in bringing about this outcome.

This chapter analyses the EP’s success and failure in empowering itself in the budgetary process. The EP’s prerogatives in the budgetary process have increased significantly since the creation of the European Economic Community. However, this empowerment has been mostly informal and irregular: treaty provisions kept intact for more than thirty years, and even today the EP has no say in revenues. Covering positive and negative cases in the budgetary process in this chapter, we assess the extent to which bargaining strategies have helped the EP to gain powers in this area of EU decision-making. The analysis of the budgetary process shows that, during the first decade of the European Economic Community, the member states’ concerns to ‘compensate’ for the national parliaments’ lack of control over the new direct expenditures had been the driver of EP empowerment in the budgetary process. Once the EP obtained leverage to strategically use a delaying, sanctioning or arena-linking strategy, it successfully did so to obtain more formal competences in the procedure.

This chapter examines the EP’s informal empowerment in the highly politicized area of EU trade agreements. In trade policy, the Lisbon Treaty granted the EP a major new right of ratification of international agreements falling under the common commercial policy. We analyse how the EP managed to significantly widen its powers beyond the final approval of trade agreements to an informal involvement in the shaping of these agreements. As this chapter shows, the EP used the strategies of sanctioning, delaying and unilateral action in order to obtain new informal institutional powers that went further than the Lisbon Treaty.

This book analyses the European Parliament’s strategies of self-empowerment over time stretching across cases of new institutional prerogatives as well as substantive policy areas. It considers why and how the Parliament has managed to gain formal and informal powers in this wide variety of cases. The book provides a systematic and comparative analysis of the European Parliament’s formal and informal empowerment in two broad sets of cases: on the one hand, it examines the EP’s empowerment since the Treaty of Rome in three areas that are characteristic of parliamentary democracies, namely legislation, the budget, and the investiture of the executive. On the other hand, it analyses the European Parliament’s role in highly politicised policy areas, namely Economic and Monetary Governance and the shaping of EU trade agreements. -- Front Matter -- Introduction -- Theory and Expectations Front Matter Theoretical Argument and Expectations Methodology and Case Selection -- The European Parliament’s Institutional Empowerment Front Matter The European Parliament in Legislation The European Parliament in the Nomination and Investiture of the Commission -- The European Parliament in Substantive Policy Areas Front Matter The European Parliament in Economic Governance The European Parliament in External Agreements -- Comparison and Conclusion Front Matter -- Conclusion: European Parliament Ascendant? -- Back Matter

In this chapter, we examine why and how the EP managed to expand its powers in the nomination and investiture of the European Commission from zero at the outset of European integration to a quasi-election of the Commission President using the Spitzenkandidaten procedure in 2014. This chapter provides evidence that the EP has been using a multitude of strategies to increase its rights in this area. Notably, the EP very successfully applied the strategies of unilateral action, an alliance with the Commission and national parliaments as well as an arena-linkage strategy to introduce informal institutional change in its favour. These were subsequently formalised in treaty changes, as the EP formed alliances with some member states.

In this chapter, we investigate the EP’s institutional role in economic governance during the Eurozone crisis and its aftermath. The Lisbon Treaty restricts the EP’s right to co-legislation in economic governance primarily to the area of multilateral surveillance. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, coincided with the onset of the Eurozone crisis. Hence, we examine the extent to which the EP has been able to increase its own power in the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union. Further, we analyse under which conditions the EP succeeded and failed in expanding its powers beyond the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. We found that—contrary to conventional wisdom—the EP obtained some (in)formal institutional changes to its benefit. It did so by employing a multitude of strategies such as arena-linking or inventing and implementing new rules unilaterally (‘moving first’). However, whenever the EP’s institutional demands affected core state powers, for instance national budgetary control in the case of member state bailouts, its strategies failed.

This chapter serves to explain how we assess our theoretical expectations empirically by relying on the congruence method in combination with process-tracing. Further, it specifies our methods of data collection. Moreover, we explain the book’s case selection rationale covering the EP’s institutional empowerment (or lack of it) over time and across policies. Hence, in order to corroborate or falsify our propositions, European Parliament Ascendant includes positive cases of empowerment where the EP succeeded in achieving new institutional rights and negative ones in which it failed.

This chapter develops the book’s theoretical argument and expectations for which we draw on rational choice institutionalism as well as sociological institutionalism. First, in Chapter 2.1, we identify reasons for the EP’s empowerment based on rationalist bargaining theories of institutional change. We assume that actors such as the EP seek to maximise their institutional powers through the use of strategies. Chapter 2.1 develops a list of strategies and theorises the conditions of their success and failure. These strategies encompass delaying, issue- and arena-linkage, alliance-building, ‘moving first’ and sanctioning. Second, Chapter 2.2 develops a theoretical argument for the EP’s self-empowerment based on norm-based explanations which complements our rationalist bargaining perspective. Norm-based explanations hold that the belief in the EU as a democratic polity helps to explain institutional change to the benefit of the EP. In Chapter 2.2, we identify three mechanisms based on this approach: the logic of appropriateness, communicative action and rhetorical action. Relying on these three mechanisms, we develop a set of strategies of EP empowerment and theorise their conditions of success and failure. These strategies are providing expertise, shaming, and mobilising external actors or public opinion.

In this chapter, we summarise and review the most important findings of the empirical case studies. We crystallise how in all of these cases the EP had considerable success in expanding its formal and informal powers by using its strategies skilfully. Furthermore, we systematically compare which strategies the EP used to widen its powers; how this varies between cases; and what accounts for this variation. Moreover, we explain why we observe variation in the degrees of formal or informal empowerment between cases of substantive policy areas. Based on our findings, this chapter reflects on the strengths and limitations of our theoretical argument, and we reflect on three counterforces to the EP’s self-empowerment: intergovernmentalism, over-constitutionalisation and agencification. Finally, we discuss the consequences of the EP’s successful self-empowerment. Despite existing counterforces, we argue that, by using certain strategies, the EP has been pushing the EU in the direction of parliamentary democracy. While we cannot see a fully fledged EU-wide parliamentary democracy any time soon, we contend that the EP has, on its own account and cooperating with actors with similar preferences, made significant progress in that direction.

In an age of rampant distrust and disaffection, pledge fulfilment is important for the quality of delegation between voters and elected officials. In this article, we make an empirical appraisal of pledge fulfilment in Portugal. Do Portuguese minority governments fulfil their pledges? How do they fulfil those pledges? What is the role of opposition parties? Using an original data set with over 3,000 electoral pledges for three Socialist governments, as well as interviews with former ministers and party leaders, our evidence suggests that: (1) minority governments fulfil at least as many pledges as their majority counterparts; (2) the main opposition party manages to extract the most policy benefits; and (3) economic conditions and cohabitation situations matter for pledge fulfilment.

Are political parties willing to partially forgo their office and policy goals to maximize their coalition governance capacities? Multiparty governments are plagued with preference heterogeneity and uncertainty about policy outcomes. In this article, we argue that parties choose to make a strategic allocation of portfolios to curb delegation perils. They use portfolios with jurisdiction overlaps to shadow each other at the ministerial level. We define a wary partners’ situation when different parties control the portfolios that form a jurisdiction combination. We test this hypothesis for 12 West European parliamentary democracies since 1945. Our contribution conjugates a Monte Carlo simulation, which estimates whether real-world distribution differs significantly from expected allocation under nonstrategic behavior, with in-depth interviews with more than 40 former ministers. Results show that wary partners are used extensively as coalition governance mechanisms, particularly because of their capacity to curb information asymmetries and to avoid interministerial gridlock.

UID/CPO/04627/2013 Made available in DSpace on 2019-03-19T23:23:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2018 publishersversion published

Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during previous election campaigns? This study provides the first comparative analysis that addresses this question with common definitions of pledges and fulfillment. We study the fulfillment of 18,743 pledges made in 54 election campaigns in 12 countries. We find high levels of pledge fulfillment for most parties that enter the government executive, and substantially lower levels for parties that do not. The findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers. The degree to which governing parties share power affects pledge fulfillment, with parties in single-party executives, both with and without legislative majorities, having the highest fulfillment rates. Within coalition governments, the likelihood of pledge fulfillment depends on whether the party receives the chief executive post and whether another governing party made a similar pledge, but not on the ideological range of the coalition.

Since the onset of the economic crisis, parties in parliament (especially those in opposi-tion) have found themselves faced with a dilemma: choosing between the need to cooperatewith the government in order to overcome the crisis and the opportunity provided by aweakened government to stress their adversarial position so as to be more easily re-elected and possibly get into power. What have they decided to do? The present contri-bution introduces a collection of works exploring this dilemma in southern Europeancountries, by examining the opposition behaviour in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain;and in the European Parliament.

Contributions to this study clearly support our initial hypotheses. It is observed, as expected, that the economic crisis has considerably decreased consensual behaviour in parliament. However, the nature of parties constitutes a crucial variable in order to explain the conduct of the opposition in the legislative arena better: since the outbreak of the crisis, radical parties have turned even more adversarial than before; whereas mainstream parties – who want to appear as a credible alternative to the government in office – have drifted towards more cooperative behaviour. Given the growing influence of the European Union on the legislation approved in response to the crisis, it was also expected (and demonstrated) that the traditionally pro-European parties would be more likely to cooperate on socio-economic issues than Eurosceptic parties. Finally, it has also been shown that timing also plays an important role in the opposition's decision either to support or to oppose the government: with opposition parties more inclined to contest the government's proposals when their chances of getting into power are higher, and vice versa.

En avril 2011 un gouvernement socialiste interimaire fit appel aux bailleurs de fonds internationaux (la soi-disant Troika : la BCE, la Commission europeenne et le FMI) pour renflouer le Portugal. A la suite d’elections legislatives, une coalition de centre-droit commenca a mettre en œuvre, a la demande semble-t-il de la dite troika, une serie de mesures d’austerite et de reformes sociales severes provoquant une importante recession ainsi qu’une agitation sociale. Cet article se penche en premier lieu sur le contexte et les conditions entourant les prets ainsi que les politiques poursuivies. Il examine egalement l’ampleur de l’influence de ces bailleurs de fonds internationaux sur le choix des mesures politiques et enfin, s’appuyant une multitude d’enquetes parlementaires et aupres de l’opinion publique, il observe comment hommes politiques et citoyens apprecient cette aide tout comme ses consequences sociales et politiques.

In this article, we focus on manifest interparty conflict over policy issues and the role of coalition agreements in solving these conflicts. We present empirical findings on the characteristics of coalition agreements including deals over policy controversy and on inter-party conflict occurring during the lifetime of governments in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. We analyze the ways in which parties in government were or were not constrained by written deals over disputed issues. Coalition agreements from all four countries include specific policy deals, one third of which are precisely defined. These policy deals concern both consensual and controversial issues. Our central finding is that, in the case of intra-party conflict, parties almost always fall back on the initial policy deals when these exist. As such, policy statements of the coalition agreement facilitate decision making in each of the countries studied.

The impressive development of the European Parliament's powers over Commission appointment and investiture may be explained by looking at interstitial institutional change and its subsequent formalisation. The Parliament, since it is less sensitive to failure and has a longer time horizon, was able to create interstitial change to its benefit by its ability to delay or block the functioning of the European Union. Interstitial institutional change may be formalised in the Treaty despite initial opposition by some member states because the informal rule has altered the status quo and thereby may have induced a preference change of member states. Given that pro-integrationist member states usually see granting more power to the Parliament as a priority, member states less inclined towards integration might grant more power to the Parliament if they perceive no de facto change in the existing power distribution linked to the formalisation.

The Portuguese case provides a unique opportunity to study the opposition's behaviour in a variety of political conditions. It offers an insight into the impact of the financial crisis on the opposition's behaviour in both majority and minority political settings. It allows the comparison of the opposition's relationship with a minority government, during which non-collaboration could have dramatic consequences, and also with a majority government, when such a choice does not have major political or policy implications. Moreover, it enables us to study the effect of an additional veto player (the so-called troika composed of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund), which not only constrains both majority and opposition parties, but also gives political entrepreneurs a unique opportunity to push ahead with liberal measures – in this case, clearly in disagreement with the moderate and radical left programmes. Relying on quantitative data on the legislative behaviour of the parliamentary party groups in the period 1995–2012, and on qualitative process-tracking of the opposition's positions on key economic issues – such as the decision to vote against Prime Minister Sócrates' last austerity package after a series of approvals – this article aims to determine whether, and if yes how, the financial crisis has affected the behaviour of the Portuguese opposition parties in parliament, by examining and comparing their behaviour in hard and in normal times.

Recorrendo a dados do Euro-barómetro e do projeto INTUNE, este artigo estuda os efeitos da crise económica de 2008 no apoio à União Europeia (UE), quer entre os cidadãos, quer entre os seus representantes, na Grécia, Portugal e Espanha, em comparação com o resto da União Europeia (UE27 ou UE17). O artigo revela que a crise financeira diminuiu profundamente o nível de confiança que os cidadãos da UE depositam nesta, mas o seu efeito não é imediato. Ao fazer o controlo de uma série de explicações, o efeito da crise económica no período 2007-2009 é só aparente entre as elites políticas e apenas na ligação à UE. Relying on data from the Euroba-rometer and the INTUNE project, the present paper studies the effects of the 2008 economic crisis on the support to the European Union, both among citizens and their representatives, in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and comparatively, in the remaining EU countries (EU27 or EU17). The paper discloses the fact that the financial crisis entailed a significant decrease in the confidence levels of the citizens towards the EU, although this effect is not immediate. After controlling for a variety of explanations, it has been made plain that the effect of the economic crisis between 2007 and 2009 is visible only among the political elites and only as regards their level of attachment to the EU.

UID/CPO/04627/2013 Relying on data from the Eurobarometer and the intune project, the present paper studies the effects of the 2008 economic crisis on the support to the European Union, both among citizens and their representatives, in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and comparatively, in the remaining EU countries (EU27 or EU17). The paper discloses the fact that the financial crisis entailed a significant decrease in the confidence levels of the citizens towards the EU, although this effect is not immediate. After controlling for a variety of explanations, it has been made plain that the effect of the economic crisis between 2007 and 2009 is visible only among the political elites and only as regard Recorrendo a dados do Euro-barómetro e do projeto intune, este artigo estuda os efeitos da crise económica de 2008 no apoio à União Europeia (UE), quer entre os cidadãos, quer entre os seus representantes, na Grécia, Portugal e Espanha, em comparação com o resto da União Europeia (UE27 ou UE17). O artigo revela que a crise financeira diminuiu profundamente o nível de confiança que os cidadãos da UE depositam nesta, mas o seu efeito não é imediato. Ao fazer o controlo de uma série de explicações, o efeito da crise económica no período 2007-2009 é só aparente entre as elites políticas e apenas na ligação à UE. publishersversion published

WOS:000347681500004 (Nº de Acesso Web of Science) Submitted by ciencia null (ciencia@iscte.pt) on 2015-08-03T10:13:19Z No. of bitstreams: 3 publisher_version_Awakeing_the_Slepping_Giant_SES_P_V19_N4.pdf: 202867 bytes, checksum: cdc1b414ec8013e6519c5346a63c015a (MD5) publisher_version_Awakening_Slepping_Giant___Appendix_1.pdf: 196361 bytes, checksum: a7b7aa18f5213fdae0e2c20958bc3ea1 (MD5) publisher_version_Awakening_Slepping_Giant___Appendix_2.pdf: 277928 bytes, checksum: 85c9b3db64c41d1d104dead6f5e931a8 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Susana Ferreira (susana.ferreira@iscte.pt) on 2015-08-03T10:14:42Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 4 "deposit.zip": 581948 bytes, checksum: 0da66f26d173743a760f81617ce8553a (MD5) publisher_version_Awakeing_the_Slepping_Giant_SES_P_V19_N4.pdf: 202867 bytes, checksum: cdc1b414ec8013e6519c5346a63c015a (MD5) publisher_version_Awakening_Slepping_Giant___Appendix_1.pdf: 196361 bytes, checksum: a7b7aa18f5213fdae0e2c20958bc3ea1 (MD5) publisher_version_Awakening_Slepping_Giant___Appendix_2.pdf: 277928 bytes, checksum: 85c9b3db64c41d1d104dead6f5e931a8 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-03T10:14:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 "deposit.zip": 581948 bytes, checksum: 0da66f26d173743a760f81617ce8553a (MD5) publisher_version_Awakeing_the_Slepping_Giant_SES_P_V19_N4.pdf: 202867 bytes, checksum: cdc1b414ec8013e6519c5346a63c015a (MD5) publisher_version_Awakening_Slepping_Giant___Appendix_1.pdf: 196361 bytes, checksum: a7b7aa18f5213fdae0e2c20958bc3ea1 (MD5) publisher_version_Awakening_Slepping_Giant___Appendix_2.pdf: 277928 bytes, checksum: 85c9b3db64c41d1d104dead6f5e931a8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014

Is informal governance the rule or the exception in day-to-day EU politics? What can explain variation in the use of this practice? Is it a good or a bad thing? These are fascinating questions, and...