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This article suggests that an alternative to a social rights of citizenship approach to comparing welfare states is to use disaggregated programme expenditure data to identify the diverse spending priorities of different types of welfare state. An initial descriptive analysis shows that four major categories of social spending (cash spending on older people and those of working age; service spending on health and for other purposes) are almost entirely unrelated to one another and that different welfare state regimes or families of nations exhibit quite different patterns of spending. The article proceeds to demonstrate that both the determinants and the outcomes of these different categories of spending also differ quite radically. In policy terms, most importantly, the article shows that cross-national differences in poverty and inequality among advanced nations are to a very large degree a function of the extent of cash spending on programmes catering to the welfare needs of those of working age.

This paper examines the historical development of the Australian welfare state with a view to identifying the role that Australia's federal constitutional arrangements have played in shaping that development. Theoretical paradigms have been unanimous in their prognoses: that federal states are likely to be slow in developing welfare state programmes and typically spend less on them than unitary states. But recently it has been argued that federal institutions may have a 'ratchet effect' of slowing down the pace of change, irrespective of its direction. The purpose of this chronological account of significant stages in the development of the Australian welfare state is to use the unfolding of historical events--far too rich in nuance and detail to be captured in quantitative modelling--as a test-bed for establishing whether, and, if so, to what extent, federalism has impacted on the trajectory of Australian welfare state development.

The different empirical indicators available for charting the process of globalization and the institutional similarities and differences between the two counties Australia and New Zealand that might constrain or facilitate globalization are identified. It is felt that to some degree globalization is as much above ideology and discourse as it is an empirically grounded and identifiable economic and social process.

New Labour theorists have been prone to identify American New Progressivism as the proximate source of 'third way' ideas. In this article we argue that, if the focus is on the governing practice rather than on the naming of a governing orientation, a case can be made for seeing Austrian Labor in government from 1983 to 1996 as a progenitor of third way thinking and as a specific source of New Labour policy development in a number of areas. Taking Stuart White's account of the main dimensions of third way programmatic realignment as our guide, we discuss the success of the Hawke/Keating Labor governments in reducing the direct provider role of state, developing new forms of collective provision, reforming the tax system, making social policy more employment-friendly and creating the institutions of an asset-based egalitarianism. We conclude by pointing out that, whilst there are many common themes in Australian Labor practice and New Labor rhetoric, and some evidence of specific policy transfer from one to the other, a plausible case can also be made for seeing many of the policy initiatives of the Hawke/Keating era as a reworking of an older Australian Labor tradition of regulatory state activism.

In recent years, there has been a strong tendency for the politicians of Western nations to make issues of economic policy making their first priority. Emerging evidence from the economics discipline, which shows a close association between subjective well-being and other macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and inflation, suggests that this priority ordering of politicians may well be one which is functional from an electoral viewpoint. However, recent research by Ronald Inglehart on the development of 'postmaterialist' values challenges the continuing electoral relevance of an economics-first approach to policy making by suggesting that, in advanced societies, mass publics are exercised more by quality of life concerns than by issues of economic affluence. Here we use Eurobarometer data for 12 EU nations to explore the nature of the linkage between economic policy outcomes and levels of popular satisfaction in both economically advanced and less advanced societies. Our findings suggest that affluence is not the only economic determinant of subjective well-being in these countries and that, contrary to Inglehart's thesis, the growth of the economy impacts on subjective well-being in rich and poor nations alike.