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The aim of this paper is to explain the relationship between Human Rights and moral universality from a constructivist paradigm. From an ordinary perspective, Human Rights are universal. This attribute has been disputed from different forms of skepticism (classical utilitarianism, neo-Aristostelianism, cultural and ethical relativism). From a constructivist point of view, Human Rights are not the product of a descriptive analysis, but the outcome of a suitable procedure of construction. The distinction between moral realism and Kantian constructivism is equivalent to the difference between a path of discovery and a path of invention in ethics. In this sense, Human Rights are the outcome of an impartial procedure of moral justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explain the relationship among naturalistic fallacy, empiricist tradition and Legal Positivism. From an empiricist point of view, it is not possible to derive evaluative statements from descriptive statements. In philosophy, this meta-theoretical requirement is called Hume's Guillotine. Such request presupposes a fact/value metaphysical dualism. From this perspective, morality is not an object of reason: values are subjective and arbitrary. However, this model has a lot of problems. Commitments, epistemic values, thick ethical concepts and desire-independent reasons for action are some counter-examples to that empiricist picture. In fact, description and evaluation are linked and interdependent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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