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Metastatic hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) to the right atrium without invasion of the inferior vena cava is a very rare and difficult diagnosis, especially when the primary tumour is yet to be known. A 68-year-old man with symptoms of heart failure was admitted to the emergency department; his transthoracic echocardiogram showed a mass comprehending almost the totality of the right atrium, obliterating its entrance nearly completely and impeding the normal auricular-ventricular flux, described as a possible auricular myxoma. The patient was promptly transferred to cardiothoracic surgery and submitted to an urgent surgery to completely remove the mass, which was macroscopically described as suspected of malignancy. Further investigation demonstrated a single nodule in the liver with malignant imging characteristics, and the histology confirmed the diagnosis of metastatic HCC of the right atrium, without metastatic disease elsewhere. He was then submitted to radiofrequency ablation and medicated with sorafenib. The disease progressed slowly but subsequently involved the inferior vena cava and portal vein, culminating in his death 4 years and 3 months after the diagnosis. Although the prognosis for metastatic HCC may be poor, especially with intracavitary heart metastasis, this case shows that an aggressive initial approach with surgical metastasectomy may prolong the median survival of the patients.

In addition to article 101 of the TFEU, the abuse of a dominant position prohibited by article 102 of the TFEU is important for the analysis of the conformity of distribution contracts towards the UE Competition Law. The clauses of the distribution contracts often contain practices that are likely to represent an abuse of a dominant position, censured by article 102 of the TFEU. In fact, one of the types of conduct qualified by article 102, (b) of the TFEU as abuse of a dominant position is the limitation of "production, distribution or technical development to the prejudice of consumers", covering not only restrictive practices resulting from the dominant company's internal behavior, but also conducts which, by conditioning third parties, pursue such restrictive purposes. Exclusive purchase obligations and loyalty and fidelity discounts are of relevance in the distribution context. Tying also arises, frequently, in the context of distribution, and is frowned upon, according to article 102, (d) of the TFEU, if the company is using the dominant power in one market to obtain an advantage in another market, excluding rivals. Bundling and multi-product rebates, so common in distribution, are also practices that may constitute exclusionary conduct by dominant companies. The existence of abusive behavior regarding price, namely, the use of predatory pricing, excessive pricing or margin squeezes, prohibited by article 102, (a) of the TFEU is also common in distribution. The refusal to supply products and services is an abuse that may result from the clauses in distribution contracts and the way distribution networks are built, with the intention of excluding rivals, with particular emphasis when related markets are concerned. On the other hand, it can be one of the instruments to prevent parallel imports, segmenting the internal market, which will be severely censured by the CJEU. Vertical restrictions can also be considered an abuse of a dominant position if they correspond to unfair commercial conditions, expressly referred to in article 102, (a) of the TFEU as far as prices are concerned, and to a discriminatory treatment of commercial partners, through unequal conditions that put them at a disadvantage in competition, present in article 102, (c), which includes, for example, loyalty discounts. The European Union case law, in turn, has reflected the concern of the competition authorities in the analysis of abusive behavior of companies towards distributors and suppliers. In this paper, considering the relevance recognized by the Commission and European Union case law to exclusionary conduct in distribution and the correspondence of some of these abuses with vertical restraints, we will analyze exclusionary conduct, referring, whenever justified, exploitative abuses and market segmentation.

The concession contract, to which the majority of legal scholars recognize the legal nature of a framework contract, is a commercial contract, which establishes a complex and long lasting contractual relationship, under which the grantor undertakes to sell to the concessionaire, and the latter to buy from him, for resale, a certain quantity of goods, assuming the risk of marketing the goods. The integration of the dealer, who acts on its own behalf and in its own name, in the grantor's network, is ensured by the compliance with certain obligations, relating to commercial policy and promotional and after sales services, under the control and supervision of the grantor. The concession contract started out as a sales contract concluded between the producer and the trader, who acted in his own name and for his own account, characterised by the existence of an exclusivity clause in favour of the latter, provided that he undertook to purchase a certain quantity of products. This negotiating scheme has, however, undergone alterations as a result of the greater integration of the distributor in the network of the licensor, resulting from the complex web of rights and duties around the parties, with emphasis on the transformation of the exclusivity clause, hitherto considered a social type element, into one of several possible clauses of the contract. Considering that we are dealing with a legally atypical, but socially typical contract, it is necessary to point out the most relevant clauses of the contract, which are essential to sustain that this contract belongs to distribution contracts, an autonomous category. The supply chain crisis currently experienced worldwide following the Pandemic COVD 19 and the role that this contract can play in the commercial distribution, by allowing the manufacturer to achieve greater efficiency in the distribution of its products, justifies the analysis of the main features of this contract.

Contributions to the 11th International Conference Perspectives of Business Law in the Third Millennium, November 19, 2021, Bucharest

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In the mid-70s, the US antitrust jurisprudence finally embraced the economic approaches developed at the University of Chicago on the 30s.The Chicago School of Economics has as its main characteristic the defence of the private economy and of a limited intervention of the government, which underlies the idea that individual freedoms depend on the existence of a system based on private initiative and market economy, affirming the interdependence of capitalism and democracy.This School was fiercely against the excessive intervention of competition authorities and courts in competition, to which attributed as final goal purpose efficiency maximization.From a methodological point of view, Chicago School will be renowned by the importance of neoclassical price theory and empirical analysis.Later, within New Institutional Economics, will rise another economicanalysis, such us Transaction Costs Economics and Property Rights Theory, that even though receiving minor attention from the literature, being until now strangely excluded from the economic and legal mainstream of thecompetition, will also inspire Antitrust Law.The Transaction Costs Economics will demonstrate that the transactions that make up the market are conditioned by the constraints of behaviour and information, giving rise to transaction costs that make markets imperfect.The institutions in thisSchool are, therefore, structures that, by influencing individuals' behaviour, mitigate market imperfections, becoming indispensable in economic analysis.The analysisofthese economic approaches will reveal that both gave the utmost importance to transaction costs, as Chicago School,without explicitly mentioning transaction costs, also considered it in antitrust analysis.In this paper, we aim at demonstrating that this proximity between Chicago School and Transaction Costs Economics is reflected in US antitrust jurisprudence.Therefore, it is pertinent to begin by summarizing the main arguments developed by these economictheories, which later received merits by the courts, thus making more evident the effect they had on US antitrust jurisprudence, often ignored by literature.As we will conclude the US antitrust analysis is performed by the Courts through lens of Chicago School and Transaction Costs Economics.

In the middle of the 80s, an economic approach, that brings together a group of academics that stand out by the harsh criticisms to the approach of the School of Chicago towards competition, arouses interest among the scholars. This school will call into question some of the foundations and justifications presented by the Chicago School, by questioning, in first place, the single monopoly profit theory. In this sense, these authors will develop a set of models designed to demonstrate that the monopolist in the primary market has incentives to monopolize the secondary market. This School will also analyse the vertical restraints, standing out the development of Raising Rivals´ Costs Theory and offer an explanation for free-riding. The Chicago School, on the other hand, is a coherent and heterogeneous economic school, responsible for the theory of oligopoly and collusion, which, by advocating the criminalization of price fixing, proceeded to analyse the anticompetitive effects of predatory pricing and various restrictions vertical. In this paper, we aim at demonstrating that the roots of the Post-Chicago School go back to the Chicago School, highlighting the contributions of Director and Levi in the construction of the Raising Rivals´ Cost Theory and, considering the connection between the Chicago school and Transaction Costs Economics, the most complete empirical analysis of this theory led by Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein. The continuous omission of the Transaction Costs Economics, considering the steadiness between both, is one of the most negative aspects of this school, which can only be explained by the fact that heterogeneity of the Chicago School and Transaction Costs Economics unmask much of the criticism knitted. Post-Chicago School, as we will conclude, will be incapable of thwarting the ideological premises of the Chicago School.