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Acordurile anticoncurenţiale, în special cele de tip cartel, au cele mai negative efecte asupra concurenţei. Astfel, majoritatea statelor au prevăzut în legislaţiile lor sancţiuni aspre pentru întreprinderile participante la un cartel, amenda, în mare parte, variază între 5-10% din cifra de afaceri. Pentru a depista cartelurile, autorităţile de concurenţă utilizează mai multe mecanisme, însă cele mai importante sunt: inspecţiile, politica de clemenţă și analiza informaţiilor din registrul achiziţiilor publice. Acest articol oferă o privire de ansamblu asupra mecanismelor menţionate supra și o analiză a cadrului legal naţional, evidenţiind unele lacune în legislaţie, dar și exemple practice din Republica Moldova și din Uniunea Europeană

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The sphere of public procurement and the disbursement of budget funds in all countries is an environment that attracts not only respectable entrepreneurs who want to make guaranteed money, but also various “criminal white-collar elements.” According to various estimates, the volume of financing for public procurement in the Russian Federation occupies up to one third of the total GDP. A large number of labor and financial resources are involved in this area, while regularly changing legislation in this area, as well as the complexity of procurement procedures for different categories of goods, works, and services create favorable conditions and allow unscrupulous bidders, as well as corrupt customer representatives, to obtain unjustified profits and illegal remuneration. In the current situation, the introduction of new control measures becomes vital to ensure fair competition and efficient use of budget funds. That is why additional research and measures aimed at eliminating these problems and the preconditions for their occurrence are an integral part of ensuring the effectiveness of the public procurement system and protecting public interests.Purpose of the research is to study the genesis of cartel agreements in public procurement and their impact on the implementation of national projects in the Russian Federation, as well as the impact of cartel agreements on the presence of healthy competition and the efficiency of spending budget funds. As part of the paper, the state of crime in this area was examined; the signs of cartel agreements, methods for identifying cartels, as well as signs of collusion between the customer and the participant in public procurement were identified.Methods and materials. The author in his paper applies a comprehensive methodological approach, including analysis of statistical data, methods of the general theory of statistics, as well as methods of synthesis and analysis. The main attention is paid to the analysis of the current legal regulation in the field of public procurement. Graphical and tabular methods were used to visualize statistical data. The study is based on data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, the Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation and the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court.Results of the study. The paper made a quantitative assessment of the scope of public procurement in recent years, and assessed the work carried out by law enforcement officials and the antimonopoly service. Typical violations of antimonopoly legislation during public procurement are given and methods for identifying them are proposed. The illegal schemes used by cartel participants in electronic trading are analyzed, as well as problematic issues and ways to resolve them that arise in practice. The paper proposes various approaches to increasing the efficiency of law enforcement and control agencies. An analysis of law enforcement practice revealed problems associated with proving crimes in this area, and noted an insufficient level of interaction between law enforcement agencies and the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation.Conclusion. In the study, the author analyzed the main features of cartels, proposed methods for identifying them, as well as ways to improve the verification activities carried out. The presented measures do not exhaust the topic of the study, and to effectively combat cartels, a systematic approach is recommended, including not only improving the quality of work of law enforcement and control agencies, but also improving the software and hardware used in carrying out inspections. Cartels in public procurement are a relatively new phenomenon for Russia; statistical data obtained from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation indicate that law enforcement and control authorities are just beginning their work to counter the criminal behavior of participants in cartel agreements. Only the fruitful joint work of law enforcement and control agencies will ensure the economic security of the state and protect the national interests of the Russian Federation.

Copyright of Actas de Diseño is the property of Facultad de Diseno y Comunicacion, Fundacion Universidad de Palermo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Law / Teise is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The European Union (EU) Commission proposes to 'green up' its enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU to allow producers to collectively overcome so-called first mover disadvantages that would result from inefficient market regulation. The Commission's reboot focuses on the last three exemption conditions. First, the consumer benefit condition is customized to use collective consumer benefits to determine whether consumers receive a 'fair share' of the benefits established under the efficiency condition. Here, the Commission bypasses the Dutch proposition to also take account of non-consumer benefits when investigating whether consumers are compensated for anticompetitive harm. Second, the indispensability condition is tasked to filter out greenwashing. Third, the residual competition condition is trusted to allow private collective action insofar it does not eliminate competition on price and/or innovation. Discussing both EU and Dutch proposals, this article finds that greening up Article 101(3) brings competition policy outside the limiting principles that define objective and effective competition enforcement in terms of voluntary exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar as alterações promovidas pela Lei n.º 14.470/2022, promulgada no final de 2022, na Lei de Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil, estabelecendo, assim, uma interconexão entre o Direito Concorrencial e o Direito Civil. O ponto central da mudança é a introdução da regra de ressarcimento em dobro dos danos resultantes de práticas anticoncorrenciais, medida essa que, apesar de destoar da função tradicional reparatória da responsabilidade civil, alinha-se às políticas de defesa da concorrência mais recentes ao incentivar que as partes lesadas busquem a reparação civil, ao mesmo tempo em que mitiga a interferência negativa na celebração de acordos de cooperação entre a autoridade e as partes envolvidas em tais práticas, trazendo à baila a possibilidade de isentá-los, tanto do ressarcimento em dobro, quanto de sua responsabilidade solidária com os demais participantes. Além disso, o legislador estabeleceu medidas de proteção às vítimas, a exemplo da imposição do ônus da prova sobre o repasse de sobrepreço para o réu acusado de participar do conluio. Outro aspecto abordado pela Lei refere-se ao regime de prescrição para ressarcimento de danos causados por infrações à ordem econômica, que toca, a um só tempo, em três questões essenciais: (i) o termo inicial do prazo prescricional; (ii) estanca a controvérsia que existia em torno do prazo prescricional aplicável à pretensão de reparação pelos danos causados pelas infrações à ordem econômica previstas no art. 36 da Lei de Defesa da Concorrência; e, finalmente, (iii) prevê, em linha com o art. 200 do Código Civil, que não correrá a prescrição de tal pretensão durante o curso do inquérito ou do processo administrativo no âmbito do CADE. Já no campo processual, a Lei passou a permitir a concessão de tutela de evidência com base no julgamento do processo administrativo, autorizando decisões liminares nas ações fundamentadas na legislação anticoncorrencial. Como se pode ver, a Lei n.º 14.470/2022 impactou substancialmente o Direito Concorrencial. O texto busca, portanto, destacar as principais alterações introduzidas pela nova legislação e investigar como essas mudanças afetam o equilíbrio entre a promoção da concorrência e a proteção dos interesses privados.

The diversification of "Big Oil" into uranium mining was a product of a long, entangled history of both the oil and uranium industries. By focussing on the story of the formation of an infamous international cartel allocating the uranium prices during the 1970s, this article explores the controversial role Gulf Oil Corporation played in the uranium mining industry. It argues that Gulf Oil's contribution to the cartel was mainly shaped by the geographical positioning of their uranium mines and the developing knowledge and technologies in the competing oil industry that helped create new economically viable uranium deposits. In this way, this article shows by combining Science and Technology Studies and Business History that the Western oil industry was not a one monolithic entity trying to "sabotage" the development of nuclear energy, but a mutually competitive market where new technologies and knowledge easily spilled over to other energy sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bid-rigging occurs when companies, which are otherwise considered competitors, tacitly agree to raise prices or reduce the quality of services or products offered to customers through the biding process. Institutions, whether public or private, often focus on competitive biding to obtain the best price. Low prices and highquality products are sought to make resources available or save resources for other services or goods. The competition process only results in lower prices and/or higher quality, as well as in innovation, when companies truly compete by independently and honestly setting their terms and conditions. Backstage dealings have a particularly negative impact when they affect public bids. Such practices deplete taxpayer resources and purchasing power, erode consumer confidence in competitive processes, and undermine the advantages of a competitive market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surveys of antitrust cases reveal that colluding firms usually (1) attempt to minimise the risk of prosecution, (2) achieve merely imperfect levels of collusion, (3) compete against some independently acting firms, and (4) adjust to market entries and exits. In contrast, existing oligopoly models neglect some of the four listed stylised facts and, thus, overlook important interdependencies between them. Therefore, the present paper develops a general quantity leadership model that simultaneously accommodates all four stylised facts. The model is a three-stage game in which each firm must make three consecutive decisions: market entry or not, collusion or not, and output quantity. The framework is augmented by an antitrust authority that ensures free market access. In addition, the antitrust authority may directly obstruct collusion and it may threaten prosecution. The results of this study indicate that the latter two instruments are rather ineffective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Se investiga la representación gráfica de la mujer en el cine español a través de 30 películas nominadas como “mejor película” en los Premios Goya entre 2018 y 2023. Se examinan los carteles principales de las 19 películas que superan el Test de Bechdel (1986), considerando variables de diseño gráfico como línea, dirección, forma, composición, color, tipografía, encuadre y ángulo. El 63,3% de los carteles analizados logra una destacada representación femenina, empleando recursos como el primer plano (44,44%) y el ángulo natural (66,66%) para resaltar a la mujer como centro de interés en un 84,21% de los casos analizados.

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is among the most pressing new challenges to international security due to both its direct economic and social repercussions and the threat it poses to the very institution of the sovereign state. This problem is particularly acute in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), which are marked by exceedingly high rates of TOC activity and influence of cross-border criminal groups. This study identifies current trends in the development of TOC in the region, as well as the approaches of the Latin American countries to combating it. In the first section the author advances a hypothesis that TOC is not an anomaly, but an integral part and an attribute of globalization. From this point of view, cross-border criminal groups may be perceived as a specific kind of TNCs. The second section considers the key trends and specific features of organized crime development in LAC countries. The author shows that cross-border criminal groups and TNCs share a number of common traits. In particular, their activities contribute to the erosion of national sovereignty as they seek to oust states from their sphere of interests by both legal and illegal means. The third section examines the current approaches of LAC countries to combating cross-border criminal groups. The author emphasizes the growing role of the armed forces in fighting organized crime, and the increasing militarization of public security on the whole. On the one hand, this trend towards the ‘policialization’ of armed forces shows that the authorities of Latin American states recognize the threat posed by cross-border criminal groups. On the other hand, it indicates their inability to counter this threat effectively. The author concludes that the TOP problem is unsolvable within the existing system of public relations in LAC countries, since it is rooted in the very nature of the current model of globalization.

Copyright of Actas de Diseño is the property of Facultad de Diseno y Comunicacion, Fundacion Universidad de Palermo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines newspaper cartels, a largely unoccupied field in media history, from the perspective of longevity. We analyse Finnish newspaper industry from the 1910s to 1970s and show that newspapers sought to regulate various aspects of competition, such as subscription prices, advertisement tariffs, and newsprint prices. Data indicates that political rivalry shaped the newspaper cartel collaboration until late 1950s: the cartel was set up by right-wing and centrist papers and, unlike in other Nordic countries, the Social Democratic press remained outside of the association until 1958. Political shocks of the Finnish Civil War in 1918 and the Second World War also changed the composition of the cartel. The era of private cartels in the newspaper industry gradually started to fade away as a result of anti-cartel laws in the 1960s and governmental anti-inflation measures in the 1970s. We conclude that the economics of newspaper industry and the cartelisation of the wider business environment, newsprint suppliers in particular, encouraged newspapers to co-operate with each other. The results of this article increase the understanding on the collaborative and competitive environment of newspaper companies, but also contributes to broader questions on cartels and their inner dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Brazilian Review of Economics & Agribusiness / Revista de Economia e Agronegócio is the property of Brazilian Review of Economics & Agribusiness / Revista de Economia e Agronegocio and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Anbar University for Law & Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Cartels are often fought by granting leniency, in the form of forgiveness of penalties, to whistle-blowers. This study employs a laboratory experiment to compare leniency programs that differ with respect to fine size and whether a second whistle-blower may apply for leniency. The results show that leniency does not affect the probability that a cartel forms, but is effective in exposing cartels and thereby inhibiting cartel success. Higher fines are more effective, but allowing leniency to a second whistle-blower is no more effective than granting leniency to only one whistle-blower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue marks the 25th anniversary of the introduction of a leniency program for antitrust in the EU and contains five original papers: Each paper examines the effects of design parameters of leniency programs on their performance. Before introducing each contribution separately, we put them in perspective by introducing readers to the existing theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature on corporate leniency programs for antitrust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As per the Competition Act 2002 (hereinafter called the Act), cartel is defined in terms of an agreement amongst competitors, operating at the same level of a commercial activity. Such horizontal agreements leading to anti-competitive practices are proscribed under the Act. The Act does not deal with the hub and the spoke of a cartel as there was a lack of urgency vis-à-vis such cartels. It has only been in the recent past, that the Competition Commission of India (hereinafter called the CCI) took note of hub and spoke cartels in the Indian market. Consequently, the Competition Law Review Committee (hereinafter called CLRC) in its Report of July 2019 has made recommendations pertaining to hub and spoke cartels. As a consequence, the 2023 Amendment to the Act has incorporated provision pertaining to hub and spoke cartels. The present article maps the Indian experience on the hub and spoke cartels. The primary argument of the author is that the legislative framework within the Act is inadequate to deal with hub and spoke cartels. Hence a comprehensive re-vision is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study discusses cartel practices in the rice supply chain with a focus on the implications of the Indonesian Farmer Shop (TTI) program. The complex rice supply chain has affected the price of consumer rice and farmers' grain. This study uses a qualitative approach with a normative juridical method and organized crime theory. The results of the study show that although the TTI program has a clear basis, cartel practices emerge due to the domination of actors in rice marketing and laxity in implementing policies. The TTI program creates shorter supply chains, but cartel practices still exist. This research reveals that cartel practices arise from the implementation of the TTI program which is controlled by certain parties with strong control. Obstacles in bookkeeping and supply management also influenced the emergence of cartels. Cartel practices arise not because of regulations, but because of their implementation which tends to be abused by cartel actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. The role of BRICS, created in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, is constantly growing and today it is this interstate union that is the driving force behind the recovery of the global economy. Thus, according to the economic partnership strategy, these countries together combine 43 % of the world's population, 21 % of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), 17.3 % of world trade in goods, 12.7 % of world trade in services and 45 % of world agricultural production. Given the above, issues related to the development and protection of competition in these countries are becoming increasingly important. At the same time, each of the BRICS member countries is well aware of the problem of one of the most serious infringements on competition – anticompetitive agreements, therefore, the attitude of the legislators of these countries to the use of criminal legal means to counter such actions is of scientific interest. Materials and methods. Normative legal acts and scientific works on the problem under study were analyzed. The methodological basis is represented by such methods as comparative legal, formal legal, systemic and structural. Results. This article presents the results of a comparative legal analysis of the legislation of the BRICS member countries in terms of regulating the grounds for criminal liability for anti-competitive agreements. Conclusions. The author comes to the conclusion that the BRICS member states demonstrate a different approach to the use of criminal law means in order to counteract cartel agreements. Based on the results of the study, the content, characteristics, features of the legal order of the BRICS member states were determined in order to form proposals for improvement in the relevant part of domestic legislation and law enforcement practice.

A finales del siglo XIX, la industria azucarera argentina ingresó en su primer ciclo de sobreproducción. Tras casi dos décadas de crecimiento, en 1895 se superaron las necesidades del consumo interno, cuya consecuencia directa fue la abrupta caída de los precios. Los intereses involucrados instrumentaron diferentes soluciones, concluyendo que sólo mediante la exportación lograrían estabilizar la plaza doméstica. Así, se ensayaron convenios entre productores y comercializadores, se gestionaron subsidios a la exportación, y se formó la “Unión Azucarera Argentina” S. A., encargada –en principio– de comprar los stocks y dosificar las ventas dentro y fuera del país para elevar las cotizaciones. La historiografía muestra considerables avances en el análisis de esta crisis, el accionar corporativo y los entretelones de la sanción de leyes de primas a la exportación. Con todo, un estudio centrado en esta firma comercial –fundamental en la arquitectura político/empresarial orientada a la exportación–, permitirá acercarnos con mayor detalle a la conformación y funcionamiento de acuerdos comerciales intrasectoriales, para dialogar con las interpretaciones generales sobre esta coyuntura y aportar nueva evidencia sobre las primeras prácticas colusorias en la industria argentina.

The study attempts to identify the basic factors that shaped the development of the brewing industry in Brno from the second half of the 19th century to the First World War. The abolition of the propination law in 1869 is particularly important, as it freed up the market and allowed investors to freely establish new breweries. In particular, the study analyses the development of První brněnský akciový pivovar a sladovna [First Brno Stock Brewery and Malt House], which is known today as the Starobrno brewery, the only industrial brewery still operating in the city. A significant part is also devoted to the competing Moravia brewery and others within the territory of today's city. The history of the Brno brewing industry was shaped by founding fever on the one hand and by competitive pressure tempered by cartelization on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cartel investigations and subsequent Commission decisions can negatively impact a company's reputation and stock market value. Using an event study methodology, this paper quantifies the effect of a Commission decision on the market value of companies involved and investigates whether the fact that a dawn raid took place has an additional effect on the impact of the subsequent decision. The findings are based on an exhaustive recent sample of 373 observations of listed firms involved in cartel cases between 2001 and 2022. We conclude that a dawn raid has a clear negative effect of -2.04% on a firm's stock price in the anticipation period prior to a decision. We attribute this to the fact that a dawn raid generates media coverage, bringing more attention to the case and making it widely known to investors. An anticipation effect is absent in cartels where no dawn raid took place, suggesting that a dawn raid entails a more prolonged and more negative effect on stock prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since espousing posters as essential teaching materials to leverage learning is one of the mainstreams in the research paradigm, the great majority of studies on their effectiveness in language education are directly conducted on learners. However, approaching them through the lens of teachers in terms of their consideration as language teaching tools is underrepresented in research. Thus, this qualitative research was conducted in Turkey and the UK using semi-structured interviews, a survey and non-participant classroom observations to explore the attitudes of English as a Foreign Language (EFL) teachers towards using posters as a strategy for reading comprehension of learners. Besides demographic features, syllogistic inference through inductive high-level data coding was employed to ascertain teachers’ attitudes. In addition, some classroom practices were observed to test whether they overlap with teacher attitudes. Particular reading strategies the teachers employed throughout their instructions were also investigated to identify the role of visuals in their teaching. The findings indicate that although teachers in both countries exhibit positive attitudes towards using posters as a strategy, they do not in fact employ them properly in classes. Accordingly, some suggestions for further research considerations are also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aura. Revista de Historia y Teoría del Arte is the property of Aura Revista de Historia y Teoria del Arte and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Allegations related to the cartel arise every time Indonesia experiences a shortage of cooking oil. The study aims to discuss the causes of the scarcity of cooking oil in Indonesia. Is it because of Permendagri Number 06 of 2022 or because of a cartel or is it caused by an artificial scarcity made by a syndicate? And whether this cartel and scarcity have anything to do with it. The study used qualitative research. The study uses normative or socio legal by analyzing relevant sources and news related to the scarcity of cooking oil. The results showed that the cause of the scarcity of cooking oil was the highest retail price which was marked by the issuance of Permendagri No. 6 of 2022, the law of one price which causes arbitrage, artificial scarcity by businessman, panic buying among the public, conditional sales and distribution problems. The relationship between the cartel and the scarcity of cooking oil lies in its complex and non-transparent distribution to consumers. The cartel group restrains the widely circulated cooking oil products with HRP because the businessman will lose out automatically if sold at HRP. Therefore, businessman withdraw products from the market and resulting in scarcity.

This paper is driven by the importance of OPEC and the mixed literature about its behaviour. The aim is to understand the debated structure of OPEC and determine using econometric tools and applying market sharing models whether the organization behaves like a cartel or is wrongly accused of being so using the annual data for 2004-2019 period. Application of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index shows a shift in its behaviour from competitive to moderately concentrated marketplace from 2013. Crude oil output coordination of member nations with OPEC is established using cointegration test. Besides this, Granger causality test suggests that Iraq’s crude oil production causes price of oil which is further confirmed by applying market share model where Iraq acts as a price setter.

The production of broilers is a well-known example of integration of food processors with growers. Tournament contracts are the norm in the industry, where processors provide chicks, feed, and veterinary supplies to the growers. The industry has come under antitrust scrutiny on several cases where processors have allegedly colluded to exercise market power both in the input and in the output markets and unilaterally exercised monopsony power. This article discusses the possible role that the integration model of contracting with growers may have on the monopsony power and collusion in the input market. In the case of confirmed collusion at the input market, damage compensation may be due. We present formulae that may be used to calculate damages in a buyer cartel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are numerous accusations of collusion in protein markets throughout the United States. The cattle market is no exception. The four major meatpackers stand accused of acting in concert to lower the quantity of cattle purchased in the cash market for fed cattle. The plaintiffs in these cases allege that these meatpackers have purposefully depressed the price they pay to various cattle ranchers and feedlot operators. This article explores the allegations brought forth in one of these complaints, as well as the economic consequences resulting from the formation of a cartel in this market if a collusive agreement truly exists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Allegations of price-fixing by U.S. chicken suppliers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act date back more than a half-century. The methods to facilitate this collusion have evolved over time from conference calls arranged by the National Broiler Marketing Association to more sophisticated methods of information sharing. Amid the highest rate of inflation in nearly forty years and persistent supply-chain bottlenecks as the country emerges from the pandemic, the chicken industry has been singled out by government officials for monopolistic pricing behavior. We examine the mechanism through which the "chicken cartel" was formed and sustained and its harmful effects on consumers. The analysis indicates that as early as 2008 a plan was hatched by U.S. chicken suppliers to collude in fixing the price of chicken. According to one complaint, this collusion, in concert with increased market concentration, raised chicken prices by approximately 50 percent. The associated consumer surplus losses are estimated at $8 to $10 billion annually with cumulative losses over the duration of the cartel ranging upward of $100 billion. Numerous indictments have been handed down and settlements reached, both civil and criminal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2020, an antitrust lawsuit was filed against the Pork Integrators alleging a §1 Sherman Act violation. At the center of the Lawsuit, there is an alleged exchange of atomistic information about the Pork integrators' operations using Agri Stats, Inc. as a clearinghouse. We use the Supreme Court benchmark in American Column & Lumber to discuss two questions that arise from the Lawsuit. The first is whether the association of Pork Integrators and Agri Stats, Inc., resulted in the restraint of interstate commerce, the main specific issue at stake in the pork Lawsuit. The second is whether information-exchange agreements using clearinghouses like Agri Stats, Inc., lessen competition and offend U.S. antitrust law, a more general issue beyond the pork Lawsuit. We find that there appears to be ample evidence in the Lawsuit to merit prosecution regarding both trade restraints and information-sharing agreements. We conclude by discussing the role of the Agencies in setting the standards in information-exchange agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contextualização: Estudos empíricos, que tem como objetivo detectar indícios econômicos de cartel, vem ganhando relevância na literatura internacional e nacional. Entretanto, existe uma lacuna na literatura de trabalhos, com aplicações dessa natureza, que abarcam a revenda de Gás Liquefeito de Petróleo (GLP). Este segmento apresenta caraterísticas que viabiliza a formação de cartel e, nos últimos anos, tem sido alvo de denúncias e investigações a respeito dessa conduta junto aos órgãos reguladores da concorrência. Objetivo: Detectar indícios econômicos de cartel na revenda de GLP, em Nova Andradina e Dourados, Mato Grosso do Sul, de maio de 2004 a agosto de 2020. Testou-se a hipótese de que, durante o período do cartel, o preço médio de GLP aumentou e a sua variância diminuiu. Metodologia: Calculou-se os coeficientes de variação de preços e os seus respectivos valores médios, para o período completo, cartel e pós-cartel. Na sequência, estimou-se os modelos de Heterocedasticidade Condicional Autorregressiva (ARCH), Heterocedasticidade Condicional Autorregressiva Generalizado (GARCH) e Threshold GARCH, todos com a introdução da variável dummy cartel, conforme proposto em Bolotova, Connor e Miller (2008). Resultados: Os coeficientes de variação de preços revelaram que estes estiveram mais alinhados, durante o período de cartel. Os modelos de volatilidade estimados, no geral, permitiram aceitar a hipótese de que, durante o cartel, ocorreu elevação no preço médio de GLP, em ambos os municípios. Não foi detectada diminuição de variância no preço de GLP para o município de Dourados-MS. Os coeficientes de assimetria apontaram que as séries, de ambos os municípios analisados, possuem impactos de choques assimétricos na variância. Conclusão: Conclui-se que há indícios econômicos de cartel na revenda de GLP nos municípios analisados.

This study examines the legal standing of the Indonesian Tyre Business Association (APBI) in light of the KPPU Decision Number 08/Pdt.G/KPPU-I-2014 concerning tire cartel violations in the Indonesian automotive industry. Utilizing normative legal research methods focusing on positive legal norms, the study identifies and systematizes violations of business competition rules by six major APBI member companies between 2008 and 2012, and critically analyzes and interprets the evidentiary basis of these findings. The companies allegedly colluded on tire pricing, manipulating the market for Passenger Car Radial (PCR) tires and inducing unfair business competition. The study asserts that, while the APBI's role in facilitating this collusion was apparent, its legal liability remains unclear due to the association's ability to influence member practices without a binding enforcement mechanism. These findings raise critical implications for market competition and cartel law enforcement, necessitating a re-evaluation of the legal provisions surrounding business associations, especially in the context of Indonesia's anti-monopoly and unfair competition laws. Highlights: • APBI's facilitation of cartel behavior among its members. • Unclear legal liability of business associations in anti-competitive practices. • Need for re-evaluation of legal provisions surrounding business associations. Keywords: Cartel, Indonesian Tyre Business Association (APBI), Unfair Business Competition, Competition Law, Indonesian Tyre Industry

Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (VBER) will expire on 31 May 2022. The VBER and its accompanying Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01) have been the most authoritative EU source of vertical restraints law for almost 12 years. The aim of this study is to focus on the two drafts and to compare the revised text with the current text, where relevant, and thus to highlight the areas and content of the currently applicable rules that are likely to be amended. Before doing so, however, it seems appropriate to briefly outline the competition test for the legal assessment of restrictive agreements, since in the absence of factual conduct, there is no reason to consider the applicability of any block exemption regulation, at least from a legal-dogmatic point of view.

This work analyzes the relation between two contemporary works and two publications. On the one hand, the series Violencia (1972) by Juan Carlos Romero and the namesake book from 1977, re-edited in 2014; then the series López (2007) by Lucas Di Pascuale, along with the 2019 publication Cartel. The cases work with the compositional devices of quotation and repetition. The reading seeks to account for the historicity in the use of aesthetic procedures, as well as the recurrences of meaning and their variations. From here we raise the question of the validity of compositional procedures, specifically regarding their collective vision and their emancipatory horizons. By considering these materials, the conceptualist strategies from the 1970s are connected with those after the 2000s. In this sense, this reflection includes the temporality of the stabilization of the digital environment and its subsequent tension with fixed media. Between both anchors, the material story proposed by these objects is analyzed.

Copyright of Maritime Faculty Journal (Dokuz Eylül University) is the property of Dokuz Eylul University Maritime Faculty Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The subject of this study is an oligopolistic market in which three firms operate in an environment of quantitative competition known as the Cournot oligopoly model. Firms and their production are differentiated, which brings the theoretical model closer to real market conditions. The main objective was to expand the Cournot duopoly and add another firm, resulting in an oligopolistic market structure assuming a partially differentiated production and coalition strategy between two firms. This article contains an oligopolistic model specifically designed for three different types of expectations, and has been applied to find and verify the stability of the net equilibrium of oligopolists. The market of telecommunication operators in Slovakia was selected as a real market case with accessible data on an oligopoly with three companies and partial differentiation. There are studies in which the authors limit their considerations to a certain number of repetitions of oligopolistic games. An infinite time interval is considered here. Three types of future expectations were considered: a simple dynamic model (or naïve expectations) in which the oligopolist assumes that its competitors will behave in the future based on their response functions, an adaptive expectations model in which the oligopolist considers a weighted average of the quantities offered by its competitors, and real expectations in which firms behave as rational players and do not have complete information about demand and offer output based on expected marginal profit. While the presented model proved to be stable under naïve and adaptive expectations, no stable equilibrium was found under real expectations and further results indicate a chaotic behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The case for a greener antitrust is weak and flawed. It is largely abstract, hypothetical, legalistic, somewhat emotive and lacks supporting evidence. Its proponents claim that the European Commission's enforcement of Article 101 TFEU blocks efficient industry-initiated cooperation to improve sustainability. But as is shown, this more permissive approach will lead to increased market power, supra-competitive prices and greater industry profits, and is unlikely to achieve greater investment in and the faster adoption of green technologies than competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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