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BackgroundUpcoming alternative payment models Primary Care First (PCF) and Kidney Care Choices (KCC) incorporate capitated payments for chronic disease management. Prior research on the effect of capitated payments on chronic disease management has shown mixed results. We assessed the patient, physician, and practice characteristics of practices with capitation as the majority of revenue, and evaluated the association of capitated reimbursement with quality of chronic disease care.MethodsWe performed a cross-sectional analysis of visits in the United States' National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for patients with hypertension, diabetes, or chronic kidney disease (CKD). Our predictor was practice reimbursement type, classified as 1) majority capitation, 2) majority FFS, or 3) other reimbursement mix. Outcomes were quality indicators of hypertension control, diabetes control, angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker (ACEi/ARB) use, and statin use.ResultsAbout 9% of visits were to practices with majority capitation revenue. Capitated practices, compared with FFS and other practices, had lower visit frequency (3.7 vs. 5.2 vs. 5.2, p = 0.006), were more likely to be located in the West Census Region (55% vs. 18% vs. 17%, p

Medical colleges have become a business industry nowadays, where rich businessmen in the name of trust and foundations are resorting to making huge profits by collecting heavy amount of capitation fees from students without providing quality education to them. It has been observed especially in some of the recently established medical colleges, that the regulations laid by National Medical Council are flouted, and these medical colleges are run with very little patients in the hospital, poor infrastructure and huge number of "Ghost faculties", who are available only during the time of inspection by the regulatory authorities. The regular faculties who are working are overburdened with teaching work, and are also denied relieving and experience letter if they submit their resignation. There is a great need for the regulatory authorities to have a strict scrutiny on such institutions and implement remedial measures to correct these irregularities.

Improving access to primary care physicians' services may help reduce hospitalizations due to Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs). Ontario, Canada's most populous province, introduced blended payment models for primary care physicians in the early- to mid-2000s to increase access to primary care, preventive care, and better chronic disease management. We study the impact of payment models on avoidable hospitalizations due to two incentivized ACSCs (diabetes and congestive heart failure) and two non-incentivized ACSCs (angina and asthma). The data for our study came from health administrative data on practicing primary care physicians in Ontario between 2006 and 2015. We employ a two-stage estimation strategy on a balanced panel of 3710 primary care physicians (1158 blended-fee-for-service (FFS), 1388 blended-capitation models, and 1164 interprofessional team-based practices). First, we account for the differences in physician practices using a generalized propensity score based on a multinomial logit regression model, corresponding to three primary care payment models. Second, we use fractional regression models to estimate the average treatment effects on the treated outcome (i.e., avoidable hospitalizations). The capitation-based model sometimes increases avoidable hospitalizations due to angina (by 7 per 100,000 patients) and congestive heart failure (40 per 100,000) relative to the blended-FFS-based model. Switching capitation physicians into interprofessional teams mitigates this effect, reducing avoidable hospitalizations from congestive heart failure by 30 per 100,000 patients and suggesting better access to primary care and chronic disease management in team-based practices., (© 2024 The Author(s). Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Purpose: The study identifies provision of primary healthcare services using the capitated health model as a prerequisite for promoting positive healthcare outcomes for a country's population. However, capitated members have continued to face challenges in accessing primary healthcare services despite enrolment in the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). This study sought to determine if variables such as patient knowledge of the NHIF benefit package, NHIF Premium Payment processes, selecting NHIF capitated health facilities, and NHIF Communication to citizens' influences access to primary healthcare services., Method: A cross-sectional analytical research design was adopted. Data was collected from patients who were using NHIF cards, who were drawn from health facilities. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire where some of the questions were rated using the Likert scale to enable the generation of descriptive statistics. Data was analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Logistic regression was conducted to determine the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables., Results: The study found that four independent variables (Patient knowledge of NHIF Benefit Package, NHIF Premium Payment processes, Selecting NHIF capitated Health Facility, and NHIF Communication to citizens) were significant predictors of access to capitated healthcare services with significance values of .001, .001, .001 and .001 respectively at 95% significance level., Conclusions: The study found that familiarity with the NHIF benefit package significantly influenced NHIF capitated members' access to primary healthcare services in Uasin Gishu County. While most members were aware of their healthcare entitlements, there's a need for increased awareness regarding access to surgical services and dependents' inclusion. Facility selection also played a crucial role, influenced by factors like freedom of choice, NHIF facility selection rules, facility appearance, and proximity to members' homes. NHIF communication positively impacted access, with effective communication channels aiding service accessibility. Premium payment processes also significantly linked with service access, influenced by factors such as payment procedures, premium awareness, payment schedules, registration waiting periods, and penalties for defaults. Overall, patient knowledge, NHIF communication, premium payment processes, and facility selection all contributed positively to NHIF capitated members' access to primary healthcare services in Uasin Gishu County., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Changing the Medicaid program is a top priority for the Republican party. Common themes from GOP proposals include converting Medicaid from a jointly financed entitlement benefit to a form of capped federal financing. While proponents of this reform argue that it would provide greater flexibility and a more predictable budget for state governments, serious consequences would likely result for Medicaid enrollees and state governments. Under all three scenarios promoted by Republicans--block grants, capped allotments, and per capita caps—most states would face increased costs. For all three scenarios, the capped nature of the funding guarantees that the real value of funds would decrease in future years relative to what would be expected from growth under the current program. Although the federal government would undoubtedly realize savings from all three scenarios, the impact might lead states to reduce benefits and services, create waiting lists, impose cost-sharing on a traditionally low-income enrollee population, or impose other obstacles to coverage. Nationally, as many as 20.5 million Americans stand to lose coverage under the proposed Medicaid changes. In California, up to 6 million people could lose coverage if changes to the Medicaid program were coupled with the repeal of coverage for the expansion population.

Purpose: We sought to assess the impact of team-based care on emergency department (ED) use in the context of physicians transitioning from fee-for-service payment to capitation payment in Ontario, Canada.Methods: We conducted an interrupted time series analysis to assess annual ED visit rates before and after transition from an enhanced fee-for-service model to either a team capitation model or a nonteam capitation model. We included Ontario residents aged 19 years and older who had at least 3 years of outcome data both pretransition and post-transition (N = 2,524,124). We adjusted for age, sex, income quintile, immigration status, comorbidity, and morbidity, and we stratified by rurality. A sensitivity analysis compared outcomes for team vs nonteam patients matched on year of transition, age, sex, rurality, and health region.Results: We compared 387,607 team and 1,399,103 nonteam patients in big cities, 213,394 team and 380,009 nonteam patients in small towns, and 65,289 team and 78,722 nonteam patients in rural areas. In big cities, after adjustment, the ED visit rate increased by 2.4% (95% CI, 2.2% to 2.6%) per year for team patients and 5.2% (95% CI, 5.1% to 5.3%) per year for nonteam patients in the years after transition (P <.001). Similarly, there was a slower increase in ED visits for team relative to nonteam patients in small towns (0.9% [95% CI, 0.7% to 1.1%] vs 2.9% [95% CI, 2.8% to 3.1%], P <.001) and rural areas (‒0.5% [95% CI, -0.8% to 0.2%] vs 1.3% [95% CI, 1.0% to 1.6%], P <.001). Results were much the same in the matched analysis.Conclusions: Adoption of team-based primary care may reduce ED use. Further research is needed to understand optimal team composition and roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BACKGROUND: Methods of remuneration have been linked with the professional behaviour of primary care physicians. In dentistry, this can be exacerbated as clinicians operate their practices as businesses and take the full financial risk of the provision of services. The main methods for remunerating primary care dentists include fee-for-service, fixed salary and capitation payments. The aim of this review was to determine the impact that these remuneration mechanisms have upon primary care dentists behaviour. OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the effects of different methods of remuneration on the level and mix of activities provided by primary care dentists and the impact this has on patient outcomes. SEARCH METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Group Specialised Register; the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL, The Cochrane Library, Issue 7, 2013); MEDLINE (Ovid) (1947 to 11 June 2013); EMBASE (Ovid) (1947 to 11 June 2013); EconLit (1969 to 11 June 2013); the NHS Economic Evaluation Database (EED) (11 June 2013); and the Health Economic Evaluations Database (HEED) (11 June 2013). We conducted cited reference searches for the included studies in ISI Web of Knowledge; searched grey literature sources; handsearched selected journals; and contacted authors of relevant studies. SELECTION CRITERIA: Primary care dentists were defined as clinicians that deliver routine or mainstream dental care in a primary care environment. We included randomised controlled trials (RCTs), non-randomised controlled clinical trials (NRCTs), controlled before-after (CBA) studies and interrupted time series (ITS) studies. The methods of remuneration that we considered were: fee-for-service, fixed salary and capitation payments. Primary outcome measures were: measures of clinical activity; volume of clinical activity undertaken; time taken and clinical session length, or both; clinician type utilised; measures of health service utilisation; access and attendance as a proportion of the population; re-attendance rates; recall frequency; levels of oral health inequalities; non-attendance rates; healthcare costs; measures of patient outcomes; disease reduction; health maintenance; and patient satisfaction. We also considered measures of practice profitability/income and any reported unintended effects of the included methods of remuneration. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Three of the review authors (PRB, JP, AMG) independently reviewed titles and abstracts and resolved disagreements by discussion. The same three review authors undertook data extraction and assessed the quality of the evidence from all the studies that met the selection criteria, according to Cochrane Collaboration procedures. MAIN RESULTS: Two cluster-RCTs, with data from 503 dental practices, representing 821 dentists and 4771 patients, met the selection criteria. We judged the risk of bias to be high for both studies and the overall quality of the evidence was low/very low for all outcomes, as assessed using the GRADE approach.One study used a factorial design to investigate the impact of fee-for-service and an educational intervention on the placement of fissure sealants in permanent molar teeth. The authors reported a statistically significant increase in clinical activity in the arm that was incentivised with a fee-for-service payment. However, the study was conducted in the four most deprived areas of Scotland, so the applicability of the findings to other settings may be limited. The study did not report data on measures of health service utilisation or measures of patient outcomes.The second study used a parallel group design undertaken over a three-year period to compare the impact of capitation payments with fee-for-service payments on primary care dentists clinical activity. The study reported on measures of clinical activity (mean percentage of children receiving active preventive advice, health service utilisation (mean number of visits), patient outcomes (mean number of filled teeth, mean percentage of children having one or more teeth extracted and the mean number of decayed teeth) and healthcare costs (mean expenditure). Teeth were restored at a later stage in the disease process in the capitation system and the clinicians tended to see their patients less frequently and tended to carry out fewer fillings and extractions, but also tended to give more preventive advice.There was insufficient information regarding the cost-effectiveness of the different remuneration methods. AUTHORS CONCLUSIONS: Financial incentives within remuneration systems may produce changes to clinical activity undertaken by primary care dentists. However, the number of included studies is limited and the quality of the evidence from the two included studies was low/very low for all outcomes. Further experimental research in this area is highly recommended given the potential impact of financial incentives on clinical activity, and particular attention should be paid to the impact this has on patient outcomes.

Objective: The purpose of this study is to explore the change in physicians' hypertension treatment behavior before and after the reform of the capitation in county medical community., Methods: Spanning from January 2014 to December 2019, monthly data of outpatient and inpatient were gathered before and after the implementation of the reform in April 2015. We employed interrupted time series analysis method to scrutinize the instantaneous level and slope changes in the indicators associated with physicians' behavior., Results: Several indicators related to physicians' behavior demonstrated enhancement. After the reform, medical cost per visit for inpatient exhibited a reverse trajectory (-53.545, 95%CI: -78.620 to -28.470, p < 0.01). The rate of change in outpatient drug combination decelerated (0.320, 95%CI: 0.149 to 0.491, p < 0.01). The ratio of infusion declined for both outpatient and inpatient cases (-0.107, 95%CI: -0.209 to -0.004, p < 0.1; -0.843, 95%CI: -1.154 to -0.532, p < 0.01). However, the results revealed that overall medical cost per visit and drug proportion for outpatient care continued their initial upward trend. After the reform, the decline of drug proportion for outpatient care was less pronounced compared to the period prior to the reform, and length of stay also had a similar trend., Conclusion: To some extent, capitation under the county medical community encourages physicians to control the cost and adopt a more standardized diagnosis and treatment behavior. This study provides evidence to consider the impact of policy changes on physicians' behavior when designing payment methods and healthcare systems aimed at promoting PHC., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

This paper aims to present a debate on the new Brazilian Primary Health Care (PHC) funding policy. We consulted the national and international literature, and we involved municipal, state, and federal PHC managers to develop the payment method. The proposed final model is based on weighted capitation, payment-for-performance, and incentive for strategic actions. Capitation is weighted by the socioeconomic vulnerability, demographic aspects, and municipal adjustment, the payment-for-performance consists of an entire set of 21 indicators, and incentives for strategic actions were facilitated from the maintenance of some specific programs. The results of the simulations pointed to low registration (90 million Brazilians) for the currently estimated coverage (148,674,300 Brazilians). Moreover, they showed an immediate increase in financial resources for 4,200 Brazilian municipalities. We observed that the funding proposal brings Brazilian PHC into the 21st century, points to the strengthening of PHC attributes, and materializes the principles of universality and equity of the Unified Health System. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economics influences how medical care is delivered, organized, and progresses. Fee-for-service payment encourages delivery of services. Fee-for-individual-service, however, offers no incentives for clinicians to efficiently organize the care their patients need. Global capitation provides such incentives; it works well in highly integrated practices but not for independent practitioners. The failures of utilization management in the 1990s demonstrated the need for a third alternative to better align incentives, such as bundling payment for an episode of care. Building on Medicare's approach to hospital payment, one can define expanded diagnosis-related groups that include all hospital, physician, and other costs during the stay and appropriate preadmission and postdischarge periods. Physicians and hospitals voluntarily forming a new entity (a care delivery team) would receive such bundled payments along with complete flexibility in allocating the funds. Modifications to gainsharing and antikickback rules, as well as reforms to malpractice liability laws, will facilitate the functioning of the care delivery teams. The implicit financial incentives encourage efficient care for the patient; the episode focus will facilitate measuring patient outcomes. Payment can be based on the resources used by those care delivery teams achieving superior outcomes, thereby fostering innovation improving outcomes and reducing waste.

OBJECTIVES: To describe the variation in practice structure, financial arrangements, and utilization and quality management systems for eye care practices with managed care contracts. STUDY DESIGN: Cross-sectional survey of 88 group and 56 solo eye care practices that contract with 6 health plans affiliated with a national managed care organization. The survey contained modules on practice structure, financial arrangements, utilization management, and quality management. The survey response rate was 85%. RESULTS: Group practices with both ophthalmologists and optometrists were triple the size of ophthalmology-only groups, and 5 times the size of optometry-only groups. Fee-for-service payments were the primary source of group practice revenues, although 60% of groups derived some revenues from capitation payments. Group practices paid their physicians almost exclusively with fee-for-service payments or salary arrangements, with minimal capitation at the individual level. Almost no practices used both capitation and bonuses to compensate providers. Most practices received practice profiles and three fourths were subject to utilization review, which mainly consisted of preauthorization for procedures, tests, or referrals. Nearly all practices used clinical guidelines, protocols, or pathways in managing patients with diabetic retinopathy or glaucoma. Further, nearly all group practices used computerized information systems to assist in delivering care, and most had provider education programs. CONCLUSIONS: Managed care has affected the way eye care providers organize, finance, and deliver healthcare. In general, our findings paint an optimistic picture of eye care practices that contract with managed care organizations. Few practices bear substantial financial risk, and nearly all practices use quality management tools that could help to improve the quality of care.

The capitation payment model has been used as a supply-side cost-containment tool in controlling physician behaviour. However, little is known regarding its effectiveness in controlling costs and discouraging use of low-value care. This study seeks to examine whether financial incentives in capitation influence provider behaviour, and if so, whether such behaviour compromises outcomes for inpatients with hypertension. To this end, we evaluate the effect on outpatient visits and inpatient outcomes of the introduction of capitation into a mixed payment system involving diagnosis-related groups and fee-for-service in the Ashanti region of Ghana. We use difference-in-differences with fixed effects and event study analysis of claims data over 48 months (2016-2019). We found that providers responded to financial incentives in capitation; outpatient visits were approximately 35% lower. However, we found no significant impact of capitation on inpatient outcomes; that is, the in-hospital death rate did not increase, and the length of hospital stay (which may be a rough indicator of the severity of illness) also did not increase. These findings indicate that patient health outcomes did not deteriorate. Evidence suggests that the observed reduction in outpatient visits may be in unnecessary or low-value visits, especially at lower levels of the healthcare system., (© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Background: Understanding how physicians respond to payment methods is crucial for designing effective incentives and enhancing the insurance system. Previous theoretical research has explored the effects of payment methods on physician behavior based on a two-level incentive path; however, empirical evidence to validate these theoretical frameworks is lacking. To address this research gap, we conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate physicians' behavioral responses to three types of internal salary incentives based on diagnosis-related-group (DRG) and fee-for-service (FFS)., Methods: A total of 150 medical students from Capital Medical University were recruited as participants. These subjects played the role of physicians in choosing the quantity of medical services for nine types of patients under three types of salary incentives-fixed wage, constant fixed wage with variable performance wage, and variable fixed wage with variable performance wage, of which performance wage referred to the payment method balance under FFS or DRG. We collected data on the quantities of medical services provided by the participants and analyzed the results using the Friedman test and the fixed effects model., Results: The results showed that a fixed wage level did not have a significant impact on physicians' behavior. However, the patients benefited more under the fixed wage compared to other salary incentives. In the case of a floating wage system, which consisted of a constant fixed wage and a variable performance wage from the payment method balance, an increase in performance wage led to a decrease in physicians' service provision under DRG but an increase under FFS. Consequently, this resulted in a decrease in patient benefit. When the salary level remained constant, but the composition of the salary varied, physicians' behavior changed slightly under FFS but not significantly under DRG. Additionally, patient benefits decreased as the ratio of performance wages increased under FFS., Conclusions: While using payment method balance as physicians' salary may be effective in transferring incentives of payment methods to physicians through internal compensation frameworks, it should be used with caution, particularly when the measurement standard of care is imperfect., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Medical groups are growing and merging to improve efficiency and bargaining leverage in the competitive managed care environment. An increasing number are affiliating with physician practice management (PPM) firms that offer capital financing, expertise in utilization management, and global capitation contracts with health insurance entities. These physician organizations provide an alternative to affiliation with a hospital system and to individual physician contracting with health plans.To describe the growth, structure, and strategy of PPM organizations that coordinate medical groups in multiple markets and contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs).Case studies, including interviews with administrative and clinical leaders, review of company documents, and analysis of documents from investment bankers, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and industry observers.Medical groups and independent practice associations (IPAs) in California and New Jersey affiliated with MedPartners, FPA Medical Management, and UniMed.Growth in number of primary care and specialty care physicians employed by and contracting with affiliated medical groups; growth in patient enrollment from commercial, Medicare, and Medicaid HMOs; growth in capitation and noncapitation revenues; structure and governance of affiliated management service organizations and professional corporations; and contracting strategies with HMOs.Between 1994 and 1996, medical groups and IPAs affiliated with 3 PPMs grew from 3787 to 25763 physicians; 65% of employed physicians provide primary care, while the majority of contracting physicians provide specialty care. Patient enrollment in HMOs grew from 285503 to 3028881. Annual capitation revenues grew from $190 million to $2.1 billion. Medical groups affiliated with PPMs are capitated for most professional, hospital, and ancillary clinical services and are increasingly delegated responsibility by HMOs for utilization management and quality assurance.Physician practice management organizations and their affiliated medical groups face the challenge of continuing rapid growth, sustaining stock values, and improving practice efficiencies while maintaining the loyalty of physicians and patients.

This study examines risk selection among nine health plans competing for 16,182 employees of one large firm in 1989: one conventional fee-for-service plan, one group-model health maintenance organization (HMO), and seven network and independent practice model HMOs. We develop and compare measures of risk using weights based on HMO and fee-for-service expenditure data, respectively. We use a multiequation statistical model to develop two sets of utilization and expenditure weights for enrollees in each plan. One set of weights, based on discharge abstracts and outpatient records from the large group-model HMO, measures how much each of the nine groups of employees and dependents would have spent, had they been enrolled in a stringently managed plan with no consumer cost sharing. The other set of weights, based on fee-for-service claims data, measures how much each group would have spent, had it been enrolled in an unmanaged health plan with significant coinsurance and deductibles. Predicted annual expenditures per enrollee exhibit a 23% range from lowest (favorable selection) to highest (adverse selection) risk plans using the HMO weights and a 17% range using fee-for-service weights. The fee-for-service plan and group-model HMO with large enrollments have risk mixes near the center of the spectrum. Smaller HMOs exhibit the extreme forms of both favorable and adverse selection. The statistical methods adopted in this study can be used to risk-adjust capitation payments to competing health plans. As mergers among HMOs and group purchasing arrangements among employers increase the average enrollment in each plan from each payor, however, risk differences among plans will be attenuated and the need to risk-adjust payments will be less severe. Key words: health insurance; adverse selection; managed competition; health maintenance organization.

Evaluating the performance of long-term care (LTC) demonstrations requires longitudinal assessment of multiple outcomes where selective mortality and disenrollment, if not accounted for, can give the appearance of reduced (or enhanced) efficacy. We assessed outcomes in social/health maintenance organizations (S/HMOs) and Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) care using a multivariate model to estimate active life expectancy (ALE). S/HMO enrollees and samples of FFS clients in four sites were analyzed and outcome differences assessed for a 3-year period. Results provide insights into S/HMO performance under different conditions and, more generally, into evaluating LTC demonstrations without randomized client and control groups.

Many health systems apply mixed remuneration schemes for general practitioners, but little is known about the effects on service provision of changing the relative mix of fee for services and capitation. We apply difference-in-differences analyses to evaluate a reform that effectively reversed the mix between fee for services and capitation from 80/20 to 20/80 for patients with type 2 diabetes. Our results show reductions in provision of both the contact services that became capitated and in other non-capitated (still-billable) services. Reduced provision also occurred for guideline-recommended process quality services. We find that the effects are mainly driven by patients with co-morbidities and by general practitioners with high income, relatively many diabetes patients, and solo practitioners. Thus, increasing capitation in a mixed remuneration schemes appears to reduce service provision for patients with type 2 diabetes monitored in general practice with a risk of unwanted quality effects., (© 2023 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Objective. Analyze the proposal by the Ministry of Public Health to reform the public financing model in Ecuador with regard to pooling of funds and payment mechanisms. Method. A literature review was done of the financing model, the current legal framework, and the budgetary bases in Pubmed, SciELO, LILACS Ecuador, and regional LILACS using the key words health financing, health financing systems, capitation, pooling of funds, health system reform Ecuador, health system Ecuador, and health payment mechanisms. Books and other documents suggested by health systems experts were also included. Results. Review of the financing model enabled identifying the historical segmentation of Ecuador's health system; out of this, the Ministry of Public Health conceived its proposal to reform the financing model. The Ministry's proposed solutions are pooling of funds and payment of services at the first level of care through payment per capita adjusted for socioeconomic and demographic risks. Progress made in reforming the financing model includes design of the proposals and their implementation mechanisms, and discussions with stakeholders. Conclusions. Implementation of these changes may produce improvements for the health system in efficiency, spreading of risks, incentives for meeting health objectives, as well as contribute to its sustainability and advance toward universal health coverage. Nevertheless, legal, political, and operational constraints are hampering their implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical colleges have become a business industry nowadays, where rich businessmen in the name of trust and foundations are resorting to making huge profits by collecting heavy amount of capitation fees from students without providing quality education to them. It has been observed especially in some of the recently established medical colleges, that the regulations laid by National Medical Council are flouted, and these medical colleges are run with very little patients in the hospital, poor infrastructure and huge number of "Ghost faculties", who are available only during the time of inspection by the regulatory authorities. The regular faculties who are working are overburdened with teaching work, and are also denied relieving and experience letter if they submit their resignation. There is a great need for the regulatory authorities to have a strict scrutiny on such institutions and implement remedial measures to correct these irregularities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary analyzes the patient-centered medical home (PCMH) model within a framework of the 8 basic payment methods in health care. PCMHs are firmly within the fee- for-service tradition. Changes to the process and structure of the Resource Based Relative Value Scale, which underlies almost all physician fee schedules, could make PCMHs more financially viable. Of the alternative payment methods being considered, shared savings models are unlikely to transform medical practice whereas capitation models place unrealistic expectations on providers to accept epidemiological risk. Episode payment may strike a feasible balance for PCMHs, with newly available episode definitions presenting opportunities not previously available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The federation of community health centers a includes 130 practices in French-speaking Belgium. They are organized as self-managed practices, which enables a certain equality between the workers in the team in terms of shared decision. Moreover, these care structures are organized as multidisciplinary teams and most of the time choose a capitation-fee payment for their services. This method of remuneration makes it possible to increase proactivity and improve prevention and health promotion, which are at the heart of the challenges for primary care. The center in Trooz illustrates this organization around the concept of community health. The active participation of patients in the project is at the center of the concerns to achieve patient-centered care., Competing Interests: H. Jamart travaille comme médecin généraliste au sein de la Maison médicale Trooz Santé ASBL. Les autres auteurs n’ont déclaré aucun conflit d’intérêts en relation avec cet article.

Background: Reimbursement systems provide incentives to health care providers and may drive physician behaviour. This review assesses the impact of reimbursement system on socioeconomic and racial inequalities in access, utilization and quality of primary care. Methods: A systematic search was performed in Web of Science and PubMed for English language studies published between 1980 and 2013, supplemented by reference tracking. Articles were selected based on inclusion criteria, and data extraction and critical appraisal were performed by two authors independently. Data were synthesized in a narrative manner and categorized according to study outcome and reimbursement system. Results: Twenty seven articles, mostly from the United States and United Kingdom, were included in the data synthesis. Reimbursement systems seem to have limited effect on socioeconomic and racial inequity in access, utilization and quality of primary care. Capitation might have a more beneficial impact on inequity in access to primary care and number of ambulatory care sensitive admissions than fee-for-service, but did worse in patient satisfaction. Pay-for-performance had little or no impact on socioeconomic and racial inequity in the management of diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and preventive services. Conclusion: We found little scientific evidence supporting an association between reimbursement system and socioeconomic or racial inequity in access, utilization and quality of primary care. Overall, few studies addressed this research question, and heterogeneity in context and outcomes complicates comparisons across studies. Further empirical studies are warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: We assess the financial implications for primary care practices of participating in patient-centered medical home (PCMH) funding initiatives.Methods: We estimated practices' changes in net revenue under 3 PCMH funding initiatives: increased fee-for-service (FFS) payments, traditional FFS with additional per-member-per-month (PMPM) payments, or traditional FFS with PMPM and pay-for-performance (P4P) payments. Net revenue estimates were based on a validated microsimulation model utilizing national practice surveys. Simulated practices reflecting the national range of practice size, location, and patient population were examined under several potential changes in clinical services: investments in patient tracking, communications, and quality improvement; increased support staff; altered visit templates to accommodate longer visits, telephone visits or electronic visits; and extended service delivery hours.Results: Under the status quo of traditional FFS payments, clinics operate near their maximum estimated possible net revenue levels, suggesting they respond strongly to existing financial incentives. Practices gained substantial additional net annual revenue per full-time physician under PMPM or PMPM plus P4P payments ($113,300 per year, 95% CI, $28,500 to $198,200) but not under increased FFS payments (-$53,500, 95% CI, -$69,700 to -$37,200), after accounting for costs of meeting PCMH funding requirements. Expanding services beyond minimum required levels decreased net revenue, because traditional FFS revenues decreased.Conclusions: PCMH funding through PMPM payments could substantially improve practice finances but will not offer sufficient financial incentives to expand services beyond minimum requirements for PCMH funding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Continuity is a core component of primary care and known to differ by patient characteristics. It is unclear how primary care physician payment and organization are associated with continuity., Methods: We analyzed administrative data from 7,110,036 individuals aged 16+ in Ontario, Canada who were enrolled to a physician and made at least 2 visits between October 1, 2017 and September 30, 2019. Continuity with physician and practice group was quantified using the usual provider of care index. We used log-binomial regression to assess the relationship between enrollment model and continuity adjusting for patient characteristics., Results: Mean physician and group continuity were 67.3% and 73.8%, respectively, for patients enrolled in enhanced fee-for-service, 70.7% and 76.2% for nonteam capitation, and 70.6% and 78.7% for team-based capitation. These differences were attenuated in regression models for physician-level continuity and group-level continuity. Older age was the most notable factor associated with continuity. Compared with those 16 to 34, those 80 and older had 1.45 times higher continuity with their physician., Conclusion: Our results suggest that continuity does not differ substantially by physician payment or organizational model among primary care patients who are formally enrolled with a physician in a setting with universal health insurance., Competing Interests: Conflict of interest: None., (© Copyright by the American Board of Family Medicine.)

The economic and social development has led governments to implement new policies in recent years that tend primarily by the principles of equity and efficiency, based on the rights of the population; Colombia has not been immune to this and has made reforms in functionality and structure responsible for ensuring the right to health authorities. You vouch for the accessibility of health services in an equitable manner becomes a big challenge in health systems, given that there are economic, cultural, demographic and social barriers. Before Law 100 was a major barrier to access health services due to high costs of care and low payment capacity of the population, constituting an unattainable to society well, but post-reform those barriers have been dispersing through the mechanism of subsidizing demand, and allowing the right to compete with the incorporation of companies providing health. This article presents a case study of successful mixed EPS Savia Salud as a model of cooperation between the public and private sector in the provision of a fundamental right. It describes the circumstances that led to its creation and administrative operations, in terms of insurance, payments and contract management, compliance and analyzing its evolution as an articulator and integrator of public health policies. The information was obtain through interviews with some managers of the EPS, and material support provided by the same. In spite of this company is in a phase of restructuring, it is see as a model to be replicate in other regions of the country, for the good levels of satisfaction achieved, reducing guardianships and subsidized the revival of Antioquia regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]