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This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of Industrial Organization.In Chapter 1, I investigate the role of network effects in explaining the within-firm rate of technology adoption. I study the conversion of movie distribution and exhibition from 35mm film to digital technology. These industries constitute a hardware-software system with indirect network effects. I specify and estimate a dynamic oligopoly game of digital hardware adoption by movie theaters and digital movies (software) supply by movie distributors. Crucially, theaters' technology-adoption decisions are made at the screen level so diffusion occurs both within and across firms. Counterfactual simulations establish that: (1) at the industry level, diffusion occurs mainly within rather than across firms; (2) differences in technology adoption across firms, which are commonly attributed to scale economies and strategic incentives, are in part due to larger firms' ability to initially adopt the technology at a smaller scale. Therefore, explicitly accounting for intra-firm adoption dynamics is important to better explain aggregate diffusion and firm heterogeneity in technology adoption.In Chapter 2, I study how non-cartel firms adjust their pricing to the supra-competitive level sustained by a cartel, and in doing so, may harm consumers via so-called "umbrella" damages. Such damages arise, in particular, when contracts are awarded through first-price procurement auctions. This chapter examines the bidding behavior of non-cartel firms bidding against the Texas school milk cartel between 1980 and 1992. Evidence is found that the largest non-cartel firm bid significantly higher when facing the cartel. Structural estimation of damages and inefficiencies due to the cartel agreement reveals that per contract: (1) damages from non-cartel firms overbidding are at least 47% of damages caused by the cartel, (2) when the outcome of the auction is inefficient, damages due to misallocation amount to 64% of cartel damages. Finally, inefficiencies raise the winner's cost by 3.7%. These results shed light on the potential importance of umbrella damages from a civil liability perspective.

This paper studies the expansion of dollar store chains in the U.S. retail landscape following the Great Recession (2008–2019). This expansion has been accompanied by growing public concern over the impact on retail markets and food accessibility in local communities. We develop an empirical framework to evaluate this impact and the role of entry regulation policies. A dynamic game of entry, exit and investment into spatially differentiated locations is specified, allowing for chain-level economies of density. Reduced-form evidence and counterfactual simulations reveal that dollar store chains compete strongly with the grocery and convenience segments and that dollar store expansion has led to a large decline in the number of grocery stores, and modest but significant reduction in fresh produce consumption.

This paper studies the decentralized adoption of a technology standard when network effects are present. If the new standard is incompatible with the current installed base, adoption may be inefficiently delayed. I quantify the magnitude of "excess inertia" in the switch of the movie distribution and exhibition industries from 35mm film to digital. I specify and estimate a dynamic game of digital hardware adoption by theaters and digital movies supply by distributors. Counterfactual simulations establish that excess inertia reduces surplus by 19% relative to the first-best adoption path; network externalities explain 29% of the surplus loss.