Search

The article addresses a two-fold question: first, why does the French state invest so much time and resources in its Indian Ocean islands, Mayotte and Réunion? And why do these ultra-marine regions remain wedded to the French Republic? The high degree of insular buy-in both regions involves a two-level game, connecting state and island actors. Such turning to mainland France represents a form of African agency, however dependent on the mainland these islands appear to be. The causal mechanisms of the integration of the French Indian Ocean territories combine historical legacy (choosing France), institutional evolution (departmentalisation), common economic and military security challenges, the cost calculus of mainland France's readiness to govern ultramarine territories and a widely shared set of beliefs in the value of remaining French. The islands are acting like rational actors, whose insular and isolated status pushes in the direction of seeking protection in an unstable environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping has continued to dominate the political stage. Having succeeded to abolish the two-term limit for the presidency in March 2018, he has consolidated even more his power, restructuring several Party and state agencies and promoting many supporters to key positions. He has also privileged very conservative policies, raising questions about China's reform and open-door strategy. However, in the summer of 2018, in the context of a growing trade war with the US, his opponents have launched an offensive that has highlighted deepening divisions within the Party leadership and among the elites. While today Xi is more contested than before, his detractors have remained unable to weaken him, let alone to use the trade war with the US, to force him to radically change course., Author(s): Jean-Pierre Cabestan [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) 0000 0004 1764 5980, grid.221309.b, Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, , Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong Introduction Since the [...]

This article focuses on the institutional changes that have occurred in the foreign and security policy realm since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012. The establishment of a National Security Commission (NSC) in November 2013, the power centralization in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the reorganization of the CCP leadership of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as well as the major branches of the PLA, the reorganization in March 2013 of the various civilian maritime security agencies and the establishment in December 2013 of a Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Small Group (LSG) are the most striking organizational reforms introduced by Xi. But other institutional changes have taken place as Xi's inclination to rely on a larger number of actors and in particular to give his closer political allies a bigger role also in foreign and security policy. These changes have obviously helped concentrate more power in the hands of Xi Jinping and, to some extent, better coordinate domestic and external security objectives and on the whole have well served China's foreign and security policy's assertiveness and initiatives. However, these changes have only partly reduced the power fragmentation that has developed extensively under Hu Jintao, and they have not contributed to institutionalizing decision-making processes at the top of the CCP and the state apparatuses. On the contrary, it appears that through these changes Xi has not only created new bureaucratic overlaps and tensions but also, in relying more on his own advisers, fed frustrations and competitions among agencies and officials, in other words, new forms of power fragmentation., Author(s): Jean-Pierre Cabestan [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) 0000 0004 1764 5980grid.221309.bDepartment of Government and International Studies Faculty of Social Sciences, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong Introduction Since [...]

In spite of John Mearsheimer (and others)'s dire prediction, Taiwan still believes that, rather than having to negotiate like Hong Kong a level of autonomy acceptable to Beijing, it can remain de facto independent as long as it is able to keep a credible conventional deterrence and a strong security relationship with Washington. The recent changes in Taiwan's defense policy as well as in Taiwan-USA relations tend to confirm that belief and willingness. However, the island is facing growing security challenges that will not be easy to fix. And overcoming these challenges will depend much more upon the Taiwanese's resolve than the USA's intention to remain committed to the island's security. Keywords China * Ma Ying-jeou * John Mearsheimer * People's Liberation Army * Taiwan security * Defense policy * USA, In a recent article, international relations realist theorist John Mearsheimer wrote that Taiwan had three options for the future: (1) develop its own nuclear deterrence, (2) try to keep some [...]