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Urbanization is occurring rapidly in Melanesia at 3-4 percent per annum. Due to unaffordable land and housing in formal urban areas, new migrants settle on marginal land without formal legal titles (‘informal settlements’). These settlements are growing and new settlements are emerging within and on the outskirts of towns and cities across Melanesia, at a rate that outpaces efforts to serve them. Settlements in the Melanesian capitals of Suva, Port Vila, Honiara, and Port Moresby comprise 20 percent-45 percent of the city population and at current urbanization rates will be between 30 percent and 65 percent by 2023. Information about informal settlements is scarce. This report provides a rapid review of water and sanitation services in the informal settlements in and around the capital cities of Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea.

This policy paper records the outcome of a strategic analysis of investment requirements in the water sector in Zimbabwe as of December 2013. The work, entitled Zimbabwe water sector investment analysis, was undertaken in close collaboration with senior officials in Zimbabwe as an exercise in determining where World Bank investments may be most effective in the future, and to assist the government of Zimbabwe to develop its own investment strategies. The analysis was framed around two key questions: (1) what immediate investments are required to ensure that water in sufficient quantity and at adequate quality will be available to underpin recovery? This is in order to ensure that water availability would not constitute a constraint to future growth and development; and (2) where in the water sector should the next dollar be best spent? This paper summarizes the context of the water sector in Zimbabwe at the time of the study and reflects the key elements of policy advice derived from the analysis. It is important to record and recognize the key elements of policy advice provided by the World Bank through the water sector investment analysis.

Between 2000 and 2005 infrastructure made a modest net contribution of less than one percentage point to the improved per capita growth performance of the Central African Republic (CAR), despite high expenses in the road sector. Raising the country's infrastructure endowment to that of the region's middle-income countries could boost annual growth by about 3.5 percentage points. Assuming that the inefficiencies are fully captured, comparing spending needs against existing spending and potential efficiency gains leaves an annual funding gap of $183 million per year. By far the largest gap exists in transport. The CAR has the potential to close this gap by raising additional public funding for infrastructure from increased fiscal receipts of various kinds. Furthermore, the CAR has not captured as much private finance for infrastructure (measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, or GDP) as many of its neighbors. This scope for improvement, coupled with the prospect of an economic rebound and prudent policies, could lift the country from it fragile state back to and beyond the prosperity standards it once enjoyed.

The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Angola. The results have been presented in reports covering different areas of infrastructure-information and communication technology (ICT), irrigation, power, transport, water and sanitation-and different policy areas, including investment needs, fiscal costs, and sector performance. This report presents the key AICD findings for Angola, allowing the country's infrastructure situation to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Given that Angola is a low-income resource-rich country, two sets of African benchmarks will be used to evaluate Angola's situation: fragile low-income countries and resource-rich countries. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate regional neighbors in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD for Angola runs from 2005 to 2009. But financial data for comparator countries typically cover an earlier period, 2001-06, and are averaged to smooth out fluctuations, while technical data are reported for 2006. In recent years, Angola's economy has been among the fastest growing in Africa. Looking ahead, the country's gross development product (GDP) is projected to rise by 6.5 percent in 2011, with oil-sector growth of 3.8 percent and nonoil- sector growth of 8.1 percent (IMF 2011). A 27-year war that ended in 2002 ravaged the country and destroyed most of its economic infrastructure. Many roads, rails, and bridges were mined and obliterated; surviving infrastructure is dilapidated after years of neglect.

Beginning in the late 1980s many developing countries turned to the private sector to provide basic infrastructure and utility services, such as highways, railroads, water, wastewater, electricity, gas, and telecommunications. Recent studies suggest that private involvement often benefited customers and reduced government fiscal problems without harming employees or enriching private providers excessively. There were enough high-profile failures, however, to discredit this reform in many quarters. Private involvement is likely to be more successful if it generates real efficiency gains rather than simply transferring costs among parties, if the systems of regulating the private companies are politically sensitive as well as technically competent, if the costs and constraints of private capital are not excessive, and if we are willing to adopt more modest and gradual schemes in difficult circumstances.

The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was also interesting for other reasons. The concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast with slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for example. And reform generated major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient company operations, and reduced waste. Moreover, the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9 percent reduction in water system tariffs. Consumers benefited from the systems expansion and from the immediate drop in real prices, which was only partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs, and access charges. And these improvements would probably not have occurred under public administration of the system. Still, the authors show information asymmetries, perverse incentives, and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the concessions sustainability. Opportunities for the company to act opportunistically - and the regulator, arbitrarily - exist, because of politicized regulation, a poor information base, serious flaws in the concession contract, a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system, and a general lack of transparency in the regulatory process. Because of these circumstances, public confidence in the process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows how important transparent, rule-based decision-making is to maintain public trust in regulated infrastructure.