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This paper examines how labor mobility restrictions like noncompete agreements affect firms' investment decisions. Using matched employee-employer data from LinkedIn, I show that increases in the enforceability of noncompete agreements lead to widespread declines in employee departures, specifically in knowledge-intensive occupations. Established firms that rely more on these knowledge-intensive occupations increase their investment rate in physical capital. However, new firm entry in corresponding sectors declines. I provide evidence for different mechanisms to explain these patterns. Together, the findings show that labor frictions play an important role in investment decisions. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this research is to examine whether and how enterprises adjust their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in response to top executives' local tournament incentives. The findings provide evidence to support the claim that local compensation gaps encourage top executives to reduce their CSR performance; furthermore, they indicate that this reduction is accomplished mainly through the CSR categories of diversity, community, the environment and product. The enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) is examined, and the negative relationship between local compensation gaps and CSR is documented to be weaker in states that feature stronger enforcement of NCAs, which constrains labour mobility and imposes turnover costs. The findings of this research are robust to concerns regarding endogeneity and reverse causality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: We investigate how worker mobility influences the adoption of a new technology using state‐level changes to the enforceability of noncompete agreements as an exogenous shock to worker mobility. Using data on over 153,000 establishments from 2010 and 2018, we find that changes that facilitate worker movements are associated with a significant decline in the likelihood of adoption of machine learning. Moreover, we find that the magnitude of decline depends upon the size of the establishment, the extent of predictive analytics adoption in its industry, and the number of large establishments in the same industry‐location. These results are consistent with the view that increases in outward worker mobility increase costs for adoption of a new technology that involves significant downstream investments in the early years of its diffusion. Managerial Summary: Successful business adoption of new technologies such as machine learning requires skilled workers with experience in implementing those technologies. In the early years of technology diffusion workers in early adopting businesses typically acquire these skills through on‐the‐job learning that is paid for by the adopter. So, if such early adopters face an increased risk of those skilled workers quitting, then their incentives to adopt the technology decrease. We examine this possibility using changes in noncompete enforceability as a proxy for changes in worker mobility and find that the likelihood of adopting machine learning decreases as the risk of worker mobility increases, particularly for larger establishments, establishments in industries where adoption may be more beneficial and in locations with many large competing establishments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the pervasive use of noncompete agreements in contemporary employment practices and proposes a paradigm shift towards intrapreneurship to foster innovation within corporations. It critiques the broad application of noncompetes across diverse job sectors. It argues that these agreements often hinder employee mobility and entrepreneurship, disproportionately affecting marginalized groups.

This article explores the issue of "killer acquisitions" and the enforcement gap in European merger control laws. It specifically focuses on employee acquisitions and whether they should be considered concentrations under the European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR). The article suggests that while employee acquisitions could potentially fall within the scope of the EUMR, the interpretation and application of jurisdictional rules may vary. The authors argue that the Microsoft/Inflection AI case highlights the need for further examination of employee acquisitions in merger control. [Extracted from the article]

This article provides an overview of the evolution of antitrust laws in the United States and their application to labor markets. It discusses the history of antitrust laws in labor markets and the recent focus on regulating competition in labor markets. The Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have been actively enforcing antitrust laws in labor markets, challenging anti-competitive conduct and issuing new guidelines. The article also highlights recent developments, such as the ban on non-compete agreements by the FTC and ongoing antitrust cases. It advises companies to review their practices in light of these developments. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Importance: The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) oversight role in the pharmaceutical market is critical to the health of patients and the health care system. This study characterized the FTC's policy on the pharmaceutical market in recent decades, identifying the types of actions it has favored, barriers it has faced, and authorities that remain untested. Objective: To review FTC legal actions in the pharmaceutical market from 2000-2022. Evidence Review: Legal actions were determined through manual review of search results from the FTC's online Legal Library as well as a 2023 FTC report on pharmaceutical actions. The alleged misconduct, type of legal action taken, timing, and outcome were collected from press releases, complaints, orders, and other legal documents. Findings: From 2000-2022, the FTC challenged 62 mergers, brought 22 enforcement actions against allegedly unlawful business practices, and made 1 rule related to pharmaceuticals. Alleged misconduct in enforcement actions involved anticompetitive settlements in patent litigation (n = 11), unilateral actions by brand manufacturers to delay generic competition (n = 6), noncompete agreements (n = 4), and monopolization (n = 3), with 10 outcomes involving monetary payment, totaling $1.6 billion. Of the 62 mergers the FTC challenged, 61 were allowed to continue, 58 after divesting certain drugs to third-party competitors. The FTC's reliance on drug divestitures decreased from 18 drugs per year from 2000-2017 to 4.3 per year from 2017-2023. Conclusions and Relevance: The FTC brought about 1 enforcement action and 3 merger actions per year against pharmaceutical manufacturers from 2000-2022, pursuing a small fraction of the estimated misconduct and consolidation in the pharmaceutical marketplace. Although the FTC faces substantial legal and practical limitations, important tools remain untested, including a rule defining "unfair methods of competition," that may allow it to more effectively prevent repetitive patterns of anticompetitive behavior. This Special Communication examines the Federal Trade Commission's policy and legal actions related to alleged misconduct, consolidation, and anticompetitive behavior in the pharmaceutical market between 2000 and 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document provides summaries of various legal cases related to different topics in the field of business franchising. The cases discussed include issues such as non-compete agreements, arbitration, fraud, vicarious liability, damages, definition of franchise, choice of forum, choice of law, and contract issues. Each summary provides a brief overview of the case and its outcome, highlighting the key legal arguments and decisions made by the courts. [Extracted from the article]

This article explores the complexities of franchise agreements and the potential for disputes between franchisees and franchisors. It discusses the history of franchise law in the United States and the role of federal and state regulations in protecting franchisees. The article focuses on two critical provisions of franchise agreements: disclaimers and territorial rights. It provides examples of court cases related to these provisions and emphasizes the need for clear and specific contractual language to avoid ambiguity and potential litigation. The article also discusses other disputes that can arise in franchise agreements, such as issues related to territory, suppliers, sale or transfer rights, renewal, and termination. It analyzes legal aspects such as the Virginia Retail Franchising Act, non-competition covenants, and choice-of-law and forum selection provisions. The conclusion highlights the importance of understanding current franchise law and anticipating potential litigation. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Kırıkkale Law Journal (KLJ) is the property of Kirikkale Law Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As legal commentators and policymakers have taken greater notice of the harms that covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”) cause workers, they have offered numerous policy proposals seeking to curb those harms. Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission proposed an outright ban on non-competes on January 5, 2023. None of these policy proposals have yet become law at the federal level. But what if there was a way to increase the legal protections afforded to workers without a single new piece of positive law? This Note identifes one such way. Under the federal employment laws, the primary test for determining whether a worker is an “employee,” and thereby protected by those laws, is the “right-to-control” test. That test asks whether the purported employer has control over the manner and means by which the purported employee accomplishes their work. Non-competes greatly increase a worker’s dependence on their purported employer, which in turn greatly increases the level of control that a purported employer exercises over the worker. Yet courts give insufficient attention to non-competes when applying the right-to-control test, effectively placing some workers who are subject to “employer”-level control outside the reach of federal employment law protections. This Note makes the case that courts have erred in failing to give significant weight to non-competes when determining whether workers are “employees” under federal law and that a faithful application of the right-to-control test would include non-competes as a central factor. Indeed, this Note argues that courts should apply a presumption that workers beholden to non-competes are employees. Were courts to apply such a presumption, the pool of workers who are beholden to noncompetes yet unprotected by the federal employment laws would decrease, thus affording greater legal protection to many non-compete-bound workers without a new law or regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing consensus holds that employer overuse of noncompete agreements adversely affects workers and the economy. But there is little agreement on how best to regulate tliese instruments. States have experimented with an array of idiosyncratic reforms that capture the most egregious misuses, while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has issued an outright ban that would prohibit all employee noncompetes and comparable instruments nationwide. This Article argues that any effective reform strategy must target what it terms "default-use" noncompetes-boilerplate restraints imposed by employers as a matter of course without close consideration of their underlying justification. Some unlawful noncompetes are clearly predatory, but others are likely due to legal and institutional factors. Vague, uncertain law as to what informational interests support a noncompele can lead employers to overestimate their need for such agreements and misconceive the lawfulness of their use. At the same time, standard corporate onboarding practices make it easy for companies to require workers to sign noncompetes along with other form agreements. The result is that companies impose standardized noncompetes whenever an employee might encounter assets they perceive (correctly or not) to be proprietary. These agreements subsequently deter employees from seeking or accepting competitive work irrespective of whether they might ultimately prove unlawful. Thus far no enacted reform measure short of a ban adequately addresses this problem. But the American Law Institute's recently adopted Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act (UREAA) models how regulators might begin to do so. UREAA incorporates what the Article calls "front-end" reforms: rules that disrupt an employer's rote decision to require a noncompete at the point of hire. Three innovations achieve this result: First, UREAA narrows the permissible bases for the use of a noncompete, eliminating employers' ability to use noncompetes to broadly protect confidential information absent a genuine trade secret. Second, UREAA requires employers to use the least restrictive form of restraint whenever possible, replacing some noncompetes with more limited, tailored restrictions. Third, UREAA pushes employers to expressly articulate a legally cognizable justification for their chosen restraint through a novel, multi-tiered notice requirement. Through these drafting choices, UREAA forces employers to confront the critical but often overlooked question of what justifies so formidable a restraint on competition. By making noncompetes a restraint of last resort it provides a second-best alternative to full ban on noncompete use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act (UREAA) which was drafted by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). Topics include factors that led the ULC to decide that a uniform act on noncompete and other post-employment agreements was desirable and practicable, the ULC drafting process and procedures, and features of the Act.

The Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act (UREAA) is the culmination of work by the appointed committee representing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Since its adoption in 2021 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni form State Laws, UREAA has been introduced as legislation in five states, while other state legislatures (and federal regulators) continue to propose novel ways of regulating restrictive covenants generally, and particularly noncompete agreements. As of August 2023, this year alone, eighty-four bills regulating noncompetes were pending in thirty-three states, with another five pending in Congress. UREAA is one piece of the noncompete puzzle that continues to keep practitioners and in-house counsel on their toes. This Article discusses UREAA's reach and its overlap with the FTC's actions, a Massachusetts state law that is closer to getting it right, and recommendations for moving forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article summarizes the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act and compares it to the proposed Federal Trade Commission rule that bans noncompete agreements. The Uniform Act regulates the whole family of restrictive employment agreements, including noncompetes but also confidentiality agreements, nonsolicitation agreements, no-recruit agreements, payment-for-competition agreements, and training-repayment agreements. By contrast, the FTC rule covers only noncompete agreements and their functional equivalents. Both the Uniform Act and the FTC rule cover all workers, including employees and independent contractors. While the FTC rule bans noncompetes for all workers, the Uniform Act bans agree111ents for low-wage workers (defined as those earning less than the state average annual wage) and regulates but does not ban restrictive agreements for higher-wage workers. For these latter agreements, the Uniform Act requires employers to give workers advance notice. The Uniform Act also establishes clear substantive criteria for each type of agreement, including that the restrictive period cannot last more than a year in most cases. The Uniform Act also establishes penalties and allows a private right of action. The FTC rule has more limited enforcement procedures and no private right of action. This Article concludes that, on balance, the Uniform Act does a better job of enhancing worker mobility while protecting legitimate employer interests. Additionally, this Article suggests that the FTC include a reverse preemption clause in its final rule so that a state legislature that enacts the Uniform Act would not have to comply with the total noncompete ban of the FTC rule. The bulk of this Article was written before the FTC issued its final rule. In a postscript, this Article analyzes the role of the Uniform Act under two scenarios: First, the final FTC rule never goes into effect because a court enjoins it or a subsequent administration. rescinds it; Second, the FTC rule remains in enforce indefinitely. Under either scenario, the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act could play a useful role and state legislatures should consider adopting the Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Noncompete law stands at the intersection of competition, equality, innovation, and employment policy. While the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreements Act (UREAA or the Act) is a positive step forward in curtailing the use of restrictive covenants, the Act is limited in its scope because it adopts a partial noncompete ban rather than a comprehensive ban. Because noncompetes harm not only workers by suppressing mobility and wages but also innovation, entrepreneurship, competition, equality, and market growth, enforcing noncompetes for higher-skilled workers can be particularly harmful from an economic policy perspective. The research on noncompetes-which has become robust in recent years-supports a national, absolute ban on all nonconipetes at all employment levels. This Article, written for the University of Florida Levin College of Law's Journal of Law & Public Policy symposium on U REAA, argues that an absolute ban on noncompetes is superior to the standard of reasoiiableness that the UR-EAA would adopt for higherskilled employees. At the same time, it explains why the Act rightfully tackles not only noncompetes but also the family of restrictive covenants that limit workers' ability to compete post-employment. This Article describes a growing body of academic, empirical, experimental, and theoretical research that demonstrates that the common use of boilerplate employment contracts, which bundle restrictive clauses-including noncompete, non-disclosure, non-solicit, non-poaching, non-dealing, and non-disparagement clauses, with choice-of-law, choice-of-forum, and severability clauses-have detrimental effects on mobility and innovation. This Article concludes that a national solution is superior to a uniform act adopted by states because the research shows that state variation, choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses, and misinformation among workers have led to noncompetes and other restrictive covenants being highly prevalent even in states that do not enforce them. Therefore, this Article commends the Federal Trade Commission's recent action in implementing the rule to ban all noncompetes and de facto noncompetes in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to articles in the issue is presented on topics including the Uniform Restrictive Employment Agreement Act (UREAA), parallel development of noncompete law in Canada, and the reality of employer contracting practices on the ground.

The article focuses on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC's) proposed rule to ban non-compete agreements, citing them as unfair methods of competition. Topics discussed include the impacts of non-competes on employment markets, arguments for and against their fairness, and the FTC's legal justifications for proposing the rule.

This document contains case notes from the Franchise Law Journal, covering various franchise-related legal cases from April 2023 to June 2023. The cases discussed include JTH Tax, LLC v. Agnant, where a former tax-preparation franchisee successfully defeated the franchisor's motion for a preliminary injunction to enforce a non-compete agreement. Another case, Hyundai Subaru of Nashville, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., involved a car dealership defeating the manufacturer's motion to dismiss on claims including violation of the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act. In Lunt v. Frost Shades Franchising, LLC, a franchisee sued the franchisor for fraudulent misrepresentation and sought restitution and rescission of agreements. The court ruled on motions to compel arbitration and for a preliminary injunction, finding that the franchisor had a duty to disclose certain information and that the franchisee had suffered irreparable harm due to a non-compete provision. The court issued an injunction against enforcing the non-compete provision but denied the request to enjoin interference with the franchisee's competing business. In Cookie Dough Bliss Franchising, LLC v. Feed Your Soul Minnesota, LLC, the court denied the franchisor's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the former franchisee from operating a competing business. The court found that the franchise agreement had been terminated by mutual agreement and that the franchisor was not entitled to injunctive relief. The court also determined that the non-compete provision was likely un [Extracted from the article]

The article provides an overview of the United Kingdom's new block exemption on vertical agreements, with a specific focus on its implications for franchising. The UK's Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Order (VABEO) came into effect on June 1, 2022, after Brexit. The VABEO outlines provisions that should not be included in vertical agreements, including franchise agreements, in order for them to be exempt from competition law regulation. The article highlights the key differences between the UK's VABEO and the EU's Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Agreements (VBER) and explores various competition law issues that arise in the context of franchising. It emphasizes the importance for franchisors operating in both the UK and EU markets to understand these differences in order to comply with competition regulations. [Extracted from the article]

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed a rule to ban post-termination non-competition agreements between employers and employees, but it would not apply to agreements between franchisors and franchisees. Some states have already enacted bans or restrictions on non-competition agreements, particularly for low-wage employees, and recent court cases in Delaware have shown increased scrutiny of these agreements. The proposed rule is likely to face legal challenges and raises concerns about businesses' ability to protect trade secrets and confidential information. The FTC's proposed ban has both supporters and opponents, and there are questions about the agency's authority to enact such a ban. [Extracted from the article]

The article explores the concept of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in trade secrets law and its application under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) in the United States. The doctrine suggests that former employees may inevitably disclose trade secrets in their new positions, leading to potential misappropriation. However, there is no consensus among courts on the doctrine's validity or scope. Some courts have adopted a broad approach, while others have rejected it altogether. The article emphasizes the need to balance the protection of trade secrets with employee mobility and suggests a framework for a federal inevitable disclosure doctrine that aligns with the DTSA. [Extracted from the article]

This article explores the concept of waivable employee rights and proposes a new approach to labor and employment law in the United States. It discusses the deficiencies of the current system and the need for reform. The article suggests that allowing for conditionally waivable employment rights could empower workers and provide more tailored work arrangements. It also highlights the role of collective representation and bargaining in determining the enforceability of waivers. The text acknowledges the complexity of the issue and the need for further exploration and development of proposals. [Extracted from the article]

The article examines the blue pencil doctrine, which permits courts to reform unreasonable noncompetition agreements to make them reasonable, and argues for its abolition. Topics discussed include the no-modification, strict and equitable modification approaches to the blue pencil doctrine, actions taken by U.S. state courts to remove discretion away from courts and force them to modify unreasonable agreements, and restrictions of the blue pencil doctrine when making an employment agreement.

Using hand-collected data on CEO noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find that NCAs are less common when CEOs expect to incur greater personal costs from reduced job mobility and more common when firms expect to suffer greater economic harm if departing CEOs leave to work for a competitor. Additionally, turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger when CEOs have NCAs. Finally, total compensation and incentive pay are higher if CEOs have more enforceable NCAs. Our identification strategy exploits staggered state-level changes in NCA enforceability. Overall, our findings suggest that restrictions on job mobility have important implications for how CEOs are monitored and compensated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a quarterly report on the developments in national competition laws across Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America during the period from July 1, 2023, to September 30, 2023. In Austria, the Federal Competition Authority focused on food price comparison websites and pursued fines in various cases.

We offer novel evidence on how the nature of brokerage-client relationships can influence the quality of equity research. We exploit a unique setting provided by the Protocol for Broker Recruiting to examine whether relaxed broker noncompete agreement enforcement generates spillover effects on sell-side analysts. Entry into this agreement reassigns ownership of the client relationship from the brokerage to individual brokers, potentially generating a greater standard of care. Using a generalized difference-in-differences research design, we provide evidence consistent with brokers reducing pressure on analysts to produce optimistic research following protocol entry. This effect is concentrated among less experienced and non-All Star analysts, who previously may have faced the greatest pressures to sacrifice objectivity. Additionally, we find that analysts issue more accurate forecasts and generate reports with heightened market reactions following protocol entry. Our collective evidence sheds new light on how the nature of brokerage relationships can influence analysts' research production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforces federal competition and consumer protection laws that prevent anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices, and works to advance government policies that protect consumers and promote competition. The FTC's Bureau of Economics performs economic analysis to support both the enforcement and policy activities of the Commission. This article discusses several examples of these activities. We first discuss some work our economists have done on spatial considerations in demand estimation, and then present an analytical approach that has been developed to assess consumer choice between service providers with the use of data on geographic variation in the location of the customers of two merging service providers. We apply this technique in the context of the analysis of the competitive effects of a merger of veterinary hospitals. Next, we discuss an important tool in the FTC's arsenal: rulemaking. We describe the benefits and costs of rulemaking, the rulemaking process, and the role of economic analysis in that process, and then highlight recent FTC rulemaking activities and the economic analysis of a proposed rulemaking that would ban employers from imposing non-compete clauses in employment contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although policymakers have recently shown a keen interest in noncompete reform, a gap exists in the literature concerning what the U.S. public's preferences are regarding noncompetes. Therefore, this article presents the empirical findings of a nationally‐representative survey of the American public on the noncompete law governing employees. Based on the results of a conjoint experiment within the survey, this article finds that the U.S public prefers that noncompetes be used to protect any types of confidential information, rather than simply customer lists or employee training investments. Additionally, the findings do not show clear support either for or against noncompete exemptions based on an employee's earnings level. However, this article finds that the U.S. public prefers a noncompete exemption for physicians, a shorter maximum duration for the noncompete period, and a legal mandate that departing employees subject to noncompetes receive some compensation from the employer during the noncompete period. Consequently, this article argues that employers should engage in greater self‐regulation if they would like to mitigate the risk not only that legislators will respond to public sentiment favoring more employee‐friendly policies by enacting a total or near‐total ban on noncompetes, but also that judges will find the noncompetes to be unreasonable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the role of restrictive covenants in trade secret law. It explains that restrictive covenants are commonly used by companies to prevent the spread of confidential information, but regulations on their scope have led to companies seeking alternative methods of protection. The article discusses the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the requirement for plaintiffs to prove reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of their trade secrets. It also explores different types of restrictive covenants in employment agreements, recent actions by President Biden and Congress to address their use, and the importance of written agreements in protecting trade secrets. The text suggests that companies should use a variety of channels to protect their confidential information and that future legislation should prioritize the interests of the employer-employee relationship. [Extracted from the article]

This article is devoted to the study of non-competition agreements (prohibition of competition) in Ukrainian legislation, their legal regulation. This mechanism is used to regulate the relationship between the employer and the employee in order to protect the legitimate interests of the employer. The most common scientific approaches used to determine the legal nature of non-competition agreements in the legal doctrine, and they are evaluated. The authors established that, in essence, non-competition agreements are obligations with a negative content, despite that they are not provided for by the Civil Code of Ukraine. The article analyzes the legislation of Western countries concerning non-compete agreements, in particular France, Italy and the USA. The authors came to the conclusion that the provisions of the legislation of these countries are similar and establish the following requirements for contracts of this type: 1) to be in writing; 2) remuneration for the employee; 3) the duration of the obligation which is mainly in several years, the applicable territory and activities that are prohibited to perform. If one of the conditions is missing, then this is the basis for declaring an agreement invalid. Ukrainian legislation was analyzed, in particular the Law of Ukraine "On stimulating the Development of Digital Economy in Ukraine", which provides for the concluding of non-compete agreements of Diya City residents. The authors came to the conclusion that, in general, Ukrainian labor legislation and civil legislation do not allow the conclusion of non-competition agreements, expect those provided for by the specified Law, because they violate human rights to work and entrepreneurial activity, and there are no laws that can limit these rights. An analysis of judicial practice is carried out, which is diametrically opposite, to some extent contradictory, because it is at the stage of formation. Since non-competition agreements exist in practice, the authors come to the conclusion that this topic is subject to further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document provides concise summaries of various legal cases related to franchise agreements. The cases cover a range of topics including forum selection clauses, venue factors, breach of contract claims, and the installation of new point-of-sale systems. The document also includes summaries of cases related to non-compete agreements, termination and nonrenewal, tortious interference, and transfers. [Extracted from the article]