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The designation of Diego Maradona's 'handball' goal, that it was an intervention by God himself, brings the phenomena of sport and religion into an interrelationship. The basic thesis of this paper is that, despite many of their phenomenal similarities, explicit religion is not, and cannot be, substantially related to sport, as the two manifest themselves in different ways of being. This thesis is supported by arguments from three philosophical areas: 1. The ontological dimension of the manifestation of the sacred in the profane through the process of hierophany in sport does not refer to a specific deity or God, and is therefore not a presentation but an indirect representation of the sacred; 2. The epistemological perspective of the intentional relation of consciousness to religious ritual justifies the necessity of situating them in an overall horizon of references and meanings to the horizon of the lifeworld; 3. The existential and experiential aspects of transformative sport experiences transform the horizon of meanings of empirical reality, but lack the sacramental perspective. Implicit religion as a possibility of transition on a continuum of complementary existential states is a suitable explicative framework for analyzing the phenomenal similarities and essential differences of religion and sport. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective touch-a slow, gentle, and pleasant form of touch-activates a different neural network than which is activated during discriminative touch in humans. Affective touch perception is enabled by specialized low-threshold mechanoreceptors in the skin with unmyelinated fibers called C tactile (CT) afferents. These CT afferents are conserved across mammalian species, including macaque monkeys. However, it is unknown whether the neural representation of affective touch is the same across species and whether affective touch's capacity to activate the hubs of the brain that compute socioaffective information requires conscious perception. Here, we used functional MRI to assess the preferential activation of neural hubs by slow (affective) vs. fast (discriminative) touch in anesthetized rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). The insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), amygdala, and secondary somatosensory cortex were all significantly more active during slow touch relative to fast touch, suggesting homologous activation of the interoceptive-allostatic network across primate species during affective touch. Further, we found that neural responses to affective vs. discriminative touch in the insula and ACC (the primary cortical hubs for interoceptive processing) changed significantly with age. Insula and ACC in younger animals differentiated between slow and fast touch, while activity was comparable between conditions for aged monkeys (equivalent to >70 y in humans). These results, together with prior studies establishing conserved peripheral nervous system mechanisms of affective touch transduction, suggest that neural responses to affective touch are evolutionarily conserved in monkeys, significantly impacted in old age, and do not necessitate conscious experience of touch.

Consolidating memories for long-term storage depends on reactivation. Reactivation occurs both consciously, during wakefulness, and unconsciously, during wakefulness and sleep. While considerable work has examined conscious awake and unconscious sleep reactivation, in this study, we directly compare the consequences of conscious and unconscious reactivation during wakefulness. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., fruits, vehicles) such that we could examine consequences of reactivation on semantically related memories. After an intensive learning protocol, we systematically reactivated some of the triads by presenting the adjective as a cue. Reactivation was done so that it was consciously experienced for some triads, and only unconsciously processed for others. Memory for spatial positions, the most distal part of the association, was affected by reactivation in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. Conscious reactivation resulted in weakening of semantically related memories that were strong initially, resonating with prior findings of retrieval-induced forgetting. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, selectively benefited weak reactivated memories, as previously shown for reactivation during sleep. Semantically linked memories were not impaired, but rather were integrated with the reactivated memory. These results taken together demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation have qualitatively different consequences. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, whereby unconscious reactivation entails less inhibition than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of conscious experience in memory storage and structuring.

Recent findings have shown that psychedelics reliably enhance brain entropy (understood as neural signal diversity), and this effect has been associated with both acute and long-term psychological outcomes, such as personality changes. These findings are particularly intriguing, given that a decrease of brain entropy is a robust indicator of loss of consciousness (e.g., from wakefulness to sleep). However, little is known about how context impacts the entropy-enhancing effect of psychedelics, which carries important implications for how it can be exploited in, for example, psychedelic psychotherapy. This article investigates how brain entropy is modulated by stimulus manipulation during a psychedelic experience by studying participants under the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) or placebo, either with gross state changes (eyes closed vs open) or different stimuli (no stimulus vs music vs video). Results show that while brain entropy increases with LSD under all of the experimental conditions, it exhibits the largest changes when subjects have their eyes closed. Furthermore, brain entropy changes are consistently associated with subjective ratings of the psychedelic experience, but this relationship is disrupted when participants are viewing a video─potentially due to a competition between external stimuli and endogenous LSD-induced imagery. Taken together, our findings provide strong quantitative evidence of the role of context in modulating neural dynamics during a psychedelic experience, underlining the importance of performing psychedelic psychotherapy in a suitable environment.

N,N-Dimethyltryptamine (DMT) is a serotonergic psychedelic that induces a rapid and transient altered state of consciousness when inhaled or injected via bolus administration. Its marked and novel subjective effects make DMT a powerful tool for the neuroscientific study of consciousness and preliminary results show its potential role in treating mental health conditions. In a within-subjects, placebo-controlled study, we investigated a novel method of DMT administration involving a bolus injection paired with a constant-rate infusion, with the goal of extending the DMT experience. Pharmacokinetic parameters of DMT estimated from plasma data of a previous study of bolus intravenous DMT were used to derive dose regimens necessary to keep subjects in steady levels of immersion into the DMT experience over an extended period of 30 min, and four dose regimens consisting of a bolus loading dose and a slow-rate infusion were tested in eleven healthy volunteers (seven male, four female, mean age ± SD = 37.09 ± 8.93 years). The present method is effective for extending the DMT experience in a stable and tolerable fashion. While subjective effects were maintained over the period of active infusion, anxiety ratings remained low and heart rate habituated within 15 min, indicating psychological and physiological safety of extended DMT. Plasma DMT concentrations increased consistently starting 10 min into DMT administration, whereas psychological effects plateaued into the desired steady state, suggesting the development of acute psychological tolerance to DMT. Taken together, these findings demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of continuous IV DMT administration, laying the groundwork for the further development of this method of administration for basic and clinical research.

A call for a larger consideration of history in management and organization studies suggests a fresh responsibility for business schools to develop historically conscious leaders. As the world is increasingly challenged by social and economic events, organizational actors must better understand and manage inherent emotions and not be limited by bounded rationality. By teaching the transgenerational transmission of collective traumas to two cohorts in an internationally renowned business school in Europe and in Asia, this study explores how historical consciousness can be construed in the context of an executive educational program and the learning consequences of this process over two years. Our findings distill five themes describing the executives' learnings. First, the intervention allowed the participants to experience historical consciousness through (a) personal connections with collective traumas, (b) awareness of the effects of the transgenerational transmission of collective traumas, and (c) the development of narrative competence. After two years, the participants identified two additional learnings in their organizational contexts: (d) they became more aware of how they manage their emotions, and (e) they identified perceived changes in their role as leaders. We propose that business schools encourage historical consciousness to better equip individuals in their roles as executives and leaders. Un appel à une plus grande prize en compte de l'Histoire dans les études de gestion et d'organization suggère une nouvelle responsabilité pour les écoles de commerce de former des leaders historiquement conscients. Alors que le monde est progressivement soumis à des événements économiques et sociaux, les acteurs organizationnels doivent mieux comprendre et gérer les émotions qui en découlent sans être menés par une rationalité limitée. En enseignant la transmission transgénérationnelle des traumatismes collectifs à deux cohortes dans une école de commerce de renommée internationale en Europe et en Asie, notre étude explore la façon don't la conscience historique peut être interprétée dans le context d'un program de formation des cadres et les conséquences pédagogiques de ce processus au cours de deux années. Nos conclusions font émerger cinq thèmes décrivant les apprentissages des dirigeants. Tout d'abord, l'intervention a permis aux participants d'expérimenter la conscience historique grâce à 1) l'approfondissment de leurs expériences personnelles liées aux traumatismes collectifs, 2) la conscience des impacts de la transmission transgénérationnelle des traumatismes collectifs, et 3) l'évolution de la compétence narrative. Les deux années écoulées, les participants ont identifié deux enseignements supplémentaires dans leurs contextes professionels: 4) ils sont devenus plus attentifs à la gestion de leurs émotions, et 5) ils ont identifié des changements perçus dans leur position en tant que dirigeants. Grâce aux conclusions de notre étude, nous proposons que les écoles de commerce encouragent la consience historique afin de mieux équiper les individus dans leur position en tant que dirigeants et leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this analysis, I employ Husserl's three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits' logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga's overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits' work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work – namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play – namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advances in the field of human stem cells are often a source of public and ethical controversy. Researchers must frequently balance diverse societal perspectives on questions of morality with the pursuit of medical therapeutics and innovation. Recent developments in brain organoids make this challenge even more acute. Brain organoids are a new class of brain surrogate generated from human pluripotent stem cells (hPSCs). They have gained traction as a model for studying the intricacies of the human brain by using advancements in stem cell biology to recapitulate aspects of the developing human brain in vitro. However, recent observation of neural oscillations spontaneously emerging from these organoids raises the question of whether brain organoids are or could become conscious. At the same time, brain organoids offer a potentially unique opportunity to scientifically understand consciousness. To address these issues, experimental biologists, philosophers, and ethicists united to discuss the possibility of consciousness in human brain organoids and the consequent ethical and moral implications.

BackgroundThere is an urgent need for easy-to-perform bedside measures to detect residual consciousness in clinically unresponsive patients with acute brain injury. Interestingly, the sympathetic control of pupil size is thought to be lost in states of unconsciousness. We therefore hypothesized that administration of brimonidine (an alpha-2-adrenergic agonist) eye drops into one eye should produce a pharmacologic Horner's syndrome if the clinically unresponsive patient is conscious, but not if the patient is unconscious. Here, in a first step to explore this hypothesis, we investigated the potential of brimonidine eye drops to distinguish preserved sympathetic pupillary function in awake volunteers from impairment of sympathetic tone in patients in a coma.MethodsWe enrolled comatose patients admitted for acute brain injury to one of the intensive care units (ICU) of a tertiary referral center, in whom EEG and/or neuroimaging for all practical purposes had ruled out residual consciousness. Exclusion criteria were deep sedation, medications with known drug interactions with brimonidine, and a history of eye disease. Age- and sex-matched healthy and awake volunteers served as controls. We measured pupils of both eyes, under scotopic conditions, at baseline and five times 5-120 min after administering brimonidine into the right eye, using automated pupillometry. Primary outcomes were miosis and anisocoria at the individual and group levels.ResultsWe included 15 comatose ICU patients (seven women, mean age 59 ± 13.8 years) and 15 controls (seven women, mean age 55 ± 16.3 years). At 30 min, miosis and anisocoria were seen in all 15 controls (mean difference between the brimonidine-treated pupil and the control pupil: - 1.31 mm, 95% CI [- 1.51; - 1.11], p  0.99). This effect was unchanged after 120 min and remained robust in sensitivity analyses correcting for baseline pupil size, age, and room illuminance.ConclusionIn this proof-of-principle study, brimonidine eye drops produced anisocoria in awake volunteers but not in comatose patients with brain injury. This suggests that automated pupillometry after administration of brimonidine can distinguish between the extremes of the spectrum of consciousness (i.e., fully conscious vs. deeply comatose). A larger study testing the "intermediate zone" of disorders of consciousness in the ICU seems warranted.

Establishing the neural mechanisms responsible for the altered global states of consciousness during anesthesia and dissociating these from other drug-related effects remains a challenge in consciousness research. We investigated differences in brain activity between connectedness and disconnectedness by administering various anesthetics at concentrations designed to render 50% of the subjects unresponsive. One hundred and sixty healthy male subjects were randomized to receive either propofol (1.7 μg/ml; n = 40), dexmedetomidine (1.5 ng/ml; n = 40), sevoflurane (0.9% end-tidal; n = 40), S-ketamine (0.75 μg/ml; n = 20), or saline placebo (n = 20) for 60 min using target-controlled infusions or vaporizer with end-tidal monitoring. Disconnectedness was defined as unresponsiveness to verbal commands probed at 2.5-min intervals and unawareness of external events in a postanesthesia interview. High-resolution positron emission tomography (PET) was used to quantify regional cerebral metabolic rates of glucose (CMRglu) utilization. Contrasting scans where the subjects were classified as connected and responsive versus disconnected and unresponsive revealed that for all anesthetics, except S-ketamine, the level of thalamic activity differed between these states. A conjunction analysis across the propofol, dexmedetomidine and sevoflurane groups confirmed the thalamus as the primary structure where reduced metabolic activity was related to disconnectedness. Widespread cortical metabolic suppression was observed when these subjects, classified as either connected or disconnected, were compared with the placebo group, suggesting that these findings may represent necessary but alone insufficient mechanisms for the change in the state of consciousness.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Experimental anesthesia is commonly used in the search for measures of brain function which could distinguish between global states of consciousness. However, most previous studies have not been designed to separate effects related to consciousness from other effects related to drug exposure. We employed a novel study design to disentangle these effects by exposing subjects to predefined EC50 doses of four commonly used anesthetics or saline placebo. We demonstrate that state-related effects are remarkably limited compared with the widespread cortical effects related to drug exposure. In particular, decreased thalamic activity was associated with disconnectedness with all used anesthetics except for S-ketamine.

A central question in consciousness theories is whether one is dealing with a dichotomous ("all-or-none") or a gradual phenomenon. In this 7T fMRI study, we investigated whether dichotomy or gradualness in fact depends on the brain region associated with perceptual awareness reports. Both male and female human subjects performed an emotion discrimination task (fear vs neutral bodies) presented under continuous flash suppression with trial-based perceptual awareness measures. Behaviorally, recognition sensitivity increased linearly with increased stimuli awareness and was at chance level during perceptual unawareness. Physiologically, threat stimuli triggered a slower heart rate than neutral ones during "almost clear" stimulus experience, indicating freezing behavior. Brain results showed that activity in the occipitotemporal, parietal, and frontal regions as well as in the amygdala increased with increased stimulus awareness while early visual areas showed the opposite pattern. The relationship between temporal area activity and perceptual awareness best fitted a gradual model while the activity in frontoparietal areas fitted a dichotomous model. Furthermore, our findings illustrate that specific experimental decisions, such as stimulus type or the approach used to evaluate awareness, play pivotal roles in consciousness studies and warrant careful consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents—in the absence of post-perceptual processes—can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself. In this review, Panagiotaropoulos reviews empirical evidence suggesting that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a critical role in consciousness. In particular, the convergence of multiple phenomena related to consciousness in the PFC suggests its integrative role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conscious experiences in infants remain poorly understood. In this NeuroView, Passos-Ferreira discusses recent evidence for and against consciousness in newborn babies. She argues that the weight of evidence from neuroimaging and behavioral studies supports the thesis that newborn infants are conscious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience. Cellular and systems neuroscience points to a thalamic contribution to consciousness. Matrix-thalamocortical loops support wakefulness and perceptual threshold, and core-thalamocortical loops maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. The mesoscale architecture of these loops may explain general properties of conscious contents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sleep is a universal, essential biological process. It is also an invaluable window on consciousness. It tells us that consciousness can be lost but also that it can be regained, in all its richness, when we are disconnected from the environment and unable to reflect. By considering the neurophysiological differences between dreaming and dreamless sleep, we can learn about the substrate of consciousness and understand why it vanishes. We also learn that the ongoing state of the substrate of consciousness determines the way each experience feels regardless of how it is triggered—endogenously or exogenously. Dreaming consciousness is also a window on sleep and its functions. Dreams tell us that the sleeping brain is remarkably lively, recombining intrinsic activation patterns from a vast repertoire, freed from the requirements of ongoing behavior and cognitive control. The paper by Tononi et al. discusses what sleep reveals about the substrate of consciousness, how experience can vanish during sleep, and how dreams can be supported by a brain largely disconnected from the environment, unreflective, and forgetful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so—changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves—and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies. In this perspective, Mudrik et al. call for more naturalistic studies of consciousness, given the artificial nature of most experimental manipulations. Despite the entailed challenges, they argue that this will increase ecological validity, generate new questions, and yield stronger effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stanislas Dehaene is a cognitive neuroscientist elucidating the biological mechanisms that give rise to human perception and cognition. In a conversation with Neuron , he talks about his ongoing interest in consciousness research, the role of theory in neuroscience, and his current work on education and the science of learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces of sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of the data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness and then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions. In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces between sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness, then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories. Consciousness theories are hotly debated but can be misaligned in scope or approach, fueling discussions centered on differences. Storm et al. argue that some seemingly insurmountable disagreements can instead be interpreted as complementary in an integrative neurobiological view on consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The neuroscience of creativity is built on a tacit and near universal assumption that is false. Paradoxically, this is not contentious; once made explicit, the assumption is readily conceded as false. Psychology regards creativity as made up of many complex, multifaceted, and varied cognitive and emotional processes deployed across many different domains. But we instead think of, and treat, creativity as if it were a single, separate, cohesive, and discrete thing--as in, Einstein had it. In a straightforward extension of this fallacy, cognitive neuroscientists have looked for uniquely creative cognition that (1) is distinct from all other kinds of cognition and (2) has a proprietary neural substrate. In other words, a standalone and monolithic creativity faculty in the brain that manages only creativity and all creativity. First, this paper brings into sharp focus the nature and ubiquity of this fallacy. It then outlines the alternative theoretical position that is (1) based on fundamental neural principles and (2) predicated on taking seriously the concept of creativity as complex and diverse. Like morality or secretiveness, it holds that creativity does not exist as its own, specialized entity in the brain. Instead, its neurocognitive mechanisms are distributed, embedded, and varied; that is, creativity is everywhere and multiply realizable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plotinus treats memory not simply as a capacity of the soul, but as an essential part of the process of the soul’s ongoing self-formation. Plotinus argues that memory and forgetting affect the soul, now and in the future. Since memories define who one is and who one is going to be, the soul must learn how it can or should shape memories. I address the topic of memory-shaping in Plotinus not only as an epistemological and metaphysical topic or an ethical problem, but as a “psychological” or “psychotherapeutic” issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Life and death education, as noted from the literatures, has been studied and researched extensively in China, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Our own research undertakings over the past several years, situated in different sociocultural settings have delved into aspects of life and death that could help advance theoretical understanding of the subject matters (e.g., does the meaning of “effective life functioning” connote differing interpretations for different cultural groups?). Situating within the framework of life and death education, we expand the study of trans-humanism by introducing an extended prefix or nomenclature known as “trans-mystical”. Specifically, our philosophized concept of trans-mysticism considers a related concept, which we term as a “trans-mystical mindset”. A trans-mystical mindset, differing from an ordinary mindset, from our philosophical rationalization, is defined as “a person’s higher-order state of consciousness, espousing her perception, judgment, belief, and attempted interpretation of life and death phenomena that are mystifying and fall outside the ordinary boundaries of human psyche.” Our focus of inquiry, as reported in the present article, seeks to advance our proposition: that a trans-mystical mindset, unlike an ordinary mindset, may help a person to rationalize, appreciate, and understand metaphysical contexts, mystical experiences, and the like. This focus, interestingly, serves to highlight an important discourse - namely, that there is a dichotomy in theoretical lenses (i.e., objective reality vs. individual subjectivity) that a person may use to rationalize the significance or non-significance of universal contexts, events, phenomena, etc. (e.g., a person’s experience of “premonition”). As such, then, there is an important question that we seek to consider: whether philosophization, or the use of philosophical psychology, would yield perceived “scientific evidence” to support or to reject the study of metaphysicism, mysticism, and the like? For example, does our philosophization of an “equivalency” between a person’s trans-mystical mindset and her experience of self-transcendence help to normalize and/or to scientize the subject matters of metaphysicism, mysticism, etc.? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THE PRACTICE OF DUTY ROUNDS (also called community rounds or simply duty) is overdue for critical assessment, particularly because of its reliance on surveillance culture and the potential hazards of such surveillance to building authentic community. In this collaborative autoethnography, one Black residential life professional's experience with duty rounds reveals the burden of double consciousness endured by Black professionals in this role. Remedies for more liberatory community accountability practices and the need to address racist behavior when directed toward any community members are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advanced meditation such as jhana meditation can produce various altered states of consciousness (jhanas) and cultivate rewarding psychological qualities including joy, peace, compassion, and attentional stability. Mapping the neurobiological substrates of jhana meditation can inform the development and application of advanced meditation to enhance well‐being. Only two prior studies have attempted to investigate the neural correlates of jhana meditation, and the rarity of adept practitioners has largely restricted the size and extent of these studies. Therefore, examining the consistency and reliability of observed brain responses associated with jhana meditation can be valuable. In this study, we aimed to characterize functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) reliability within a single subject over repeated runs in canonical brain networks during jhana meditation performed by an adept practitioner over 5 days (27 fMRI runs) inside an ultra‐high field 7 Tesla MRI scanner. We found that thalamus and several cortical networks, that is, the somatomotor, limbic, default‐mode, control, and temporo‐parietal, demonstrated good within‐subject reliability across all jhanas. Additionally, we found that several other relevant brain networks (e.g., attention, salience) showed noticeable increases in reliability when fMRI measurements were adjusted for variability in self‐reported phenomenology related to jhana meditation. Overall, we present a preliminary template of reliable brain areas likely underpinning core neurocognitive elements of jhana meditation, and highlight the utility of neurophenomenological experimental designs for better characterizing neuronal variability associated with advanced meditative states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: According to a seminal hypothesis stated by Crick and Koch in 1995, one is not aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex (V1) because this region lacks reciprocal connections with prefrontal cortex (PFC). Methods: We provide here a neuropsychological illustration of this hypothesis in a patient with a very rare form of cortical blindness: ventral and dorsal cortical pathways were lesioned bilaterally while V1 areas were partially preserved. Results: Visual stimuli escaped conscious perception but still activated V1 regions that were functionally disconnected from PFC. Interpretation: These results are consistent with the hypothesis of a causal role of PFC in visual awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]