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It is well known that in assignment markets competitive prices always exist, but no price mechanism is strategy-proof for all agents. We investigate the extent a single agent can influence three special competitive price vectors by misreporting his/her reservation values. We provide an exact formula how the minimum, the maximum, and the fair competitive price vectors change, and show that at the fair prices no agent can gain more than half of the deviation from the true values. We also derive the analogous results for the corresponding core payoffs of the associated assignment game via graph-theoretic characterizations of the two side-optimal core payoffs. • Sensitivity of competitive equilibrium prices in assignment markets are studied. • Any agent can influence the fair prices by misreporting his/her reservation values. • An exact formula is given how the fair price of a single misreporting agent changes. • Analogous results are given for core payoffs of the associated assignment game. • Graph-theoretic characterizations of the side-optimal core payoffs are used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article is a challenge in trying to capture the changes that the Common Agricultural Policy has undergone throughout its existence, the successive restructuring caused by the changing European reality, the need to ensure the Community's food security, competitive pricing policy and the importance of the growing role of rural development in both the CAP and other European Union policies, interconnected to ensure sustainable rural development. Thus, this article makes the transition from the theoretical-methodological aspects of rural development to the reality of this development, as designed jointly (in a unitary way) by the countries that were from the beginning members of this organization. It will present, in a summarized form, the conception and pragmatism of the European Union in the issue of rural development, considered as an inseparable part of the broad process of sustainable development. Based on this premise, important aspects will be reflected, such as: the characteristics of the European rural area, the content and evolution of the common agricultural policy, the new CAP reform which expands its scope and introduces the concept of common rural development, the diversity of rural areas in the countries of the European Union, the European model of agriculture, the transformations that have taken place in the financing mechanisms of agriculture and rural development.

The article is a challenge in trying to capture the changes that the Common Agricultural Policy has undergone throughout its existence, the successive restructuring caused by the changing European reality, the need to ensure the Community's food security, competitive pricing policy and the importance of the growing role of rural development in both the CAP and other European Union policies, interconnected to ensure sustainable rural development. Thus, this article makes the transition from the theoretical-methodological aspects of rural development to the reality of this development, as designed jointly (in a unitary way) by the countries that were from the beginning members of this organization. It will present, in a summarized form, the conception and pragmatism of the European Union in the issue of rural development, considered as an inseparable part of the broad process of sustainable development. Based on this premise, important aspects will be reflected, such as: the characteristics of the European rural area, the content and evolution of the common agricultural policy, the new CAP reform which expands its scope and introduces the concept of common rural development, the diversity of rural areas in the countries of the European Union, the European model of agriculture, the transformations that have taken place in the financing mechanisms of agriculture and rural development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To achieve the self-sufficiency of salt, prices need to be considered. This study develops a dynamic simulation model of salt supply chains to analyze the significant factors affecting prices from upstream to Indonesia's downstream levels. A set of dynamic simulation models is developed to achieve competitive prices using system dynamics. Furthermore, the system dynamics framework is utilized because it can model non-linear behavior between variables with a significant contribution to the system. Based on the simulation results, local and imported salt prices may compete by implementing land integration systems. This system is likely to reduce production costs and increase farmers' revenues to IDR 61,211,892 at the end of the simulation in 2035. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Repurchase intention is included in post-purchase behavior, so it becomes an important topic to be investigated. This study aims to determine the effect of trust, competitive prices, and application quality on repurchase intention in Traveloka online travel agents. This study uses an explanatory research approach using multiple linear regression analysis methods. Data sources come from distributing questionnaires online. The sampling method uses purposive sampling with the criteria of respondents being at least 18 years old and having made a purchase of at least one time on the Traveloka mobile application. The sample used was 150 respondents. The results of this study indicate that the variables of trust, competitive prices, and application quality significantly influence the repurchase intention of Traveloka online travel agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer-seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results concerning buyers and sellers' equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out that, by playing first, sellers are able to instigate an outcome that corresponds to the sellers' optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: To increase the security of energy supply, lessen dependence on crude oil import and buffer against the impacts of large change in crude oil prices, the Thai government initiated and officially announced the national ethanol fuel program in year 2000. Since then, domestic ethanol demand has grown rapidly. Presently, all commercial ethanol in Thailand is produced from molasses as Thai law prohibits producing it from sugar cane directly. This is likely to limit ethanol supply in the near future. One possible solution is to supply more ethanol from cassava which is widely cultivated in this country. However, its production cost has not yet been known for certain. The objective of this study is to estimate the life cycle cost of ethanol production from cassava and to assess its economic competitiveness with gasoline in the Thai fuel market. Based on the record of cassava prices during the years 2002–2005, it was found that using it as feedstock would share more than 50% of the ethanol from cassava total production cost. It was also found that a bio-ethanol plant, with a capacity of 150,000l/day, can produce ethanol from cassava in a range of ex-factory costs from 16.42 to 20.83baht/l of gasoline equivalent (excluding all taxes), with an average cost of 18.15baht/l of gasoline equivalent (41, 52 and 45UScents/l gasoline equivalent respectively, based on 2005 exchange rate). In the same years, the range of 95-octane gasoline prices in Thailand varied from 6.18baht to 20.86baht/l, with an average price of 11.50baht/l (15, 52 and 29UScents/l respectively, based on 2005 exchange rate) which were much cheaper than the costs of ethanol made from cassava. Thus, we conclude that under the scenario of low to normal crude oil price, ethanol from cassava is not competitive with gasoline. The gasoline price has to rise consistently above 18.15baht (45UScents)/l before ethanol made from cassava can be commercially competitive with gasoline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]