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The article scrutinizes the dynamic interplay between theory and practice in EU competition policy. Through an in-depth analysis of theoretical and empirical insights, the article evaluates the impact of antitrust measures, merger control, and sector-specific regulations on EU flagship initiatives and economic growth. Emphasizing the pivotal role of competition policy in the single market, it calls for heightened theoretical underpinnings to enhance policy efficacy. As the article unfolds against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, it underscores the policy's adaptability to new strategic priorities, advocating for innovation, resilience, and sustainable development. The analysis reveals that while the European Union's competition policy has contributed to market efficiency and economic growth, challenges persist, particularly in addressing weak competition in certain sectors and adapting to evolving global economic dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2023, the Swedish Competition Authority adopted a decision accepting commitments from Finnair to reverse a policy implemented with online travel agencies. Specifically, Finnair was preventing online travel agencies from marketing Finnair airfares at a discounted level (relative to the airfares offered by Finnair to the online travel agencies) to customers who were searching for Finnair tickets online, in particular on metasearch websites. This case is noteworthy for three reasons. First, this commitments decision has commercial and strategic implications for the sector across the European Union. Second, while conflicting legal arguments were raised, the economic assessment was quite unequivocal, pointing to the challenged conduct being very likely to generate anti-competitive effects. Third, the Swedish Competition Authority's investigation overlapped with the entry into force of the 2022 European Commission's Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and showed some potential ambiguity in its interpretation and application, which the investigation's outcome has hopefully alleviated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we compare a tax and a standard as environmental tools depending on firms' R &D strategy and the government's ability to credibly commit to its policy. We consider a duopoly model where production is polluting and in an effort to mitigate emissions, firms invest in green R &D (in the presence of technological spillovers) either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. We explore two policy games in which the regulator establishes an emission tax or an emission standard either before or after firms engage in R &D. We endogenize both the firms' R &D strategy and the regulator's choice of policy instrument. We find that an emission standard is adopted only when firms choose not to cooperate. Conversely, a tax is desirable when firms collaborate in green R &D. Moreover, we expand our framework by offering the opportunity for the regulator to authorize or ban cooperation in green R &D before the firms make their strategic decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines policy uncertainty on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in South Africa, emphasising the extensive regulatory review by the Competition Commission under the 'public interest consideration' criterion. It aims to identify the cost implications and uncertainties associated with M&A transactions to propose measures to reduce these uncertainties. Utilising qualitative methodologies, the study gathers empirical evidence through interviews with companies and competition lawyers involved in the M&A processes. The findings reveal significant concerns about economic uncertainty, merger control, and policy and regulation impacting investment decisions. Policy uncertainty, particularly in the context of merger regulation, imposes substantial cost implications and delays on M&A activities, negatively affecting investment, growth, and economic development. It emphasises the necessity for a regulatory framework that minimises disruptions and costs to business participants. The findings suggest that addressing policy uncertainty and streamlining regulatory processes are crucial steps towards enhancing South Africa's attractiveness as an investment destination and fostering economic growth and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a framework of bilateral agreements governing cooperation in competition policy since 1991, the European Union (EU) and United States of America (US) established a new Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue in 2021, which was different from previous cooperation and separate from the transatlantic Trade and Technology Council. Drawing from the principal-agent literature, this article argues that the choice to establish the new Joint Dialogue can be understood as an exercise of discretionary authority by agents in different jurisdictions with similar preferences who responded similarly to the common external factor of digitalisation. Facing new and shared challenges arising from the digital economy, the EU and US competition authorities undertook a new effort at cooperation – the Joint Dialogue – through which regulatory agents at various levels can interact, exchange information and improve enforcement in a rapidly changing business environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The internationalization of competition law in recent decades has been very successful. A very large number of jurisdictions have now adopted competition laws and apply them in marked similarity. And yet, at times, these laws, despite the similarity in wording and theory, lead to substantial differences when enforced. Differences in the meaning attributed to various concepts, to the goals of competition laws and to the methods of implementation, may result in inconsistency in the enforcement. The Latin American experience reveals a certain level of mutation process from the model laws through the flexibilization in their competition law enforcement, influenced by their own social values and beliefs, as well as their economic, political, institutional, and legal cultures. These cultural challenges need to be solved internally in each jurisdiction to allow competition law enforcement to further develop. Those jurisdictions where competition law enforcement has evolved the most are those that have adapted their competition laws to their cultural realities, while at the same time learning from the international experience. An interdisciplinary debate, at the local and regional levels, has showed to be an essential tool to help find possible solutions to the different challenges Latin American enforcers face. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background and methods: Competition regulation has a strong influence on the relative market power of firms. As such, competition regulation can complement industry-specific measures designed to address harms associated with excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. This study aimed to examine, through a public health lens, assessments and decisions made by competition authorities in four jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU)) involving three harmful consumer product industries (alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, tobacco). We analysed legal case documents, sourced from online public registers and dating back as far as the online records extended, using a narrative approach. Regulatory decisions and harms described by the authorities were inductively coded, focusing on the affected group(s) (e.g., consumers) and the nature of the harms (e.g., price increases) identified. Results: We identified 359 cases published by competition authorities in Australia (n = 202), South Africa (n = 44), the US (n = 27), and the EU (n = 86). Most cases (n = 239) related to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Competition authorities in Australia, the US, and the EU were found to make many decisions oriented towards increasing the affordability and accessibility of alcohol beverages, soft drinks, and tobacco products. Such decisions were very often made despite the presence of consumption-reduction public health policies. In comparison, South Africa's competition authorities routinely considered broader issues, including 'Black Economic Empowerment' and potential harms to workers. Conclusion: Many of the competition regulatory decisions assessed likely facilitated the concentration of market power in the industries we explored. Nevertheless, there appears to be potential for competition regulatory frameworks to play a more prominent role in promoting and protecting the public's health through tighter regulation of excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neo‐Brandeisian legal scholars have recently revived the ideas of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who championed state regulation that preserved market competition and economic liberty in the face of concentrated private power. Yet ultimately and perhaps paradoxically, it has been Europe and not the United States that has proved more hospitable to accommodating key features of the Brandeisian approach. We explain this outcome by tracing the evolution of EU competition law to gain insight into the social learning processes through which such regimes change over time. We argue that the EU's administrative system, which provides the European Commission with significant bureaucratic discretion, has facilitated processes of ongoing deliberative adjustment to policy and practice, which over time has resulted in a system of "regulated competition" with striking similarities to the Brandeisian vision. The analysis highlights how administrative law institutions condition how regulatory regimes evolve in response to acquired experience and knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Future emergencies from climate degradation or diseases are likely, prompting ongoing investment in emergency readiness and learning from country responses. South Africa’s healthcare system, divided into public and private sectors, required a coordinated, intersectoral response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A coordinated action that the South African government took was adapting competition regulations. The South African Department of Trade, Industry and Competition on 19 March 2020, published a block exemption (easing of competition rules) for healthcare to promote standardization of practices across the health sector and facilitate agreements between the National Department of Health and the private sector to ensure adequate service delivery to all South Africans. Methods We assessed how much coverage the block exemption for healthcare received in the media and if the scope included details of what the exemption meant, how stakeholders and the public could use it, and the resulting public sentiment. We conducted a media content analysis to select, screen and assess the media material. Online and social-media articles in the public domain from 19 March 2020 to 19 March 2021, in English were considered. Results We analysed 22 online media articles that matched our inclusion criteria. Twenty of these reflected a positive sentiment, and two were negative. Media reported on the COVID-19 block exemption in healthcare only in the first three months of our study period. The articles primarily communicated what the block exemption meant, focusing on allowing collaboration, the purpose of the exemption, the activities granted under the exemption and the actors to whom it applied. It’s estimated that these media articles could have been read by up to 432,003 people out of a total population of just under 43 million people over the age of 15 years. Conclusion In times of crisis, the media has a significant responsibility to provide accurate information to the public. However, the accuracy and reliability of such information depends on the quality of official sources on which the media relies. Our research shows that very few media reports were available about the block exemption for healthcare. While the government implemented the exemption, it did not communicate its purpose directly to the public. Our research highlights the need for better communication between policymakers and the media.

Abstract Background and methods Competition regulation has a strong influence on the relative market power of firms. As such, competition regulation can complement industry-specific measures designed to address harms associated with excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. This study aimed to examine, through a public health lens, assessments and decisions made by competition authorities in four jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU)) involving three harmful consumer product industries (alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, tobacco). We analysed legal case documents, sourced from online public registers and dating back as far as the online records extended, using a narrative approach. Regulatory decisions and harms described by the authorities were inductively coded, focusing on the affected group(s) (e.g., consumers) and the nature of the harms (e.g., price increases) identified. Results We identified 359 cases published by competition authorities in Australia (n = 202), South Africa (n = 44), the US (n = 27), and the EU (n = 86). Most cases (n = 239) related to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Competition authorities in Australia, the US, and the EU were found to make many decisions oriented towards increasing the affordability and accessibility of alcohol beverages, soft drinks, and tobacco products. Such decisions were very often made despite the presence of consumption-reduction public health policies. In comparison, South Africa’s competition authorities routinely considered broader issues, including ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ and potential harms to workers. Conclusion Many of the competition regulatory decisions assessed likely facilitated the concentration of market power in the industries we explored. Nevertheless, there appears to be potential for competition regulatory frameworks to play a more prominent role in promoting and protecting the public’s health through tighter regulation of excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries.

The European automotive industry is transitioning from combustion engines to electric vehicles but lags behind international competitors. This geoeconomic competition has contributed to the revival of industrial policy in the EU. However, EU competition policy restricts more vertical industrial policy approaches. In this context, the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) have emerged as a novel governance tool. This article examines this transformation in EU industrial policy by focusing on the Battery IPCEIs. The article includes an in-depth case study of the Battery IPCEIs, using secondary literature and 11 expert interviews. It concludes that IPCEIs represent a gradual regulatory-developmental turn within EU industrial policy by drawing on developmental state theory in a European context, critical EU integration literature, and global production networks research. In response to geoeconomic competition and the region's lack of productive capacities, the EU is indirectly facilitating the development of European battery innovation and production networks by issuing direct state aid at the national level. However, the EU's participation in the subsidy race and the global green-tech race via "green" industrial policy indicates only a partial shift in the relationship between states and markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) has a positive impact on average labor wage. • Labor income share increases more in local state-owned and nonstate-owned enterprises. • AML effectively promotes industry competition and boosts the labor income share. • AML reduces market power, curbs monopoly profit, and increases the average labor wage. This study examines the impact of increased market competition on labor income share. We use the enactment of China's Anti-Monopoly Law as a quasi-natural experiment. The results reveal that the Anti-Monopoly Law has a significant positive effect on the labor income share of firms with higher market power. This is because the rising market competition, effected by the Anti-Monopoly Law, inhibits market power and increases average labor wages. Our findings are relevant for firms in provinces with higher administrative monopolies, with less competition, and under industries with less competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two different jurisdictions (EU and Spain) at different times and the exogeneity of the introduction date enable us to identify their impact using difference-in-differences estimations. We empirically show that leniency programs, by destabilizing existing cartels, allow for the detection of the longer-lasting ones in the short run. In the long run, our results suggest that destabilization effects prevail, and leniency programs discourage the creation of new cartels. Specifically, our findings indicate that the duration of detected cartels almost doubles in the short run and nearly halves in the long run. Finally, our study reveals that the introduction of leniency programs results in a significant increase in the average fines per cartel case, both before and after taking into account the fine reductions resulting from these programs. This suggests that leniency programs contribute to stronger sanctions against cartels, enhancing their general deterrent effect. However, our findings also indicate that leniency programs lengthen the average duration of cartel investigations, which may hinder the ability of competition authorities to proactively pursue other cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How was the European Union's privacy regime built? Drawing on regime theory and carrying out qualitative document analysis, we present the evolution of the privacy regime across the three decades from the 1995 European Data Protection Directive to the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, the 2022 Data Governance Act and finally the 2022 Digital Markets package. Our analysis focuses on the European Commission and suggests that the privacy regime emerged out of the seemingly conflicting interplay between the (digital) single market whose power draws on the network effects of expanding data resources and concerns for personal privacy that seek limiting data gathering itself. Contrary to expectations, potential tensions between competition law and consumer protection have not hindered or decelerated the formation of the regulatory regime. In fact, these tensions have proven to be surprisingly productive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital market regulations respond to technological changes and global dynamics, but also to how political actors shape markets. Focusing on the Digital Markets Act, this article explains the EU's marketcraft as the result of a struggle in the policy field between political actors promoting competing economic ideas in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical context. We show that significant discursive and policy change in digital market governance has occurred because of shifting coalitions between three constellations of actors, which we call market-correctors, market-busters, and market-directors. Tracking the ongoing campaign to challenge Big Tech and define the meaning of digital sovereignty, we argue that market-directors have ushered in potentially comprehensive policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2023 Merger Guidelines (MGs) change the Agencies' narrative regarding non-horizontal mergers. They follow a four-pronged approach: (1) They blend horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. (2) They simplify the narrative about non-horizontal mergers. (3) They consolidate and broaden the theories of harm in non-horizontal mergers. (4) They blend economics and law analysis. In this article, we elaborate on these points. We discuss how the MGs' anticompetitive presumptions apply to non-horizontal mergers, relate them to the economics literature, and provide examples. We finish discussing the economic rationale of the structural presumption involving rivals' exit concerns due to the exercise of market power and propose a path forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes about market definition are often regarded to be dispositive of litigated merger cases. Yet the market definition process is illogical—circular at best but actually far worse because it distorts or discards much of the available information on a proposed merger's effects. Against this background, the 2023 Merger Guidelines present a paradox. On one hand, they double down on market definition through what may be their most important change: tightening and augmenting the so-called structural presumption, under which high market shares are sufficient to presumptively block a merger. The importance of market definition is thereby elevated because one cannot know what market shares to use unless a market is defined. On the other hand, the 2023 Merger Guidelines' longest segment—on market definition and market shares—demotes the familiar methods (including the hypothetical monopolist test) and expresses a clear preference for the use of direct evidence on a proposed merger's effects. But direct evidence, as is well known, is a substitute for market definition, not a way to define a market in which market shares can then be calculated. This change thus disables the structural presumption. The analysis here identifies and deepens the resulting conundrum by elaborating the disconnect between the proper economic analysis of mergers and the market definition paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2023 Merger Guidelines make some notable improvements over the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. They give greater emphasis to the idea that predicting the competitive effects of a proposed merger is inherently difficult and that to block a merger the government need only show a risk that the merger may substantially lessen competition – not that it will do so. They also give greater emphasis to dynamic competition and innovation – especially with regard to acquisitions of potential entrants – and they add useful material on multi-sided platforms. However, the treatment of market definition in the 2023 Merger Guidelines may weaken horizontal merger enforcement by demoting the role of the "hypothetical monopolist test," which is used to define markets for the purpose of measuring market shares, and by removing extensive material from prior guidelines that explained why market shares measured in narrower markets tend to be more informative than market shares measured in broader markets. The 2023 Merger Guidelines lower the market concentration thresholds that trigger a presumption by the antitrust enforcement agencies that a merger may substantially lessen competition, but the enforcement data suggest that change will have little effect in practice. The 2023 Merger Guidelines also may lead to less effective deterrence of harmful mergers because they are not well targeted at the mergers that are most likely to substantially lessen competition. One cannot prioritize everything. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary Building a new development pattern is a strategic choice made in the light of China's own development stage and conditions, taking full account of economic globalization and changes in the external environment. It is an inevitable choice for China to rebuild its competitive advantage after entering a new development stage. In-depth exploration of the industrial policy system's evolution and main trends that adapt to the new development pattern is not only the need for actively responding to the actions of developed countries to suppress China with the stick of industrial policy. but also the need for promoting China's high-quality development. For more than 40 years since the reform and opening up, the main goal of industrial policy system has been to promote China's economic growth. The selective industrial policy committed to catching up with developed countries has promoted economic growth, but also caused great damage to the market environment of fair competition. Under the new development pattern, stimulating internal competition and strengthening external security have become the new main goals of industrial policy system. To build a new development pattern, industrial policy is still an indispensable tool for promoting domestic and international double circulation and promoting high-quality economic development due to great changes in internal and external environment and factors such as the development environment of the times and industrial policy objectives. However, the previous industrial policy objectives and pattern should be adjusted and upgraded. The narrow industrial policy which is represented by industrial structure policy and industrial development policy with selective characteristics, scientific and technological innovation policy and competition policy and some other polices together constitute the broad industrial policy system closely related to economic development, but the implications of above policies overlap. Based on the perspective of economic development stage, this paper clarifies the integration. coordination withdrawal and reconstruction of industrial policy, scientific and technological innovation policy and competition policy. And we clarify the evolution of the three types of policies in the four stages of economic development, and try to explore the basic role of various policies in the construction of new development pattern. The new development pattern that makes the national economy supply and demand to achieve a virtuous cycle is a dynamic process. It requires that industrial policy and competition policy, special science and technology innovation policy dedicated to overcome the"stuck neck" difficulties and conventional science and technology innovation policy are balanced and coordinated with each other. Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes that under the diversified policy goals of the new development pattern. the relationship between the three types of economic policies is not the opposite but the complementary and coordinated. And China's policy system should be structured as follows: competition policy should be the basis of all policies: industrial policy and competition policy coordinate with each other; selective industrial policy gradually gives way to functional industrial policy; science and technology policy pay more attention to the front of the innovation chain than the back and the new nationwide system keeps the selective character. Finally, this paper further puts forward some suggestions to improve the industrial policy system under the new development pattern. such as establishing anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies. establishing a multi-level policy coordination mechanism. improving the whole-process governance mechanism of industrial policy. The conclusion in this paper is of great significance for exploring what kind of industrial policy system is needed in the new development pattern and what is the evolution trend of China's industrial policy system in the future. It also provides institutional innovation impetus and important policy tools for China to build a new development pattern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper considers the role that innovation plays in EU merger control analysis, and seeks to integrate perspectives highlighted by the philosophical literature on the so-called ‘direction of innovation’ in order to critically assess the impact of market concentration on the diversity of innovation and its ability to address larger normative questions and challenges, such as the transition to more sustainable economies. While normative goals other than competition are not an inherent part of merger control, this paper argues that in concentrated markets, ignoring such questions can play into the hands of the powerful merging entities, allowing them to further determine the direction of innovation to best serve their interests and business models rather than public interests. This is illustrated by critically discussing the merger between Bayer and Monsanto as an example.

China enacted the Anti‐Monopoly Law in 2008. This law is deemed a milestone of competition policy to improve market efficiency in the country. This paper builds a theoretical model and applies a difference‐in‐differences method using a firm‐level dataset of the 1998–2015 period to examine the impact of this law on firm productivity. We show that the enactment of this law significantly increased the total factor productivity (TFP) of the firms. The results are shown to be robust across alternative definitions of the treatment variable and alternative measures of productivity. Finally, we show that the productivity effect of this law tends to be stronger among state‐owned enterprises than private/foreign firms and large firms than small firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several theoretical propositions suggest that changes in economic activity can explain the decision to form a cartel. The majority of the propositions claim that cartel formation is more likely in expansionary and less likely in contractionary phases of the business cycle. The propositions are re-examined theoretically and by using data on detected cartels for the European Union. In both cases, the results cannot confirm that more cartels are formed in any of the business cycle phases and that correlated economic growth rates create higher incentives to collude. Furthermore, it cannot be confirmed that more cartels form shortly after respectively the trough or the peak in the business cycle. The conclusion is that cartel formation is unaffected by changes in the business cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European automotive industry is transitioning from combustion engines to electric vehicles but lags behind international competitors. This geoeconomic competition has contributed to the revival of industrial policy in the EU. However, EU competition policy restricts more vertical industrial policy approaches. In this context, the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) have emerged as a novel governance tool. This article examines this transformation in EU industrial policy by focusing on the Battery IPCEIs. The article includes an in-depth case study of the Battery IPCEIs, using secondary literature and 11 expert interviews. It concludes that IPCEIs represent a gradual regulatory-developmental turn within EU industrial policy by drawing on developmental state theory in a European context, critical EU integration literature, and global production networks research. In response to geoeconomic competition and the region’s lack of productive capacities, the EU is indirectly facilitating the development of European battery innovation and production networks by issuing direct state aid at the national level. However, the EU’s participation in the subsidy race and the global green-tech race via “green” industrial policy indicates only a partial shift in the relationship between states and markets.

Intensifying concerns about online platform firms’ rapid rise, expansion, and growing asymmetric power have attracted political scrutiny and undermined the legitimacy of a minimalist regulatory regime that is giving way to intense debate and increasingly interventionist governmental policies and enforcement actions. First, we view the rise of, and recent political responses to, the often-predatory power and manipulative conduct of platform firm in terms of a ‘Polanyian’ double movement in which the destabilising and destructive effects of unchecked corporate activities and market development eventually generates political and regulatory responses to constrain private power that threaten the social, political, and economic order. Second, incipient legal changes, most notably the EU’s proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, indicate a shift in regulatory emphasis from competition (and antitrust) policy and law towards more intensive and encompassing forms of socio-economic regulation. Finally, these regulatory changes will likely vary in character and significance across political jurisdictions, and embody distinctive and possibly divergent developmental trajectories. The EU may have a first-mover advantage in regulating platform firms, but we are only at the very beginning of a protracted and conflictual transformational process.

Although the use of algorithms has become increasingly prominent in the digital market, such algorithms are often opaque and prone to risks of making biased decisions. Algorithms could also be used to harm competition, such as by facilitating cartels. Such developments make it necessary to examine the readiness of existing competition law to tackle cases involving algorithms. This paper focuses on analysing Indonesian competition law to address the following issues: (1) how current Indonesian competition law deals with algorithms-related cases; (2) which indicators could detect anti-competitive algorithms; and (3) which competition policy approach could be considered in Indonesia to tackle the problem resulted from the use of algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) Commission proposes to 'green up' its enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU to allow producers to collectively overcome so-called first mover disadvantages that would result from inefficient market regulation. The Commission's reboot focuses on the last three exemption conditions. First, the consumer benefit condition is customized to use collective consumer benefits to determine whether consumers receive a 'fair share' of the benefits established under the efficiency condition. Here, the Commission bypasses the Dutch proposition to also take account of non-consumer benefits when investigating whether consumers are compensated for anticompetitive harm. Second, the indispensability condition is tasked to filter out greenwashing. Third, the residual competition condition is trusted to allow private collective action insofar it does not eliminate competition on price and/or innovation. Discussing both EU and Dutch proposals, this article finds that greening up Article 101(3) brings competition policy outside the limiting principles that define objective and effective competition enforcement in terms of voluntary exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses three routes for the formation of market-opening rules: competition enforcement, legislative rulemaking, and market investigation. Using examples and case studies related to facilitating market access in banking and payment systems, we illustrate essential features and limitations of the different modes of rulemaking. The interrelation between them is explored, emphasizing the merits of having them available in parallel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the media goods' dual economic and cultural role, merger and acquisition (M&A) assessments are complex and differ from M&As in other sectors. An additional layer of complexity is added to the assessment when various authorities are involved. An even more complicated matter is when the authorities have different remits. These authorities mostly comprise National Competition Authorities that enforce competition law, focused on economic considerations, and National Regulatory Authorities that enforce and oversee the application of media law, focused not only on setting rules and limitations on the media market but also on considering non-economic elements such as plurality. In certain countries, ministries and government authorities can intervene in these assessments. There have been discussions on the need for cooperation between authorities, however, mostly at the international level. Thus, little is known about the current cooperation procedures at the national level. The article proposes a typology of cooperation at the EU member states level and the United Kingdom and introduces the concept of the 'power pyramid' to represent the hierarchical relationships between authorities. Cooperation proves that competition policy and media-specific regulation are intertwined and are complementary. Furthermore, the article shows that having more than one authority assessing media M&As leads to media pluralism being more often explicitly one of the criteria used in the assessments, and thus providing a more holistic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Snowden revelations, Cambridge Analytica, and a policy vacuum created by technological convergence and neoliberal reforms, policy efforts to articulate oversight of digital platform markets gathered policymaker support and public attention internationally. In the U.S., examined here as a case study of these international policy efforts, competition policy emerged as a prominent governance mechanism over digital platforms, resulting in the current antitrust scrutiny of tech giants like Google and Meta. Drawing on policy documents, fieldwork, and expert interviews, I trace how antitrust reform proposals, pitched as reclaiming democratic governance over private markets, came to dominate platform policy discussions. I examine how policy efforts to address platform power via competition grappled with non-competitive harms arising in digital markets, such as threats to user privacy and disinformation flows. Finally, I show how these debates began to converge on the contours of an emergent governance paradigm for digital platform oversight. I argue that this governance framework, which seeks to optimize market mechanisms to discipline platform markets, has significant limitations, notably in addressing issues associated with big data commodification and quantification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1984, due to a US Department of Justice antitrust lawsuit, AT&T, the U.S. telecommunications monopoly, split into eight entities, including long-distance and local service providers known as Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). Vertical integration of suppliers typically benefits consumers by avoiding the issues associated with successive monopolies, where prices may be excessively high. The separation of long-distance and local services by the Department of Justice may seem counterintuitive, potentially driven by concerns over AT&T's size rather than economic rationale. This paper suggests that integrated monopolies have more willingness to build demand rigidity due to an absence of the free-riding problem, leading to higher prices. The implications extend to regulated firms and social media, highlighting the complexity of antitrust actions and their economic consequences on market dynamics and consumer welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antitrust policymakers in the United States and the European Union have announced that certain mergers should be blocked because of the presumed harm to innovation. Companies increasingly engage in innovation as a primary means of competing with rivals. This article considers the implications of innovation competition for antitrust merger policy. We argue that the presumption of innovative harm risks diminishing competition and reducing innovation. We propose an approach to evaluating whether mergers may lead to innovative efficiencies or harm. Furthermore, we suggest that the application of advances in the economics of technology and innovation can help determine the effects of mergers on welfare. We find that horizontal mergers can promote innovation competition by increasing innovative investment and expanding the benefits of innovation. We also find that vertical mergers can promote innovation competition by increasing innovative investment and improving commercialization. We further find that acquisition of entrants can increase entrepreneurship and innovation. We recommend that the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines should apply economic analysis to evaluate the effects of mergers on innovation competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper estimates the impact of reforming competition authorities on perceived antitrust effectiveness using methods of causal inference. We study how 20 countries reformed their competition authorities in depth between 1995 and 2020, and what has been the outcome of such reforms in the perceived competition policy effectiveness by the business community compared with 18 control countries in a balanced panel. As the political economy literature warned, we find that reforms paradoxically have not always improved antitrust effectiveness. Some of the reforms approved stalled or backlashed as politicians opted for a Machiavelli option: undertaking "counter‐reforms" even in the name of an apparent but deceptive progressiveness and pro‐competition drive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fairness is not foreign to competition law and fairness considerations are not new to it. However, the endemic uncertainty on its notion has traditionally made fairness unsuitable to act as a stand-alone applicable legal standard. Indeed, antitrust enforcers have usually been reluctant to engage with the unfairness of terms and conditions. Nonetheless, against the perceived undue corporate power and market concentration in the digital economy, fairness has recently gained center stage in the policy debate, especially in Europe where recent regulatory interventions have been declared to be aimed at promoting fairness in digital markets. Against this background, the article attempts to demonstrate that the vagueness and ambiguity associated with its meaning may make fairness particularly attractive to policy makers and that, accordingly, the revival of fairness risks being simply functional to grant them more discretion and room for intervention. JEL codes: K20, K21, L40, L50 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In literature, most studies on mergers focus purely on competition-related aspects; additional conditions that can apply are labelled non-competition goals or public interest considerations (PICs). The imposition of these conditions is garnering more attention from the competition authorities as a means to assist the struggling economy in South Africa. This paper reports the impact that various independent variables can have on the probability of certain public interest considerations being imposed on merger cases in South Africa with the use of a quantitative logit regression model. The study sample consists of 221 mergers between 2010 and 2019, and only includes cases with PICs as conditions to merge, based on all small, intermediate, and large mergers collected from Competition Commission and Tribunal newsletters, case files and company websites, as well as the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances. This research makes use of descriptive statistics and regression analysis from this unique database to analyse the data. The results indicate that for South Africa, the competition authorities focus on employment, supplier development fund programmes and Black economic empowerment conditions when considering which PIC to enforce on merger cases. The article contributes to the literature on competition policy and economics by adding to the minimal research already conducted and enhances our understanding of mergers with non-competition goals and the impact of these considerations in the South African merger framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool to govern of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of so-called gatekeepers to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a legal and from an economic perspective. Notwithstanding a number of benefits, we identify several issues with the current proposal. When looking at the core provisions of the proposal from an economic perspective, a number of of contention arise: many of the provisions seem to be quite narrow in scope and it seems difficult to extrapolate more general rules from them; the economic harm of some of the provisions is both uncertain and in principle debatable; the alleged (self-executing; non self-executing) distinction between different types of obligations cannot be verified; and, in addition, Art. 5–7 DMA seem to contain three distinct regulatory instruments; last but not least, while the DMA seeks to control existing gatekeepers, the "tipping" of markets and the rise of further gatekeepers is not guaranteed by the proposed regulation, this in turn leads to a larger critical analysis of the gatekeeper as the DMA's norm addressee. While the goals and nature of the DMA have gained in clarity throughout the legislative process, its scope remains somewhat obtuse. On the one hand it seems set on regulating gatekeepers as they exist today, on the other, it also aims to bring about systemic change in the digital single market. How it expects to achieve the latter is not entirely clear. On closer examination, the DMA also contains a complex enforcement regime that not only depends on the compliance of gatekeepers but may also forestall the envisioned speed and efficacy of the instrumment. In this light and by critically looking at the nature of ex ante and ex post measures in broader competition policy, we conclude that a reform of the competition policy regime would better suit the overalls aims of reining in big tech in future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stricter competition regulation in digital markets is a growing trend in the Global North, with the Digital Markets Act in Europe being the poster child of a more interventionist approach. In this article we do not focus on the debate surrounding these European efforts (which has meritorious arguments on both sides in our view), but instead examine similar developments elsewhere in the world, namely in South Africa, India, China, and Brazil. With reference to recent enforcement activities in these countries (such as industry investigations, greater scrutiny of mergers and of individual firm conduct, and in some cases ex ante regulations targeted at specific categories of firms), we provide our views on the potential adverse consequences of seeking to replicate the European approach in instances where digital markets may be less mature. In particular, while it is generally understood that heavy-handed regulation can stifle innovation and chill competition, we argue that such risks are more acute in countries outside of Europe (and North America), which thus warrants more cautious regulation methods. This is especially the case where the policy objectives deviate from the traditional one of protecting competition rather than competitors, since such an approach runs the risk of promoting short term gains at the expense of long-term benefits, which may ultimately harm the very stakeholders that such regulation is designed to advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission enforces competition law in the areas of antitrust, merger control, and State aid. After providing a general presentation of the role of the Chief Competition Economist's team (CET), this article surveys some of the main developments at the Directorate General for Competition over 2022/2023. In particular, the article reviews the Commission antitrust investigation of Amazon marketplace and the Amazon "Buy Box", the expansion of manufacturing support with two recent frameworks for manufacturing aid, and the MOL/OMV merger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are well-documented episodes of prices remaining at supracompetitive levels even after a cartel was shut down by the competition authority. As long as market conditions remain reasonably stable, collusive prices may still be incentive compatible so the collusive equilibrium could continue after firms are no longer engaging in illicit communications. This situation poses a challenging dilemma: consumer harm persists because of past unlawful conduct but there is no apparent recourse. This paper offers a remedy in the form of coupons. As part of the penalty imposed by the competition authority, each cartel member is required to distribute coupons to its past purchasers. Contrary to their usual form, these coupons can only be used to buy from a firm's competitors. I show how this temporary intervention can help destabilize collusion and restore competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition policy has been at the core of the European integration project from its very inception. The United Kingdom (UK) played a truly pivotal role in the development of European Union (EU) competition policy with the policy long presenting one of the best illustrations of Europeanisation. The public vote for Brexit in 2016 pushed the reset button for the UK's engagement with the EU and saw successive UK governments all pursuing a de-Europeanisation trajectory as part of their objective of 'taking back control'. State aid emerged as a contentious issue during the Brexit negotiations. The UK government hailed its new Subsidy Control Act (2023) as a clear departure from the EU state aid regime, but is this a case of de-Europeanisation or partial de-Europeanisation? This article argues that the UK has still not entirely broken free from EU's state aid regime and finds itself in a state of orbiting Europeanisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teece asserts that competition policy is so outdated that it now significantly degrades the ability of Big Tech firms to bring socially beneficial innovations to market. He suggests that strategic management research is essential in the struggle to update such policies. We counter that none of these assertions are accurate, let alone backed by evidence. While the larger goal of improving laws and policies through scientific research is a worthy one, the specific focus on doing so to aid a set of powerful firms that have allegedly caused—directly or indirectly—great societal damage is quite unappealing. To balance his pro-Big Tech perspective, we provide logical and theory-based arguments and evidence that indicates Big Tech has often been bad for innovation and society while their regulation has been good, and that more oversight—specifically tailored to digital platforms—would be better. We then offer three alternative paths for us, as management scholars, to take that leverage our distinctive skills and that fulfill our ethical and professional mandates, in the pursuit of improving the strategic decisions and actions that policymakers and firms take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed Digital Markets Act has been under severe scrutiny in the past couple of years. While it received mostly positive feedback, there were numerous authors and scholars arguing that the new legislation does not provide anything useful or new. The common denominator of most of the analyses is that the Digital Markets Act is an ex-ante antitrust legislation and that the obligations tackle the (abusive) dominance of the gatekeepers to be designated. In this article, I try to deconstruct the requirements for determining whether an undertaking is a gatekeeper and to assess whether the proposal fits into a regulatory compliance type of legislation or ex-ante competition law. In addition to the analytical approach, I will take the example of the Intel and Microsoft cases and the intricacies that arose from them. I will further assess possible implications that the proposal might have for innovation and other aspects of the market.