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The designer's exercise consists of designing a rights structure that formalizes the idea of power distribution in society. A solution is implementable in largest consistent set by a rights structure if there exists a rights structure such that for each preference profile, the largest consistent set of the game played by agents coincides with the set of outcomes that the solution would select for it. In a setting with transfers, every Maskin monotonic solution is implementable. This finding implies that the class of implementable solutions in core equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.

This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of the productivities and the size of the coalition. We consider egalitarian societies in which coalitions split their surplus equally and individualistic societies in which the surplus of a coalition is split according to productivity. Preferences of coalition members depend on their material payoffs, but are also influenced by relative payoff concerns, which relate their material payoffs to the average material payoff in the coalition. Our analysis uses two stability notions, the Core and the Myopic Stable Set. The stable partitions in both egalitarian and individualistic societies are segregated, i.e., individuals with adjacent productivities form coalitions. If some individuals are not part of a productive coalition, then these are the least productive ones for egalitarian societies and the most productive ones for individualistic societies. If all individuals have different productivity levels and there are sufficient complementarities in production, egalitarian societies induce more efficiency than individualistic societies.

The political marketing exchange is triadic in structure, as promises given by political actors in the context of an election campaign can only be reciprocated if 1. the political actor is selected, 2. has influence over legislation negotiations, and 3. is in a position to deliver on these promises. In each of these three 'interaction marketplaces', political actors are indirectly influenced by stakeholders. These 'indirect stakeholders' are often public affairs practitioners engaged in lobbying activities in the political sphere. This paper integrates the triadic interaction model of political marketing exchange with the political marketing stakeholder concept and highlights how public affairs practitioners can target their efforts for maximum benefit. This aim is motivated by a need to increase our understanding of how political marketing theory can help political actors and their stakeholders to optimise the resources that are used on marketing activities across the electoral cycle.

Reciprocation and interchange of grooming and support may emerge as a consequence of the socio-spatial structure of the group through which individuals interact with certain partners more frequently than with others. This is shown in a computational model of grouping, fighting, and grooming, called Groofiworld. In this case, no specific mechanism of exchange is needed, such as described in calculated reciprocity or emotional bookkeeping. One of the drawbacks of this model, GroofiWorld, however, is that it lacks social bonding, a factor that may play an important role in real societies of primates. To investigate the effect of social bonding on exchange relations, in the present study, we add 'social bonding' to the model 'GrooFiWorld.' In the new model, called 'FriendsWorld,' social bonds or 'friends' are defined as the top 25 % grooming partners and individuals are given a tendency to follow their friends. Note that they do not intend to reciprocate or interchange social services with friends. Results show that this mechanism of 'follow-your-friends,' not only increases social interactions among top grooming partners, but also strengthens the patterns of reciprocation and interchange. Our findings suggest that, in real primates, reciprocation and interchange may emerge as a side-effect of the social-spatial structure of the group and subsequently be strengthened by social bonding as represented in FriendsWorld. We give predictions that distinguish between the mechanism of 'follow-your-friends' and emotional bookkeeping.

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of matchings such that there is no myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching in the set to another matching in the set (internal stability) and there is a myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching outside the set to some matching in the set (external stability). For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted. We present examples where this is the unique myopic-farsighted stable set as well as examples of myopic-farsighted stable sets consisting of a core element different from the woman-optimal matching or even of a non-core element.

Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970-2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

Three studies examined the hypothesis that shared cognition and group identification can be each other’s catalysts as well as driving forces behind multiparty negotiation outcomes that might not otherwise be realized. Experiment 1 demonstrates that clear links exist between communication, the development of shared cognition and group identification, and integrative outcomes. The subsequent experiments isolated the causal directions of these links. Experiment 2 showed that stronger group identification before interaction was associated with the development of shared cognition in a subsequent phase of negotiation, which then increased the attainment of integrative outcomes. Conversely, a direct manipulation of shared cognition in Experiment 3 resulted in stronger identification during negotiation, which then led to more integrative outcomes. Thus, we find support for the theoretical claim that group identification can be both the product of, and precursor to, the development of shared cognition, with communication functioning as the interface between the two.

Complex social behaviour of primates has usually been attributed to the operation of complex cognition. Recently, models have shown that constraints imposed by the socio-spatial structuring of individuals in a group may result in an unexpectedly high number of patterns of complex social behaviour, resembling the dominance styles of egalitarian and despotic species of macaques and the differences between them. This includes affiliative patterns, such as reciprocation of grooming, grooming up the hierarchy, and reconciliation. In the present study, we show that the distribution of support in fights, which is the social behaviour that is potentially most sophisticated in terms of cognitive processes, may emerge in the same way. The model represents the spatial grouping of individuals and their social behaviour, such as their avoidance of risks during attacks, the self-reinforcing effects of winning and losing their fights, their tendency to join in fights of others that are close by (social facilitation), their tendency to groom when they are anxious, the reduction of their anxiety by grooming, and the increase of anxiety when involved in aggression. Further, we represent the difference in intensity of aggression apparent in egalitarian and despotic macaques. The model reproduces many aspects of support in fights, such as its different types, namely, conservative, bridging and revolutionary, patterns of choice of coalition partners attributed to triadic awareness, those of reciprocation of support and 'spiteful acts' and of exchange between support and grooming. This work is important because it suggests that behaviour that seems to result from sophisticated cognition may be a side-effect of spatial structure and dominance interactions and it shows that partial correlations fail to completely omit these effects of spatial structure. Further, the model is falsifiable, since it results in many patterns that can easily be tested in real primates by means of existing data.

Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970-2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970-2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

In this article, we analyze the policy and office motivations of parties in coalition-formation processes at the German federal-state level. We utilize a model developed by Sened that considers both motivations simultaneously and introduces a method by which to estimate its key parameters using data of German state-level coalition-formations.

Arguably the most influential force in human history is the formation of social coalitions and alliances (i.e., long-lasting coalitions) and their impact on individual power. In most great ape species, coalitions occur at individual and group levels and among both kin and non-kin. Nonetheless, ape societies remain essentially hierarchical, and coalitions rarely weaken social inequality. In contrast, human hunter-gatherers show a remarkable tendency to egalitarianism, and human coalitions and alliances occur not only among individuals and groups, but also among groups of groups. Here, we develop a stochastic model describing the emergence of networks of allies resulting from within-group competition for status or mates between individuals utilizing dyadic information. The model shows that alliances often emerge in a phase transition-like fashion if the group size, awareness, aggressiveness, and persuasiveness of individuals are large and the decay rate of individual affinities is small. With cultural inheritance of social networks, a single leveling alliance including all group members can emerge in several generations. Our results suggest that a rapid transition from a hierarchical society of great apes to an egalitarian society of hunter-gatherers (often referred to as "egalitarian revolution") could indeed follow an increase in human cognitive abilities. The establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian alliances creates conditions promoting the origin of cultural norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals., Comment: 37 pages, 15 figures

We examine whether economic and military competence of political leaders affect their duration in office. We introduce leader heterogeneity in the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and derive the hypothesis that in the presence of a revolutionary threat, economic competence is negatively related to political survival, but that the effect is moderated by the size of the winning coalition. As military and economic competence are negatively correlated, the opposite holds for military competence. We present empirical estimates using proxies for military and economic competence in a parametric Weibull duration model that support our theoretical predictions.