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The article reports on efforts by the Chinese government to make its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) environmentally sustainable to counter criticisms that the initiative would cause environmental crisis. Topics covered include BRI's growing investment in renewable power, and a growing number of Chinese and Asian banks that are starting to consider green finance.

The article presents an analysis of the 2017 Chinese film "Wolf Warrior 2." Topics covered include the structural tension between China's extractive and militarized forms of investment and domination in Africa and its claims to anti-imperialist solidarity with Africans battling white supremacy and Northern imperialism. Also mentioned is the film's male-centrism and reliance on colonial tropes of race and gender subordination.

The article discusses artworks that engage with China's Belt and Road Initiative, a development strategy designed to create a China-centered global trading network. It features artists illustrating gendered histories of domestic labor and care work, and addressing China's relationship to the Global North and the Global South.

Great‐power competition has once again assumed primacy in the international arena. Facing a rising China and a resurgent Russia, the United States formally reoriented its National Security Strategy in 2017 to place more emphasis on the return of great‐power politics and global multipolarity. With the resumption of such competition, the Middle East has rightfully been noted as a regional theater where Russia and China have sought to exploit US policy blunders and retrenchment (real or perceived) to push for increased regional multipolarity. Although the Middle East has been recognized as a prime theater for great‐power competition, the approaches adopted by most existing studies are primarily one‐sided: they examine great‐power competition in the region from the outside, stressing how global powers are manipulating affairs in the Middle East in order to advance their own interests. Often missing from this conversation is how external engagement in the Middle East is being exploited and shaped by regional powers and endogenous developments. This study seeks to fill this gap by using the conceptual lens of omnialignment to examine how regional powers are manipulating the return of great‐power competition to advance their own strategic imperatives, both at home and abroad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been touted as the centrepiece of China's Belt and Road Initiative and the key to its strategic partnership with Pakistan. Notwithstanding claims about the CPEC's economic potential, however, Islamabad's economy continues to be dire. This article attempts to better understand the ramifications of Pakistan's economic viability and its consequences for China. It does so by examining China–Pakistan relations from the lens of Pakistan's civil–military relations, paying attention in particular to what the Pakistan Armed Forces (PMA)'s domestic dominance means for China's interests, including economic interests, in Pakistan. We suggest that PMA preponderance and its attendant influence on the country's economic performance bring another dimension to interpreting Sino-Pakistani relations. As Beijing's most trusted political partner in Pakistan, the PMA's local dominance has considerable benefits for China, particularly in the security and political aspects of its interests. However, this dominance also entails a number of complications for Chinese economic interests, a factor that has implications for the future of China's CPEC investments and their financial sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the effects of the 2008 New Zealand (NZ)–China free trade agreement (FTA) on exports from NZ to China, and real GDP per capita in NZ using the synthetic control method to estimate the counterfactuals. NZ exports to China were more than 200% higher in 2014 than what they would have had the FTA never been signed. NZ's food and live animals exports to China were more than 180% higher in 2014 than the counterfactual. Our counterfactuals indicate a small but negative effect of the FTA on NZ's real GDP per capita between 2009 and 2012. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building foreign policy theories with Chinese characteristics has long been an aspiration of Chinese scholars, but has not resulted in much globally recognized achievements to date. This review essay begins with an overview of the obstacles to reaching this goal: confusion over the concept of theory, over-emphasis on policy prescription, confusion between the subject and object of study, restrictions on access to research materials, and lack of methodological diversity. To overcome these obstacles, we argue Chinese scholars should bring Chinese foreign policy studies (CFPS) into the larger field of comparative foreign policy analysis (FPA), and take advantage of FPA's rich arsenal of methodological tools and theoretical lenses to conduct insightful and rigorous analysis and theory building. Such an effort will not only facilitate the construction of foreign policy theory with Chinese characteristics but also contribute Chinese wisdom to FPA theory building, making it a truly global field of study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise as a global power corresponded with a diminution of Taiwanese diplomacy, which has left Central America as the last region to host a continuous bloc of countries that recognize the ROC. In this article, we argue that China's success in gaining diplomatic recognition from Taiwan's former allies has largely resulted from China's economic policy, specifically its promises of large-scale infrastructure projects and the integration of Central American economies with Chinese markets. However, there are limits to how far China has advanced in gaining full recognition from the region. The competing political and economic interests of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the Central American countries themselves, continue to influence patterns of diplomatic switching. More specifically, we argue that the threat of punitive measures from the United States combined with a turn in Taiwanese diplomacy toward assistance efforts to combat Covid-19 may deter future switching in the short to medium-term. Our analysis offers case studies of four Central American countries (Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador and Nicaragua) to illustrate the multi-year processes by which China's economic strategy leads to diplomatic switching and examine the paths ahead for the remaining holdouts facing the prospect of economic and political penalties by the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to embrace and connect China with European Union (EU) Member countries; the latest in 2019 with Italy, a G-7 member, also joining. EU members participating in the BRI include Poland, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. While Germany and France lead the EU in trade and investment with China, political winds may be blowing. The EU has noticed that the seventeen Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) under the "17+1" format, a majority of which are EU members, are capturing greater amounts of Chinese trade under their BRI cooperation agreements; CEEC trade reportedly totaling over $82 billion in 2018. EU officials are increasingly critical of the 17+1 and wary that the mechanism could further undermine and divide EU unity on policies toward China. In 2016, the European Commission Joint Communication on Elements for a New EU Strategy on China insisted that any bilateral relations with China--including in-group settings such as the 17+1 format--should be coordinated with the EU to ensure that relevant aspects are "in line with EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole." Current EU policies and regulations require that process. Poland is one of the largest countries in this group and has important ports along one of China's strategic BRI corridors. Chinese investments in Poland were estimated between 130 million and one billion Euros from 2016 to 2017. Poland offers China several assets--proximity to key partners in Western Europe, access to the sea or convenient road and rail connections, and access to a qualified workforce. Labor issues are also a factor in Chinese investment in Poland and the CEEC. Chinese investors, particularly the large SOEs, frequently bring much of their own workforce with them. Poland and other CEEC with low wage levels have been experiencing a labor exodus of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) workers and an introduction of many foreign workers. With the wage levels in China and Poland not so disparate, both factors could allow a positive fit under BRI. Attention is given to the relevancy and implications, including legal limitations on foreign trade agreements (FTA) for EU members in the CEEC, relevant EU Directives, and international treaties influencing a future EU-China FTA. Discussion includes whether Poland and the CEEC/17+1's developing BRI relationship with China might divide the EU or facilitate a pathway to an eventual EU-China FTA which places trade and investment under the EU. This could diminish the competitive labor advantages of Poland and the CEEC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose of the study: The article analyzes the long-term history of diplomatic relations between Russia and China. Characterized by common goals and prospects, this collaboration between the neighboring giants began many decades ago. The historical perspectives outlined in the previous decades are still relevant in the 21st century. Methodology: The authors of the article dwell on economic achievements of China. Main Findings: Nowadays, the People's Republic of China is among industrial leaders with the fastest-growing economic indicators if compared to other countries. It is especially important and revealing that eastern countries pay more attention to the development of "soft power", i.e. their intellectual resources, whose key aspect is the introduction and support of multilevel education by the state. Therefore, one of the priority tasks of China's development has been a gradual increase in budgetary investments for the needs of education and training. All this serves as a guarantee of the further growth and effective development of Chinese society. The authors note that this experience would be extremely useful for Russia. The article is also concerned with the migration interaction between these countries. The authors characterize the general and labor migration between Russia and China, including historical aspects of this process. As a result, they have determined two trends in migration: economic motives and tourism. The article aims at analyzing the Russian-Chinese relations and prospects for further cooperation. Novelty/Originality of this study: In conclusion, the authors identify strategic areas of cooperation and prospects of the future co-development: from finding common points of interaction within the framework of international security in order to prevent a terrorist threat to intensifying interaction between two states under the auspices of APEC. The modern challenges clearly indicate that the potential of both countries in many areas, especially the economy, is quite large and should be realized with maximum efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has made a concerted effort for over a decade to conclude extradition treaties with developed countries that are popular "safe havens" for its fugitive officials and economic criminals. Chinese President Xi Jinping has placed these efforts at the forefront of Chinese foreign policy in recent years as part of his anticorruption campaign, invariably pressing the issue of extradition with these trade partners and their (largely) liberal democratic leaders. Nonetheless, China's extradition drive has attained mixed results. A number of developed civil law states have concluded treaties with China while their common law counterparts almost universally refuse to follow suit. This Article analyzes this pattern of divergent behavior and is the first to offer a legal explanation for it. It argues that the nature of executive authority to extradite and other branches' checks on that authority differ significantly in common and civil law systems. Differing policies regarding the extradition of nationals and evidentiary standards for extradition requests exacerbate these structural differences. These factors calibrate a state's threshold to enter into an extradition treaty, particularly with a controversial state like China. The geopolitically significant backdrop of China's extradition drive teases out the differences between common and civil law systems, broadly shedding light on the collective impact of these legal dissimilarities on state extradition practice at a time when many states are in the process of streamlining their extradition schemes to boost international law enforcement cooperation. Independent of its novel arguments, this Article also comprehensively catalogues and elaborates on factors (legal and non-legal) relevant to any state's decision to enter into an extradition treaty. This article will be of interest to scholars, governments, and others interested in how divergent extradition schemes influence state practice and, by extension, impact the efficacy of international extradition law, international legal cooperation, and individual rights protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building upon the conceptual work of Krahmann and Habermas, this study explains how political power and market forces in China combined to create an enormous domestic market for overseas security services and, at the same time, undermined the full development of domestic private security companies (PSCs). The growing responsiveness of the state to the request for protection of Chinese citizens and assets abroad made room for the initial development of Chinese PSCs' overseas operations. However, the policy makers' focus on political loyalty has inhibited the full-fledged maturation of China's private security industry. So far, large foreign PSCs have been the main beneficiaries of this situation. The future development of Chinese PSCs remains possible in a gradual and pragmatic way, but Chinese policy makers will have to deal with important diplomatic and political questions before the development of any "Chinese Blackwater" will be imaginable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's new Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is commanding attention, in this moment of international disorder, as a global strategy reflecting its growing political-economic power. This essay offers a 'food regime' lens on these developments. There are two, related, dimensions: the first concerns how China is addressing future food security requirements, via domestic and international food provisioning; and the second situates China's recent 'going out' policy with respect to global food regime transitioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges dominant understandings of 'rising powers' by developing a decentred, relational account of Russia and China in Central Asia. We ask whether Moscow and Beijing's regional integrative strategies do not guide, but rather are led by, everyday interactions among Russian and Chinese actors, and local actors in Central Asia. Rising powers, as a derivative of 'Great Powers', are frequently portrayed as structurally comparable units that concentrate power in their executives, fetishise territorial sovereignty, recruit client states, contest regional hegemony and explicitly oppose the post-1945 international order. In contrast, we demonstrate that the centred discourse of Eurasian integration promoted by Russian and Chinese leaders is decentred by networks of business and political elites, especially with regard to capital accumulation. Adopting Homi K. Bhabha's notion of mimicry (subversion, hybridity) and J. C. Scott's conception of mētis (local knowledge, agency), and using examples of Russian and Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in Central Asia, we argue that in order to understand centring discourse we must look to decentring practices at the periphery; that is, rising power is produced through ongoing interactions between actors at the margins of the state's hegemonic reach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents the views of the authors on the crisis triggered by China's plan to ban imports of used goods and materials in the governance of global waste flows. It explores policy developments that are overturning global resource recovery, along with their ramifications within China. The implication of China's ban for states accustomed to having the country absorb their post-consumer discards is discussed.

This article investigates youth perceptions of China's rise in seven Asian societies. Unlike previous studies' findings that most Asians hold positive views of China's influence, this study finds that Asian youth view a rising China more coolly than does the general public. Even though they acknowledge that China's rise offers increased opportunities, Asian youth tend to strongly distrust and worry about the negative influence of China. The results show that most youth in Asian countries surveyed believe China's rise will challenge global order and that China will not maintain peaceful relations with other Asian countries. Multilevel analyses show that both microlevel personal traits and macrolevel structural factors can account for how Asian youth view China's rise. The results indicate that China has not successfully convinced young Asian citizens of its determination to rise peacefully. China's foreign policymaking should take greater consideration of Asian public opinion rather than be dominated by wishful thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the changing basis of relationship between New Zealand and China. The author explores his experience of studying Chinese language in Hong Kong, working in the New Zealand embassy in Beijing, and being a New Zealand ambassador to China. He relates how the relationship of two countries started. He also calls on the New Zealand government to be transparent and consistent in dealings with China.

This article assesses China-Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the period 2014-2018 and asks whether China has exercised distinct pressure on Pakistan to be a more constructive partner for Afghanistan. A central argument is that even as China has failed to alter Pakistan's policies significantly in the short term it is still continuing to successfully build power and trust in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as with their neighbours to the north and west. This bodes well for China's exercise of regional leadership in a long-term perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the challenges and risks that are associated with efforts to engage with China and the U.S. on public administration, and it mentions China's foreign relations with other countries, as well as the efforts of public administration practitioners and scholars. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the impact of Chinese manufacturing competitiveness on jobs in America are examined, along with Australian-Chinese relations, China's economic power, and U.S. President Donald Trump.

The article examines China's diplomacy since the reform and opening-up from the perspective of international positioning. It mentions that China's international positioning mainly reflects the fundamental perception and evaluation made by the Chinese government. It states that Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China's reform and opening-up, believed that China's most important national interests during 1978-1989 were economic development and socialist modernization.

The article looks at China's foreign policy in 2018. It mentions that China's diplomatic work, under the formidable guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy defended the country's national sovereignty, security and development interests with strategic vision and composure. Also discusses is the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that overcome difficulties and forge ahead in the great endeavor of socialism.

The article looks at China's foreign policy in 2018. It informs that China has remained a staunch supporter for globalization, multilateralism, and free trade system despite facing headwinds of protectionism, unilateralism and acts of bullyism. It mentions that the country's policy focuses on openness, cooperation and steady progress.

The article analyzes the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue's (Quad) latest progress, future cooperation priorities and development trends, and discuss the trajectory and characteristics of the reconstruction of Asia-Pacific regional order. It also evaluate Quad's impact on China's external environment and the nation's rise. Also discussed is the Belt and Road Initiative and establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Against the background of intensified US government pushback against Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military practices seen as adverse to US interests, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang during visits to annual leadership meetings in the region conveyed confidence that Beijing's economic prominence, diplomatic resolve, and military power would continue to advance Chinese influence. Xi's November visits to the Philippines, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea (PNG), including the annual APEC Leaders' Meeting in Port Moresby, and Li's November visit to Singapore and participation in the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus Three, and China-ASEAN meetings there showed significant gains. Notably, ASEAN was pliant to Chinese preferences on South China Sea disputes and Beijing showed prominence as a rising power among the Pacific Island nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the modest civilian nuclear power program of China with reference to the U.S.-China relations. The U.S. support to China by assuring continued input of nuclear technology would enhance friendly relations between the two countries. But such policies should meet certain prerequisites. China should prove that it has attained maturity to conduct nuclear tests by agreeing the conditions of Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate bilateral agreements for peaceful nuclear energy cooperation with the U.S.

The slow moving conflict in the South China Sea has been characterized by some as “not worth the candle.” China claims the entirety of the South China Sea pursuant to a nine-dash line, the legal impact of which has been limited by international courts. At the same time, China has changed the reality of control over the South China Sea by building a number of fortified islands in the Spratly Islands and elsewhere. The US has either refused to stand up to China's behavior (Obama) or responded unevenly (Trump). This paper examines the impact of China's behaviour on local parties, US interests, and the liberal international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]