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This essay traces the structural sources of Malaysia's South China Sea policy. It argues that Malaysia's 'light-hedging' approach is primarily a smaller-state's response to growing systemic pressure arising from power asymmetry, rivalry, and uncertainties. The features of this approach are: an insistence on not taking sides, concurrent adoption of open deference and indirect defiance, and an active effort to cultivate a fallback position, all aimed at reducing multiple risks associated with the uncertainties of US commitment , China's long-term intentions, and their future relations. We have arrived at three main findings. First, structural impact matters: as geopolitical uncertainty increases, weaker states hedge more deeply. Second, smaller states do have agency, even if only in a low-profile manner. Because smaller states have been disadvantaged under an asymmetric power structure, they often use a combination of diplomatic, legal, developmental, and defence means to shape favourable external conditions. Third, while hedging is chiefly a result of structural factors, the forms and degree of a state's hedging activism are necessarily a function of its threat perceptions, elite interests and other unit-level variables. These factors explain Malaysia's light form of hedging: quiet action and limited defiance alongside open accommodation in managing the South China Sea disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Viewed through the standard prisms of international politics, escalation of security tensions is the definitive feature in the evolution of relations between China and Southeast Asia over the last decade. Disagreements over territorial ownership of and rights to the South China Sea sharpened and arguably became the defining feature of regional geopolitics. Yet, China and Southeast Asia have also managed to prove predictions of fateful conflict to be premature. In this article, we study Chinese and Southeast Asian strands of security discourse, which provide political and diplomatic cover for cooperative interaction in parallel with little or no compromise on security principles. Then we select interactions between China and the Philippines and China and Vietnam as cases to illustrate our observations. We conclude by postulating that, at least in the maritime space, tension management rather than conflict resolution is more likely to be the continuing feature into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While contemporary scholarly literatures on South China Sea conflicts have been dominated by hard power calculations, some other aspects remain under-researched. Rather underplayed in the existing literature is the question on the political implication of the conflicts on China’s soft power in the region. In responding to this issue, this article tries to carefully investigate the nature of the China’s soft power and the linkage between the increasing Chinese assertive measures in the South China Sea and the foundation of China’s soft power in the region. Through some cases of China’s skirmishes with Southeast Asian countries on the South China Sea between 2009 and 2012, this article argues that Beijing’s increasing hard power measures have induced growing threat perceptions in the region. This very context not only signals a distinct dissonance of Beijing’s image in Southeast Asia but also creates surging discontents and rejections to China’s role and political position in the region. Ultimately, China’s perceived inappropriate hard power measures affect its soft power, particularly in eroding the reputation of being a benign political entity as its source of soft power in Southeast Asia.

By examining the activities of Zheng He and members of his expeditions at the Malabar Coast, Sri Lanka, and Bengal, this article argues that the Yongle emperor wanted to exert military power in South Asia in order to legitimize his usurpation at the Ming court. The essay analyzes Zheng He's intervention in the dispute between Calicut and Cochin, the armed conflict in Sri Lanka in 1410-11, and the expedition's involvement in a dispute between Bengal and its neighboring polity, Jaunpur. These episodes in South Asia make it difficult to accept the modern representations of the Zheng He expeditions as diplomatic missions intended to promote peace and harmony. Rather, they were, as the essay contends, part of the Yongle emperor's aim to establish hegemony over "all the known world under the Heaven" or the tianxia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the literature on state transformation focuses on China's relations with African, Asian and Latin American countries and the National Oil Companies' overseas expansion to show that China has become fragmented, decentralised and internationalised. This article contributes novel findings by focusing on China's relations with Europe and the actions of China's National Nuclear Companies (NNCs). It shows that NNCs, which have become relatively autonomous actors, often pursue their agendas of expansion into Europe without much coordination with, or even in contradiction to, other ministries' agendas and interests, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead of being orchestrated by the central government, their expansion reflects considerable disorganisation and sometimes undermines China's official strategy. The article demonstrates this through case studies of NNCs' involvement in the UK and Romania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vying for high-speed railway projects overseas has become a prominent feature of China's diplomacy in recent years, including in Southeast Asia. These efforts have been widely depicted within the premises of the China Threat narrative – as a part of Beijing's agenda to alter the power balance in Southeast Asia at the expense of the economic, political, and security well-being of countries in the region. This paper challenges such interpretations and concludes that these projects do not have either the intention or capacity to facilitate such a hostile and far-reaching agenda toward the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BRI, when compared with any other connectivity project in the 21st century, can indisputably be regarded as the greatest project considering its size and diversity. Yet, the real significance of this project isn't linked to its size; it is the paradigm and the spirit behind it. Cooperation, inclusiveness and win-win approach, being the main elements of this development model, makes it a completely distinct paradigm, from what has been in practice since last over 200 years in the world, under the Colonial Culture of Domination, to benefit from the opportunities offered by the over powering trend of globalization. Although China now enjoys a greater global influence, many of the other powerful international and regional players, while may like to benefit from the project, might not reconcile with the approach that has laid the foundation of BRI. Thus, while the physical and functional aspects of the BRI would naturally attract the maximum attention, an aggressive communication strategy advancing the spirit of BRI is a prerequisite to make the project a real success. While this is important for each and every region (and country) involved in BRI, the regions and countries sharing borders with China naturally occupy special significance; since the physical connectivity cannot be achieved without taking them on board. This paper, after elaborating the above perspective discusses in the final part CPEC experience as an example in the overall context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews China's diplomacy toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN chronologically from the 1990s to 2015, focusing on the changes that occurred during the second half of the Hu Jintao Administration and the further policy adjustments made during the first Xi Jinping Administration. While there are still many uncertainties regarding the policies, and many aspects are still in progress, this study provides an outline of the current period of change in China's relations with Southeast Asia and China's more active engagement in relations with ASEAN from the late 1990s through the early 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the concept of space and time dimension in formulation of maritime defense strategy, in the wake of China's provocative strategies on South and East China Sea. It presents example of Vietnam war to discuss Russia and China's ripening-time strategy. It discusses strategy of revisionist powers of expanding military forces and influencing other nations to respond to security environment. It also discusses NATO's effective reaction to Russian aggression during the Cold War.

The most challenging task in creating peace in the South China Sea is how to deal with Chinese assertive behavior. This is important since many proposals of the regional security architecture have failed to engage China in order to establish a long-lasting peace in the region. This paper seeks to explain the failure of security management in the South China Sea. Using the concept of strategic culture deriving from constructivism in International Relations, this paper argues that China's strategic culture is the main factor behind the aggressive behavior in the South China Sea. This culture is rooted from the pre-modern China's history that has distinct perspective from the Westphalian international law with regard to territorial disputes. This cultural dimension, not the material one, is the key to rethinking security management in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese officials showed confidence and satisfaction that the cooling tensions in the South China Sea demonstrated increasing regional deference to Beijing's interests while China's economic importance to Southeast Asia loomed larger in a period of anticipated international retrenchment. They remained alert to possible actions by the United States, Japan, Australia and South China Sea claimant states that might upset the recent positive trajectory, but generally saw those states preoccupied or otherwise unwilling to push back strongly against Chinese ambitions. The way seemed open for steady consolidation and control of holdings and claimed rights along with a Chinese supported code of conduct on maritime activity in the South China Sea, diplomatic initiatives to promote closer ties and reduce regional suspicion of Chinese intentions, and an array of economic blandishments in line with Beijing's ambitious Silk Road programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IS AN AREA WHERE ASEAN (SPECIFIC INSTITUTION SOUTHEAST ASIA) MAY CONTRIBUTE BUT DON'T GET INVOLVED (NORTH KOREA, CHINA-TAIWAN, SITUATED IN NORTH-EAST ASIA), BUT NOT IN THE CASE OF MILITARY INCIDENTS (THE CLASH BETWEEN CHINA'S PATROL VESSELS AND PHILIPPINE, VIETNAMESE EXPLORATION VESSEL BLOCKAGE BY CHINA, BORDER CLASHES BETWEEN THAILAND AND CAMBODIA) LEAVING THEM IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY. TAIWAN, A TRIANGLE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS OVERLAPS ON A DIPLOMATIC FUND WHICH PREVENTED THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT BROKE OUT OPENLY, MUCH MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN ANY REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FORMAT. IN EAST ASIA, OUTBREAKS OF CRISIS THAT CAN ESCALATE INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT - THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT TO WHICH IT ADDS THE DISPUTES RELATED TO ARCHIPELAGOS FROM THE EAST CHINA SEA SOME UNDER THE CONTROL OF CHINA. THE MIMETIC ADOPTION OF THE OSCE MODEL IN SEARCH OF THE LEGITIMACY FOR THE REGION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, NAMELY THE ASEAN AS A SECURITY INSTITUTION WITH AN AGENDA OF ITS OWN IS THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR LONG TIME. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Indonesia's foreign policy strategy under the administration of President Joko Widodo, who has been distancing himself in shaping the country's foreign relations after former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono positioned the country as a rising middle power. Topics discussed include the lack of a leader in addressing foreign policy issues, and Indonesia's growing dependence on China.

Chinese leaders steered relations in Southeast Asia to their advantage after successfully countering the adverse ruling of the arbitral tribunal in The Hague against China's controversial claims in the South China Sea. The remarkable turnabout in the Philippines, from primary claimant to pliant partner, and notable restraint on the South China Sea disputes by other claimants and concerned powers allowed Beijing to seek greater regional influence. In the closing months of 2016, Beijing made major advances with visits by the Philippine president and Malaysian prime minister, Premier Li Keqiang's participation at ASEAN and East Asia Summit meetings in September, and President Xi Jinping's participation at the APEC Leaders Meeting in November. China adopted a stronger regional leadership role as the US failed to implement important initiatives, notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The main uncertainty in China's positive outlook was President-elect Donald Trump who repeatedly criticized China, foreshadowing a less predictable and less reticent US approach to differences with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of China and India has profoundly influenced the policies of Southeast Asian countries. For a small country like Singapore, with a uniquely majority ethnic Chinese population in Southeast Asia, the process of engagement with China and India is historically entrenched and multifaceted. Historically, China and India constitute two major immigration streams into Singapore. Since the 1990s, with low total fertility rates, Singapore has viewed both China and India as sources for not only increasing its overall population to maintain its ethnic demographic profile, but also towards sustaining its economic growth. This article will examine the impact of large foreign manpower and migrant inflows from China and India into Singapore. It will argue that while the prevailing population shrinkage and manpower shortages in Singapore have been eased with migrants from China and India, at the same time they have created new socio-political fissures in Singapore’s increasingly diverse population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governments of China and Malaysia have deployed their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to channel investments between both countries. This is to increase private investment flows into the mainland, while in Malaysia it serves an urgent need to draw foreign and domestic investments. These state-led investments have resulted in joint ventures that have included private enterprises owned by Chinese entrepreneurs, an attempt to continue to encourage private investment in business ventures. This article provides insights into three issues. First, it deals with the question of why investments through business networks by Southeast Asian Chinese enterprises in China have not led to the emergence of this community as a global economic force. The second issue deals with the question of whether these state-led infrastructure projects, now comprising SOEs and privately owned Chinese enterprises, will inspire the latter to increase their investments in each of these countries. The third issue involves a review of the theory of transnationalism, in order to determine its applicability in explaining cross-border investment patterns involving Chinese-owned enterprises from Southeast Asia [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing literature on foreign policy formulation suggests that individual leaders in small and politically unstable states exert a disproportionate impact on foreign policy-making. Some analysts further contend that personalized foreign policy decision-making is more likely to suffer from discontinuities. This article, however, argues that the foreign policies of small and politically unstable states exhibit considerable variation in terms of constancy. It does so by offering a comparative study of the foreign policies of the Philippines and Thailand towards China. It demonstrates that the Philippines' policy towards China underwent significant changes in the last few years of the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and that bilateral relations deteriorated rapidly after Benigno Aquino III came to power in 2010. In contrast, Thailand has maintained a cordial relationship with China despite domestic political turmoil since 2006. This article suggests that neither the shift in the distribution of capabilities nor the presence or absence of territorial disputes sufficiently explains this variation. It argues that the personalization of foreign policy and economic dependence are two important factors that determine constancy and change in the foreign policies of small states towards major powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Malaysia and China upgraded their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013 and signed a Joint Communique in 2014. Although the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership includes a pledge to strengthen cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, so far, however, Sino-Malaysian defence ties have advanced only incrementally. This article focuses on the development of defence relations between the two countries from 1991 until the first half of 2015. It examines several areas of defence diplomacy, including visits by senior officials, the exchange of military students, arms sales, defence and security consultations and combined military exercises. It concludes that although Malaysia-China defence ties have not developed as quickly as other aspects of the bilateral relationship, this does not mean that the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership lacks depth, or that Kuala Lumpur fundamentally distrusts Beijing because of recent developments in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing tension between China and a number of countries in Southeast Asia over the contested waters of the South China Sea has become one of the biggest potential flashpoints in the region-thus, a good indicator to use in testing the "China threat." Concurrently, America's handling of this "Asian problem" is becoming a litmus test for the future status of US primacy as the nation faces crucial opportunities to prove its hegemonic resilience as well as its military and diplomatic skills to protect its allies and friends while navigating through its rivalry with a rising China. This research analyzes the changes and continuities in China's policy toward territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the prospect for peaceful conflict resolution, and the greater security implications of this issue for Sino-US relations and the future of American supremacy in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a report on the China-Southeast Asia relations focusing on China's economic initiatives despite its disputes with other Southeast Asia countries for the territories in South China Sea. Topics include an assessment on China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its Silk Road Fund, an analysis of the implications and motives surrounding the relationship between Southeast Asia and China, and China's border issues with Burma.

The article discusses relations between China and Southeast Asia in the last four months of 2014. Topics discusses include Chinese policy toward Southeast Asia benefiting from statesmanship of Chinese President Xi Jinping and leaders at multilateral meetings and visits to Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific, participation in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and proposed 21st Century Maritime Silk Road through Southeast Asia and Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).

Using the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines as a case study, in this article I examine two approaches to addressing territorial disputes-power politics and liberalismlegalism. China, a major power, uses realpolitik to press its expansive claim in the South China Sea. The Philippines, a small power, adopts the liberal-legal approach that seeks to balance against China. During the standoff, China drove the Philippines out of the shoal, though stopping short of an armed clash, and effected a de lacto occupation of the contested area. As a countermeasure, the Philippines filed a statement of claim with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The confrontation was a test of Thucydides's age-old aphorism that "the strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what they have to accept." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International arbitration, as a neutral, flexible, efficient and binding legal means of dispute resolution, has been effective in settling maritime delimitation disputes, especially in recent years since the UNCLOS came into force. There are a number of reasons (i.e. advantages) for its increased popularity. Reasonable expectations thus arise as to its applicability onto similar maritime delimitation disputes of the East Asian countries whose diplomatic efforts have mostly failed to address these matters. This article examines this practical issue primarily from the legal perspective by reviewing relevant international rules including the UNCLOS provisions on compulsory dispute resolution and cases such as the ongoing Philippines-China arbitration over the South China Sea. Observations are also made from the political and cultural perspectives as well. It concludes that, though multiple dispute settlement means are still encouraged, international arbitration could be an important alternative for East Asian countries seeking a peaceful solution to their maritime delimitation disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the foreign collaboration of the Association of South East Asian Nations with China in the aspect of national security and its possible implications to the peace and stability in the region.

The article reviews China-Southeast Asia relations for the first four months of 2014, as it indicates that China's efforts to advance territorial control in the South China Sea met stiff U.S.-led opposition. Topics discussed include China's South China Sea advance receiving strong opposition from the U.S., Japan, the Philippines and Australia. Also mentioned are China's responses to the rising criticisms, as well as a chronology of China-Southeast Asia relations from January 2014 to April 2014.

The article examines U.S. foreign relations with Southeast Asia. An increase in U.S. involvement in the region under the administration of President Barack Obama is considered. A contradiction in U.S. policy is said to exist between insistence by the administration that its desire for stability and freedom of the seas in Southeast Asia is not intended as containment of China and China's aggressive maritime boundary claims in the South China Sea.

One of the most interesting phenomena in contemporary international relations is the growing role of local government entities in forging and intensifying cross-border interactions in the social, economic and cultural arenas. Lamentably, this aspect of international relations, which I conceptualize as local liberalism, has not received sufficient scholarly attention. This paper attempts to fill in the gap by describing and analyzing how local liberalism has played a role in China's relations with Southeast Asia. The paper argues that local governments in Yunnan and Guangxi have played an important and positive role in cementing the relations between China and Southeast Asia. The paper suggests that debunking the China ‘black box’ to examine the different units in China, including the sub-national governments, may provide more useful insights for our understanding of China–Southeast Asian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article provides an overview of events related to international relations in the Southeast Asia region for the year 2013, focusing on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under the chairmanship turn of Brunei. It discusses diplomatic activities related to competing territorial claims between China and Southeast Asian countries over the South China Sea. Other topics include U.S. and Russian relations with ASEAN and international economic competition.

The article provides an overview of foreign relations developments in the Southeast Asia region during the year 2013, focusing on the policies of the major powers China, Japan, India, and the U.S. toward the region. Topics include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the impact of rising tension between Japan and China, and economic relations. A sidebar on military relations between Japan and Philippines is included.

The article looks at developments related to politics, security, and international relations in the Southeast Asia region during 2013, looking at individual countries including Thailand and Malaysia as well as at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It discusses tensions between China and countries in the region including Philippines over territorial claims in the South China Sea, noting the engagement of outside powers including Japan and the U.S.

The article provides an overview of political, economic, and foreign-relations developments in the Southeast Asia region during the year 2013. It discusses the political turmoil in Thailand, the Cambodian election, and ongoing political reform in Myanmar, or Burma. Other topics include insurgencies in Philippines and Thailand, the involvement of major powers including the U.S. and China in the region, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The article discusses China-Southeast Asia relations particularly on the South China Sea dispute. Included in the discussion are an explanation on the shift in the foreign policy of China in which countries that accept Chinese claims are promised win-win situations, negligible code of conduct in the South China Sea, and U.S. and Japanese support for the Philippines. A chronology of China-Southeast Asia relations for the months of May to August 2013 is presented.

The author describes the state of China-Southeast Asia relations in 2013. He believes that tensions in Chinese relations with Southeast Asian countries by dispute over territorial claims in the South China Sea posed less serious challenges to China compared to the international crisis in Korea and the Sino-Japanese confrontation over disputed East China Sea islands. He reports that China has shown determination to defend and advance its South China Sea claims and uphold China's sovereignty.

The history of the conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea, focussing particularly on the recent disputes between China and Vietnam/the Philippines. The author describes how external actors, principally the US, but also India and Japan, have been drawn in as a counterweight to China. He then goes on to assess the possible impact of this political dispute on the essentially economic relationship between China and ASEAN. His conclusion is that the economic relationship is likely to prove enduring. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines China's foreign relations with the U.S. and Southeast Asia. Increased involvement by the U.S. in Southeast Asia is examined as a source of tension between the U.S and China due to China's territorial claims in the South China Sea opposed by Southeast Asian countries, That conflict is contrasted with increased and cordial foreign economic relations between China and Southeast Asia.

The article considers the international organization Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2012. The failure of the organization to reach agreement on issues including its members' foreign relations with China and human rights is examined. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) regional free trade agreements between ASEAN and countries including China, Australia and India is examined.

This article analyses China's hydro-politics along the Mekong River. It seeks to explain why China's unilateral dam-building projects on the upper reaches of the river have not been met with sustained criticism on the part of the downstream riparian countries, for which upstream dams are likely to have severe negative consequences. It is held that China has embarked on a strategy of implicit and broadly conceived actor-reversed issue linkage as a means to nip any loud disapproval of its dams in the bud. By downplaying its dam-building projects and instead promoting common development goals with the Mekong riparian countries through highly increased political and economic engagement, Beijing has successfully defused any potential counter-measures against its dams, at least for the time being. The sustainability of this strategy and its transferability to others of China's trans-boundary rivers must be questioned. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses conflict in the South China Sea and its Islands, focusing on a lack of resolution of disputes over sovereignty and control involving China and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The author highlights international, regional, and bilateral strategies for resolving conflict in the South China Sea, including discussions of a lack of involvement by the United Nations (U.N.), Track-2 (nongovernmental) diplomacy efforts, and foreign relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. It is suggested that balancing strategies involving outside countries such as the U.S. may preserve the status quo in the South China Sea region.

The article discusses conflicts over issues of sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS), focusing on the involvement of the U.S. in the region in the 21st century. The author notes that countries such as the U.S., Japan, and India have interests in the SCS and highlights both diplomatic approaches to conflict and the building of military strength in order to address conflicts through force. The SCS is highlighted as a potential threat to maritime security, and multilateral efforts to address the issue by ASEAN are noted. Other topics include China's involvement in the region; a Code of Conduct on SCS disputes; and the 45th annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) on July 9, 2012.

An introduction is presented in which the author discusses the complexities of foreign relations between China and other southeast Asian countries as of August 2012.

Despite China’s claims of a foreign policy of ‘peaceful rise’/‘peaceful development’ and of seeking a ‘harmonious world’, and despite its economic openness and active participation in economic multilateralism, China’s neighbours continue to be concerned about the overall direction and intent of Beijing’s security policies. These concerns are particularly heightened by China’s rapid military modernization of the past couple of decades. The announcement in 2010 that China considered its territorial claims in the South China Sea a ‘core interest’, can be seen as a setback to its regional diplomacy, so diligently crafted over the years and drove its Southeast Asian neighbours to seek closer engagement with the US. This article argues that the contradictions evident in China’s neighbourhood foreign policy reflect its continuing search for a model of international relations that can balance its domestic interests such as the need for political stability, including regime stability, on the one hand and its external ambitions for a decisive role in regional affairs, on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers information on the relations between China and other Southeast Asian countries. The authors talk about China's closer ties with Cambodia compared to other Southeast Asian nations citing China's support of Cambodia's economic development and Cambodia's mediation between China and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The article discusses the diplomatic trips by Chinese President Hu Jintao to countries like Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The article explores Beijing, China's regional security diplomacy towards Southeast Asia, with a focus on its use of regional multilateralism in its diplomatic policies. The author discusses China's policy orientation and its shift in perception of its multilateral security arrangements, as well as the factors affecting the country's socialization. China's participation in the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Regional Forum) is examined by the author as specific evidence of its multilateral diplomacy.